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LAWLESSNESS, SACERDOTALISM,
AND
RITUALISM

DISCUSSED IN
SIX LETTERS

ADDRESSED, BY HIS PERMISSION, TO
THE RIGHT HON. LORD SELBORNE,

BY,
MALCOLM MACCOLL, M.A.

SECOND EDITION.



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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THIS work has now been for two months before the public, and has been extensively reviewed in the interval ; but no serious attempt has been made to shake any of its main arguments or to impeach its accuracy in its statement of facts. There has been no occasion therefore to make any alteration in the second edition which is now issued. If, indeed, my other engagements had permitted me to rewrite parts of the book, I believe I could have materially strengthened my argument against the Purchas Judgment. As it is, I can do no more than notice briefly in this Preface a few points which seem to invite further elucidation.

Now, first of all, let us remember the broad facts of the case. On the accession of Queen Elizabeth the vast majority of the parish priests throughout England submitted to the new *régime* and retained their cures. "Of the nine thousand benefices then named in England," says Echard,* "fourteen Bishops, six Abbots, twelve Deans, twelve Arch-

* Hist. of Engl. vol. i. bk. iii. p. 330.

deacons, fifteen Heads of Colleges, fifty Prebendaries, and eighty Rectors, was the whole number of those that were deprived." That is to say, all the parish priests in England, with the exception of about one hundred, kept possession of their parishes. This is a remarkable and significant fact on the one side. On the other is the well-known anxiety of the Queen to make as few changes as possible either in the substance or the exterior garb of religion. She was anxious to restore the Prayer Book of 1549 in its integrity. Overruled on that point, she took care that the ephemeral Book of 1552 should not be sanctioned without important changes. Among these changes was the restoration of the Eucharistic Vestments, which the Book of 1552 had explicitly forbidden. The Rubric of 1552 prescribed as follows :—

“ And here is to be noted that the Minister at the time of the Communion, and at all other times in his Ministration, shall use neither alb, vestment, nor cope ; but being Archbishop or Bishop, he shall have and wear a rochet ; and being a priest, or deacon, he shall have and wear a surplice only.”

For this was substituted, in 1559, the following Rubric :—

“ And here is to be noted that the Minister at the time of the Communion, and at all other times in his ministration, shall use such ornaments in the Church as were in use by authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward the

Sixth, according to the Act of Parliament set in the beginning of this book."

It is admitted on all hands that the Prayer Book of 1559 restored the vestments prescribed by the Book of 1549. But an attempt has been made, in the Purchas Judgment and elsewhere, to neutralise the force of this admission by laying stress on an expression in the 13th* Clause of the Act of Uniformity which accompanied the Prayer Book of 1559. The clause runs as follows :—

"Provided always, and be it enacted, that such ornaments of the Church and of the ministers thereof shall be retained and be in use, as was in this Church of England by the authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth, until other order shall be therein taken by authority of the Queen's Majesty, with the advice of Her Commissioners appointed and authorized under the Great Seal of England for causes Ecclesiastical, or of the Metropolitan of this Realm.

So far the Purchas Judgment quotes, and then it stops and argues as follows :—

"The Prayer Book, therefore, refers to the Act, and the Act clearly contemplated further directions to be given by the Queen, with the advice of Commissioners or of the Metropolitan. It was not,

* In the Purchas Judgment it is called "the 25th Clause." Whether this is an error, or whether my copy of the Act is wrongly numbered, I cannot tell.

apparently, thought desirable to effect an immediate outward change of ceremonies, although the adoption of the Second Prayer Book of Edward VI., in lieu of the first, had effected a great change in the very substance of the Communion Service, with which the theory of the peculiar Vestments (the Alb and Chasuble) was closely connected.”*

What their Lordships meant by the “great change in the very substance of the Communion Service” which the Prayer Book of 1552 “effected” I am unable to guess, and I think they would find it hard to explain. But I have a more serious charge to bring against the Court than mere inaccuracy of theological statement. If, instead of substituting a full stop for the colon of the original, they had proceeded with their quotation to the end of the clause, the inference which they have drawn from it would have been impossible—at least for the readers of the Judgment. The reader will see this at once by continuing the quotation as follows:—“And also, That if there shall happen any contempt or irreverence to be used in the Ceremonies or Rites of the Church, by the misusing of the Orders appointed in this Book, the Queen’s Majesty may by the like advice of the said Commissioners, or Metropolitan, ordain and publish such further Ceremonies or Rites as may be most for the advancement of God’s Glory, the edifying of His Church, and the due reverence of Christ’s Holy Mysteries and Sacraments.”

* Brooke’s Priv. Council Judgments, pp. 168-9.

It is plain, therefore, that the "other order" contemplated by the Act of Uniformity was intended to enlarge, not to curtail the ritual prescribed by the Rubric. And this was the interpretation put upon the clause at the time. "But the ceremonies," says George Withers, "which, as was above stated,* were retained in the Church at the first reformation of Edward, are restored under the same name. Power, moreover, was given to the Queen and the Archbishop to introduce whatever *additional* ceremonies they might think proper; and they immediately afterwards both discontinued the ordinary bread heretofore used in the administration of the Lord's Supper, and for the sake of a newer reformation adopted the round wafer, after the pattern of that used by the papists."† In another letter, written by George Withers and John Barthelot to Bullinger and Rudolph Gualter in 1567, they say, "Moreover, there is power given by Act of Parliament to the Queen and the Archbishop to introduce whatever ceremonies they please into every Church in the kingdom."‡

Whenever I have had occasion in this volume to

* The reference is to a previous part of the letter, where Withers says that "altars, organs, theatrical dresses of the papists, and other things of the like kind, were retained under the name of ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers thereof."

† Letter of George Withers to the Prince Elector Palatine, Zurich Letters, Second Series, p. 161.

‡ Zurich Letters, Second Series, p. 150.

point out misquotations or *suppressiones veri* in the Purchas Judgement, I have been careful to acquit the Court of any intentional fraud. But I cannot acquit it of misrepresentation of facts so gross and culpable as to render belief in its impartiality simply impossible. In the Case before us, the Court founded an important argument upon a garbled quotation. It stopped at a colon, and left out a passage which would have destroyed its argument. But to proceed :—

A number of Puritans, who had lived on the Continent during the reign of Mary, returned to England on the accession of Elizabeth, and used all their power to reduce the doctrine, ritual, and discipline of the Church of England to the model of the Calvinistic worship to which they had been accustomed abroad. They were but a mere handful as compared with the clergy at large ;* but they were very energetic and noisy, had powerful friends at Court, and some of them got installed in prominent and influential positions. They set all law and order at defiance. They refused to wear any ecclesiastical Vestments, to

* “ There is crept and brought into the Church, by *some few persons*, abounding more in their own senses than wisdom, and delighting in singularities and changes, an open and manifest disorder, and offence to the godly, wise, and obedient persons, by diversity of opinions, and specially in the external, decent, and useful rites and ceremonies to be used in the Churches.”—Letter of Queen Elizabeth to the two Metropolitans in January, 1564. (Strype's Parker, Append. xxiv. 66.)

kneel at the reception of the Blessed Sacrament, or to use, without curtailment or addition, the new Prayer Book. This state of lawlessness reached such a pass at last, that the Queen and some of the Bishops felt the necessity of dealing with it in a peremptory manner.

In the beginning of 1564 Her Majesty wrote in strong terms to the two Archbishops, requiring them to take measures for suppressing the irregularities of the Puritans. The well-known Advertisements were the result. There is not a scintilla of evidence to connect these Advertisements with the "other order" of Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity, and that they were aimed at the Puritans exclusively—that is, at defect, not excess, in ritual—is one of the most patent facts in the history of that time. I have given, as I believe, sufficient evidence of this fact in the body of the work. But erroneous impressions are sometimes hard to dislodge, and therefore it may be as well to adduce some additional evidence here.

Oldmixon,* writing under the date of 1564, says,—

"The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishops of London, Ely, Winchester, and Lincoln, framed several articles to enforce the habits, which were styled Advertisements. The Archbishop carried them to the Court; but the Queen as yet refused to give them her sanction. The Archbishop chafed at the disappointment, said the Court had put them upon

* History of England, p. 840.

framing them, and if they would not go on and give them the royal sanction they had better never have done anything; nay, if the Council would not lend them helping hand against Nonconformists, as they had done heretofore in Hooper's days, they should be but laughed at for what they had done. But still the Queen was so cold that when the Bishop of London came to Court she spoke not a word to him about *the redressing the neglect of Nonconformity* in the City of London, where it was most disregarded; upon which the Archbishop went to the Secretary desiring another Letter from the Queen to back up their endeavours for conformity; adding, in some heat, 'If you remedy it not by Letter, I will no more strive against the stream, fume or chide who will;' which shows us that the Bishops incited the same measures against the Puritans, and that the statesmen did not care to meddle in the matter, since it must be their backwardness which made the Queen cool in an affair she had put the Bishops upon."

Carter* says,—

"The exiles, returned from Geneva, had already begun disputes about the cap, surplice, and *other ecclesiastical habits*, not daring as yet to attack either the liturgy or the bishops. Their aversion to the habits of the Clergy was founded on their having been worn by the Papists; though they had most

* History of England, vol. iii. pp. 420-1.

of them been in use before any of the corruptions of Popery were known in the world, and had not been derived from any pope, but indulged to the bishops and clergy by the Emperor Constantine the Great, being really parts of the imperial ornaments, and as such worn by emperors and kings, particularly by those of England, at their coronations to this day, from the time that those ceremonials were instituted."

It is evident from this extract that Carter understood other ecclesiastical vestments besides the surplice to have been in dispute; for the surplice, as distinct from the alb, was not worn by sovereigns at their coronation, but the alb, the dalmatic, the amice, and in some cases the chasuble, were. But let us hear what Carter has to say about the Advertisements. After mentioning the Queen's Letter of January 25th to the two Primates, "expressly requiring them" to restrain the lawlessness of the Puritan Clergy, he says:—

"But the business went on heavily, especially in London, where the greatest number of the irregular men were; well knowing that, as they had hitherto been connived at by their bishop, Grindal, they should on this occasion be supported by Sir Francis Knolles (who had been one of their congregation in London, and was now vice-chamberlain, allied to the Queen by his marriage with Cary, and much in her favour) by Dudley Earl of Leicester, who had lately put himself at the head of the party, and by others of

their friends in the Court and Council.* These courtiers had influence enough to prevent the Queen's authorizing some orders [*i.e.*, the Advertisements] drawn up by the bishops for all Ministers to subscribe." Bullinger also and his correspondent George Withers condemn the Advertisements on the very ground that their purpose was to pull the Puritans up, not to pull down the "papistarum Sacrificuli," as Withers scornfully calls the great body of the English Clergy.

A dispassionate review of all the facts of the case will, I believe, satisfy any impartial inquirer that the condition of ecclesiastical affairs in England, on the appearance of the Advertisements, was as follows. The nine thousand and odd priests who remained in possession of their benefices on the accession of Queen Elizabeth went on quietly with their work, most of them probably making no change in the wonted ritual of their churches. It is probable indeed that in many parishes, especially in the country, the new Prayer Book was little, if at all, used or known. In opposition to this view I may be reminded of the stringent terms of the Act of Uniformity. But that is no answer at all. For, in the first place, it is an undoubted fact that the Puritan Clergy disregarded the Prayer Book,

* Among those other friends of the Puritans "in the Court and Council" were Sir Francis Walsingham, the Earl of Bedford, and the Earl of Warwick.—See Oldmixon, p. 840.

the Act of Uniformity notwithstanding, during the first seven years of Elizabeth's reign. And, in the second place, it is on record that neither the Prayer Book of 1549 nor that of 1552 was ever used at all over a large part of England. Yet the enactments of Edward the Sixth's reign, in favour of uniformity, were quite as stringent as those of Queen Elizabeth's. In the diocese of Durham certainly, and probably throughout all the northern counties, the reformed Liturgy was never used during the whole of Edward the Sixth's reign.* There is very little doubt that the same state of things prevailed in several dioceses for a long time after Elizabeth's accession. It is quite unsafe to assume, in the absence of direct proof, that edicts, whether Royal or Episcopal, were implicitly obeyed. There is a passage bearing on this point, which is worth quoting, in the letter of George Withers to the Elector Palatine. After complaining bitterly of the restoration, under Elizabeth, of the Vestments and other ornaments prescribed by the Prayer Book of 1549, he proceeds:—

“Then on the expulsion of the popish bishops new ones were to be appointed in their room; and most of these were of the number of those who had been exiles. These at first began to oppose the ceremonies; but afterwards, when there was no hope otherwise of obtaining a bishopric, they yielded,

* See “John Knox and the Church of England,” by Professor Lorimer, pp. 29, 107.

and, as one of them openly acknowledged, undertook the office against their conscience. In the meanwhile they comforted their brethren, whom they perceived to be still struggling against these things, by promising them free liberty in the government of their churches; and for some years they kept this promise. On the obtaining of which liberty they diligently purified their churches from all the blemishes and defilements of popery. Others, who had at first yielded, incited by their example, began to reform their churches in the like manner. But when the bishops saw the number and influence of these parties increasing among the people, they thought their dignity was at stake, unless they compelled the inferior clergy to adopt the same usages as they did themselves. They took up the matter therefore at the Queen's command." Then, after referring to the deprivation of Sampson, the summary proceedings against the recusant clergy of London, "the royal injunctions, and the admonitions, or (as they call them) advertisements of the bishops," he bewails "the wretched aspect of the Church of England," and especially the prevalence of popery among the clergy. "What must we say," he exclaims, "when most of them are popish priestlings, set apart to perform Mass (plerique sunt papistarum sacrificuli missæ consecrati), while the vast majority of the rest are most ignorant men, appointed at the will of the people, not to the ministry of the Word, but to repeat the

office of the day or festival, which almost any boy might do without difficulty."

This letter, let it be remembered, is a sketch of the English Reformation from the time of Henry VIII. to the date of the letter, and it reveals the following state of facts as existing when the letter was written :—

1. The restoration of the Vestments and other Ornaments which were in use in the second year of Edward VI. These things, Withers says, "*are restored under the same name (sub eodem nomine restituuntur).*"
2. Most of the clergy were "popish priestlings set apart for the Mass," and the rest were ignorant men who could do nothing except repeat the office of the day or festival. Is it not a fair inference from this that the great majority of the clergy went on pretty much as they had been accustomed to do, celebrating the Holy Communion (which, no doubt, they continued to call the Mass) in the usual Vestments and with the usual ceremonies, and saying their daily office in the old fashion? By "the office of the day or festival" Withers can hardly have meant the Matins and Evensong of the Prayer Book.
3. The utter lawlessness of the handful of noisy Puritans caused a reaction on the part of the Bishops who had at first patronised them, and a determined effort was accordingly

made, by means of the Advertisements, to compel the recusants to adopt at least a minimum of decent ritual. And, indeed, it was high time, for during the "some years" in which these Puritans had "free liberty in the government of their Churches" they "diligently purified their Churches" with a vengeance, embezzling or destroying sacred vessels and vestments whenever they could lay their hands upon them.

There is no date to this letter of Withers, but there is internal evidence that it was written after the year 1566, for it refers to events that took place in that year. It therefore demonstrates three things: first, that the Rubric prescribing the Eucharistic Vestments was then in full force, for Withers refers to them specifically as then actually "restored;" secondly, that the Advertisements were not aimed at those who obeyed the Ornaments Rubric, and were not intended to modify that Rubric, but were, on the contrary, directed exclusively against those who did not obey the Rubric, so as to bring them up to at least a partial obedience to it; thirdly, that the "other order," contemplated by the Act of Uniformity did not mean the Advertisements, but rather additional ceremonies, like the wafer-bread ordered by the Injunctions of 1559.

It does not matter to my argument whether the Advertisements had or had not the force of law. I believe that they had not, and I have given some

evidence in support of that opinion. George Withers and other Puritans of the time speak of them invariably as "the Bishops' admonitions, or (as they call them) Advertisements," and carefully and pointedly distinguish them from the "royal Injunctions." Mr. Droop, in a recently published pamphlet, states his belief that the Advertisements were not published at all till 1566. But for this belief he has produced no evidence that can stand a moment's cross-examination. There can be no doubt that the Advertisements were published in 1564. They were not rigorously enforced till 1566, because the Queen, under the influence of Leicester and other patrons of the Puritans, could not be prevailed upon to lend what Archbishop Parker called "a helping hand" in the matter. In 1566, however, she was induced to issue a proclamation "requiring conformity to the habit; and thus," adds Collier, "the bishops' Articles or Advertisements were in some measure ratified."* Yes, "in *some measure* ratified;" that is to say, the Queen never signed the Advertisements, and never sanctioned in any way the belief that they were hers; but she issued a proclamation which had, "in some measure," the same end in view as the Advertisements. Her own feelings being strongly in favour of putting down the Puritans with a high hand,† she

* Collier vi. p. 419.

† "The Queen could not satisfy her conscience without

was very glad to let the Bishops proceed against them under the ægis of her name; but the Puritans had powerful friends at Court who took care that the Queen should not be legally committed to any sanction of the Advertisements. Thus Cecil, immediately after the Queen's proclamation, encouraged Parker to enforce the Advertisements, and told him "that the Lord-Keeper Bacon, the Marquess of Northampton, and himself intended to be" at the meeting, in which the London clergy were required to conform. "But none of them came: it seems they recollected themselves, and declined having a share in such unacceptable business."*

The exact value of the Advertisements in point of law is however, I repeat, a matter which does not touch my argument, inasmuch as they were aimed, beyond all possibility of doubt, at the Puritans exclusively. They were intended to enforce a minimum of ritual; but there is not the shadow of a shade of evidence to show that they were meant to abolish anything sanctioned by the Rubric and Statute of 1559. The partisans of the Purchas Judgment must really be called upon to face and answer plain historical facts. They insist that the Advertisements were not intended to enforce a minimum of rubrical observance while permitting a maximum. I have already (pp. 75-6) disposed of this assertion, crushing the Puritans."—Speech of the Lord Treasurer. Oldmixon, *Hist. of Engl.* p. 451.

* Collier, vi. p. 419.

and it is surely not unreasonable to demand that it be not repeated till my facts are proved to be fictions.

But now let us see what the Advertisements really do say on the question of the Vestments :—

“In the ministration of the Holy Communion in Cathedral and Collegiate Churches the principal Minister shall wear a cope, with Gospeller and Epistoler agreeably, and at all other prayers to be said at the Communion table to use no copes but surplices. That the Dean and Prebendaries wear a surplice with a silk hood in the choir, and when they preach in the Cathedral or Collegiate Church, to wear their hood. That every Minister saying any public prayers, or ministering of the Sacraments or other rites of the Church, shall wear a comely surplice with sleeves, to be provided at the charges of the parish.”

Commenting on this order, the Judges in the case of *Mr. Purchas* “think that in prescribing the surplices only, the Advertisements meant what they said, the surplices only.” The reader will observe that the Court has quietly interpolated the word “only,” which completely changes the whole meaning of the passage. But let us proceed :—

“If the Minister,” says the *Purchas Judgment*, “is ordered to wear a surplice at all times of his ministration, he cannot wear an alb and tunicle when assisting at the Holy Communion ; if he is to celebrate the Holy Communion in a chasuble, he cannot celebrate in a surplice.”

That is a plain unambiguous statement. The use of the surplice precludes the use at the same time of either alb or chasuble, and also, I presume, the use of the cope. The Court gave no reason for this assertion. It appealed to no authority. It laid down its dictum as an historical axiom so clear and self-evident as to supersede the necessity of argument. Unfortunately for the credit of the Court, however, it is one of those cases in which bold assertion is the child of ingenuous ignorance.

A few examples will suffice to show this.

The following Rubric is from the York Missal: "Hæc lectio sequens in medio Chori ab aliquo Vicario seniori in superpellicio *et capa rubea serica*."*

The old statutes of St. Paul's enjoined the canons to wear "*colobium aut superpelliceum album*" under the Mass Vestment.†

In the Roman Missal the secular priest is enjoined, if it can be conveniently managed, to put on a surplice *first*, and *over* that the amice, alb, etc.

The Canons of Rouen always wore chasubles over their surplices on the Feast of Pentecost at Tierce.‡

* Surtees Society's Edition, vol. i. p. 10.

† Dr. Rock's "Church of Our Fathers," ii. 16; and Mr. J. D. Chambers' "Comment and Confutation of Priv. Council Dec. p. 71.

‡ "Le jour de la Pentecôte à Tierces Sept Chanoines Prêtres revêtus de chasubles *pardessus leurs surplis*, accompagnez du Diacre et du Souüdiacre pareillement Chanoines revêtus de

“Durandus commends the practice of some in wearing a surplice over their own clothes under the amice ; next was the alb embroidered, made of fine linen, or byssus ; it was straight, without any surples, and had straight sleeves ; it had a head-stall, and covered the whole body. Then the girdle ; next was the stole or scarf over this was the chesible, or planet, which was a surpled garment.”*

The Rubric of Edward VI.'s first Prayer Book ordered the celebrant to wear “a white albe plain, with a vestment or cope.” A Rubric at the end of the Communion Office says : “The Priest shall put upon him a plain albe or *surplice, with a cope.*”

Two Rubrics at the end of the Book of 1549 prescribe as follows :—

1. “In the saying or singing of Matins and Evensong, Baptizing and Burying, the Minister in parish churches and chapels annexed to the same shall use a Surplice. And in all Cathedral Churches and Colleges, the Archdeacons, Deans, Provosts, Masters, Prebendaries, and Fellows, being graduates, may use in the choir, besides their Surplices, such hoods as pertaineth to their several degrees, which they have taken in any university within this realm.”

2. And wheresoever the Bishop shall celebrate dalmatique et de tunique.” *Voyages Liturgiques de France*, p. 327. Paris, 1718.

* Johnson's Canons, A.D. 1460. Note E.

the Holy Communion in the Church, or execute any other public ministration, he shall have upon him, *besides his rochette, a surplice or albe,* and a cope or vestment.*"

So much for the confident dictum of the Purchas Judgment. It is directly the reverse of the truth. And it is for disregarding a judgment thus honey-combed with grotesque blunders that a large section of the Clergy of England have been held up to public odium as "lawless" and "revolutionary." Considering that a Draconic law has been passed against them on this plea, they have surely a right to demand that their Judges in the last Court of Appeal shall be men who are acquainted with at least the alphabet of the questions likely to come before them for adjudication. A man does not acquire an intuitive knowledge of matters which he has never studied by becoming a Judge. Legal training is useful enough in its way; but legal training will no more make a man a good theologian or ritualist† than it will make him a good cricketer or boatman. An elementary knowledge of the questions in dispute would have saved the Court in

* The surplice and alb differed very little from each other, and either name was sometimes, though not generally, used for both. "Le surplis," says an author already quoted, "qui n'est que l'aube racourcie." (*Voyage Lit. de France*, p. 125.) So also Pascal (*Origines de la Liturgie*, p. 91) says that the surplice "est identifié avec l'aube."

† I use the word in its proper sense, as one learned in the history and meaning of religious rites.

the Purchas Case from supposing that an order to wear a surplice necessarily meant an order not to wear an alb or chasuble. Numbers of pre-Reformation canons order the surplice without mentioning any other vestment. One of the canons in Archbishop Reynolds' Constitutions (A.D. 1322), for example, says, "Let no clerk be permitted to minister in the office of the altar without a surplice ; and let two candles, or one at least, be lighted at the time of High Mass." Here we see the rule of minimum and maximum even before the Reformation.

Another argument of the Purchas Judgment, into which I did not think it necessary to enter in the body of my book, is founded upon "the various Visitation Articles . . . as showing that the surplice alone was to be used, and that deviations from that rule were on the side of defect, and not in the direction of returning to the Vestments of the Mass. Some of these Articles were published by Bishop Cosin and others, who took part in the revision of the Prayer Book. In the Sixth Article Bishop Cosin inquires, 'Have you a large and decent surplice (one or more) for the Minister to wear at all times of his public ministration in the Church ?' The repetition of the words 'at all times' of his ministration, the exact words of the Rubric, is very significant as a contemporaneous exposition of it by one of its framers."*

* Brooke's Six Privy Council Judgments, p. 175.

This is one of the many instances in which the Court, in the plenitude of its ignorance, founds conclusions upon arguments which are simply fatal to them. It is true that Cosin, in his Visitation Articles, makes no mention of the Eucharistic Vestments, but inquires particularly about the surplice. And for this there was a very good reason. Cosin's diocese had been ruled by a number of violent Puritans since the time of Cuthbert Tunstall, and the Great Rebellion, following on the iconoclasm of these men, had denuded it of all the decencies of public worship. It is on record that numbers of parishes were without a surplice, and were too poor to buy one. To inquire therefore, under such circumstances, whether the parishes possessed rich and costly vestments would have been cruel irony. But Cosin's own opinion on the subject is not a matter of inference or conjecture, but of absolute certainty. He has recorded his judgment, Advertisements and Canons notwithstanding, that "the Vestments were prescribed by law."*

So much for the "contemporaneous exposition of the Rubric by one of its framers." By what fatality is it that the Court in the Purchas Case has so obligingly supplied its adversaries with weapons wherewith to destroy its Judgment? That these Visitation Articles insist upon a minimum of rubrical observance is plain from another fact. Several of them inquire, "Whether you have a convenient and

* See Cosin's Works, vol. v. pp. 42, 280, 418, 489.

decent communion table with a carpet of silk or some other decent stuff continually laid upon the table at time of Divine Service." But not one, so far as I know, makes any inquiry about altar frontals with a sequence of colours proper for different festivals. Yet these have been declared legal by the Judicial Committee. They were very valuable, in most cases, like copes and chasubles, and were simply stolen, sometimes under the plea of putting down superstition, sometimes under no plea at all. I have seen something of the same kind in Sicily within the last few years: churches robbed of valuable vestments by the rapacity of greedy laymen, and not infrequently by the clergy themselves. I have often been stealthily offered most valuable vestments at a great bargain.

We must, however, distinguish between these Visitation Articles. In dioceses which were ruled by Puritans—and they were the majority during the reign of Elizabeth—any sort of excess and lawlessness was encouraged by the Bishops till, as George Withers tells us, they found "their own dignity" at stake. Jewel, for instance, writing to Peter Martyr in the year 1562, expresses an ardent wish that "that linen surplice" could be "removed together with the rubbish" which had already been got rid of.* And Grindal and Horn, writing to Rudolph Gualter in 1567, express themselves thus in reference to the Vestments then in use:—"We call

* Zurich Letters, vol. i. p. 100.

Almighty God to witness that the dissension has not been occasioned by any fault of ours, nor is it owing to us that Vestments of this kind have not been altogether done away with: so far from it, that we most solemnly make oath that we have hitherto laboured with all earnestness, fidelity, and diligence, to effect what our brethren require, and what we ourselves wish.”*

Bishop Sandys says:—

“The Queen’s Majesty considered it not contrary to the word of God, nay, rather for the advantage of the Church, that the image of Christ crucified, together with Mary and John, should be placed, as heretofore, in some conspicuous part of the church, where they might more readily be seen by all the people. Some of us [Bishops] thought far otherwise, and more especially as all images of every kind were at our last visitation not only taken down, but also burnt, and that too by public authority. . . As to myself, because I was rather vehement in this matter, and could by no means consent that an occasion of stumbling should be afforded to the Church of Christ, I was very near being deposed from my office, and incurring the displeasure of the Queen.”†

In a list of Visitation Articles of the year 1559, I find the following inquiries, “Whether in these churches and chapels all images, shrines, all tables, candlesticks, . . . pictures, paintings, . . . be removed,

* Zurich Letters, vol. i. p. 177. † Ibid. pp. 78-4.

abolished, or destroyed." "Whether they do not every holy-day, when they have no sermon, immediately after the Gospel, openly, plainly, and distinctly recite to their parishioners in the pulpit the Lord's Prayer, the Belief, and the Ten Commandments in English."*

The second inquiry is based on the Injunctions of 1559. So that if these Injunctions are now binding in law, a great many of our clergy are in bad case. The first inquiry has been disposed of by the Judicial Committee, which declared the legality of candlesticks in churches.

These are the sort of men whose Visitation Articles are quoted in the Purchas Judgment as evidence of legal proceedings. The Judges refer to the Zurich Letters, which certainly supply evidence enough of the lawlessness of these Visitation Articles. The Puritan Bishops told their friends, in their private correspondence, that their proceedings in their respective dioceses, so far from being a carrying out of the law, "incurred the displeasure of the Queen," and "very nearly" caused them to be deposed from their office.

The "Acts and Proceedings" in the Convocation of 1586 show the result of Puritanical rule in the diocese of Norwich. Among the complaints from that diocese are the following:—"That there was no observation of the canons, that unworthy persons

* Cardwell, *Doc. Ann.* vol. i. pp. 242-3.

were ordained and instituted.” “The Communion not at all, or but in part, used and observed. The wearing of the surplice refused. Holy days not observed. The Communion was received by many sitting, and those that conformed to the church called ‘Time Servers’.”*

The Purchas Judgment lays great stress upon the evidence supplied, as they think, against Vestments by Mr. Peacock’s “Church Furniture.” Here is their argument :—“An inventory of the ornaments of 150 parishes in the Diocese of Lincoln, 1565—1566, has been published by Mr. Edward Peacock ; and it shows that the chasubles, or vestments, and the albs, were systematically defaced, destroyed, or put to other uses, and a precise account was rendered of the mode of their destruction. . . There is no reason to doubt that all through the country commissions were issued to enforce the observance of the Advertisements, within a few years after they were drawn up.”

That is to say, the Court quotes Mr. Peacock’s book as containing a record of Church Ornaments destroyed in virtue of the Advertisements. The fact is, however, that the shocking record of robbery and sacrilege which Mr. Peacock’s book contains has nothing to do with Queen Elizabeth’s Advertisements. It is confined to 150 parishes in one diocese which happened to be distinguished for its Puritanical excesses. Some of the ruin which the

* Cardwell’s Synodalia, vol. ii. p. 565.

inventory relates took place before the reign of Elizabeth; most of it was perpetrated before the Advertisements appeared, and there is not a scrap of evidence that any of it was in the slightest degree connected with the Advertisements at all. It was partly due to the merest vulgar pillage, and partly to the unreasoning fanaticism of Puritanism. But what is certain is that it had no legal basis whatever. Surely a Court of Final Appeal ought to read its authorities with sufficient care to save it from misrepresenting them in this culpable fashion. The Court appears to have forgotten, too, that both in the Lincolnshire inventory and in the Visitation Articles of Grindal and others the destruction of crosses, candlesticks, and altar-frontals was as ruthless and as systematic as the destruction of chasubles. Yet the former have all been declared legal by the Judicial Committee. It is really not fair, it is scarcely honest, to play fast and loose with arguments in this manner.

After the review of my book in the *Guardian*, the Rev. William Milton addressed a letter to that paper, which the Editor, not being able then to afford space for a controversy on the subject, sent to me. Mr. Milton is, I believe, considered a representative champion on the side of the Church Association, and has, I am told, written a pamphlet on the Vestment question, which, however, I have not had the advantage of reading. It is due to him therefore that I should notice so much of his

criticism as appears to me to be material to the argument.

“It is astonishing,” he says, “that Mr. MacColl can believe that in that year 1571 the Sacrificial Vestments were retained, when he must know that one of the Canons of that same year condemned the use of the grey amice as contaminated with superstition, and commanded Deans, Archdeacons, and others ‘to wear *only* the linen Vestment still retained by the Royal mandate, and the scholastic hood in their churches.’” (Cardwell, Synod i. 116.)

It is astonishing, I reply, that Mr. Milton should found any argument at all upon the Canons of 1571; still more astonishing that he should consider the passage which he has quoted as relevant to the point in debate. The heading of the chapter from which he has quoted is “*Decani ecclesiarum cathedralium*,” and the sentence which he has quoted prescribes the use of the “linen vestment only.” But this would be as fatal to the cope as to the chasuble. Yet, even by the admission of the Purchas Judgment, the cope was lawful in Cathedral and Collegiate Churches both before and after 1571. The argument proves too much; which means that it is irrelevant.

The truth is, however, that the Canons of 1571 had no force whatever. The Lower House of Convocation would have nothing to do with them; the Queen refused to sanction them; and even Grindal “stood in doubt whether they had *vigorem legis*,” and declined to put them in force for fear of

Præmunire. All this is related in Cardwell, to whom Mr. Milton has referred me.

In fact the Injunctions and Advertisements of that period had, for the most part, an ephemeral purpose. They were remedies against pressing evils, and were never intended to have a perennial force, still less to abrogate an Act of Parliament. One of the Injunctions of 1559, for example, dooms to destruction "all tables, candlesticks, . . . pictures, paintings, . . . so that there remain no memory of the same in walls, glass-windows, or elsewhere within their churches and houses." Yet when George Withers, acting on this Injunction, set about destroying painted windows in the chapels of Cambridge, in 1565, he was severely punished for his pains.

The only other point in Mr. Milton's letter which seems to me deserving of notice is the following:—

"But Mr. MacColl finds his novel deductions from the letter of Zanchius confirmed in express word by Beza in his letter of Sept. 3rd, 1566. Here he has made the discovery that the translation in the Parker Society's volume is unfaithful, the word 'hoods' being substituted for 'chasuble,' as the word Beza used was 'casulis.' This is a serious charge, if it can be substantiated. But if Mr. MacColl had consulted so common a work as Du Cange's Glossarium, he would have found that that learned writer gives to 'casula' the meaning of 'hood,' even in precedence to that of 'chasuble.'

‘Casula pro habitu monachico sæpe sumitur atque adeo pro ipsa cuculla. Theod. Abb. ‘cucullam nos esse dicimus, quam alio nomine casulam vocamus.’ And in Beza’s letter the meaning ‘chasuble’ is wholly impossible; for he says in the passage quoted by Mr. MacColl, that ministers were deprived and imprisoned if they would not wear the square cap, bands, surplice, and ‘casulam.’ Now Mr. MacColl knows very well that no minister was deprived or imprisoned because he would not wear a chasuble—he himself says that that Vestment was never *enforced*. It is evident, therefore, that ‘hood’ is the right translation, and Mr. MacColl’s discovery and argument collapse together.”

Mr. Milton has misunderstood Du Cange, who is, no doubt, an eminent authority. It is not true “that that learned writer gives to ‘casula’ the meaning of ‘hood,’ even in preference to that of ‘chasuble.’” On the contrary, he begins his description of casula by quoting with approbation the description of Isidore Hispalensis (Etymol. Lib. xix. c. 24, sec. 17,) which is as follows:—

“Casula est vestis cucullata dicta per diminutionem à casa, quod totum hominem tegat quasi minor casa. Unde et cuculla, quasi minor cella.”

Then, in another paragraph, comes the passage quoted by Mr. Milton, and the meaning of which he has entirely missed. What it says is that the casula was sometimes applied to the monkish habit, and so to the cowl itself. But what sort of garment was the

cuculla? An older authority than Du Cange, and in some respects superior to him, shall tell us: "*Cuculla Monachorum sumpta est a Colobio Apostolorum; illorum vero tunica formatur, ut Dalmatica. Hæ duæ vestes formam Crucis præferunt : duæ vero partes Cucullæ in ante, et retro duæ alæ sunt, quibus corpus protegunt Cucullæ nomine habitum longum et amplum, sed manicas non habentem . . . nos intelligimus.*"* The old shape of the cuculla was, in fact, as nearly as possible that of the Roman casula. Mr. Milton has confounded the cuculla with the modern English notion of a "hood." Indeed, if he had read with a little more care "so common a work as Du Cange's *Glossarium*," he would have found that his interpretation of the passage on which he fastens is quite untenable. For Du Cange quotes the following passage from the Life of Fulgentius: "*Casulam vel superbi coloris nec ipse habuit, nec monachos habere permisit. Subtus casulam nigello vel lactineo pallio circumdatus incessit.*" Jean Grancolas† places the meaning of this passage beyond a doubt. After describing the chasuble in accordance with all the authorities, he says: "*Monachorum etiam pallium casula dicitur in regula S. Macarii, cap. 27; in vita S. Gregorii, l. ii. c. 45; et in vita S. Fulgentii.*" And then he takes from the Life of S. Fulgentius the passage

* Dom. Macri, *Hierolexicon*. Editio octava. Venetiis, 1788, p. 300.

† Comment. Hist. in Rom. Breviarium, pp. 155-6.

quoted above. The monkish cuculla was, in short, a chasuble of coarser material and plainer colour than that in common use. Mr. Milton is apparently not aware that the chasuble was at one time the ordinary out-door dress of the clergy. In a Synod held under Charlemagne in Germany, in the year 742, the following canon was passed: "Decrevimus quoque, ut Presbyteri non sagis laicorum more; sed casulis utantur ritu servorum Dei."*

Those whose curiosity is lively enough to pursue the object further may, in addition to the authorities already referred to, consult Sicardi's *Mitræ*, lib. ii., column 77; Joannes de Janua's *Catholicon*, in loc; Durandus's *Rationale*, lib. iii. c. vii.; Martene; to say nothing of Pontificals innumerable.

Mr. Milton will now see that "a little learning is a dangerous thing," and that a cursory dip into "so common a work as Du Cange's *Glossarium*" will not save a man from blundering egregiously on questions which he has never thoroughly studied. Beza was far too good a scholar to use the word "casula" in the sense which Mr. Milton attributes to him.

There is more plausibility in Mr. Milton's next objection, namely, that Beza cannot have meant the chasuble, because that vestment, even on my own

* Cf. Fleury, *Hist. Eccl.* tom ix. p. 305: "Le prêtres et les diacres ne porteront point des manteaux semblables à ceux des laïques, mais des chasubles. C'étoit donc encore l'habit ordinaire des ecclésiastiques."

admission, was not forced upon the Puritans. The answer, however, is simple enough. Beza was writing at a distance. He had heard that Sampson and others had been deprived and imprisoned for refusing to wear what Sampson himself described as “the Golden Vestments of the Papacy” (*aureis vestibus papisticis*);* he knew that the Rubric, sanctioned by an Act of Parliament, enjoined the chasuble among other vestments; and he wrote accordingly. Beza’s testimony is therefore valuable. Coming as it does, after the publication of the Advertisements, it negatives the idea that the Advertisements were understood at the time as prohibiting the chasuble.

In the body of this work I have adduced some evidence from Nonconformist sources against the interpretation put upon the Ornaments’ Rubric by the Purchas Judgment. Let me add some further evidence here, for which I am indebted partly to Mr. Fuller Russell and partly to Mr. J. D. Chambers. The first is from a book published in 1566, and entitled “An Answer for the time to the examination put in print without the Author’s name, pretending to maintain the Apparel prescribed against the Declaration of the Ministers of London.” On pp. 29-30 occurs the following passage:—

“You reject the vestment, and retain the cope; you reject the alb, and retain the surplice; you reject the stole, and retain the tippet; you reject

* Zurich Lett. vol. i. p. 36.

the shaven crown, and retain the square cap. *And yet these, and such like, are in one predicament; why you should keep the one and refuse the other, we know not, but by this rule, Quod volumus sanctum est.*"

And on page 54 the author says distinctly that "by authority of Parliament albs, altars, vestments,"* were then prescribed by law. This testimony is most valuable. Here is one of the actors in the scene reproaching the Bishops for what seemed to him very inconsistent and arbitrary conduct. The law prescribes, he says, the vestment, the alb, and the stole; just as much as it does the cope, the surplice, and the tippet. Yet here are you Bishops picking and choosing among things equally binding in law, with no better authority than your own arbitrary will. Would this language have been possible for one who believed that the Advertisements had abolished the alb and chasuble? Is it not, on the contrary, clear that the writer regarded the Advertisements as a mere arbitrary exercise of authority on the part of the Bishops? In fact, he puts his meaning beyond a doubt on p. 115, where he says: "By the former Book of King Edward (whither the Act of Parliament referreth us) an alb is appointed with a vestment for (? or) a cope for the administration of the Sacrament; and in some places the priest at this day weareth an alb." London was at this time the stronghold of the Puritan Clergy, of whom this writer was probably

* A term which always included the chasuble.

one. Altars and vestments had been destroyed with indiscriminate fury under Ridley when there was no question as to their legality; and Grindal, as we have seen, confessed that he did his best, in the teeth of the law, to get rid of the vestments, including the surplice. Parker, moreover, tells us that the clergy whom he sent to officiate in the City were sometimes obliged to forego Divine Service because no surplice could be found. The wonder therefore is, not that it is difficult to procure positive evidence as to the use of the chasuble, but that "in some places the Priest at this day weareth an alb."

The other piece of evidence supplied to me by Mr. Fuller Russell is contained in a book bearing the following title: "A Scholastical Discourse against Symbolising with Antichrist in Ceremonies, especially in the Sign of the Cross." The author was Robert Parker, and the folio edition from which I quote bears the date of 1607. He, too, taunts the bishops of his day with their inconsistency in enforcing the cross and surplice, but not "the Alba, the Cappa, the Casula, the Baculus Pastoralis, *all which are enjoined by law as well as the cross and surplice, because named in King Edward's Communion Book, to which our Law and Rubric sendeth us.* (Pt. 1. pp. 150, 151.) Opposite the word "Law" is an asterisk referring to the following side-note: "Eliz. i. c. 2; rubric in init. leiturg."

From Mr. J. D. Chambers I have received the

following piece of evidence. "In De Lanne's 'Plea for the Nonconformists,' (p. 45, London : Marshall, 1712) the author, after drawing an ingenious parallel between the English and Latin offices, maintaining them to be in substance the same, adds, "Have they (*i.e.* the Romans) habits for their clergy, and particular vestments for their holy ministration, as albes, surplices, chasubles, amicts, gowns, copes, maniples, zones, etc. ? *So have we.*"

In truth, so strong and overwhelming is the evidence for the legality of the Eucharistic Vestments that my respect for the purity and conscientiousness of our Judges forbids me to doubt that the Purchas Judgment will be upset on the first opportunity for a fair trial.

And now let me say a word or two on the question of ritual in general in the time of Archbishop Laud.

In the year of 1636 was published a book, entitled "For God and King. The Summe of Two Sermons preached on Fifth of November last in St. Matthewes, Friday Street. By Henry Burton, Minister of God's Word there and then."

The two sermons in question reach the portentous length of 194 pages, and are, in fact, a furious tirade against the Popish practices, as the author deemed them, then prevalent in the Church of England. Here are some specimens of his indictment : "Praying with the face towards the East, where the altar standeth ; placing of images in churches ;

erecting of crucifixes over the altars." These Popish practices, he declares, have found their way from the cathedrals into parish churches. "These [cathedrals] be those nests and nurseries of Superstition and Idolatry, wherein the old Beldame of Rome hath muzzled up her brood of Popelings, and so preserved her *Usum Sarum* in life to this very day. . . . For these Mother Churches, to which the Daughter Churches must conforme, are they not the natural Daughters of Rome? Do they not from top to toe exactly resemble her? Her pompous Service, her Altars, Palls, Copes, Crucifixes, Images, superstitious gestures and postures?" He specifies, among other things, "new Images of Saints and Angels, new rites on Candlemas Day, with their hundreds of tapers and candles. . . . What Prescription can that Cathedrall Church at Wolverhampton in Staffordshire plead for her goodly costly new Altar, with the Dedication thereof within these 2 or 3 yeares last past, in which Dedication *all the Roman rites were observed, as Censings*, washing [the hands at the celebration of the Holy Communion,] bowings, Copes (though borrowed from Lichfield)? . . . The like may be said of many other Cathedrals, if not all, which within these few yeares, yea but yesterday, have been strangely metamorphosed into a Curtizan-like garbe; and now must be, *Like Mother, Like Daughter*."

He goes on to say that these "Romish fashions" had been introduced into the college chapels at the

universities, and into parish churches. He inveighs against the hardship of compelling other churches to "have Organs, Singing Quires, Altars, Images, Crucifixes, Tapers, Copes, and the like, *because such is the guise of Cathedralls.*" (pp. 198, 163.)

To this attack Archbishop Laud replied in a set speech before the Council in the Star Chamber. He published the speech immediately afterwards with a dedication to the King, and I have the first edition of it now lying before me. Does Laud dispute the accuracy of Burton's statement of facts in respect to any of the particulars which I have quoted? So far from it, he says explicitly, "Whether there be not more reason the Parish Churches should be made conformable to the Cathedral and Mother Churches than the Cathedral to them, I leave to any reasonable man to judge." Heylin, too, wrote an elaborate reply to Burton; but neither does he dispute the specific charges as to matters of fact which I have quoted from Burton. This is most remarkable. Images, crucifixes, altars, tapers and candles, palls, copes, "all the Roman rites" in fact, according to the Sarum Use, are now, says Burton, the rule of our Cathedrals; and Parish Churches are expected to conform to the usages of the Mother Churches. Such is the charge, and Laud and his Chaplain tacitly admit it. Yet, in the teeth of all this, the Judicial Committee tell us that all these things have been strictly illegal and obsolete from

the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign to our own time, save and except the cope, which may be worn in Cathedrals and Collegiate Churches on certain high festivals! It is evident that the Caroline divines knew nothing of such law. In fact, the authorities in one of the City Churches ("St. Gregories by Paules") claimed the liberty of not being obliged to conform to the ritual of the Cathedral, and the claim was disallowed by Royal Injunction.

Before I conclude, I must quote some important passages from Laud's speech, bearing on the position of the altar. One of the innovations charged against him by Burton was the position of the Holy Table Altar-wise against the east wall of the Church. Laud denies point blank that this is an innovation at all. "And this," he says, "appears both by the practice and by the command and Canon of the Church of England. First, by the practice of the Church of England. For in the King's Royall Chappels, and divers Cathedrals, the Holy Table hath ever since the Reformation stood at the upper end of the quire, with the large or full side toward the people." He admits that "it stood in most parish Churches the other way," but argues that the parish churches should follow the example of the Cathedrals, not *vice versa*. He mentions, in particular, St. Paul's Cathedral and Westminster Abbey as churches in the metropolis which had always preserved the altar-wise position. "May the

Holy Table," he asks pertinently, "stand this way in the King's Chappel or Cathedrals, or Bishops' Chappels, and not elsewhere? Surely if it be decent and fit in God's Service, it may stand so (if authority please) in any Church. But if it advance or usher in any superstition and Popery, it ought to stand so in none."

"Secondly, this appears by the Canon or Rule of the Church of England too, for it is plain in the last Injunction of the Queen: That the Holy Table ought to stand at the upper end of the quire, north and south, or Altar-wise. For the words of the Queen's Injunctions are these:—

"'The Holy Table in every Church (mark it, I pray you, not in the Royal Chappel, or Cathedrals only, but in every Church), shall be decently made and set in the place where the Altar stood.'

"Now the Altar stood at the upper end of the Quire, North and South, as appeares before by the practice of the Church. And there to set it otherwise is to set it *crosse* the place, not *in* the place where the Altar stood. . . . These words of the Injunction are so plaine as that they can admit of no shift. And give me leave to tell you that a very learned Prelate of this Church, and one whom I think these men will not accuse as a man like to advance or usher in Popery, is of the same opinion: 'tis my Lord the Bishop of Salisbury."

Laud then gives the particulars of a dispute upon this question in a parish church in the diocese of

Salisbury, and the following order of the Bishop, when called in to settle the matter :—

“ By the Injunction of Queen Elizabeth and by Canon 82, under King James, the Communion Table should ordinarily be set and stand with the side to the East wall of the Chancell.”

Laud concludes the matter as follows :—“ It follows in the same Injunction, that when the Altar is taken down, the Holy Table shall bee set in (not crosse) the place where the Altar stood ; which (as is aforesaid) must needs be Altar-wise.”

To conclude. I have very little doubt, I repeat, that the Purchas Judgment will be reversed when the questions ruled by it have been fairly argued before a competent tribunal. And then see what follows. Many of the Bishops and the leading organs of public opinion have propagated the belief that disobedience to the Purchas Judgment means lawlessness. The Church Association has expressed its intention accordingly to enter upon a campaign of prosecutions “ with a light heart,” like the French when they began the campaign of 1870. And I venture to predict, to compare great things with small, that the results will not be dissimilar. The army which left Paris, shouting “ à Berlin ! ” found itself indeed on the other side of the Rhine ere long ; not as victors, however, but as prisoners of war. And such is the fate, as I believe, which is in store for the Church Association in the campaign against Ritualism on which it is about to enter. It declares

war "with a light heart," because it is ignorant alike of the weakness of its own case and of the strength of its adversary's. But what will happen when it has fought and lost its Sedan? How will it fare with us when the Purchas Judgment has been reversed? Unless we come to an understanding beforehand, we shall probably have a repetition of what is now going on in Ireland. The aggressive party will agitate violently for a revision of the Prayer Book, and whether the agitation succeed or fail, the too probable end will be disruption and disestablishment.

Such, then, being the probable result of putting the Public Worship Regulation Act in force, would it not be well to come to some understanding on the subject before hostilities are fairly begun? How stand the facts? Roughly speaking, there are three parties in the Church of England; and, for my part, I should be very sorry to see any of them suppressed, for I believe that each brings into prominence some truth or truths which the others possibly leave too much in the background. I am not an admirer of a cast-iron system of uniformity in doctrine or ritual. Unity in doctrine indeed there must be. But a healthy unity should leave ample elbow-room for intellectual liberty outside the limits of the Christian *credenda*. Any one who possesses even a moderate acquaintance with the great lights of patristic theology, S. Augustine, for example, in the West, Clement of Alexandria and even Athanasius in the

East, must know the bold yet devout spirit of their speculation in matters which did not touch the essence of the Catholic creed. Many of their theological excursions would, I fear, be denounced heterodox, if not heretical, by impatient partisans, not confined to one School, among ourselves—I am persuaded that the expulsion of any one of the three parties of which the Church of England consists would be an irreparable loss to the whole body. Grant even that they do not all hold the Catholic Faith with an equal clearness of intellectual vision, or with an equal appreciation of its paramount importance in the sphere of human conduct ; it does not at all follow that those whose vision of the truth is thus imperfect should be cast out, so long as they have a willing mind and loyally accept the Church's creed. “Where there's a will there's a way” in matters of faith as well as of action ; and in the midst of our dissensions I console myself with the thought that we are like travellers scaling a lofty mountain partially veiled in mist. It is not till we have passed the region of mist and emerged on the sun-gilt summit of the mountain that we shall know how close to each other we have often been, without knowing it, during the toil and weariness of the ascent.

LETTER I.

ACCUSATION OF LAWLESSNESS.

MY LORD,

We have heard a great deal of late about the "lawlessness" of certain of the English clergy. So long as this cry was confined to the newspapers, or to irresponsible speakers on public platforms, it was perhaps better, on the whole, to disregard it. But it assumes a very different aspect when it is echoed, as it was on the third reading of the Public Worship Regulation Bill, by a Peer of your Lordship's eminence in his place in Parliament. It becomes necessary at once therefore for all who are implicated—and every clergyman of the Church of England who is not specially excepted is implicated—to examine the charge, in order to see whether, and how far, he is himself amenable to it. For, my Lord, to call a man "lawless" is no light accusation; it is one of the most serious that can be made against any one.

Now "lawlessness" is a word which admits of various meanings, and our estimate of it, from a moral point of view, must accordingly depend on the

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specific meaning which we attach to it. Speaking broadly, it means either—

1. Materially, the violation of some particular law; or,
2. Formally, an inward disposition or habit of mind antagonistic to lawful authority in general.

It is evident, of course, that a man may belong to No. 1 without necessarily belonging to No. 2; and *vice versa*. In other words, to break a law is not necessarily and formally to be a lawless person. For one may break a law ignorantly, or accidentally, or because he thinks that obedience to the law in question may involve disobedience to some higher law which binds his conscience. In none of these cases would it be fair to call a man lawless. He might be an object of pity, or even of punishment, but hardly of moral blame; for he who obeys the wrong dictates of an ill-informed conscience is morally a better man than he who does what really is right while believing it to be wrong. Mere disobedience to law, therefore, does not of itself prove a man morally lawless. There may be circumstances in the case which exonerate him from any kind of blame, or which may actually make his disobedience a virtue. "What glory," says Sir James Mackintosh,* "is not due to those who, like Wallace, are ready, for their country, to commit even their good name to fortune; *who, for the sake of justice, wear the*

* "History of England," vol. i. p. 265.

garb of offenders against law, with a full knowledge that nothing but signal success will save them from the reproaches of a posterity as base as their contemporaries." "It would be hard," says Burke, "to point out any error more truly subversive of all the order and beauty, of all the peace and happiness of human society, than the position that any body of men have a right to make what laws they please; or that laws can derive any authority from their institution merely and independent of the quality of the subject-matter. . . . In reality there are two, and only two, foundations of law; and they are both of them conditions without which nothing can give it any force; I mean equity and utility."*

The history of the United Kingdom, my Lord, is full of illustrations of the positions here laid down by two such distinguished authorities as Burke and Mackintosh. For something like seven centuries England imposed upon Ireland laws which violated the first principles of equity. She first made the Irish Papists at the point of the sword, and then she tried to make them Protestants by a liberal use of the same convincing weapon; and failed. "No country, I believe, since the world began," says Burke, "has suffered so much on account of religion as Ireland; or has been so variously harassed both for Popery and Protestantism."† And what is the

* "Tracts on the Popery Laws." Works, vol. vi. pp. 16, 17.

† Works, vol. vi. p. 80.

result? Why, that one of the most loyal and most law-abiding people on the face of the earth has become one of the most disloyal and lawless. Enforced obedience to unjust laws has been avenged by a terrible Nemesis.

On the evening of August, 1833, Lord Suffield, in a speech in the House of Lords, made the following portentous statement:—"I hold in my hand a list of *five hundred and fifty-five perjured verdicts*, delivered at the Old Bailey, in fifteen years, for *the single offence of stealing from dwelling-houses*; the value stolen being, in these cases, sworn above forty shillings [the legal capital offence], but the verdicts returned being to the value of thirty-nine shillings only. If required, I will produce the name of every one of the five hundred and fifty-five convicts, and show the value proved to have been stolen."

My Lord, I do not scruple to say that I honour the humane jurors who gave these "perjured verdicts" far more highly than I do the legislators who could enact, or the judges who could administer and defend, laws which violated the first principles of natural justice, and from the atrocious cruelty of which nothing but perjury could save their victims. Let me give a few examples.

In the year 1777 a young woman, named Mary Jones, was hanged at Tyburn under the following circumstances. "She was very young (under nineteen), and remarkably handsome. She went into a linen-draper's shop in Ludgate Street, took some

coarse linen off the counter, and slipped it under her cloak. The shopman saw her, and she laid it down. *For this she was hanged.* Her defence was, 'that she had lived in credit, and wanted for nothing, till the press-gang came and stole her husband from her; but since then she had no bed to lie on, *nothing to give her children to eat, and they were almost naked;* and perhaps she might have done something wrong; for she scarcely knew what she *did.*' *The parish officer testified to the truth of this story."*

It was a plea in bar of judgment sufficient, one should have thought, to move the stoniest heart. An enlightened legislature having legalised the forcible kidnapping of the husband of this young girl, it might be supposed that the ministers of justice would view leniently an attempt on her part to pilfer a piece of "coarse linen," in order to cover the nakedness of her starving children. But no. She was "lawless," and the majesty of the law must be vindicated. And so Mary Jones was hanged!

"When brought to receive sentence she behaved in such a frantic manner as proved her mind to be in a desponding and distracted state; and the child was sucking at her breast when she set out for Tyburn."*

Well might Sir William Meredith exclaim, in calling the attention of the House of Commons to this case: "I do not believe that a fouler murder

* See "The People's Blue Book," Second Edition, p. 519.

was ever committed against law than the murder of this woman by law."

In the year 1814 a man called Edward Pollo was hanged at Chelmsford for cutting down a young cherry-tree in a neighbouring plantation. The presiding judge was Mr. Justice Heath, who, in passing sentence, declared solemnly, that "a man who would cut down a young cherry-tree would take away a man's life." An appeal for mercy was made to George the Fourth, then Prince Regent; but he regarded the "lawlessness" of Edward Pollo as clearly established, and the law was accordingly allowed to take its course and stifle its victim.

A Recorder of London, soon afterwards, preached a homily on this incident, and declared it to be the determination of the Prince Regent to make a stern example of any who should dare to steal from a shop or from the person; and he supplied the moral of his homily by the condemnation to death of a child ten years old for stealing a pocket-handkerchief.

By the Act 9th George I., it was declared that any one disguised and in possession of a weapon, "appearing in any warren or place where hares or conies have been, or shall be usually kept, and being thereof duly convicted, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy."

But your Lordship is, perhaps, mentally wondering what all this has to do with the purpose of this letter. It has a great deal to do with it, I venture

to think; for I am endeavouring to discover, by an inductive process, what some distinguished members of the House of Lords mean by the word "lawlessness."

The first man who made a serious attempt to repeal the atrocious laws to which I have referred was Sir Samuel Romilly. He began modestly with a Bill to repeal the statute of William, which made a theft in a shop to the amount of five shillings punishable with death. The Bill passed the Commons, and was defeated in the House of Lords by a majority of twenty, including all the lawyers in the House, with one Archbishop and six Bishops!

"I trust," said Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough in the debate on the subject, "your Lordships will pause before you assent to a measure pregnant with danger to the security of property. The learned judges are *unanimously* agreed that the expediency of justice and the public security require there should not be a remission of capital punishment in this part of the criminal law. My Lords, if we suffer this Bill to pass we shall not know where to stand,—we shall not know whether we are on our heads or on our feet. My Lords, I think this, above all others, is a law on which so much of the security of mankind depends in its execution, that I should deem myself neglectful of my duty to the public if I failed to let the law take its course."

If such a Bill were suffered to take its place on the Statute Book, said Lord Wynford, another law

peer, "the people of England could not sleep in safety in their beds."

And so, my Lord, within the memory of men still living a humane proposal to save boys and girls of the tender age of ten from the gallows, for the crime of "lawlessness" up to the value of five shillings, was defeated repeatedly by the combined opposition of the Episcopal and law members of the House of Lords. I do not suppose that the leading bishops and lawyers of that day, any more than the leading bishops and lawyers of our own, were less humane than other men. But it is the natural tendency of close attention to any single pursuit, or to any habitual mode of life, to exaggerate the importance of its requirements relatively to other duties. A man who has spent his life in the study and administration of the law is naturally more impressed by breaches of the law than by considerations of extenuating circumstances; and one accustomed to rule is similarly tempted to fix his attention too exclusively on outward disobedience. But the juries who were sworn to administer the laws of the land under the old cruel penal code were under no such bias, and their sense of natural justice constrained them to defeat the very laws which they had sworn to enforce. They were "lawless," my Lord, in strictness of speech. But it was their profound respect for eternal justice that made them disobedient to the obligations of positive enactments which violated the first principles of morality. And it is to their "lawlessness" we

owe the purification of our Statute Book. The correction or abrogation of bad laws has, in fact, generally been brought about by men who, "for the sake of justice," have been brave enough to incur the risk and odium of "lawlessness."

To say, then, that disobedience to the mere letter of a law does not always and necessarily prove a lawless temper is to express a simple truism. It all depends on the circumstances of each particular case. A northern Dean lately denounced the doctrine of Absolution from the pulpit of his Cathedral, and declared that nothing would induce him to obey the plain rubrics of the Prayer Book on that subject. Numbers of clergymen have not only denounced the Athanasian Creed as heterodox and immoral, but have publicly declared that they will on no account obey the rubric which positively enjoins its use. Conduct like this, my Lord, is not only lawless in fact, but indicates a distinctly lawless temper. There is no pretence here that the law is of doubtful interpretation, or is in conflict with other laws, or is imposed by an authority not acknowledged as binding on the conscience. The law is admitted to be capable of only one interpretation, it reposes on the united authority of ecclesiastical sanction and Parliamentary statute, and it has never become obsolete. It would be hard to produce clearer evidence of "lawlessness" in act and disposition. And yet I should be sorry to see these lawless persons prosecuted, as they may be under the Public Wor-

ship Regulation Bill, by any three nominal English Churchmen, not one of whom need live within a thousand miles of the place in which the alleged offence is committed.

Surely, my Lord, these cases of "lawlessness" stand on a different footing altogether from that of those who do not conform in their practice to some of the rulings of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. Let us take the most unpopular view of the conduct of these latter, namely, that which represents them as disregarding those decisions because they emanate from a tribunal whose authority, in matters ecclesiastical, they feel themselves conscientiously obliged to disown. Grant that they are in error as to the matter of fact; still they do not proclaim themselves "lawless," that is, independent of all authority; on the contrary, their very objection to a particular Court on the ground of defective jurisdiction implies a willing submission to a Court not tainted with such defect. This is very different from saying: "The law is very plain, and I acknowledge the validity of its source. Nevertheless I refuse to obey, simply because I dislike it." The former plea is perfectly consistent with the utmost submission to law as such: the latter is simply subversive of the essential idea of allegiance, for it repudiates all external authority whatsoever and takes refuge in self-will.

But many object to the ecclesiastical decisions of the Judicial Committee on other grounds than that of defective jurisdiction. For myself, I do not

see how any religious community can emancipate itself from the control of the Civil Courts in matters which involve temporal rights. It is not a question of establishment or non-establishment, as was clearly proved by the Saurin and O’Keeffe Cases, where we saw the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical authorities in the Roman Communion overhauled and reviewed by the civil tribunals. As a clergyman of the Church of England, I have no objection to the Civil Courts sitting in judgment on the legal interpretation of certain documents, provided they restrict themselves rigorously to their legal functions; and provided also the Church shall have liberty to amend the law whenever its legal interpretation appears to differ from her real intention. In the Gorham case the Court laid down the following specific rules for its own guidance :—

“It is not for the Court to decide whether opinions are theologically sound or unsound, but whether such opinions are contrary or repugnant to the doctrines which the Church of England, by its Articles, Formularies, and Rubrics requires to be held by its Ministers.

“The Court will apply to the construction of the Articles and Liturgy the same rules which have been long established, and are by Law applicable to the construction of all written instruments, assisted only by the consideration of such rational or historical facts as may be necessary for the understanding of the subject-matter to

12 *It has no Jurisdiction in Matters of Faith.* [LETTER

which the instruments relate, and the meaning of the words employed.

“In all cases in which the Articles, considered as a test admit of different interpretations: *Held*, that any sense of which the words fairly admit may be allowed, if that sense be not contradictory to something which the Church has elsewhere allowed or required; and if there be any doctrine on which the Articles are silent or ambiguously expressed, so as to be capable of two meanings: *Held*, that it was intended to leave that doctrine to private judgment, unless the Rubrics and Formularies clearly and distinctly decide it. . . .

“The Court has no jurisdiction or authority to settle matters of faith, or to determine what ought in any particular to be the doctrine of the Church of England; its duty extends only to the consideration of that which is by Law established to be the doctrine of the Church of England, upon the true and legal construction of the Articles and Formularies.”

Again: “This Court, constituted for the purpose of advising Her Majesty in matters which come within its competency, has no jurisdiction or authority to settle matters of faith, or to determine what ought in any particular to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Its duty extends only to the consideration of that which is by Law established to be the doctrine of the Church of England, upon the true and legal consideration of her Articles and Formularies; and we consider that it is not the duty of

any Court to be minute and rigid in cases of this sort. We agree with Sir William Scott in the opinion which he expressed in *Stone's Case*, in the Consistory Court of London,—‘*That if any Article is really a subject of dubious interpretation, it would be highly improper that this Court should fix on one meaning, and prosecute all those who hold a contrary opinion regarding its interpretation.*’ ”*

Admirable rules! How far the Court adhered to them may be shown by a few examples out of many.

The Court, in Mr. Gorham's case, affirmed of him that, “he explicitly and expressly denied that he either held, or persisted in holding, that infants are not made in Baptism, ‘members of Christ and the children of God.’ ” What Mr. Gorham really did hold is given in his own language as follows, in the late Bishop of Exeter's *Pastoral Letter* (p. 13):—

“As infants are by nature unworthy recipients, being born in sin and the children of wrath, *they cannot receive any benefit from Baptism, except there shall have been a prevenient act of grace to make them worthy.*”

“This statement,” adds Bishop Philpotts, “when his attention was specially called to it, in order that, if he thought fit, he might correct it, he solemnly re-affirmed.” And he goes on to quote the following sentence from Mr. Gorham's Answers:—

“That filial state” (meaning adoption to be the sons of God), “though clearly to be ascribed to God,

* Brooke's “Privy Council Judgments,” pp. 1, 2, 35.

was given to the worthy recipient *before* Baptism, and *not in* Baptism."

But I am not concerned to reconcile Mr. Gorham's doctrine with the representation of it given in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. Both are equally repugnant to the plain grammar of the "Articles, Formularies, and Rubrics," to the construction of which the Court professed its intention of applying "the same rules which have been long established, and are by law applicable to the construction of all written instruments." The doctrine, whether it be Mr. Gorham's or not, which the Court affirmed to be in harmony with the language of the Baptismal Office, is as follows:—That children in general are really regenerated, but that this can never be affirmed of any child in particular, because it is impossible to know what child in particular may chance to present an obstacle to the admission of that "prevenient grace" which Mr. Gorham declared a *conditio sine quâ non* of Baptismal grace. The Court quite admitted that in Baptism "our Lord Jesus Christ grants" to children in general "that thing which by nature they cannot have;" only it is impossible to say as much of "*this* present infant." It allowed that infants in general, "coming to His Holy Baptism, may receive remission of sins by spiritual regeneration:" only to some infants unknown, and possibly therefore to "*this* present infant," original sin, of which the infant is simply unconscious, offers a fatal obstacle to God's

remedial grace. It is not denied that in Baptism *some* infants are "regenerate and grafted into the body of Christ's Church;" but we can never be certain that this is true of any infant in particular.

It is a cruel and repulsive doctrine. I can understand a man declaring his opinion jauntily, like Lord Palmerston, that all men are born equally good, there being no such thing as original sin;* and I can under-

* Lord Palmerston's opinion is not more opposed to the Bible than it is to the latest and, as it seems to me, best accredited speculation of physical science as to the genesis of man: I mean the theory of Evolution. That theory asserts the transmission from ancestral acts to remote generations of mental and moral, as well as physical, qualities. For myself, I see no objection theologically to the theory of Evolution rightly understood. The accepted doctrine in theology as to the origin of individual men is that of Creationism, which traces each separate soul to a distinct act of immediate Divine creation, leaving the genesis of the human body to the physiological laws which regulate the processes of natural generation. I am quite content to leave the discussion of these laws to physiologists. Let Mr. Darwin prove the descent of my material frame from the Ascidians, and I shall accept as a fact what is now only an unproved hypothesis, without the smallest perturbation of my faith in any of the Articles of the Christian faith. "I cannot for a moment admit that the theory of Evolution will alter our theological views. That theory embraces several laws or uniformities which are observed to be true in the production of living forms; but these laws do not determine the size and figure of living creatures, any more than the law of gravitation determines the magnitudes and distances of the planets. Suppose that Darwin is correct in saying that man is descended from the Ascidians; yet the precise form of the human body

stand a man believing that we are all born into the world under the blighted influence of some abo-

must have been influenced by an infinite train of circumstances affecting the reproduction, growth, and health of the whole chain of intermediate beings." Organized beings, even in their lowest forms, are separated by an impassable gulf from the products of physical agents. The latter are always and everywhere on our planet the same; the former "are everywhere different, and have differed in all ages;" and therefore "between two such series of phenomena there can be no casual or genetic connection." "Living forms, as we now regard them, are essentially variable. Now from constant mechanical causes constant effects would ensue. If the original life-germ of each creature is a simple particle of protoplasm, unendowed with any distinctive forces, then the whole of the complex phenomena of animal and vegetable life are effects without causes. Protoplasm may be chemically the same substance, and the germ-cell of a man and of a fish may be apparently the same, so far as the microscope can decide; but if certain cells produce men and others as uniformly produce a given species of fish, there must be a hidden constitution determining the extremely different results. If this were not so, the generation of every living creature from the uniform germ would have to be regarded as a distinct act of arbitrary creation."—"The Principles of Science," vol. ii. pp. 461-463. By Professor Jevons. "Essay on Classification," p. 75. By the late lamented Professor Agassiz.

I do not see how any Evolutionist can escape from the dilemma suggested above. Either the primordial life-cell was endowed by a presiding Creative Mind with the capacity of developing an endless variety of products; or each separate product is "a distinct act of arbitrary creation." Otherwise we must resign ourselves to the contemplation of "effects without causes."

original calamity, and that God has provided a remedy available alike, and without respect of persons, to all who come within reach of it. But that God should have ordained Baptism for the remission of sins, and yet that only those infants should receive the gift to whom He had previously granted "prevenient grace,"—this appears to me a doctrine as dishonouring to Almighty God as it is abhorrent to the moral sense of man.

But let that pass. What I am now concerned to show is not the objectionable character of the doctrine shielded by the Judicial Committee, but its flat contradiction to the language of the Prayer Book. The Court admitted the gift of regeneration to baptized infants in the abstract, but denied its certainty to every baptized infant in the concrete. Now the Baptismal Office speaks in the concrete throughout. It predicates regeneration, absolutely and certainly, of "*this* infant," "*this present* infant." In plain language, my Lord, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in order to save the Evangelical party, solemnly and deliberately declared that black was white.* "Those words" (of the Baptismal Office), says an unexceptionable witness, Lord Macaulay, "to all minds not sophisticated appear

* And yet I do not see in what way the Evangelical party, as such, could have been affected one way or the other by the Gorham Judgment. For Mr. Gorham's doctrine, as I understand it, is not the doctrine of the Evangelical party.

to assert the regenerating virtue of the Sacrament."*

In the case of *Liddell v. Westerton* the judgment of the Judicial Committee declares that, "At the date of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI., the doctrine of the English Church as to the Real Presence and the nature of the Holy Communion was undecided; the Book therefore enjoined no change in the form of the Altar, but spoke of the rite itself as the Lord's Supper, commonly called the High Mass, and of the structure indifferently by the names of the Altar and the Lord's Table. It contains a prayer for the consecration of the sacred elements, in which the sign of the Cross is to be used. The bread is to be unleavened and round as it was aforetime. The corporas, the paten, the chalice, the vestments, are all articles directed to be used in the Roman Catholic Ritual, and spoken of by those names in the Missal. But by the time when the Second Book was introduced a great change had taken place in the opinion of the English Church, and the consequence was that, on the revision of the Service, these several matters were completely altered; the use of a surplice was substituted for the several vestments previously enjoined; the prayer for consecration of the elements was omitted, though in the present Prayer Book it is restored; the bread and wine delivered to the communicants were no longer described as the Body and Blood of

* "History of England," vol. iii. p. 478.

Christ, as was the case in the First Prayer Book; the Table was no longer spoken of as the Altar, but as the Lord's Table, or as God's Board; and the Table is to have at the time of the Communion a fair white linen cloth upon it, and is to stand in the body of the Church, or in the Chancel, where morning and evening prayer are appointed to be said. And it is declared by the Rubric that, 'to take away the superstition which any person hath, or might have, in the bread and wine, it shall suffice that the bread be such as is usual to be eaten at the table with other meals,* but the best and purest wheaten bread that conveniently may be gotten. And if any of the bread and wine remain, the curate shall have it to his own use.' "†

I have quoted this passage at length as a fair illustration of the sort of scholarship which has usually presided over the ecclesiastical deliberations of the Judicial Committee. And I do not hesitate to say that an examining chaplain who did his duty would refuse to pass a candidate for Holy Orders who displayed such gross ignorance of the history of the Book of Common Prayer, and of Liturgiology generally, as is here displayed in a judgment which English Churchmen, who do know something of these things, are expected to treat with unquestioning reverence and awe.

* Their Lordships did not take the trouble to be even verbally correct. The word in the original is not *meals* but *meats*.

† Brooke's "Privy Council Judgments," pp. 68, 69.

The judgment is evidently a piece of patchwork. Such portions of it as deal with strictly legal construction are luminous and masterly, as indeed became the reputation of such men as Lords Cranworth and Wensleydale, Mr. Pemberton Leigh, Sir John Patterson, and Sir W. H. Maule. But I suppose the law members of the Court left their episcopal colleagues to deal with the theology and ecclesiastical history of the case. Anyhow these portions of the judgment revel in ignorant assumptions. Let me mark a few of them.

The First Prayer Book of Edward VI., says the Judgment, "spoke of the rite itself as the Lord's Supper, commonly called the High Mass." The First Prayer Book of Edward VI. did nothing of the kind. It spoke of "the Supper of the Lord and the Holy Communion, commonly called the Mass." The compilers of the First Prayer Book, whatever else we may think of them, were certainly theologians, and possessed a competent knowledge of theological and liturgical language. The Holy Communion never was, and never is, "commonly called the High Mass," and to make such an assertion is to betray an ignorance of the whole subject so complete as utterly to discredit the authority of the person who is guilty of it, or the Court which sanctions the blunder. In itself it is a small matter. But in theology and ecclesiastical history, just as in classical scholarship, or in the naval or military profession, a man's total unacquaintance with the subject is tested

by his ignorance of some unimportant detail, much more than by an error on a larger scale.

But it is not only in matters of unimportant details that the judgment in the Case of *Liddell v. Westerton* goes astray. Its blunders in matters of the gravest import are equally extraordinary. "The prayer for consecration of the elements," says the Court, "was omitted, though in the present Prayer Book it is restored." The Court—I presume under the instruction of its episcopal assessors—actually thought that the prayer of consecration was omitted in the Second Prayer Book of Edward VI., and only restored at the last revision in 1661! This marvellous specimen of their Lordships' knowledge of the subject on which they were gravely adjudicating was immediately and mercilessly exposed in the public press; and so, in the authorised Report of the Judgment, the blunder is amended as follows:—"Material alterations were introduced in the prayer of consecration." Not a word of regret or acknowledgment that their Lordships had been misled into a gross error of fact.

But my objection to the passage which I have quoted from the Judgment does not rest on points of mere detail, important or unimportant; I object to the whole argument which that passage was adduced to support, because it is founded on allegations which are historically untrue. It is not true that "at the date of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. the doctrine of the English Church as to the Real

Presence and the nature of the Holy Communion was undecided." And still less true is it to affirm that "by the time when the Second Prayer Book was introduced a great change had taken place in the opinion of the English Church" on the subject of the Holy Eucharist. Appeals are sometimes made to "the principles of the Reformation" by persons who, it seems to me, either know exceedingly little about "the principles of the Reformation," or only value them so far as an *ad captandum* reference to them may help to raise an unfair prejudice against a theological opponent. If there was one principle of the Reformation which was asserted, and dwelt upon, and reiterated in every variety of form, it was the solemn asseveration that, in casting off the accumulated corruptions of ages, the Church of England had no intention at all to separate herself from Catholic antiquity, or even from the existing Churches of Christendom, except on those points in which they had departed from the standard, whether of doctrine or ritual, of the undivided Church of Christ.* And, in matter of fact, the

* See the declaration of the 80th Canon of 1604 that "So far was it from the purpose of the Church of *England* to forsake and reject the Churches of *Italy, France, Spain, Germany*, or any such like Churches, in all things which they held and practised, that, as the Apology of the Church of *England* confesseth, it doth with reverence retain those Ceremonies which do neither endamage the Church of God, nor offend the minds of sober men: and only departed from them in those particular points, wherein they were fallen both from themselves in their

Act of Parliament which ratified the Second Book of King Edward negatives absolutely their Lordships' positive and unhesitating assertion that the substitution of the Second Prayer Book for the First proved that "a great change had taken place in the opinion of the English Church." The Act states distinctly that there was nothing in the First Book but what was "agreeable to the Word of God and the primitive Church, very comfortable to all good people desiring to live in Christian conversation, and most agreeable to the state of this Realm;" and secondly, "that such doubts as had been raised in the use and exercise thereof proceeded rather from the curiosity of the minister and mistakers than from any other cause." The first Act of Uniformity of Edward, moreover, affirmed of the First Book that, "by the aid of the Holy Ghost it was with one uniform agreement concluded." Archbishop Cranmer bears a similar testimony. "The manner of the Holy Communion," he says, "which is now" (in the First Prayer Book) "set forth within this realm is agreeable with the institution of Christ, with S. Paul, and the old primitive Apostolic Church, and with the right faith of the Sacrifice of Christ upon the Cross."*

ancient integrity, and from the Apostolic Churches which were their first Founders."

* "Defence of the Catholic Doctrine of the Sacrament." Bk. v. chap. 18. See Bulley's "Variations of the Communion and Baptismal Offices," p. 9.

The Protector Somerset also wrote to Cardinal Pole that there was "a common agreement of all the chief learned men of the Realm" in favour of "the form and rite of service" prescribed by the First Book.*

These strong testimonials in favour of the First Book, on the part of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of the day, do not appear to me to bear out the allegation of the Judicial Committee that "at the date of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI., the doctrine of the English Church as to the Real Presence and the nature of the Holy Communion was undecided." The truth is that the Second Prayer Book owed its existence, not to any change of opinion on the part of the English Church, but to the accidental influence then exercised on English legislation by "a revolutionary and aggressive party," to quote your Lordship's language in the House of Lords a few days ago; a party which, besides being "revolutionary and aggressive," was alien from the English Church in language, nationality, doctrine, sympathies, and respect for law. At the head of that party was a triumvirate consisting of Peter Martyr and Martin Bucer (placed by the Protector in the Regius Chair of Divinity at Oxford and Cambridge respectively), and John à Lasco, a Polish refugee, who for a time enjoyed the hospitality of Cranmer, and then started a conventicle

* See "State Papers" quoted in *Annotated Book of Common Prayer*, p. xxx.

in London. The loyalty of these foreigners to the principles of the English Reformation and to the authority of the Church, into whose high places they were thrust by Somerset, is illustrated by the fact that during the whole period of his residence in the university as Regius Professor and Canon of Christ Church Martyr obstinately refused to wear the surplice.

Those meddlesome foreigners received the support of a few native Churchmen, who were more unreasonable and intolerant than themselves, but whose unreasonableness had an excuse which cannot be pleaded on behalf of Bucer and his confederates. Henry VIII., as is well known, had conceived a thorough detestation of the doctrines of the foreign Reformers, and had himself broken a lance with Luther. Being determined to exclude these doctrines from England, he had an Act framed, in the year 1539, "for abolishing of diversity of opinions in certain articles concerning religion." This Act consisted of six articles, in favour of transubstantiation in its grossest form, communion in one kind, celibacy of the clergy, vows of chastity, private masses, and compulsory auricular confession. The Act further decreed that offenders against the doctrine of transubstantiation should be burnt, with forfeiture of their goods, as in cases of high treason; while offenders against any of the other five articles should suffer and forfeit as in cases of felony. It is worthy of remark that this draconic instrument for

putting down unpopular opinions encountered no serious opposition from the lay members of the legislature in either House of Parliament. But several of the Bishops opposed it strenuously. Cranmer, with that facility of conviction in the direction of self-interest which ever distinguished him, separated himself from his brethren, and supported the Bill through all its stages. Having undergone some slight amendment in the House of Commons, the Act received the Royal Assent on June 24, 1539, and was popularly known under the *sobriquet* of "the whip with six strings." It was repealed on the accession of Edward VI., and the attempt of the Commons to revive it in the reign of Mary was defeated by the Bishops in the House of Lords.

The effect of this atrocious Act was to banish to the Continent a number of zealous Churchmen, who, partly by the force of the recoil, and partly by their association with the Swiss Reformers during their exile, were driven to the opposite extreme, and returned to England in the reign of Edward, bent on overthrowing the constitution of the Church and reconstructing it in all respects on the model of the democratic religious bodies with which they had become familiarised abroad. In this enterprise the foreign Reformers proved powerful auxiliaries. Two of the most active of them, as already stated, had been placed in the first chairs of theology in the kingdom; and Calvin, in addition, plied Edward assiduously with letters in support of the schemes of

1.] *Second Prayer Book not approved by Convocation.* 27

the revolutionary party. His recommendations were backed up by some influential persons at Court, who probably calculated that a reformation on the Swiss pattern would be certain to relieve the Church of much property, which nobody could use so profitably as themselves. The mind of the pedantic boy who occupied the throne of the Tudors was completely turned by the artful flatteries of these men. He was persuaded to regard himself as a second good Josiah, whose name would be blessed by future generations as a great Reformer.* But the Bishops set their faces against the revolutionary proposals suggested to them, and the King, finding himself balked in that quarter, told Sir John Cheke that when Parliament met he should effect his purpose by the exercise of his Royal authority.† This threat he appears to have executed—at least partially. There is no record of the Second Prayer Book of Edward having ever been submitted to Convocation. Cardwell surmises that “the Convocation was induced to delegate its authority to a commission appointed by the King;”‡ but of this there is no proof in the records of Convocation.

* Strype’s “*Memorials of Cranmer*,” vol. ii. p. 9.

† “*Hoc non me parum recreat quod mihi D. Checus indicavit: si noluerint ipsi [episcopi] ait, efficere ut quæ mutanda sint mutentur, rex per seipsum id faciet; et cum ad parliamentum ventum fuerit ipse suæ Majestatis auctoritatem interponet.*”—See Peter Martyr’s Letter to Bucer, in Strype’s “*Memorials of Cranmer*,” vol. ii. p. 668.

‡ The “*Two Liturgies of King Edward VI.*,” p. xviii.

Crammer, as usual, seems to have played a double game. He solicited the criticism of Bucer and Martyr on the First Book, and professed, according to their own accounts, to pay much deference to their opinions. There is some evidence also, I think, that he endeavoured unsuccessfully to persuade Convocation to fall in with the King's wishes. His real opinion, however, as to the aims and character of the new Reformers, may be gathered from a letter which he wrote to the King's Council, in reply to a Royal mandate that he should peruse and report upon the Second Prayer Book. One sentence will suffice:—

"I know your Lordship's wisdom to be such as that I trust ye will not be moved with *these glorious and unquiet spirits which can like nothing but that is after their own fancy; and cease not to make trouble when things be most quiet and in good order. If such men should be heard, although the Book were made every year anew, yet it should not lack faults in their opinion.*"* This is a pregnant comment on the declaration of the Act of Parliament which ratified the Second Book, that "such doubts as had been raised in the use and exercise" of the First Book proceeded rather from "the curiosity of the Ministers and mistakers than from any other worthy cause."

The Act of Uniformity which sanctioned the Second Book, and which was passed on April 6th, 1552, enjoined that the new Book was to come into

* "State Papers, Domestic." Edward VI. xv., 15.

use on the 1st of the ensuing November. The copies of the Book which were printed in the interval, however, were so full of errors, that—partly for this reason, and partly, as it seems, because the King was anxious to have the Book revised still further in the interest of the Puritans—an Order in Council was issued on the 27th of September condemning them, and forbidding the issue of any more. On the 6th day of the following July the boy-king, who had been ailing for some months previously, died; and his Second Book of Common Prayer died with him. It seems tolerably clear that its adoption was very irregular and partial, and of questionable legality.* Its use would have been illegal before the Feast of All Saints, 1552. But all the copies printed up to the end of September in that year had been suppressed by the Order in Council already referred to. There is not a fragment of proof, that I know of, to show that any other edition had been printed in the meantime, and there is a very strong probability the other way. It was pretty evident before the end of 1552 that

* See Letter of George Withers to the Prince Elector Palatine (Zurich Letters, Second Series, pp. 159, 160.) Speaking of the suppressed edition of the Second Prayer Book he says:—“But the King, who truly feared God, not being yet satisfied with these improvements, was about to put the last finish to this work, and appointed a day for the assembling of both Houses of Parliament. All were full of hope and expectation; but in the meantime our most excellent King was taken away by an untimely death.”

the King was dying, and the perilous uncertainty as to the succession filled the minds of those in authority with apprehensions which were not likely to leave much room for deliberations about the new Prayer Book. The King himself too, knowing that his illness was incurable, had to think of other matters than the disputatious letters of Calvin and the flat-teries of self-seeking courtiers. The Duke of Northumberland, who after the death of the Protector really ruled the kingdom, was bent on securing the sceptre for his daughter-in-law, the unfortunate Lady Jane Grey, and had actually persuaded the King to appoint her his successor by Letters Patent. The partisans of Mary were equally resolute on the other side; and in the prospect of a struggle which promised to be as desolating as the Wars of the Roses, the small knot* of Puritanical Reformers and their nostrums were forgotten.

So much for the "great change" which their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have assured us "had taken place in the opinion of the English Church" in the period between the introduction of

* "There is crept and brought into the Church, by some few persons, abounding more in their own senses than wisdom would, and delighting in singularities and changes, in open and manifest disorder and offence to the godly, wise, and obedient persons by diversity of opinion, and especially in the external, decent, and lawful rites and ceremonies to be used in the Churches. So as except the same should be speedily withstood, stayed, and reformed, the inconvenience thereof were like to grow from place to place, as it were by an infection." Strype's Parker. Append. xxiv. 66.

the First Book of Edward and "the time when the Second Prayer Book was introduced." This "great change" during the period in question is a pure imagination; and the argument built upon the Second Prayer Book falls to the ground when we consider the circumstances to which it owed its existence, and the brief period during which its irregular, if not strictly illegal, use prevailed in the dioceses of such Bishops as approved of it. And upon this erroneous assumption the Court built an elaborate argument which necessarily vanishes with the mythical foundation on which it rests. There was no change of opinion, the Second Prayer Book did not receive the sanction of Convocation, and it never came into common use.

But even if their Lordships' fictions were facts, they ought in fairness to have gone on to add that the next edition of the Prayer Book on Queen Elizabeth's accession expunged the "material alterations" made in the Second Book of Edward, and reversed others. If the omission of the order to use wafer-bread in the celebration of the Holy Communion proved "a great change" in a Puritanical direction, surely any other logic than that of the Privy Council would teach us that the restoration of wafer-bread by the *Injunctions* of Elizabeth indicated an equally "great change" in a Catholic direction.

It is not my intention to criticise *seriatim* all the inaccuracies, mutual contradictions, and unfairness of the ecclesiastical decisions of the Judicial Committee,

for that would compel me to make this letter so long that it would be quite unreasonable to ask your Lordship to read it even in good type. I confine myself to the endeavour of proving that objections may be urged and sustained of such kind as not only to vitiate the judgments in question in the court of conscience but, in addition, to make obedience to them all round simply impossible. I shall, therefore, proceed with some more examples.

The Court decided, in *Martin v. Mackonochie*, that omission is prohibition; in other words, that which the law does not command it forbids. Now I appeal to your Lordship whether this is not in contradiction to one of the fundamental principles of English law. It is indeed in literal agreement with Greek law, which was founded on the maxim stated by Aristotle: * *Quæ lex non jubet vetat*. But our law rests on the Roman, of which the maxim was: *Quæ lex non jubet permittit*.†

But not only is their Lordships' ruling, as I take it, inconsistent with one of the cardinal principles of the law of the land, but it involves consequences which give it, in fact, a practical refutation. "The

* *Ἡ δὲ μὴ κελεύει [ὁ νόμος] ἀπαγορεύει*. Eth. Bk. v. ch. 11.

† Cum apud Græcos leges non juris tantum, sed virtutis causa ferrentur, legibus præcepta continebantur quibus magistratus edicebant quæ fieri vellent. Apud nos autem, stricto jure inter Romanos jam orto, lex nihil jubet, sed quæ fieri nolit, edicit, ita ut contraria Aristoteli jam nunc obtineat regula: *quæ lex non jubet permittit*." Michelet, "Commentar. ad Aristot. Ethic. Nicom.," p. 195.

Prayer Book in the Preface," they say, "divides all ceremonies into these two classes: those which are retained are specified, whereas none are abolished especially, or by name; but it is assumed that all are abolished which are not expressly retained."*

Further on their Lordships profess to be guided by the rules laid down by the same Court in the Case of *Liddell v. Westerton*—which, by the way, their Lordships both here and in the *Purchas Case* persist in calling erroneously "the case of *Westerton v. Liddell*."† In that Case their Lordships were "not prepared to hold that the use of all articles not expressly mentioned in the Rubrics, although quite consistent with, and even subsidiary to, the service is forbidden." And they mention "organs," "pews, cushions to kneel upon, pulpit-cloths, hassocks, seats by the Communion Table,"‡ as falling under the shelter of this definition.

The Judges in the *Mackonochie Case* quote this part of their predecessors' judgment quite accurately, and add: "In these conclusions and in this construction of the Rubric their Lordships entirely concur, and they go far, in their Lordships' opinion, to decide this part of the case." And then, having thus clearly and accurately laid out their ground of argument and established their premisses, they come to the extraordinary conclusion that lights at the celebration

* Brooke's "Privy Council Judgments," p. 125.

† Ibid. pp. 124-127.

‡ Ibid. p. 74.

of the Holy Communion "are clearly" forbidden by the Ornaments Rubric, because "they are not subsidiary to the service, for they do not aid or facilitate, much less are they necessary to the Service." Now the "construction of the Rubric," in which their Lordships professed to "entirely concur," and which they quoted correctly, admitted the legitimacy of "articles which are *consistent with*, and even subsidiary to, the Services." What right had their Lordships to disregard the words which I have printed in italics? I could have understood their ignoring the case of *Liddell v. Westerton* altogether. But to refer to it pointedly and repeatedly by way of precedent, to quote its construction of the Rubric accurately, to declare their intention of abiding strictly by that construction, and then to decide in utter violation of one of its saving clauses! Surely, my Lord, this is very strange. If they had adhered to their premisses, what they had to consider was not merely whether "lighted candles" are "subsidiary to the service," but whether they are "consistent with" it. Yet they condemned them entirely on the former ground, and completely ignored the latter! "The authorities cited," their Lordships admit, "show beyond all doubt the very ancient and general use in the Church of these symbolical lights," and their prescribed use in the Church of England in particular within a certain period after the Reformation. The evident inference, therefore, would seem to be that they belong to the category of "articles which are consistent

with," if not "subsidiary to, the services." I have seen pews which, so far from being "subsidiary to the service," required a very wide latitude of construction to make them even "consistent with" it. All parishioners have equally a right to a seat in their parish church, and a system which usurps those rights by making the seats the private property of certain persons can hardly be considered "consistent with the service." And as to "cushions to kneel upon, pulpit-cloths, hassocks," I fancy that in many churches they would be considered as anything but "subsidiary to the service." So that the rule, in fact, remands the question to the common sense and requirements of different congregations; and I have little doubt that the Judicial Committee in the Case of *Liddell v. Westerton* would have thus dealt with what are called altar lights if the question had been before them.

You will observe, my Lord, that I am not at present arguing either for or against the legality or advisability of altar lights on general grounds; I am merely pointing out some of the arbitrary and illogical reasons by which the Court in the *Mackonochie* case justified their condemnation. First they appeal to and discuss a previous ruling of the Court; then they declare their "entire concurrence in this construction," and give it as their opinion that it "goes far to decide this part of the case;" and then they fling away one half of the rule which they had professed to follow, and condemn the defendant

under the other half! After this achievement it was natural enough and consistent that they should immediately revert to their old maxim, and add: "Nor can a separate and independent ornament previously in use be said to be consistent with a Rubric which is silent as to it, and which, *by necessary implication, abolishes what it does not retain.*" As if, forsooth, this were not as fatal to organs, credence-tables, "pulpit-cloths," and "cushions to kneel upon," as to lighted candles!

But, in truth, my Lord, if we are to hold that "a Rubric which is silent as to" any article of clerical dress or ornament of the fabric "by necessary implication abolishes what it does not retain," we shall not only find ourselves landed in sundry absurd conclusions, but we shall, moreover, be running our heads against the stonewalls of historical facts; and I venture to think that, in the long run, our heads will get the worst of it. The first Rubric of the Hereford Missal, for example, runs as follows:—"Ad introitum Missæ postquam sacerdos induerit se amictum et album, stans ante altare incipiat Antiphonam."* Are we to infer from this that the chasuble was forbidden by the Hereford Use, and that the only legal vestments for the priest during the celebration of the Holy Communion were the amice and alb? That is the inevitable conclusion from the maxim laid down by the Court in the *Mackonochie*

* Maskell's "Ancient Liturgy of the Church of England," p. 8.

Case. But it is a conclusion directly in the teeth of historical facts. And the opening Rubric in the York Missal supplies a still more ludicrous illustration. "Quando presbyter lavat manus suas," says that Rubric, "ante Missam dicat hanc orationem."* Does omission mean prohibition here? If it does, we must conclude that in the diocese of York, before the Reformation, the celebrant wore no vestments at all, the only adornment imperative upon him by the Rubric being the washing of his hands.

It would be easy, my Lord, to multiply instances of the extraordinary results which would necessarily follow from a strict adherence to the Rubrical law laid down in the *Mackonochie* Judgment; but I shall conclude this part of my argument with one more illustration.

In the case of *Sheppard v. Bennett* Dr. Stephens argued that the "Second Prayer Book . . . prohibited all manual acts in the Prayer of Consecration." This was rather too much for the Court, and gave rise to the following instructive interpellation:—

"LORD JUSTICE MELLISH: Was there no direction to break the bread?

"MR. STEPHENS: There was no direction.

"ARCHBISHOP OF YORK: Your argument would prove too much.

"LORD CHANCELLOR: There must, *ex necessitate*, here be some manual acts.

* "*Missale ad Usus insignis Ecclesiæ Eboracensis*," i. 165. (Surtees Society's Publications.)

“MR. STEPHENS: My contention is, there were none; and your Lordships have already ruled that ‘omission is prohibition.’

“ARCHBISHOP OF YORK: Then in 1552 the minister could not take the paten or the chalice in his hand?

“MR. STEPHENS: No.”

If the *Mackonochie* Judgment is good law, Dr. Stephens’s argument is unanswerable, and the Archbishop of York, who sat as one of the judges in that Court, ought to have known so. His Grace has written a book on logic, and it ought not therefore to be necessary to remind him that it is a fundamental rule in logic that a disputant cannot take as much of an argument as he pleases. He must take it with all its consequences, or he must just leave it alone.

Dr. Stephens’s argument is of course merely a *reductio ad absurdum* of Privy Council Law, and Mr. Grueber has furnished the following remarkable historical illustration of it:—

“The case occurred A.D. 1573. It was heard before Queen Elizabeth’s High Commissioners. The Commissioners were Dr. Sandys, Bishop of London; the Lord Chief Justice; Gabriel Goodman, Dean of Westminster; and others. The party accused was Robert Johnson, Chaplain to the Lord Keeper Bacon. The charge laid against him was the omitting “*to repeat the Words of Institution*” when in the Administration of the Sacrament more

wine was required than had been previously consecrated.

“It must be borne in mind that there was at that time no Rubric, as there is now, prescribing the form or manner of consecrating more Bread and Wine, when that which had been consecrated was ‘all spent.’

“Johnson’s Defence was as follows:—

‘I answer under protestation, that at no time in the celebrating of the Communion have I omitted any prayer or words of Institution which the order of the Book prescribeth, but have used them in as full and ample manner as they are appointed; but sometimes upon occasion, when the wine failed, I sent for more, which I delivered to the people with the words appointed in the Book to be said at the delivery of the Sacrament, not again repeating the words of Institution, partly for that, it being one entire action and one Supper, the words of Institution spoken were sufficient, as I do take it; and partly for that in the Book of Common Prayer there is *no such order appointed*, unto which in this case I do refer myself.’

“What follows,” Mr. Russell says, “is copied verbatim from Johnson’s report of his trial, the spelling only being modernized:—

‘The Bishop of London: The Consecration of the Sacrament; for, in that it had not the word, it was no Sacrament, and so the people were mocked.—Robert Johnson: My Lord, I did not mock the people, for it was a Sacrament.—Dean of Westminster:—Saint Augustine saith, ‘*Accedat verbum ad elementum, et fit Sacramentum.*’ Now you lacked the word, therefore it was no Sacrament.—Robert Johnson: I had the word.—Bishop of London: How had you the word, when you confess that you recited not the Institution?—Robert Johnson: I had recited the Institution afore, and that was sufficient.—

Dean of Westminster : Yea, for that bread and wine that was present, but when you did send for more bread and wine you should have again rehearsed the words of Institution.—Robert Johnson: *The Book appointed no such order.*—Bishop of London: Yes, sir, the Book sayeth you shall have there sufficient bread and wine, and then the prayer of Institution must be recited ; for as much as you had not sufficient, therefore you should have repeated the Institution.—Robert Johnson : There is *no such caveat nor proviso appointed in the Book.*—Bishop of London: But what is the meaning of the Book?—Robert Johnson : Men may make what meaning they list, *but I refer myself to the Book, whether it be so appointed or no.* '*

It only remains to add that the Rev. Robert Johnson was found guilty, and imprisoned for prematurely anticipating one of the many singular *dicta* of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Upon the whole, then, I humbly venture to think that a decision built upon a maxim which is a direct contradictory of one of the acknowledged canons of English law, and which leads to a *reductio ad absurdum* in addition, is not well calculated to command the respect and loyalty of law-loving subjects.

And now, my Lord, I come to the *fons et origo malorum*—the notorious Purchas Judgment. Till that most unfortunate "outrage upon law, logic, and history," as I heard one of the most distinguished laymen of the day characterize it on the morrow of its delivery, the great majority even of the Ritualists submitted to the ruling of the previous judgments of the Judicial Committee. Altar lights and incense were generally discontinued even by those who

* "Omission not Prohibition." By Rev. C. S. Grueber, pp. 81, 82.

thought the Judicial interpretation of the law bearing on these points an erroneous one. I verily believe that if matters had been allowed to rest there the progress of Ritualism would have been seriously checked. But when the excitement in the *Mackonochie* Case was beginning to calm down, out came that marvellous exhibition of everything which a judicial decision should not be. In short, my Lord, the Purchas Judgment was generally accepted, by friends and foes, as a declaration of war against the whole High Church party; and it was immediately met by a Protest, combining in one phalanx of opposition such names as the Dean of Chichester, Dean of Durham, Dean of St. Paul's, Dean of York, Mr. Golightly, Dr. Pusey, Dr. Liddon, Mr. Charles Kingsley, and the late Mr. Maurice. I saw moreover, at the time, a letter from one of our leading Evangelical Bishops in which he said that he thought the Judgment so unfair and such a misconstruction of the Rubric, that he wrote at once to such of his clergy as he knew would be affected by it, to assure them that if they chose to disregard it he should not interfere with them. It was instinctively felt by all parties in the Church alike, except by the narrow clique of fanatics on whom the Bishop of Peterborough bestowed the *sobriquet* of "The Prosecution Company Limited," that a crisis had been reached, and that a firm stand must at last be made against the decisions, miscalled "lawful," of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It was

in no spirit of "lawlessness," my Lord, that this attitude was assumed towards the Judicial Committee; the combination of the representative names which I have mentioned is a guarantee against any such assumption. On the contrary, it was because men, to many of whom Ritualism was indifferent or even distasteful, were driven to the conclusion that the law had been misinterpreted, in order to put down an unpopular party, and that Justice must accordingly be vindicated in this particular against the mistakes of her ministers. The character and magnitude of these mistakes I shall now endeavour to place before your Lordship. And let me add, that the question which I am at present discussing is not whether Ritualism is a good or bad, a wise or an unwise thing in itself. Considerations of that sort are entirely irrelevant, and my argument would not be affected in the least if the practices in dispute were as detestable as those of the Indian Thuggee. For I hold—what, indeed, is no more than a cardinal principle of English justice—that it is a thousand times better that the most atrocious crime that can be imagined should be acquitted according to law, than that it should be condemned contrary to the law. We have lately seen the usual course of English justice deranged, and the country put to enormous expense, in order to ensure a fair trial to a criminal whose guilt, after the preliminary trial, none but fools or knaves could controvert. I have seen the Purchas Judgment pooh-poohed as of no

consequence one way or the other, because the matters *sub judice* belonged to the category of "the infinitely little." But this is a superficial fallacy. It is because men despise "the infinitely little," that errors are usually allowed to accumulate into a system. Neglect of the "infinitely little" produced the False Decretals, and the False Decretals have culminated in the portentous propositions of the "Syllabus" and the gigantic dogma of the Vatican. Hampden's resistance to ship-money was materially a very small matter—the question of only twenty shillings; and the law had declared against him. But in the womb of that controversy were struggling two antagonistic principles of civil government, the conflict of which deluged England with blood. The only safe rule in all such cases is: *Principiis obsta.* It is no small matter, in my humble judgment, that the laws of England should be administered in an impartial spirit, and with strict regard to historical truth. How far the Purchas Judgment fulfils these conditions shall now be shown. I am not, of course, going to enter upon anything like an exhaustive scrutiny of it. To test it in a few typical instances will sufficiently answer my purpose, and will enable me, at the same time, to make as little demand as possible on your Lordship's patience.

Let us begin, then, with the question of the Eucharistic Vestments.

The battle-field of the dispute is of course the Ornaments Rubric, in the beginning of the

last Edition of the Prayer Book, and which runs as follows :—

“ And here is to be noted, that such Ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their ministration, shall be retained, and be in use, as were in this Church of England, by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth.”

I believe, my Lord, that a judge unimbued with ecclesiastical prejudices—let us say a Jew or a Parsee—but possessing a competent knowledge of the English language, and of the principles of English law, would have no difficulty whatever in interpreting this Rubric. It being conceded that the word “ornaments” includes the vestments of the clergy as well as the furniture of the fabric, he would set himself to discover what ornaments were actually in use “by the authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth,” and he would conclude that whatever ornament was then legally in use in any of the religious offices of the Church was by this Rubric prescribed anew. He would not trouble himself to examine any intermediate legislation, rightly believing that any such examination would simply be an irrelevant digression. He would assume that the authors of the Rubric were men of ordinary intelligence, who meant what they said. But, in any case, he would consider himself bound by the grammatical construction of the Rubric, which necessarily limited the scope of

his inquiries to the definite period of time mentioned therein. He would refuse to be led astray by such *πάρεργα* as the Advertisements of Elizabeth or the Canons of King James, feeling that the discussion of such topics would be as little *ad rem* as a dissertation on the Laws of the Twelve Tables, or on the Institutions of Lycurgus.

If, instead of dealing with home polemics, the Purchas Case had to do with some dispute about Hindoo or Mohammedan ritual, I have no sort of doubt that this is the view which their Lordships would have taken of their duties as judicial interpreters. Nor, my Lord, is this merely the opinion of persons of no repute like myself. It is the opinion of lawyers whose names carry as much weight at least as that of any of the distinguished persons who tried Mr. Purchas. Let one or two quotations suffice.

“The Act of Uniformity [of which the Ornaments Rubric is a part] is to be construed,” says Sir J. T. Coleridge, himself erewhile a distinguished ornament of the Judicial Committee, “by the same rules exactly as any Act passed in the last Session of Parliament. The Clause in question (by which I mean the Rubric in question) is perfectly unambiguous in language, free from all difficulty as to construction; it therefore lets in no argument as to intention other than that which the words themselves import. There might be a seeming difficulty in *fact*, because it might not be known

what vestments were in use by authority of Parliament in the Second Year of King Edward VI.; but this difficulty has been removed. It is conceded in the Report that the Vestments, the use of which is now condemned, were in use by authority of Parliament in that year. Having that fact, you are bound to construe the Rubric as if those Vestments were specifically named in it, instead of being only referred to. If an Act should be passed to-morrow that the uniform of the Guards should henceforth be such as was ordered for them by authority, and used by them in the 1st Geo. I., you would first ascertain what that uniform was; and, having ascertained it, you would not inquire into the changes which may have been made, many or few, with or without lawful authority, between the 1st Geo. I. and the new Act? All these that Act, specifying the certain date, would have made wholly immaterial. It would have seemed strange, I suppose, if a commanding officer, disobeying the statute, had said in his defence—"There have been many changes since the reign of George I.; and as to "retaining," we put a gloss on that, and thought it might mean only retaining to the Queen's use; so we have put the uniforms safely in store." But, I think, it would have seemed more strange to punish and mulct him severely if he had obeyed the law, and put no gloss on plain words."*

I suppose the opinion of Mr. Justice James would

* "Remarks on Report of Judicial Committee," pp. 7, 8.

be considered at the Bar equal to that of any member of the Court in the case of Mr. Purchas; and this is what he says:—

“I have read the Case printed as a Case submitted on the part of the ‘several Archbishops and Bishops’ to Counsel, and the opinion of Counsel thereon; and, with the most unfeigned respect for the Counsel whose names appear as subscribing the opinion [your Lordship was one of them], *I am really unable to bring my mind to entertain a doubt upon the subject*” of the Ornaments Rubric.

“I could easily understand the case and the reason of the opinion if the question were the converse of that which is the actual question to be determined; viz., if the question were whether any proceedings could be successfully taken against clergymen not using the Ornaments which ‘were in use in this Church of England, by authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI.’ But the disuse, which may be suggested as an excuse in a penal proceeding for not strictly following a prescribed rule, because it has become obsolete, does not seem to me to afford the slightest ground for imputing illegality to those who obey the very letter of the rule, and decline to avail themselves of such excuse. To say, as appears to me to have been said, that the words ‘shall be retained and be in use’ did, in the Rubric at the time when the Rubric was made, mean ‘there is only to be a retainer of things which, being then prescribed, have since been and continue to

be in use at this day, and that the use of things then prescribed and now fallen into disuse is forbidden'—seems to me to be a most unnatural interpretation, and the most violent implication. If they did not at the time mean so, of course no subsequent desuetude can make obedience to the prescribed rule now illegal. But if at the time they meant so, it certainly is a most singular form of expression, not used by ignorant men, not used by a *parliamentum indoctum*, but used by learned theologians—men acquainted with and fully alive to all the controversies which had in the interval disturbed the country and a large part of Christendom on this very subject.”*

So much as to the grammatical and logical—and I will presume to add the legal—meaning of the Ornaments Rubric. But since the Court, as I humbly venture to think, chose to travel out of the record, and to import into the argument matters which eminent lawyers consider extraneous to the case, it becomes necessary to follow it in this irrelevant digression.

Their Lordships, finding it impossible to evade the plain meaning of the Rubric, had recourse to various expedients for explaining it away. And very remarkable some of these expedients are. Referring to Queen Elizabeth's Prayer Book which repealed the Rubric of the Second Book forbidding the Eucharistic Vestments, and to Elizabeth's Act of Uni-

* First Report of Rit. Comm., pp. 155-6.

formity which brought back the ritual of the First Book of Edward, their Lordships say,—“It was not, apparently, thought desirable to effect an immediate outward change of ceremonies, although the adoption of the Second Prayer Book of Edward VI., in lieu of the First, had effected a great change in the very substance of the Communion Service, with which the theory of the peculiar Vestments (the *albe* and *chasuble*) was closely connected.”

What “great change in the very substance of the Communion Service” did their Lordships mean? Were they, too, under the impression that the Second Prayer Book abolished the Consecration Prayer? However that may be, the assertion that “the adoption of the Second Prayer Book of Edward VI., in lieu of the first, had effected a great change” in the doctrinal attitude of the Church of England rests, as I have already shown, on no solid foundation.

“The Rubric and the proviso together,” their Lordships go on to argue, “seem to restore for the present the Ornaments of the Minister which the Second Prayer Book of King Edward had taken away.” “Seem to restore!” my Lord. Is this the language of men bent upon “applying to the construction of the Articles and Liturgy the same rules which have been long established, and are by law applicable to the construction of all written instruments:”^{*} Or is it the language of men who are determined to find

* Gorham Judgment, Brooke’s Report, p. 1.

arguments to support a foregone conclusion? But let us proceed with the quotation:—

“But Sandys, afterwards Archbishop of York, who assisted at the revision of the Prayer Book, gives to Archbishop Parker a different suggestion. ‘Our gloss upon this text,’ he says, ‘is that we shall not be forced to use them (the Ornaments) but that others in the meantime shall not convey them away, but that they shall remain for the Queen.’”

Now, assuming the validity of Bishop Sandys’s gloss, what is the plain inference? Surely that, in the opinion of Sandys and the Puritans for whom he spoke, “the Rubric and the proviso together” not only “*seemed* to restore,” but actually did restore, the legality of the Vestments abolished by the Second Prayer Book; the only question being whether the Puritans “should be forced to use them;” or whether, on the contrary, the “other order” promised by the Act of Uniformity should sanction, for their benefit, the use of a lower type of ritual. In other words, the “gloss” of Bishop Sandys proves that the contemporaneous interpretation put by the Puritans on the Rubric of Elizabeth’s Prayer Book and on the twenty-fifth clause [some mysterious fatality seems to lurk in twenty-fifth clauses] of the Act of Uniformity was, that they legalised the Eucharistic Vestments as a maximum of ritual, but promised a minimum by way of relaxation to the Puritans, who meanwhile should “not be forced to use them.” That is to say, Sandys proves the contradictory of

the conclusion in support of which their Lordships quoted him.

You will observe further, my Lord, that the Eucharistic Vestments were not to be destroyed, were not to be "conveyed away;" in the opinion even of the Puritans of the day, they were to "remain for the Queen." A most incomprehensible provision if it was intended to abolish them altogether. What on earth was the Queen to do with them? Was she to convert them into dresses for herself or for her courtiers? Did she purpose to replenish her exchequer by a public sale of them? Their Lordships should really have offered some explanation, or at least hazarded some conjecture on this point. But since they have failed to do so, I must take the liberty of suggesting what appears to me to be the common-sense view of the matter. "As the reformation of abuses in religion," says Strype, "went forward under such a King [Edward VI.] and such an Archbishop [Cranmer], so there wanted not for evils accompanying it, as there do commonly the best things; the profaneness of some, and the covetousness of others, giving occasion thereunto." And he quotes from a proclamation put forth by the King, in which it was said that these profane and covetous persons were "making the same [churches], which were properly appointed to God's service and common-prayer, like a stable or common inn, or rather a den or sink of all unchristiness." "Besides the profanation of churches."

Strype goes on to say, "there prevailed now another evil, relating also to churches, viz., that the utensils and ornaments of these sacred places were spoiled, embezzled, and made away, partly by the churchwardens and partly by other parishioners."*

This was in the year 1548, that is, even before the First Prayer Book of Edward was put forth, and while the pre-Reformation ritual remained in all respects intact. It is easy to understand how these disorders would be aggravated on the accession of Queen Elizabeth, and how necessary it was to prevent the embezzlement of Eucharistic Vestments and other goods.

But why should strict inventories be made of these things? And why should they "remain for the Queen?" Not for her own personal use unquestionably: but in order that there should be a legal record of them, and that they should "be retained" till better times, even in those churches in which it was not intended, according to the gloss of Sandys, to "enforce their use." This is clearly the meaning of the XLVIIth of Queen Elizabeth's Injunctions: "That the churchwardens of every parish shall deliver unto our visitors the inventories of vestments, copes, and other ornaments . . . appertaining to the church." They were not to be removed from the church, but to be "retained" there, and the churchwardens were made responsible for their safe custody.

* "Mem. of Cranmer," vol. ii. p. 89.

But, their Lordships argue, the Act of Uniformity of Elizabeth, which "seemed to restore for the present" the Eucharistic Vestments, did so, at all events, only "until other order shall be therein taken by the authority of the Queen's Majesty." That "other order" appeared when the Advertisements of 1564 were published; and these Advertisements "make order for the Vesture of the Minister in these words—'In the ministration of the Holy Communion in Cathedrals and Collegiate Churches the principal Minister shall wear a cope, with Gospeler and Epistoler agreeably, and at all other prayers to be said at the Communion Table to use no copes but surplices.'

"'That any Minister saying any public prayers or ministering the Sacraments or other rites of the Church shall wear a comely surplice with sleeves, to be provided at the charge of the parish.' " *

In their Lordships' judgment, therefore, the Advertisements made the cope in Cathedrals and Collegiate Churches and the surplice in all other Churches the only permissible Vestments in all religious services. And they attempt to support this opinion by such arguments as the following:— "These Advertisements were very actively enforced within a few years of their publication." And what they mean by enforced is "that the chasubles, or vestments, and the albs, were systematically defaced, destroyed, or put to other uses." To prove this

* "Brooke's Report," p. 169.

they quote from the Visitation Articles of Archbishop Grindal and Archbishop Parker. I shall deal with Archbishop Parker presently. Meanwhile let us see what Grindal's inquiries prove, if they are to be accepted as evidence in settling the intention of the Advertisements. He inquired "whether all vestments, albs, stoles, phanons, pixes, paxes, hand-bells, sacring-bells, censers, crismatories, crosses, candle-sticks, holy water, stocks,* images, and such other reliques and monuments of superstition and idolatrie be utterly defaced, broken, and destroyed."

I make this quotation from the Purchas Judgment, and I solicit your Lordship's particular attention to its importance. It proves too much, or it proves nothing at all. For if we are to conclude that all things which happened to be destroyed under the Advertisements of Queen Elizabeth are now illegal, or that at least as many of them are illegal as were destroyed by the authority of those "Archbishops and Bishops" who were charged to put the Advertisements in force, it follows that crosses and candlesticks are now illegal. But crosses and candlesticks have been declared legal by previous decisions of this very same Court. Nor can their Lordships urge here what I must really call the wretched plea

* I quote this verbatim from the Report of the Purchas Judgment. But if I had the original to refer to I have no doubt that, instead of "holy water, stocks," I should find "holy water stoups."

by which they endeavoured to evade the interpretation of the Ornaments Rubric by the Court of Appeal in *Liddell v. Westerton*, viz., "that this question of the *Vestments* was not before the Court." The question of the cross and candlesticks was before the Court, and they were ruled to be legal under the Ornaments Rubric, the Advertisements of Elizabeth notwithstanding. If therefore the Eucharistic Vestments are illegal because "the chasuble, alb, and tunicle, were swept away with severe exactness,"* under the operation of Queen Elizabeth's Advertisements, the cross and candles must be illegal for the same reason. Their Lordships have thus placed themselves in a dilemma, and I leave them to impale themselves on whichever horn of it they may consider most compatible with their dignity. Either the Eucharistic Vestments are not condemned by the Advertisements of Elizabeth; or the decision of the Judicial Committee in favour of the legality of crosses is bad in law. I might add embroidered altar cloths, which were declared legal by the Judicial Committee in *Liddell v. Westerton*, but which were also "swept away with severe exactness in the time of Queen Elizabeth."

I really think, my Lord, that I might stop here, for I have destroyed the keystone of the arch on which the Purchas Judgment reposes. But the admirers of that Judgment are like the Russian soldiers of whom Napoleon said, that "it was not

* *Purchas Judgment*. "Brooke's Report," p. 182.

enough to kill them ; you must knock them down." So I proceed with my criticism.

Not only is their Lordships' inference against the Vestments from the Advertisements of Elizabeth exploded by the fact of its proving too much, but it is positively inconsistent with the facts of the case. Cardwell studied this question with a thoroughness to which of course the Judges in the Purchas Case can make no pretension, and this is his deliberate verdict on the meaning of the Rubric of 1559 and the Advertisements of 1564:—"But the Rubric of 1559, that restored* the Ornaments and Vestments of the second year of King Edward, was extremely galling to the exiles, and would probably have prevented the greater number of them from becoming Ministers of the Church, had not the Act of Uniformity furnished them with a plea for complying. It had been enacted that the Queen, with the advice of her Commissioners or the Metropolitan, might make such changes in the Rubrics as might afterwards be found requisite. The Reformers therefore were not without some reason for hoping that their brethren who might be advanced to high stations in the Church would maintain their present spirit of moderation, and exercise a salutary influence on the future proceedings of the

* He knew too much of the subject, and understood English grammar better than to affirm, with their Lordships, that the Rubric "seemed to restore."

Court.* But the clauses in question, however available for such purposes, were probably introduced with very different designs. *It appears that they were added to the Bill at the express direction of the Queen, and were intended to assist her in carrying forward the high views of doctrine and authority which she was known to entertain.*"†

It appears, therefore, on the high authority of Dr. Cardwell, that the intention of the Advertisements was to insist on the use of the surplice as a minimum, and to pave the way for the gradual introduction of the Vestments, which were to "be retained" in all Churches meanwhile. And this is the only conclusion which will suit the facts. Can we really believe that so astute a person as Queen Elizabeth, aided by those sagacious counsellors, on whose co-operation in the matter Sir W. Vernon Harcourt discoursed the other evening in his vapid declamation,‡ would wantonly have "restored the Ornaments and Vestments of the second year of King Edward" merely for the purpose of declaring, in the Act of Uniformity which sanctioned them, that they were to be presently repealed by some "other order?" I take the liberty of suggesting that the Queen and her advisers—notwithstanding the

* He quotes in a note the passage from the letter of Sandys which has been commented on above.

† Cardwell's "Conferences," pp. 86, 87.

‡ Speech on Second Reading of Public Worship Regulation Bill, July 9th.

superior knowledge of history, of which Sir William Harcourt claims a monopoly, and notwithstanding the decision of the Purchas Judgment—were neither drivelling idiots nor petulant mischief-makers. And either of these they must have been if they had deliberately revived vestments in 1559, not with the intention that they should be used, but, on the contrary, that they should be finally abolished in 1564, after they had stirred up all the Puritan blood in the land to fever heat meanwhile. History has its doctrine of probabilities as well as mathematical science, and a theory which violates all the probabilities of the case may be dismissed at once without further consideration. There was a valuable maxim in the Roman law, which is applicable to this point, and which, by the way, is usually misinterpreted in common parlance. When a Roman judge wished to find a clue to the intention of an act, he asked *Cui bono?* to whose advantage? who would benefit by it? Test my interpretation of Queen Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity and Advertisements and that of the Judicial Committee by this maxim. Who would benefit by their interpretation? Nobody in the world. It would breed mischief all round, without an atom of compensating advantage. According to my theory, on the other hand, Queen Elizabeth had a definite purpose, and expected to reap a definite advantage. The stringent enforcement of the surplice on all would help to curb the unbridled anarchy of the Puritan party; while the re-enactment of the vest-

ments, and the clause enjoining their retention, even where it would not be prudent under the circumstances to enforce their use, would leave a door open for their assumption wherever it might be possible. We are apt to think that the Puritanical disorders of that time were something of the same kind as the rubrical irregularities of our own day. This is quite an error. It was the rule of the Puritans, in the early part of Elizabeth's reign, to use no vestments of any sort, but to perform all their religious ministrations in their ordinary dress. This explains why such a point was made by those in authority of insisting on the surplice. Cardwell, speaking of Archbishop Parker's Articles of Visitation in 1567—three years, that is, after the publication of the Advertisements—says: "The Articles themselves, although intended primarily for the diocese of Norwich, were strictly applicable to the general condition of the Church, and afford evidence of the following facts connected with the progress of its history; that *Puritanism and not Popery* was now the opponent to be dreaded; that the contest with Puritanism was now no longer respecting forms and ceremonies, but principles and doctrines; that opinions were inculcated adverse to good morals and destructive to Church authority; and lastly, that the disorders existing in the Church had seriously affected the duties owing to the State."*

* Doc. Ann. i. 888. The Bishop of Norwich, to whom these Articles were addressed, was John Parkhurst, and the following

To argue that because, in such a condition of things, the authorities in Church and State did not attempt the impossible task of enforcing the full measure of lawful ritual, and contented themselves with a minimum, therefore the maximum became *ipso facto* unlawful, is surely a singular specimen of historical logic. The Rubric of 1559, which re-enacted the ritual of the First Book of Edward, and which had the force of a Parliamentary Statute, remained intact; and we are calmly asked by a Court of Final Appeal in England, in the year of grace 1871, to believe that this statutory enactment, still retaining its place in the Prayer Book, was repealed by certain Episcopal admonitions which insisted on the enforcement of part of it; these admonitions, moreover, being themselves entirely without force of law! Really, my Lord, to ask reasonable beings to accept a *dictum* like this, even on the august authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, is extract from a letter of his to Bullinger will show what manner of man he was, and to what a length the iconoclastic fury of the Puritans could go:—

“After I had written this, lo! good news was brought me, namely, that the crucifix and candlesticks in the Queen’s Chapel are broken in pieces, and, as some one has brought me word, reduced to ashes. A good riddance of such a cross as that!”—Zurich Letters; First Series; p. 122.

If Puritanism could break into the Queen’s private chapel and commit outrages like this, is it so very certain that the vestments and crosses, which “were swept away with severe exactness in the time of Queen Elizabeth,” were swept away by authority of her Advertisements?

to ask them to abdicate their reason altogether and take refuge in credulity. It might be argued with just as much reason that because the Advertisements ordered that, "If the parson be able, he shall preach in his own person every three months,"* therefore it was unlawful to preach oftener. Or because he was commanded to "read daily at the least one chapter of the Old Testament, and another of the New,"† therefore he was forbidden to obey, if he chose, the Rubric which plainly commands the reading of two chapters daily from each Testament.

I presume that no lawyer would dispute my assertion that the Advertisements of Elizabeth had no force in law—at least before the Canons of 1603, if then. But since this Letter will probably find its way into the hands of men who are not lawyers, it may be well to refer to one or two authorities.

Mr. Stephens writes of them thus:—"Which other order (at least in the way prescribed in this Act) was never made; and therefore, legally, the Ornaments of Ministers in performing Divine Service are the same now as they were in the 2nd of Edward VI."‡ Dr. Burn says:—"Which other order as to this matter was never taken."§ "Which other order," says Bishop Gibson, "(at least in the method prescribed by this Act) was never yet made; and therefore *legally* the Ornaments of Ministers in performing Divine Service

* Cardwell Doc. Ann., i. 825.

† Cardwell i. 881. Collier Eccl. Hist. vi. 891.

‡ Eccl. Stat. i. 870.

§ Eccl. Law, iii. 487.

are the same now as they were in 2nd Edward VI.”* And Secretary Cecil, whose testimony on this point may be considered decisive, declared in writing at the time of their publication that the Advertisements had no legal authority. He described them as “Ordinances accorded by the Archbishop of Canterbury, etc., in his Province.” And he adds emphatically; “these were not authorised nor published.”† Lastly, Collier tells us that “the Queen, as was observed, refused to confirm these ‘Advertisements,’ though drawn at her direction.”‡ And he adds that “the ‘Advertisements’ were checked at present by the interposing of the Earl of Leicester, of Knolles, and some other Court patrons of the Dissenters.” This clearly shows, what indeed is indisputable from other sources, that the Advertisements were aimed exclusively at defects in ritual. Let one contemporary witness suffice. George Withers, in a long letter to the Prince Elector Palatine, gives a sketch of the English Reformation down to the issuing of the Advertisements. On the accession of Elizabeth, he says, “the second form of prayers, which Edward left behind him at his death, was restored to the Church. But the ceremonies which, as was above stated, were retained in the Church at the first Reformation of Edward, are restored under the same name. Power, moreover, was

* Codex, Vol. I., p. 297.

† Strype's *Life of Parker*, p. 158. “Published” is used by Cecil in a technical sense, meaning *legally* published.

‡ *Ecol. Hist.* vi. 891, 892.

given to the Queen and the Archbishop to introduce whatever *additional* ceremonies they might think proper; and they immediately afterwards both discontinued the ordinary bread heretofore used in the administration of the Lord's Supper, and for the sake of a newer reformation adopted the round wafer, after the manner of that used by the Papists."* George Withers was one of the chief Puritan leaders of the time, and his testimony is therefore valuable, as showing the sense in which the Puritans understood the Advertisements. They knew, in fact, that they were aimed at them; and that, so far from intending to curtail or repress the Ritual of the First Prayer Book in any way, the authors of the Advertisements wished to bring about its gradual re-introduction. And this is Collier's view of the matter. "The application" of the Puritan party, he says, for toleration in their nonconformity to the Rubric of 1559 (which re-imposed the Ritual of the First Prayer Book) was "well received by the Earl of Leicester," and "was not without its effect: for now the Queen seemed not unwilling to relax in the discipline of the Church, and come towards an indulgence for the Dissenters. But the Bishops, receiving no countermand to their former directions, drew up several Articles, entitled 'Advertisements.' They were first styled 'Ordinances'† accorded by

* Zurich Letters, Second Series, p. 161.

† This is the name by which they are mentioned by Cecil. See p. 62.

the Archbishop of Canterbury, etc., in his Province.' But the Queen's zeal growing cool, and refusing to enforce the book [*i.e.*, the Advertisements] with the authority of the Privy Council,—for this reason, I say,—it is probable the title was altered from 'Ordinances' to 'Advertisements.' ”

It seems evident then, first, that the Advertisements had no legal authority, and therefore could neither repeal nor modify the Rubric of 1559, which had the force of a Parliamentary Statute; secondly, that the Queen refused to give legal sanction to the Advertisements because, under the influence of Leicester, she did not wish the Rubric to be enforced too rigidly against the Puritans. She left the Bishops therefore to enforce, by means of the Advertisements, as much of the Ritual of the First Prayer Book of Edward as they could. I can hardly conceive the possibility of any unprejudiced person, who has mastered the facts, arriving at any other conclusion. But it is very hard to overthrow deep-seated prejudices, and I must crave your Lordship's patience therefore while I support my view of the matter with a few more proofs.

The argument of the Judicial Committee, which I am at present engaged in refuting, is this:—The Advertisements, they contend, were meant to impose the surplice as the exclusive clerical vestment in all religious services, except in cathedrals and collegiate churches, where the cope was prescribed on certain occasions; and the Visitation Articles of the time

show that, under the legitimate operation of the Advertisements, "the chasuble, albe and tunicle were swept away with severe exactness." I have already proved to demonstration, as I believe, that the Advertisements were not issued with any such intention, and that the argument of their Lordships cannot be accepted without manifest absurdity. But is it true that the legitimate effect of the Advertisements was, in matter of fact, to destroy the Eucharistic Vestments "with severe exactness?" I say "legitimate effect," for that the Ornaments of the Church and of the minister were ruthlessly and indiscriminately destroyed in many churches is only too true. But if the Advertisements had been intended to suppress the vestments summarily, it is hardly possible that they would have been used openly and commonly some years after the publication of the Advertisements. That they were so used is, I think, capable of proof, as I shall now endeavour to show.

Among the Zurich Letters is a long one from Jerome Zanchius to Queen Elizabeth, remonstrating against what he considers the Popish enactments of her reign, and especially against "the restoration of the Popish Vestments."* But, argue the Judges in the Purchas Judgment, by "Popish Vestments" the Puritans of that day meant the surplice. And there is some plausibility in this argument. It is quite true that in the Puritan tirades against "Popish Vestments" the surplice is almost always the only

* Zurich Letters, Second Series, p. 389.

vestment specifically objected to. In this very letter of Zanchius he says,—“The dispute itself teaches us that they [Puritans] are disturbed beyond measure by the order about wearing the linen surplice. For their complaints are so vehement that their querulous lamentations and groans penetrate into and are heard even in Germany.” The cope also is occasionally mentioned by name.

Now what is the proper inference from this? My inference is that the vestments generally were allowed even after the Advertisements; but that the surplice in particular was so furiously attacked by the Puritans because its use was made compulsory, while the other vestments remained optional in practice, though statutably binding. The letter of Zanchius, from which I have just quoted a passage against the surplice, says on a previous page: “The most holy and consecrated vestments of the clergy are now resumed.” Now the Eucharistic Vestments—that is, the chasuble, albe and tunicle—were always consecrated; the surplice, as such, was not. Therefore the reference here cannot be to the surplice, and must be to the Eucharistic Vestments. And this conclusion is rendered still more certain, if that be possible, by some other expressions used by Zanchius. “What else is it then,” he says, “to re-introduce at this time those filthy vestments and the other rubbish of the Popish Church into the Church of Christ than to afford an opportunity to the Papists, and that a most excellent

one, of confirming themselves and their people in their superstitions ; and indeed to lend them, as it were, assistance towards this very object ?" Elsewhere he calls the vestments "the habits of the ungodly mass-priests," "the ridiculous and execrable garments of the ungodly mass-priests," "the sacerdotal vestments."

The facts disclosed in this letter, therefore, are as follows :—

1. At the period when it was written, "the most holy and consecrated vestments of the clergy" had been "resumed." But this description is not applicable to the surplice, and is applicable to the Eucharistic Vestments.
2. These vestments had been "re-introduced." But the surplice had never been abolished ; on the contrary, it was prescribed as the "only" garment in the Second Prayer Book of Edward. Therefore it is not the surplice that is meant, but some vestments which had been abolished.
3. The surplice cannot be meant by "the habits of the ungodly mass-priests;" "the ridiculous and execrable garments of the ungodly mass-priests." For the Mass was never celebrated in a surplice, but almost invariably in the chasuble, etc., especially when the celebrant was a priest, as distinct from bishop ; and the mass-priests were priests simply, not bishops.

But perhaps I may be told that the phraseology of Zanchius, though not applicable to the surplice, is applicable to the cope, which was prescribed for the office of the Holy Communion in cathedrals and collegiate churches. The reply to such an objection is, that Zanchius speaks of the vestments of the Mass specifically, which the cope is not, and the chasuble is. According to the English pre-Reformation ritual the chasuble was the only priestly vestment which priests could not use except in the Mass. It was therefore, as Zanchius calls it, a peculiarly "sacerdotal vestment." And this opinion is confirmed by Neal, who says that the Queen "was desirous to retain . . . *all the old Popish garments,*" and that, "in short, the service performed in the Queen's Chapel and in sundry cathedrals was so splendid and showy, that *foreigners could not distinguish it from the Roman, except that it was performed in the English tongue.*"*

We are not, however, left to mere inference in the matter, irresistible as that inference is. There is proof positive and demonstrative that not only the cope and surplice but the chasuble also survived the Elizabethan Advertisements. In a letter from Beza to Bullinger, dated "Geneva, September 3rd, 1566," he vents his anger against the religious condition of England in the following strain:—"What must we say when not only the Papists are left in possession of the revenues of their benefices, but even of their

* "Hist. of Puritans," Edition of 1798, i. pp. 129, 144.

ecclesiastical offices, upon merely taking an oath to maintain the Reformation; so that godly brethren are for the most part placed under the authority, and compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of those who are in general both unlearned and in their hearts the most bitter enemies of true religion?"

Here is one proof among many which might be adduced that the great body of the clergy, in dioceses not governed by fanatical Puritans, went on quietly as they had done under Mary; using the English Prayer Book, but retaining the old ritual observances. This is made tolerably clear by another passage in Beza's letter. He complains bitterly that of the "*very few teachers of the pure Gospel* some are turned out of their offices, and others even thrust into prison, unless they will swear that they will so inviolably approve all these things as not to impugn them by word or writing; and will resemble also the priests of Baal in their square caps, bands, surplices, hoods, and other things of the like kind."*

I have followed the English translation of the Parker Society's edition. But if your Lordship will look at the original Latin you will find that the word rendered "hoods" by the Parker Society edition is "*casulis*," that is, "*chasubles*." Here, then, we find indisputable evidence that chasubles were in use two years after the publication of the Advertisements which are supposed to have abolished and swept them away. Does not this one fact show how unsafe it is

* Zurich Letters, Second Series, p 180.

to infer the disuse of a thing because it may be difficult to produce positive evidence of its use after an interval of three centuries? The burden of proof surely rests on those who, in defiance of all probability and of the plainest facts, assume that Queen Elizabeth, whose policy it was to conciliate the clergy in possession, was so reckless as to violently revolutionise the ceremonial of Divine Service in every parish in England. It would require strong evidence indeed to prove that she made any such attempt.

But the evidence is, in fact, all the other way. In a letter of Thomas Lever to Bullinger, in 1560, he says: "The same order of public prayer, and of other ceremonies in the Church, which existed under Edward the Sixth, is now restored among us by the authority of the Queen and Parliament." And then he adds: "there are prescribed to the clergy some ornaments, such as the mass-priests had and still retain. A great number of the clergy, all of whom had heretofore laid them aside, are now resuming similar habits, and wear them, as they say, for the sake of obedience." It is quite clear from this passage that the writer was not thinking of the clergy of cathedral and collegiate churches, but of the clergy generally. And, in fact, he places the matter beyond a doubt by the three sentences which follow my quotation: "There are, indeed, but few of us who hold such garments in the same abhorrence as the soldier mentioned by Tertullian did the crown. But we are not ignorant what occasion the Pa-

pists will take from thence as a cause of stumbling to the weak. For the prebendaries in the cathedrals, and the priests in the other churches, retaining the outward habits and inward feeling of Popery, so fascinate the ears and eyes of the multitude, that they are unable to believe but that either the Popish doctrine is still retained, or at least that it will shortly be restored.”*

This affords demonstrative proof that “the outward habits . . . of Popery,” “such as the mass-priests formerly had and still retain,” were restored under Elizabeth in ordinary parish churches, as well as in cathedrals and collegiate churches. And the conclusion is inevitable, that “the most holy and consecrated vestments,” of which Zanchius complains in his letter to Queen Elizabeth, were the Eucharistic Vestments, properly so called. Now, when was the letter of Zanchius written? It is dated “Sept. 10, 1571;” that is, seven years and seven months after the issuing of Queen Elizabeth’s Advertisements. And now, my Lord, what becomes of the confident assertion made in the Purchas Judgment, that “there is abundant evidence, that, within a few years after the Advertisements were issued, the vestments used in the Mass entirely disappeared?”†

Really, my Lord, it is hard to speak with patience of some passages in this extraordinary Judgment.

* Zurich Letters, First Series, pp. 84, 85.

† Brooke’s Reports, p. 170.

Take the following: "Their Lordships think that the defacing and destroying, and converting to profane and other uses of all the vestments now in question, as described in the *Lincoln MS.*, published by Mr. Peacock, show a determination to remove utterly these ornaments, and not to leave them to be used hereafter when higher Ritual might become possible."*

Undoubtedly this vandalism "shows a determination to remove utterly these ornaments;" but a determination on the part of whom? On the part of Queen Elizabeth and the Bishops charged with enforcing the Advertisements? Why, it was but a few pages before that their Lordships had quoted with approbation the opinion of Sandys, that the Queen's intention with respect to the ornaments was, "that others in the meantime shall not convey them away, but that they shall remain for the Queen." And Queen Elizabeth fulfilled this intention, in their Lordship's opinion, by having these ornaments "defaced and destroyed, and converted to profane and other uses!!" How is it possible to treat respectfully the decisions of a Court which commits itself to statements like this? Despite, however, the surprising ignorance of the whole subject which every page of the Judgment betrays, still the ordinary instincts of common sense ought to have saved the judges from the folly of supposing that the indiscriminate destruction of church ornaments took place

* Brooke's Reports, pp. 177, 178.

by the authority of Queen Elizabeth. How it really did take place is related in the following passage from a letter of George Withers, already quoted: "Then on the expulsion of the Popish bishops new ones were to be appointed in their room; and most of these were of the number of those who had been exiles. These at first began to oppose the ceremonies; but afterwards, when there was no hope otherwise of obtaining a bishoprick, they yielded, and, as one of them openly acknowledged, undertook the office against their conscience. In the meanwhile they comforted their brethren, whom they perceived to be still struggling against these things, by promising them free liberty in the government of their churches; and *for some years* they kept their promise. On the obtaining of which liberty they diligently purified their churches from all the blemishes and defilements of Popery. Others, who had at first yielded, incited by their example, began to reform the churches in like manner. But when the bishops perceived that the numbers and influence of these parties was increasing among the people, they thought their dignity would come to nought unless they compelled the inferior clergy to adopt the same usages as they did themselves. They took up the matter, therefore, at the Queen's command."

This is too plain to require any ingenious Privy Council theories to interpret it. In those dioceses, which were presided over by the zealots who returned from exile, the destruction of Church monuments

went on in such a wholesale manner that the Queen, when it came to her ears, interposed to put a stop to it. But in the dioceses which were under the management of more prudent Bishops that state of things prevailed which extorted the remonstrance of Zanchius to Elizabeth.

But the Court was not satisfied with grossly misrepresenting—not intentionally, I am sure—the Advertisements of Elizabeth; it flagrantly misquoted them in one important particular. “They think that in prescribing the surplice only the Advertisements meant what they said, the surplice only.”* But the Advertisements do not say anything of the kind. The adverb “only” is an interpolation of their Lordships, and it alters essentially the meaning of the original, which is as follows:—“That every minister saying any public prayers, or ministering of the Sacraments or other rites of the Church, shall wear a comely surplice with sleeves, to be provided at the charges of the parish.”† My Lord, this is simply scandalous. I do not, of course, accuse the Court of wilfully garbling its authorities. But I do seriously accuse it of having been so set on condemning Mr. Purchas that it adopted with careless avidity and with scant examination anything that promised to help it to the end it had in view. And carelessness of this sort in a Court of Justice,

* “Brooke’s Reports,” p. 178.

† Cardwell’s “Doc. Ann.,” i. p. 826.

and in a Court of Final Appeal especially, is a crime.

One other point I must notice, and then I think we may take our leave of Queen Elizabeth's Advertisements.

"Their Lordships remark further that the doctrine of a minimum of Ritual represented by the surplice, with a maximum represented by a return to the mediæval* vestments, is inconsistent with the fact that the Rubric is a positive order, under a penal statute, accepted by each clergyman in a remarkably strong expression of 'assent and consent,' and capable of being enforced with severe penalties. It is not to be assumed, without proof, that such a statute was framed, so as to leave a choice between contrary interpretations, in a question that had ever been regarded as momentous."

This looks plausible; but *solvitur ambulando*. The following Rubric occurs in the Prayer Books of 1559 and 1604, and is substantially repeated in that of 1662:

"The Table and Calendar expressing the Order

* Why "mediæval?" The Eucharistic Vestments are just as much or just as little mediæval as the surplice. They existed centuries before the period bounded by the Middle Ages; and they exist now not only in the Church of Rome, but in all the Churches of the East, and in the Lutheran Communion. Their Lordships seem to think that these vestments were a superstitious invention of the Middle Ages. Or, perhaps, they meant nothing at all except to give, according to the proverb, "a bad name" to something which they had made up their minds to get rid of.

of the Psalms and Lessons, to be said at morning and evening prayer throughout the year, except certain proper feasts, as the rules following more plainly declare."

"The rules following" enjoin the reading daily of *two* chapters from the Old Testament and *two* from the New. Yet concurrently with this Rubric the Advertisements sanctioned a minimum which fell short of it in the express permission granted to the parochial and other clergy to "read daily at the least *one* chapter of the Old Testament, and *another* of the New." It is not, therefore, as their Lordships allege, "assumed, without proof, that such a statute was framed so as to leave a choice between contrary interpretations." There is positive proof against their Lordships' argument, and it is inexcusable in them not to have known it.

"If the minister is to wear a *surplice* at all times of his ministration," their Lordships continue, "he cannot wear an *alb* and *tunicle* when assisting at the Holy Communion; if he is to celebrate the Holy Communion in a *chasuble*, he cannot celebrate in a *surplice*." Good:* but the argument is as fatal to the black gown in the pulpit as to the chasuble at the

* I make their Lordships a present of their assumption for the sake of argument. But, in matter of fact, the assumption is purely gratuitous. "Surplice" and "Alb" are but two names for one and the same vestment, which the Priest was not only permitted, but required, to wear under the Chasuble at the celebration of the Holy Communion.

altar. Yet the black gown has maintained for itself a continuity of usage in the pulpit, the "severe penalties" of "a penal statute" notwithstanding. The cope, on the other hand, has not been used in some cathedrals and collegiate churches for two centuries. How often must I remind their Lordships that they cannot take as much of an argument as they please; that logic is an exacting mistress, whose behests, like those of Vivien in the "Idylls of the King," must be obeyed, "not at all or all in all."

But the plain truth is, my Lord, if I must speak my mind plainly, the argument of the Court on this part of the case is nothing but superficial trifling with historical facts. The Advertisements were aimed at the Rubrical irregularities of the Puritans, and at nothing else. And here I must notice another specimen of the habitual inaccuracy which pervades the Purchas judgment. "If the minister is ordered," say their Lordships, "to wear a surplice at all times of his ministration" he cannot wear any other Vestment at the celebration of the Holy Communion. This order is contained in the famous Ornaments Rubric; and in that Rubric there is absolutely nothing about the surplice; on the contrary, Ministers are therein ordered to use "at all times of their ministration" the vestments prescribed by the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. That is the standing statutable order of the Church of England. The Advertisements, on the other hand, which were

merely an episcopal admonition to the Puritans, dispensed them from the strict requirement of the Rubric, but fixed a standard on the side of defect beyond which they must not fall : namely, the surplice in all parish churches in all ministrations, and the reading daily of one lesson at least from the Old and New Testaments respectively. No more gratuitous assumption can be imagined, none more opposed to plain facts, than that of their Lordships, when they say, that "the Advertisements had taken away" the Ornaments prescribed by the Rubric of 1559. Besides, my Lord, if we adopt the outrageous paradox, that a series of episcopal admonitions, which had no legal sanction,* tacitly repealed a clause in

* On the 1st of March, 1641, the House of Lords appointed a Committee to "take into consideration all innovations in the Church respecting religion." The Committee consisted of ten earls, ten bishops, and ten lay barons, with power to associate with them as many learned divines as they pleased. Among the names on the Committee may be mentioned Archbishop Usher ; Drs. Prideaux, Hacket, Calamy ; Bishops Montague, Moreton, Sanderson, and White. The innovations into which the members of the Committee were to inquire were in a High Church direction, and the Committee stated that some clergymen "pretended for their innovations the Injunctions and Advertisements of Queen Elizabeth, *which are not in force*, but by way of commentary and imposition." This proves two things : first, that the High Church party understood that the Advertisements were in the interest of Laudian doctrines and ceremonies ; secondly, that a Committee of the leading peers and divines as late as 1641 considered that the Advertisements "were not in force." There is no pretence that they ever

a Parliamentary Statute, and are now legally binding, in spite of a subsequent statute which re-enacted the clause in question, I wish to know whether the following orders are still binding:—

“That all deans of Cathedral Churches, masters of Colleges, all archdeacons, and other dignitaries in Cathedral Churches, doctors, bachelors of divinity and law, having any ecclesiastical living, shall wear in their common apparel abroad a side-gown with sleeves straight at the hand, without any cuts; and that also without any falling cape, and to wear tippets of sarcenet, as is lawful for them by the Act of Parliament, Anno. xxiv. Hen. Octavi.

“That they and all ecclesiastical persons or other, having any ecclesiastical living, do wear the cap appointed by the Injunctions. And they to wear no hats but in their journeying.

“That they in their journeying do wear their cloaks with sleeves put on, and like in fashion to their gowns without guards, welts, or cuts.*

“That in their private houses and studies they use their own liberty of comely apparel.

“That all inferior ecclesiastical persons shall wear long gowns of the fashion aforesaid, and caps as before is prescribed.

acquired any additional force after that date; and therefore this piece of evidence is alone sufficient to dispose of the argument of the *Purchas Judgment* on this point.—*Cardwell's Conferences*, p. 278.

* These orders about the private apparel of the Clergy are repeated in the 74th Canon of 1604.

"That the bishop do call home once in the year any prebendary in his church, or beneficed in the diocese, which studieth at the universities, to know how he profiteth in learning, and that he be not suffered to be a serving or waiting man dissolutely.

"That at the archdeacon's visitation the archdeacon shall appoint the curates to certain texts of the New Testament to be conned without book. And in their next Synod to exact a rehearsal of them."*

Now, my Lord, of two things one. Either the Advertisements are now legally binding, or they are not. If they are not, the whole superstructure of the *Purchas Judgment* tumbles to the ground at once. If, on the other hand, they are binding, all the clergy in the Church of England, from the Archbishop of Canterbury to the poorest curate in his diocese, is in a state of "lawlessness." I must again protest against the habit of taking just as much of an argument as suits the exigencies of the moment, leaving out those parts of it which prove its irrelevancy to the point at issue. And I must further remind the Judicial Committee that the Advertisements recognise the legality of the ecclesiastical legislation of "*Anno xxiv. Hen. Octavi;*" a fact which the admirers of the *Purchas Judgment* might find somewhat inconvenient if the Advertisements are binding in law.

* Cardwell's "*Doc. Ann.*," i. pp. 828, 829. Here and elsewhere I have modernised the spelling.

I now come to their Lordships' argument at close quarters against the obvious meaning of the Rubric of 1662, which is now binding on the clergy. The Rubric is as follows:—

“And here is to be noted, that such Ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their ministration, shall be retained, and be in use, as were in this Church of England, by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth.”

The obvious and grammatical meaning of this Rubric, as Sir John T. Coleridge has shown, is to legalise all Ornaments, whether of the fabric or the minister, “as were in this Church of England” at the period specified. Let us now see how the Court in the *Purchas Case* interpreted it. After some extraordinary argumentation, which I shall examine presently, their Lordships sum up the case thus:—

“The vestment, or cope, alb, and tunicle, were ordered by the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. They were abolished by the Prayer Book of 1552, and the surplice was substituted. They were provisionally restored by the Statute of Elizabeth, and by her Prayer Book of 1559. But the Injunctions and Advertisements of Elizabeth established a new order within a few years from the passing of the Statute, under which *chasuble*, *alb*, and *tunicle*, disappeared. The Canons of 1603-4, adopting anew the reference to the Rubric of Edward VI., sanctioned in express terms all that the Advertise-

ments had done in the matter of the vestments, and ordered the *surplice* only to be used in parish churches. The revisers of our present Prayer Book, under another form of words, repeated the reference to the second year of Edward VI., and they did so advisedly, after attention had been called to the possibility of a return to the vestments."

Before grappling with their Lordships' general argument, I must remark on two or three inaccuracies in this summary statement of the case. I claim to have proved that the Eucharistic Vestments were restored absolutely, under Elizabeth, and not "provisionally;" and also that the Injunctions and Advertisements did *not* "establish a new order. . . . under which chasuble, alb, and tunicle disappeared." But what I particularly invite attention to is another specimen of their Lordships' inveterate habit of misquotation. "The Canons of 1603-4. . . . ordered the surplice only to be used in parish churches." This implies that the word "only" is in the Canon; but it is not, and I again protest against the importation into an argument of an important word which is not in the authority referred to, and which changes essentially the meaning of the passage. It is unnecessary of course to disclaim all intention of imputing any fraudulent intention to the Court. I mean no more, here or elsewhere, than that the members of the Court were so possessed by their own non-natural interpretation of the Rubric that through some inscrutable process of "unconscious

cerebration" they read that interpretation in all the documents bearing on the subject.

And now let us consider the interpretation itself.

The Rubric in the Prayer Book of 1559 ordered that "the minister at the time of the Communion, and at all other times of his ministration, shall use such Ornaments in the Church as were in use by authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI., according to the Act of Parliament set in the beginning of this Book." The Act of Uniformity which enforced this Rubric enjoins "that such Ornaments of the Church and the ministers thereof shall be retained and be in use as were in this Church of England by authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of Edward VI., and until other order shall be therein taken by the authority of the Queen's Majesty," etc.

The present Rubric, it will be observed, is a combination of the language of Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity and Rubric; and the question is whether they mean the same thing, or whether the slight variation of language indicates a fundamental difference of meaning. The Court in the *Purchas Case* took the latter view. The Court in *Liddell v. Westerton* adopted the former. After quoting the twenty-fifth Clause of Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity, the Judgment in the *Liddell Case* declares that "the Rubric to the new Prayer Book" was "framed to express the meaning of this proviso." And, to place the matter beyond a doubt, the judgment goes on to

say:—"It will be observed that this Rubric does not adopt precisely the language of the Statute, *but expresses the same thing in other words*. The Statute says 'such Ornaments of the Church and of the ministers shall be retained and be in use;' the Rubric, 'that the minister shall use such Ornaments in the Church.'

"The Rubric to the Prayer Book of January 1, 1604, adopts the language of the Rubric of Elizabeth. The Rubric to the present Prayer Book adopts the language of the Statute of Elizabeth; *but they all obviously mean the same thing, that the same dresses and the same utensils or articles which were used under the First Prayer Book of Edward VI.* MAY STILL BE USED."

This was the solemn decision, in 1857, of Lord Cranworth, Lord Wensleydale, Mr. Pemberton Leigh, Sir John Patteson, Sir William Maule, Archbishop Sumner, and Dr. Tait, now Archbishop of Canterbury. In the year 1871, my Lords Chelmsford and Hatherley, the present Archbishop of York and the present Bishop of London affirmed the direct contradictory of the above decision. For they ruled that the twenty-fifth Clause of Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity, the Rubric of 1559, the Rubric of 1604, and the Rubric of 1662, "obviously" do *not* "mean the same thing;" and they punished Mr. Purchas heavily for having been so very simple as to believe that the same Court, in the year 1857, really meant what it so plainly said. They had evidently some

misgivings, however, and felt that conduct so extraordinary demanded an extraordinary justification; which they proceeded accordingly to offer as follows:—"In *Westerton v. Liddell* the question which their Lordships had to decide was, whether the Rubric which included all use of crosses in the service affected crosses not used in the service, but employed for decoration only, and they determined that these were unaffected by the Rubric. . . . In construing the expressions made use of in that judgment, it should be borne in mind that this question of the *Vestments* was not before the Court." As if that had anything on earth to do with the point in dispute! The question is not what was before the Court in the Case of *Liddell v. Westerton*, but the grounds on which the Judges arrived at their judgment. Those grounds are utterly annihilated, and therefore the judgment based on them is utterly annihilated, by the *Purchas* Judgment. The two judgments are direct logical contradictories one of another, and like the pots in the fable which went sailing down the stream they crack and sink each other.

Of all this, however, the Court in the *Purchas* Case confessed itself simply unconscious. "Their Lordships feel quite free to adopt both the positive and the negative conclusions thus arrived at." A piece of very superfluous information; for it is hardly possible to read two consecutive pages of their judgment and not perceive that they were utterly at

sea on the subject on which they were adjudicating. Otherwise they would scarcely have felt themselves quite so "free to adopt" "positive and negative conclusions," which to ordinary intellects appear mutually destructive. But let us proceed.

"The learned Judge in the Court below," say their Lordships, "assumes that the Puritan party at the Savoy Conference objected to this Rubric, whereas it was the Rubric of James that they were discussing." But both Rubrics "obviously mean the same thing" according to the judgment of the same Court in 1857. Let that pass, however, and let us see what really is involved in the objections of the Puritans to the Ornaments Rubric at the Savoy Conference. That objection is as follows:—"Forasmuch as this Rubric seemeth to bring back the cope, alb, etc., and other vestments forbidden by the Common Prayer Book, 5 and 6 Edward VI., and so our reason alleged against ceremonies under our eighteenth general exception, we desire it may be wholly left out."*

Now if the Bishops had intended not only not to restore the Eucharistic Vestments, but positively to forbid them, and to prescribe the surplice only, their

* "An Account of all the Proceedings of the Commission of both Persuasions," p. 12. A rare Pamphlet published immediately after the Savoy Conference by the Nonconformists, and containing the "Rejoinder" of the latter, which Cardwell does not give. This part of the proceedings, however, has lately been published in full in "Documents Relating to the Act of Uniformity, 1662," pp. 201-845.

answer to the Puritans' objection would have been a simple and straightforward one. They would have said: "Our intention is not to bring back these vestments to which you object. On the contrary, we are anxious to forbid them, and to make the surplice the only legal vestment in all ministrations in parish churches. And to place the matter beyond possibility of doubt, we will substitute for the Rubric, to which you object, another which shall express our meaning in plain and unambiguous language." But this was emphatically not the answer, nor anything like it, which the divines at the Savoy Conference made. Mr. Purchas's judges, indeed, assure us that "the Bishops in their answer show that they understood the surplice to be in question, and not the vestments." My Lord, I hardly know how to deal with such an assertion in becoming language. The Judicial Committee cannot have realized the gravity of the imputation which they here make on the common sense—I had almost said the sanity—of the eminent divines who took part in the Savoy Conference. The Puritans objected specifically and by name to the "cope, alb, etc., and other vestments prescribed in the First Book of Edward," and which "seemed to be brought back" under the Rubric. But "the Bishops," according to the Purchas Judgment, "in their answer show that they understood the surplice to be in question, and not the vestments!" Really, my Lord, this seems to me equivalent to saying that the Bishops were fools; and that is an accusation

which can hardly be sustained against men like Sheldon and Cosin, Heylin and Hacket, Pearson, Sparrow and Thorndike.

The fact is, the Judicial Committee have mixed up together two questions which are quite distinct. Under the eighteenth general head of their exceptions against the Prayer Book the Nonconformists attack, at considerable length, the whole principle of ceremonialism in religion, and they take special exception to the obligation of wearing the surplice, to the sign of the cross, and to the kneeling at the reception of the Holy Communion. The Bishops deal very briefly with these three things, but they enter into a long and elaborate defence of the rationale of ceremonialism. The question of the Eucharistic Vestments was not then before them; but the general principles which they lay down are just as applicable to the vestments as to the surplice. It is not till some pages further on that the Nonconformists object to the Ornaments Rubric, as "seeming to bring back" the full ritual of 1549; and they "desire it may be wholly left out" for the "reasons alleged against ceremonies under our eighteenth general exception." The Bishops reply briefly:—"For the reasons given in our answer to the 18th general, whither you refer us, we think it fit that the Rubric continue as it is." Not a word here to give the faintest colour to the suggestion of the Judicial Committee that "the Bishops in their answer show that they understand the surplice to be

in question, and not the vestments." The Nonconformists say, in effect: "We desire this Rubric to be wholly left out because it revives all the Vestments and other Ornaments of 1549; and for our reasons we refer you to our general argument against the whole principle of ritualism." The Bishops reply:—"We have given already a full reply to your general attack on the principle of ritualism; and for the reasons there given we think it fit that the Rubric continue as it is." This is simply equivalent to saying:—"We are quite aware that this Rubric will legalise the use of the Eucharistic vestments, and we have justified their use in the general answer which we have given you."

And this is the interpretation which the Nonconformists put upon the Bishop's answer. "We have given you reason enough," they say in their Rejoinder, "against the imposition of the *usual ceremonies*; and would you draw forth *those absolute* (sic) *ones to increase the burden?*"*

But, say the Judicial Committee, the Bishops, after declaring they would not alter the Rubric, did, as a matter of fact, alter it in the interest of the Nonconformists in such a way as to preclude the revival of the vestments. I venture to think, however, that the Nonconformists themselves are the best judges in this matter, and they certainly did not think that the changes which the Convocation of

* "An Account of the Proceedings," etc., p. 98. The italics in the passage quoted are in the original.

1661 had made in the Rubrics were in the direction of a lower ritual. On the contrary, they complained bitterly that all the Rubrical changes were in favour of a more advanced ritual. "So strongly did they feel this, that it was proposed on their behalf in the House of Lords that the existing Liturgy should be continued, and all *the corrections made in Convocation should be abandoned.*"* And in the course of Tillotson's abortive schemes of comprehension a few years later, Baxter and the Nonconformists insisted "that the Rubric for the old Ornaments which were in use in the second year of King Edward VI. be put out." And this they regarded as "among the most necessary alterations in the Liturgy."† In short, it is quite evident that the interpretation put upon the Ornaments Rubric of 1661 in the Purchas Judgment is not the interpretation put upon it either by the Churchmen or Nonconformists of that time. Both parties regarded the 58th Canon as prescribing a minimum of ritual, while the Ornaments Rubric left a door open for the gradual introduction of a maximum. The slight alteration in the wording of the Rubric which was then made, and on which the Judicial Committee lay so much stress, was considered of no significance by those immediately concerned.

Among the many statements in the Purchas Judgment which have greatly surprised me, is the following:—

* "Cardwell's Conferences," p. 887.

† See Sylvester's *Reliquæ Baxterianæ*, pt. iii. p. 89.

“With regard to the suggestion attributed to the House of Lords, ‘Whether the Rubric should not be mended where all vestments in time of Divine Service are not commanded which were used by *Edward VI.* (*Cardwell*, *Conferences*, p. 274),’ the learned judge has overlooked the fact that this applies to the earlier Rubric; and the suggestion did not emanate from the House of Lords, nor was it ever adopted by that body.”*

Whether the Court or the Editor of the Judgment is responsible for this pretended quotation from *Cardwell* I know not; but it is grossly and even ludicrously inaccurate. I never heard or read before that the Eucharistic Vestments “were used by *Edward VI.*,” and by the substitution of “not” for “now,” before “commanded,” the meaning of the quotation is exactly reversed. I pass this by, however, as it may be a clerical error; nor need I notice again their Lordship’s pet, but untenable, theory as to the difference between the present and “the earlier Rubric.” But what is one to say of their assertion that “the suggestion did not emanate from the House of Lords, nor was it ever adopted by that body?” I am sure they would not deliberately misrepresent the facts; but, viewing the assertion itself on its simple merits, I must characterise it as both a *suppressio veri* and a *suggestio falsi*. What are the facts? When the premonitory mutterings of the storm, which eventually overthrew the Monarchy and

* “*Brooke’s Reports*,” p. 175.

the Church, had become menacingly audible in the ears of those in authority, they sought to save the ship by cutting down some of its rigging, and throwing part of its cargo overboard. In March, 1641, accordingly the House of Lords appointed a Committee, consisting of ten Earls, ten Bishops, and ten lay Barons, to "take into consideration all innovations in the Church concerning religion." Ten days later the members of this Committee "were empowered to associate with them as many learned divines as they pleased, and Archbishop Usher, and Drs. Prideaux, Warde, Twisse, and Hacket are particularly mentioned as selected for the purpose."* The object for which the Committee was ostensibly appointed, however, was far more contracted than its real object. In the language of Cardwell, there was "an understanding on all sides that they were to carry their inquiries into the whole field of doctrine and discipline, and suggest such measures as might tend to allay the great and general feeling of discontent." And the Report of the "Proceedings of the Committee" fully justifies the description of Cardwell. It is a document of seven octavo pages, and it reveals a state of something like anarchy in the doctrine, ritual, and discipline of the English Church at that time. Nor need we wonder. The triumph of Puritanism was even then all but complete. The Monarchy was virtually destroyed, and the use of the Prayer Book was very soon forbidden even in private.

* "*Cardwell's Conferences*," p. 288.

Among the doctrines and practices reported are the following :—

“Some have preached that private confession by particular enumeration of sins is necessary to salvation, ‘*necessitate medii.*’”

“Some have published that there is a proper sacrifice in the Lord’s Supper, to exhibit Christ’s death in the postfact, as there was a sacrifice to prefigure in the old law in the antefact, and therefore that we have a true altar.”

“Some have introduced prayers for the dead, as Mr. Brown in his printed sermon, and some have coloured the use of it with questions in Cambridge, and disputed that ‘*preces pro defunctis non supponunt purgatorium.*’”

“Some have defended universal grace, as imparted as much to reprobates as to the elect, and have proceeded ‘*usque ad salutem ethnicorum,*’ which the Church of England both anathematised.”*

“Some have defended the whole gross substance of Arminianism, that ‘*electio est ex fide prævisa,*’ that the act of conversion depends upon the concurrence of man’s free will; that the justified man may fall finally and totally from grace.”

With respect to matters of discipline the Committee’s Report mentions :—

“The turning of the holy table altar-wise, and most commonly calling it an altar. Bowing towards

* I know not where the Church of England has done this.

it, or towards the east, many times, with three congees, but usually in every motion, access, or recess in the Church." "Advancing candlesticks in many churches upon the altar so called. In making canopies over the altar so called, with traverses and curtains on each side, and before it. In compelling communicants to come up before the rails and there receive. In advancing crucifixes and images upon the parafront or altar so called. . . By the minister's turning his back to the west and his face to the east when he pronounceth the Creed, or reads prayers. By reading the Litany in the midst of the Church in many of the parochial churches. . . By offering of bread and wine by the hand of the Churchwardens or others before the consecration of the elements. By having a *credentia*, or side-table, besides the Lord's table, for divers' uses in the Lord's Supper. By introducing an offertory before the Communion, distinct from the giving of alms to the poor. . . by prohibiting a direct prayer before sermon, and bidding of prayer. . . By introducing Latin-service in the communion of late in Oxford, or into some colleges at Cambridge, at Morning and Evening Prayer, so that some young students, and the servants of the college, do not understand their prayers. By standing up at the hymns in the Church, and always at *Gloria Patri*. By carrying children from the baptism to the altar so called, there to offer them up to God. By taking down galleries in churches, or restraining the build-

ing of such galleries where the parishes are very populous.”*

The upholders of these doctrines and practices, the Committee report, appeal to the Injunctions and Advertisements of Queen Elizabeth, “*which are not in force, but by way of commentary and imposition*; and by putting to the Liturgy printed ‘*secundo, tertio Edwardi Sexti*,’ which the Parliament hath reformed and laid aside.” It is clear from this, as I have already observed, that in 1641 the Advertisements of Queen Elizabeth were held to possess no legal force, and were considered, both by the High Churchmen and Puritans of that day, to encourage instead of repressing the ritual of Edward’s First Prayer Book. This point is, in fact, placed beyond all possibility of doubt by one of the suggestions of the Lords’ Committee. They suggest “whether the Rubric should not be mended where all vestments in time of Divine Service *are now commanded* which were used by Edward VI.”† My Lord, this little incident shatters the Purchas Judgment in pieces. That judgment is based on the assumption that the Advertisements of Elizabeth, issued in 1564, repealed the Rubric of 1559, and rendered the Eucharistic Vestments illegal. But in 1641—that is seventy-four years after the publication of the Advertisements—we find the leading peers and bishops of the day

* “Cardwell’s Conferences,” pp. 270-74. † Ibid. p. 274.

suggesting that the Rubric of 1559 * should "be amended" because it still "commanded" the very vestments which, according to the Judicial Committee, it ceased to command in the beginning of 1564. And let it be observed that the Lords' Committee state the matter as if there were no sort of doubt about it. They assume that their interpretation of the Rubric is the universally accepted interpretation. And no doubt it was so. The interpretation of the Judicial Committee is as novel as it is non-natural. It is an interpretation forced into the Rubric in support of a foregone conclusion, and in violation alike of the rules of grammar and the facts of history.

Now how do their Lordships get over the awkward obstacle placed in their path by this authoritative interpretation of the Ornaments Rubric? "The suggestion," they say, "did not emanate from the House of Lords, nor was it ever adopted by that body." I wish to speak with all possible respect of the Judicial Committee; but truth compels me to say that their Lordships have here taken refuge in a quibble. The suggestion "emanated" from a most influential Committee appointed by the House of Lords to inquire, *inter alia*, into this very matter.

* I assume, with the Judicial Committee in *Liddell v. Weston*, that the Rubrics of Elizabeth and of James "obviously mean the same thing." The pet theory of the Purchas judgment on that point, viewed apart from the authority of the Court, is too absurd to require serious refutation.

And the suggestion was not adopted by the House of Lords because the attitude of the Commons had in the meantime become so hostile to the Church that no concessions which stopped short of organic changes—of a revolution in fact—would satisfy it.

But what matters it, after all, whether the suggestion did or did not come from the House of Lords? Put the lay members of the Lords' Committee aside altogether, and then the Court will be obliged to account for the fact that, in the year 1641, the Ornaments Rubric was interpreted in a sense directly contrary to the Purchas Judgment by the following eminent divines:—Archbishop Usher, Bishops Williams, Moreton and Montague; Drs. Warde, Prideaux, Sandeman, Featley, Brownrigg, Holdsworth, Hacket, Twisse, Burgess, White, Calamy, Marshall, and Hill. Are we to conclude that these men, some of whom rank among the most illustrious names in the annals of the Church of England for learning and acuteness, and all of whom were coeval with the Rubric which they were considering; were less competent to interpret that Rubric than the four distinguished persons who are responsible for the Purchas Judgment? I feel sure that these persons themselves would be the last to suggest such a comparison.

I must again call attention to the remarkable circumstance that the Committee of 1641 assumed, as a fact, notorious and undisputed, that the full ritual of the second year of King Edward was at that

time—not permissible, but—“commanded.” And yet that ritual, according to the Purchas Judgment, had been forbidden and had “ceased to exist” seventy-seven years previously. Here, then, is another positive and demonstrative disproof of their Lordships’ assertion, “that the doctrine of a minimum of Ritual represented by the Surplice, with a maximum represented by a return to the mediæval Vestments, is inconsistent with the fact that the Rubric is a positive order, under a formal statute, accepted by each clergyman in a remarkably strong expression of ‘assent and consent,’ and capable of being enforced with severe penalties.” *Solvitur ambulando.*

Everybody understood in 1641 that the use of the Vestments was “commanded” “under a formal statute;” but it was notorious that this command was not enforced. In other words, a maximum of ritual was theoretically binding, and a minimum was generally, but by no means universally, enforced. And if theory and practice were thus in conflict from 1564—it would be more correct to say from 1548—to 1641, there seems to be no violent impossibility against their continuing in conflict from 1662 to 1871. Why, moreover, should it be so very impossible to disobey “a positive order, under a penal statute,” which prevents the use of a chasuble, and be so very innocent and easy to disobey another “positive order, under a penal statute,” which prescribes daily matins and evensong, or the recitation of the Atha-

nasian Creed on certain occasions? I cannot suggest an answer; and I seriously doubt whether Mr. Purchas's judges could suggest one either. Yet the question is vital, or rather fatal, to their argument. The Rubric of 1604, be it remembered, admitted "preaching" or "studying of divinity" as valid excuses for neglecting to say the daily office; and by pointedly expelling these from the category of "sickness or some other urgent cause," the revisionists of 1662 have barred the door against all excuses less urgent than a disabling illness.

As a further proof that neither the Rubrics of the Prayer Book, nor the Thirty-nine Articles were intended to be a hard and fast line beyond which no latitude of omission or commission was to be on any plea allowed, I may refer to the Latin Prayer Book of 1560, put forth by royal authority, with the approbation of the Church, for the use of Universities and Public Schools. In this Book there are other variations from the English edition of the Prayer Book, besides the fact of its being in "a tongue not understood of the people;" such, for instance, as the restoration from the Book of 1549 of the Rubric commanding the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament in the following words:—"Quod si contigat eodem die Cœnam Domini in Ecclesia celebrari, tunc sacerdos in cœna tantum Sacramenti servabit quantum sufficit ægroto; et non finita cœna una cum aliquot ex his qui intersunt ibit ad ægrotum, et primo communicabit cum illis qui assistunt, et interfuerunt

cœnæ, et postremo cum infirmo. Sed primo fiat generalis confessio et absolutio cum collecta, ut supra est præscriptum. Sed si infirmus illo die petat communionem, quo non celebratur cœna, tunc sacerdos in loco decenti in domo ægroti celebrabit cœnam hoc modo."

A form was likewise added for the commemoration of founders, and an office for Communion at burials was inserted from the First Book of Edward.

Surely we may regard this as a proof that those who were in authority in the early part of Queen Elizabeth's reign were by no means averse to an encouragement, wherever it was possible, of a higher ritual and a higher expression of doctrine than it was possible to enforce upon the whole body of the Clergy. Queen Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity, like her Advertisements, was evidently intended to secure compliance with a minimum of ceremonial, while leaving diversities above that level to approach as nearly as possible towards the requirements of the Book of 1549. I have supplied evidence of this in the preceding pages; and the following passage in the Proclamation which legalised the Prayer Book of 1560 is a further indication in the same direction: "*Peculiariora quædam in Christianorum funebribus et exequiis decantanda adjungi præcipimus, statuto de Ritu Publicarum precum anno primo Regni nostri promulgato in contrarium non obstante.*"

The judges in the *Purchas Case* make a great point of an argument for which they are indebted to

Mr. Robertson's "*How shall we conform to the Liturgy?*" namely, that there is an essential difference between the Rubric of James and the Rubric of 1662. Now let us forget, for a moment, what I have already urged on that point, as well as the distinctly contradictory decision of the Court in *Liddell v. Westerton*, and let us see whether their Lordships' argument will yield even a plausible conclusion when it is closely examined.

"The Bishops" (at the Savoy Conference), they say, "determined that the Rubric 'should continue as it is.' But after this they did, in fact, recast it entirely. It must not be assumed that alterations made under such circumstances were made without thought, and are of no importance. The Rubric had directed the Minister to 'use at the time of the Communion, and at all other times of his ministrations'* the ornaments in question. The statute of *Elizabeth* did not direct such use, nor refer to any special times of ministration, but it ordered simply the retaining of the ornaments till further order made by the Queen. The Bishops threw aside the form of the old Rubric, and adopted that of the statute of *Elizabeth*, but added the words 'at all times of their ministration,' without the words which had in all former Rubrics distinguished the Holy Communion from other ministrations; a mode of expression more suitable to a state of things wherein the vestments for all ministrations had

* The Rubric uses the singular—"ministration."

become the same. The change also brought in the word 'retained,' which, it has been argued, would not include things already obsolete."

And further on they observe:—"Both in the Statute of *Elizabeth* and in the Rubric in question the word 'retain' seems to mean that things should remain as they were at the time of the enactment. . . To retain means, in common parlance, to continue something now in existence." They forget altogether the crucial fact that in 1662 the Church of England was legislating on a *tabula rasa*. She had been swept off the face of the land for twenty years, and during that period not only was the surplice abolished, but it was highly penal to use the Prayer Book at all, even in private. If, therefore, the insertion into the Rubric of 1662 of the words "shall be retained" means "that things should remain as they were at the time of the enactment," this certainly is fatal to the chasuble; but it is equally fatal to the surplice. For no surplice had been seen in England for twenty years previous to this enactment. Their Lordships' argument proves too much. Do they really suppose that the Convocation of 1662 was dealing with a state of things similar to that with which the Convocation of 1875 will have to deal? Did it make no difference that all the parishes in England were then in possession of men who had never used a surplice or a Prayer Book for upwards of twenty years—most of whom, indeed, had never used them at all? Yet their Lordships tell us that the Ornaments Rubric,

as altered in 1662, meant "that things should remain as they were at the time of the enactment!" Unfortunately things did "remain as they were" in many parishes in England long after "the time of the enactment." The Bishops were by no means successful in their laudable endeavours to enforce the use of the surplice in *any* of the ministrations of the Church, much less in *all*. Even before the great Rebellion we find Bishop Montague (A.D. 1638) inquiring, in one of his Visitations:—"Doth your minister officiate Divine Service in due place, upon set times, in the habit and apparel of his order, with a surplice, an hood, a gown, a tippet; not in a cloak, or sleeveless jacquet, or horseman's coat? for such I have known." If such extraordinary laxity as this could prevail in the reign of Charles I. under the primacy of Laud, and in the diocese of a very High Church prelate like Montague, is it a great marvel that the Rubric of 1662 should prescribe a higher ritual than it was possible to enforce? According to the Purchas Judgment the surplice has been the only legal vestment in parish churches since 1564. Yet here we have positive proof that a "jacquet or horseman's coat" was worn by the officiating minister during Divine Service instead of the surplice, and this, too, seventy-four years after the surplice was prescribed, in their Lordships' opinion, as the only legal vestment, and under the sanction of a penal statute. If these things might be done in the green tree, what might not be done

in the dry? If a clergyman in the time of Laud could celebrate the Holy Communion in a "horseman's coat," is it incredible that immediately after the desolation of the Commonwealth the divines of the English Church should lay down a standard of ritual which it might be possible to realize in better times, but to which it was quite hopeless to aspire in their own generation? They made the obligation of the daily service, for example, much more stringent than it was before; yet there is no record of their attempting to enforce it. It does not figure among their Visitation inquiries. When it was so hard to get the clergy to wear the surplice it would have been sheer madness to make any inquiry about the wearing of the chasuble.

That Charles II.'s Act of Uniformity did not secure the use of the surplice is, I imagine, incontestable; and I need not trouble your Lordship therefore with any detailed proof. Let one witness suffice. In a book published in 1669 by one of the king's chaplains, and bearing the *imprimatur* of the Primate of the day, I find the following curious incident. The author is replying to some "fables," as he calls them, of a Presbyterian controversialist; and one of those fables is as follows. "By some accident" the surplice happened to be lost in a certain parish in the diocese of Durham, whereupon, according to the fable, the Ordinary, Bishop Cosin, ordered that there should be no divine service in the parish for two Sundays—that is, I suppose, till a new surplice

could be got. How did the Church of England champion meet this raillery of the adversaries of the surplice? He replies to it very angrily, but quite seriously. "Esto," he says, "quod ejusmodi querela ad Ordinarium delata fuerit, quis credat eum propter talem casum paucis aut forte nemini imputandum, toti parochiæ maximam partem, si non universam, prorsus innocenti pœnam adeo gravem infixisse? Quid opus erat tanto strepitu propter superpelliceum casu amissum cum remedium ubique ad manum fit, nempe si aliud conficiatur. *Ad hæc norunt omnes qui Angliam norunt, IN PLURIMIS ECCLESIIIS, non solum ante promulgatum decretum pro uniformitate cultus divini, sed diu post, absque linea veste, cum nondum comparata esset, Sacra celebrata ab ipsis Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ Ministris.*" *

Here, then, my Lord, is contemporary evidence, under the *imprimatur* of the Archbishop of Canterbury of the day, that "not only before, but long after" the publication of the last Act of Uniformity, the surplice was not used "in very many churches" during the celebration of divine service. The author appeals to it as a notorious fact, "known to everybody who knew England;" and the Primate of all England seals the assertion with his voucher.

But did the revisionists of 1661 mean anything at all by their slight variation from the Rubrics of 1559 and 1604? That they did not mean to lay down a different rule of ritual either as regards the fabric or

* *Vindiciæ Eccles. Anglicanæ*, p. 89.

the officiating clergy must, I believe, be as evident to any one who will dispassionately survey all the facts as it was to the Final Court in *Liddell v. Westerton*, and *Martin v. Mackonochie*. But the verbal changes in the Rubric, slight as they are, seem to me to have introduced into it just that amount of relaxation from the previous stringency of its obligation which would enable the Bishops, while retaining the higher standard theoretically, to dispense with it in practice, and even to restore the minimum of requirement gradually. Both the Rubric of 1559 and that of 1604 have the expression, "the Minister . . . shall use." This is absolute and imperative. It imposes the obligation on every Minister without exception. We know indeed, as a matter of fact, that it was impossible to enforce the obligation in practice though it remained legally binding. But it is, no doubt, a bad thing to have a positive law laid down in plain and rigorous language which nevertheless is openly disregarded. Looking at the question, then, from the point of view of common sense, what would be the natural and probable conduct of men placed in the circumstances in which the divines of 1661 were placed. It is unquestionable that their own inclination, or at least the inclination of the large majority, including all the leading men, was in the direction of high ritual. Their bearing in the Savoy Conference shows this. The Nonconformists complained bitterly that every suggestion they made in favour of a low ritual was summarily rejected.

Moreover, the Warrant under which the Conference was held enjoined its members "to advise upon and review the said Book of Common Prayer, comparing the same with the most ancient Liturgies which have been used in the Church in the primitive and purest times." In any alterations which they thought good to make, therefore, they were to go back, not forward; to a Catholic, not to a Puritan standard of appeal.

It was in this sense, and with these objects, that the revision of 1661 was undertaken. But, on the other hand, the Church had just returned from a Babylonish captivity of twenty years; and in the interval her temples had been rifled and desecrated, and "the ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers thereof," for the most part, had been ruthlessly destroyed. This being the condition of things, it was obviously hopeless to attempt to enforce at once more than the partial use even of the surplice. Everything had been destroyed; no surplices existed, and many parishes were too poor to buy any. What did Convocation do under the circumstances? It followed the statute of Elizabeth by changing the Ornaments Rubric from the active to the passive form, and by inserting the expression, "shall be retained." Instead of saying:—"The Minister at the time of the Communion, and at all other times in his ministration, shall use such Ornaments in the Church as were in use by authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI.,

according to the Act of Parliament set in the beginning of this Book;" it said:—"Such ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their ministration, shall be retained and be in use, as were in this Church of England, by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI."

Now what is the grammatical and legal value of this variation from the Rubrics of 1559 and 1604? I submit that it amounts to this. By the former Rubrics the ornaments prescribed were, in point of strict law, obligatory *ipso facto* and without exception. But the obligation of the Rubric of 1662 would be fulfilled if only partial obedience was rendered. Not to dwell on the difference in respect to stringency between saying that certain ornaments "shall be in use," and saying that the Minister "shall use" them, the "words shall be retained" was a distinct *careat* against any future attempt to bar the legal assumption of such ornaments as could not during those troublous times "be in use." It was a public and perpetual advertisement of a right of way to the full ritual which was in use by authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI. I quite agree with the Court in the Purchas Case in the opinion that "it is reasonable to presume that the alteration was not made without some purpose." But when they add that "the words of the Rubric strictly construed would not suffice to revive ornaments which had been lawfully set aside," I can

only refer your Lordship to the evidence which I have already adduced to prove that the ornaments in question had *not* been "lawfully set aside." I shall produce more evidence on that point presently. But, meanwhile, I shall take the liberty of observing that the words "shall be retained" are, on their Lordships' interpretation, tautological and meaningless. There was some colour for that interpretation as it occurred in the statute of Elizabeth—that is, provided their Lordships' view of the force and effect of Queen Elizabeth's Advertisements were as correct as it is manifestly the reverse. If it was the inscrutable intention of that statute to "retain" the Eucharistic vestments in order that they might be "swept away with severe exactness" a few years afterwards, there would certainly in that case be some meaning in the words "shall be retained," though it would seem to be the meaning of madmen. In their Lordships' opinion no Eucharistic vestments were in use when the restoration of the Monarchy took place. True, but there were no surplices in use either. If the revisionists in 1661 intended to prescribe the use of the surplice to the exclusion of any other vestment, why did they not say so in plain and unambiguous language, especially after the distinct warning of the Nonconformists? Surely that is a question which the upholders of the Purchas Judgment are bound to answer. But even supposing that the revisionists, instead of using the straightforward language of common sense, chose to

wrap up their meaning in a form of speech which was admirably calculated to mislead, and which even Mr. Purchas's judges are feign to characterise as "obscurely framed," why should they have gone back all the way to the statute of Elizabeth in order to import the phrase "shall be retained and be in use" instead of the simple and more familiar phrase, "the Minister shall use?"

I submit that the only rational explanation of the phraseology of the Rubric is, that it was intended to cover the legality of the whole ritual of the second year of Edward VI., and to restore its use as circumstances permitted. We know, as a matter of fact, that even the surplice was restored very gradually. Can we feel surprise, I ask again, that the restoration of the chasuble was a matter of much greater difficulty? Picture to yourself, my Lord, a civil war in England at this moment. Suppose that after some years of internecine struggle the Sovereign of England had been publicly executed, the royal family exiled, the monarchy abolished, the Church swept off the face of the land so completely that it was highly penal to use her offices even in private. Suppose, further, that this state of things lasted for twenty years; that there was then a restoration; that the revolutionary party, however, was still in possession, and that it was necessary to come to terms with it if possible; that the sanctuaries of public worship were bare of all the ornaments, whether of the Minister or the fabric, appertaining to the decent

celebration of Divine Service, and that their restoration could only be a work of time. What would be the conduct, under such circumstances, of the divines of the day, most of them being, as the majority of the revisionists of 1661 were, decided High Churchmen who were known to be in favour of high ritual? If they wished to restore the ritual of the first years of Edward VI., and were prudent men into the bargain, I venture to say that they would have drawn up just such a Rubric as that which the Court in the case of Mr. Purchas interpreted with such elaborate mal-adroitness.

But the picture which I have supposed your Lordship to sketch in imagination falls, in reality, far short of what took place under the Commonwealth. It is indeed difficult to realize at this distance of time, even in imagination, the iconoclastic fury with which the Puritanism of the Cromwellian era declared a war of extermination against all that was beautiful in the twin regions of literature and art. Whatever may be said against the political capacity or character of Charles I., no one will deny that he was a munificent patron of all that tends to encourage learning and literature, and to promote and purify the arts. Himself a prince of considerable learning, and of a refined and elevated taste, he did his best to diffuse among his people an appreciation of the beautiful in secular as well as in religious matters. It was his delight to make the sacrifice of praise which man offers to the Maker of all that is

beautiful in earth, and sea, and sky "exceeding magnificent;"* an offering which can never pretend indeed to be worthy of Him Who dwelleth not in temples made with hands, but which, nevertheless, He deigns to accept when presented as the sincere homage of grateful hearts.

But it was not in the service of the Sanctuary alone that Charles wished to enlist the best achievements of human genius. To him the nation is indebted for the Cartoons of Raphael. He invited Vandyke, Rubens, Bernini, and other foreign artists into this country; he was the liberal patron of Ben Jonson, Inigo Jones, and other native poets and artists; and among the crimes laid to his charge by his triumphant enemies was one for which posterity has certainly forgiven him, namely, that the works of Shakespeare were his inseparable companions. Had circumstances permitted him to reign in peace there can be little doubt that literature and the arts, but especially the latter, would have made great progress in England. This progress was rudely arrested by a Commonwealth which, whatever good it may have affected for the country in other respects, gave a blow to the arts from which they are even now, in some departments, but slowly recovering. The austere tyranny of Puritanism almost succeeded, as it seems, in crushing all true appreciation of the beautiful out of the

* "And David said, Solomon my son is young and tender, and the house that is to be builded for the Lord must be exceeding magnificent."—1 Chron. xx. 5.

nation. And no wonder when one reads the edicts which went forth against all that appealed to man's native love of harmony and beauty. The theatres were all closed; for all stage plays, without exception, were considered impious and profane. Altar-pieces of inestimable value were pulled down and destroyed, and precious statues were broken in Cathedrals and parish Churches innumerable as images worshipped by priests of Baal—that is, by the clergy of the Church of England. Music was ruthlessly banished from the temples of Almighty God as an abomination of Popery, and some of the masterpieces of our native composers perished in the universal ruin. Poetry,*

* How the spirit of Milton groaned under the tyranny of the Puritan régime is plain from his Sonnet "On the New Forces of Conscience under the Long Parliament:"—

"Because you have thrown off your Prelate-lord,
And with stiff vows renounced his Liturgy,
To seize the widowed whore plurality,
From them whose sin ye envied, not abhorred,
Dare ye for this adjure the civil sword
To force our consciences that Christ set free?
And ride us with a classic hierarchy,
Taught ye by mere A. S. and Botherford?
Men whose life, learning, faith and pure intent
Would have been held in high esteem with Paul,
Must now be held and printed heretics
By shallow Edwards and Scotch What—d'ye—call.
But we hope to find out all your tricks,
Your plots and packing worse than those of Trent,
That so the Parliament
May, with their wholesome and preventive shears,
Clip your phylacteries, though bank your ears,
And succour our just fears.
When they shall read this clearly in your charge—
New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large."

The last line, by the way, is often quoted in a sense the very

too, shared the fate of her twin-sister; and Chaucer, Spenser and Shakespeare were banished from the libraries of the orthodox. The King's private collection of paintings was sold for a mere song, and went to enrich half the collections of Europe. And, but for the tact and management of Selden, the library and medals of St. James's would have been put up to auction in order to pay the arrears of some regiments of Cavalry quartered near London. Several Cathedrals on the Continent are at this moment enriched by the spoils, in Ornaments of the Church and Vestments of the Clergy, which were appropriated by Cromwell's soldiers. The symbol of the Crucified was a special object of abhorrence; indeed, if we may credit the assertion of an old author, it was held in such detestation that tailors were actually forbidden to sit cross-legged!

And the eminent persons who sat in judgment on Mr. Purchas are so ingenuous as to suppose that after twenty years of this Puritanical tornado the Convocation of the Church of England could at once have restored the full ritual of 1549, had it been anxious to do so, by a short Rubric sanctioned by an Act of Uniformity! Convocation knew better, and so it passed a Rubric, deliberately and with its attention called loudly and directly to the fact, opposite of that in which Milton uses it. His argument is that in using the word *Presbyter* instead of *Priest* the Puritans transferred to the former word all the meaning contained in the latter.

which established the legality of the Eucharistic Vestments, as the Nonconformists then and some years afterwards bitterly complained, but which there was no intention to enforce. In other words, a maximum standard of ritual was established as the ideal to be aimed at; but such was the state of deplorable neglect and slovenliness into which everything connected with Divine Service had degenerated, that the Bishops found it hard enough to force their clergy up to the barest minimum of decency. Yet the Court which condemned Mr. Purchas actually makes this the foundation of an argument against Eucharistic Vestments. "Their Lordships may refer to the various Visitation Articles, published in the second Report of the Ritual Commission and elsewhere, as showing that the *surplice* alone was to be used, and that deviations from that rule were on the side of defect, and not in the direction of returning to the Vestments of the Mass."*

A more transparent *non sequitur* it would be difficult to imagine. Certainly "the surplice alone was to be used" as against "a cloak, or sleeveless jacquet, or horseman's coat." But how does that prove that the surplice was intended to be enforced as against a vestment which, in the language of Sir J. T. Coleridge, is as absolutely prescribed by the

* Brooke's Report, p. 175. The italics in this and other quotations are in the original.

Rubric as if it "were specifically named in it instead of being only referred to?"*

Their Lordships appear to have thought that, if all other arguments failed, their conclusion against the Eucharistic Vestments could at all events be sustained by that clause in the Rubric which prescribes the ornaments of the Church and the clergy, "at all times of their ministration." "If the Minister is ordered to wear a *Surplice* at all times of his ministration, he cannot wear an *Alb* or *Tunicle* when assisting at the Holy Communion; if he is to celebrate the Holy Communion in a *Chasuble*, he cannot celebrate in a *Surplice*."†

I have already shown that this argument is based on their Lordships' ignorance that surplice and alb are interchangeable terms, and that the alb or surplice was, in fact, ordered to be worn under the chasuble. But even if this were not so, and if their Lordships were correct in supposing that the surplice and chasuble could not be worn at the same time, it would not help them one step to their conclusion. The Rubric, be it remembered, applies to the "ornaments of the Church" as well as to the "ornaments of the Ministers thereof." If, therefore, their Lordships' argument is valid in the case of the latter, it must be equally valid in the case of the former. In other words, if "at all times of their ministration" means that the clergy are to wear on their

* "Remarks on Report of Judicial Committee," p. 7.

† Brooke's Report, p. 178.

persons the same "ornaments" in all the ministrations of Divine Service, it follows, of course, that they are bound to use precisely the same "ornaments of the Church" "at all times of their ministration." The result would be that altar-frontals of different colours, sanctioned by the Judicial Committee in *Liddell v. Westerton*, would be forbidden by the same Court in *Hebbert v. Purchas*. The argument would run: "If the Minister is ordered to vest the Holy Table with a red altar-frontal at all times of his ministration, he cannot vest it with an altar-frontal of white or any other colour on certain occasions."

But perhaps it may be objected that the Rubric says nothing about any particular colour in altar-frontal cloths. No; and it says just as little about any particular vestment to be worn by the Minister. "The Minister" is *not* ordered by the Rubric "to wear a surplice at all times of his ministration" any more than he is ordered to wear a cope or chasuble." The insertion of the word "surplice" into the Rubric is simply one of their Lordships' careless interpolations.

But the invalidity of the argument is capable of further illustration. Its necessary corollaries would by no means stop at the prohibition of the ecclesiastical sequence of colours in the case of altar-cloths. For if the Rubric means that the same ornaments are to be used alike in all ministrations, it follows inevitably that the chalice and paten are to be used in the Office of Baptism as well as in the administration

of the Holy Communion. Such is the logical result of their Lordships' argumentation! But I humbly venture to think that an argument which leads, when tested, to a *reductio ad absurdum* is not good for much.

The meaning of "at all times of their ministration" seems to me plain enough. And I cannot help thinking that it would have been equally plain to their Lordships if they had not read between the lines of the Rubric and unconsciously interpolated the word "surplice" as an equivalent for "such ornaments of the Minister as were in use" in the second year of King Edward. A reader not hampered by any *arrière-pensée* would understand the Rubric to mean that in all the ministrations of Divine Service the ornaments of the Church and of the Minister which were lawful in the second year of Edward VI. are lawful still. And he would certainly never dream of the strange interpretation on which the Judicial Committee based their judgment, namely, that every one of these ornaments is to be used in every ministration.

I do not forget that great stress has been laid on the omission from our present Rubric of the expression, "at the time of the Communion," which occurs in the Rubric of 1559. But the explanation seems to me obvious enough. The earlier Rubric ordered "that the Minister, at the time of the Communion, and at all other times of his ministration, shall use such Ornaments *in the Church*," as are there pre-

scribed. "At the time of the Communion," and "in the Church," were both omitted at the last revision. Why? Because it was found exceedingly hard to get the Puritan Clergy to wear even the surplice "in the Church," and quite impossible to get them to wear it out of Church—at funerals for example. Now the phrase, "in the Church," gave the Puritans a certain plausible excuse for discarding *all* ecclesiastical vestments out of Church. This loophole was accordingly shut up at the last revision by wording the Rubric so as to cover all ministrations of the Clergy, whether in the Church or Churchyard. The Court in the Purchas Case has gone astray on many points from not remembering that from the time of Edward VI. to our own the lawless party has always been the Puritan. The difficulty has always been to bring that party up within sight of even a distant approximation towards rubrical observance; and therefore it would be fair to assume, even if there were no direct evidence of the fact, that rubrical changes in the matter of dress were intended to correct negligence and defect. Bancroft was a man of no extreme views, yet the utter lawlessness of the Puritans of his day extorted from him more than one outburst of indignation like the following:—

"How carelessly subscription is exacted in England, I am ashamed to report. Such is the retchlessness of many of our bishops on the one side, and their desire to be at ease and quietness to think upon their own affairs; and on the other

side, such is the obstinacy and intolerable pride of that factious sort, as that betwixt both sides either subscription is not at all required, or if it be, the bishops admit them (Puritans) so to qualifie it that it were better to be omitted altogether. . . . There is no Church established in Christendome so remisse in this point as the Church of England: for in effect every man useth and refuseth what he listeth. Some few of late have been restrained, who had almost raised the land into an open sedition. But else they follow their own fancies, and may not be dealt withal (forsooth) for fear of disquietness."—*Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline*. P. 249.

Their Lordships scout as improbable the suggestion of the Dean of Arches, that the Ornaments Rubric prescribes a maximum of ritual, while a minimum was nevertheless practically allowed. "It is not to be assumed, without proof," they say, "that such a statute was framed so as to leave a choice between contrary interpretations." I have already traversed this statement by some opposing facts, and I shall now quote a direct confutation of it from the very statute which is the subject of their Lordships' hasty criticism. As a matter of fact, the Uniformity Act of 1662 does leave in express terms "a choice between contrary interpretations" in the case of a plain Rubric. What can be more explicit than the following order?—

"And all Priests and Deacons are to say daily the Morning and Evening Prayer, either privately or openly, not being let by sickness or some other urgent cause.

"And the Curate that ministereth in every Parish

Church or Chapel, being at home, and not being otherwise reasonably hindered, shall say the same in the Parish Church or Chapel where he ministereth, and shall cause a bell to be tolled thereunto a convenient time before he begin, ~~that~~ the people may come to hear God's word, and pray with him."

I have already noticed the fact, that preaching and the study of divinity were admitted in the Rubric of 1604 as a valid excuse for disobedience; the effect of excluding such excuse from the present Rubric being, of course, to make its obligation proportionately more stringent. But whatever be the character of the "urgent cause" or "reasonable hindrance," it was evidently intended to dispense the parish priest, *pro hac vice*, from the obligation of saying the Morning and Evening Prayers *daily*, and from that alone. But in the second clause of the Act of Uniformity no excuse at all is allowed. The order is absolute and unconditional. "Be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, and by the advice and with the consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that all and singular Ministers in any Cathedral, Collegiate, or Parish Church or Chapel, or other place of public worship within this Realm of England, Dominion of Wales, and Town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, shall be bound to say and use the Morning Prayer, Evening Prayer, celebration and administration of both the Sacraments, and all other the public

and Common Prayer, in such order and form as is mentioned in the said Book annexed and joined to this present Act, and entitled, The Book of Common Prayer, and Administration of the Sacraments and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church, according to the use of the Church of England; together with the Psalter, or Psalms of David, pointed as they are to be sung or said in Churches; and the form or manner of making, ordaining, and consecrating of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; and that the Morning and Evening Prayers therein contained shall, upon every Lord's Day, *and upon all other days and occasions, and at the times therein appointed, be openly and solemnly read by all and every Minister or Curate in every Church, Chapel, or other place of Public Worship, within this Realm of England, and places aforesaid.*"

In the Seventh Clause of the Act, indeed, some relaxation of this imperative rule is allowed in the following terms:—

"And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that in all places where the proper incumbent of any parsonage, or vicarage, or benefice with cure, doth reside on his living and keep a curate, the incumbent himself in person (not having some lawful impediment, to be allowed by the ordinary of the place), shall once (at the least) in every month, openly and publicly, read the common prayers and service, in and by the said Book prescribed, and (if there be occasion) administer each of the Sacraments, and other rites of the Church, in the parish Church

or Chapel of, or belonging to, the same parsonage, vicarage, or benefice, in such order, manner, and form, as in and by the said Book is appointed; upon pain to forfeit the sum of five pounds to the use of the poor of the parish for every offence, upon conviction by confession, or proof of two credible witnesses upon oath, before two justices of the peace of the county, city, or town corporate where the offence shall be committed (which oath the said justices are hereby empowered to administer), and in default of payment within ten days, to be levied by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the offender by the warrant of the said justices, by the churchwardens or overseers of the poor of the said parish, rendering the surplusage to the party."

If then the Rubric which prescribes Daily Service is to be interpreted by the Act of Uniformity, no excuse at all for any omission is permitted except in the case of incumbents who happen to have curates; and these are bound, under easily-enforced penalties, "to read," "in person," "at the least in every month," "the Common Prayers and Service, in and by the said Book prescribed, and (if there be occasion) administer each of the Sacraments and other Rites of the Church in the Parish Church or Chapel belonging" to them. It is notorious, however, that Daily Service and the Observance of Saints' Days were as rare in Parish Churches at the commencement of the Oxford Movement as the daily celebration of the Holy Communion is now;

and I could easily point out more than one Church in which it would be easy to convict the incumbent “before two justices of the peace” for violation of the Seventh Clause of the Act of Uniformity. It is evident that those who have clamoured for some easier method by which the Ritualists may be delivered over to the secular arm are not aware of the means of retaliation which the Ritualists possess under the present law, to say nothing of the fresh weapons which the Act of last Session has placed in their hands, if they choose in self-defence to avail themselves of them. But however that may be, it is a patent fact that the Act of Uniformity makes a strict observance of the Rubric which orders Daily Service more stringent than observance of the Ornaments Rubric; and it is equally clear that the former Rubric has been systematically disregarded, till lately almost universally disregarded, with the most entire impunity, “capable” though it be “of being enforced with severe penalties” “under a penal statute.”

One of the reasons given in the Purchas Judgment for the condemnation of the Eucharistic Vestments is, that “a clear and abundant *expositio contemporanea* has been” supplied against them. By this phrase their Lordships, I suppose, mean that their researches have not enabled them to trace the use of the Eucharistic Vestments in the English Church from the date of Queen Elizabeth’s Advertisements “to about 1840.” If they had continued their researches I have reason to think that they would have come to

a different conclusion. I cannot, however, allow the argument to pass without objecting to it both as irrelevant, and as proving too much. It is irrelevant because the mere fact of a law being in abeyance does not abrogate the law. If, indeed, their Lordships had meant by the expression, *expositio contemporanea*, that the stream of commentators understood the Ornaments Rubric in the sense of the Purchas Judgment, there would have been some force in the appeal provided that facts were forthcoming to substantiate it. But to declare that the statute does not mean what it plainly says, merely because circumstances prevented its being put rigorously in force, is surely a somewhat violent specimen of judicial exegesis. The *expositio contemporanea* argument, moreover, proves too much, as I have already pointed out, inasmuch as it would be fatal to a number of other things which have in recent times been legally revived from a long desuetude.

But if *expositio contemporanea* means the sense in which the Ornaments Rubric has been understood “from the days of Elizabeth to about 1840,” there is at once an end of the Purchas Judgment; for hardly a respectable writer can be produced in the interval named by their Lordships who does not interpret the Rubric in the sense condemned by the Court. It would be easy to produce a catena of authorities in support of this statement, but I shall content myself with three ecclesiastics, two of whom will carry weight by their reputation for moderation and learn-

ing, and the third by his acknowledged mastery of legal knowledge.

Commenting on the Ornaments Rubric Wheatley says:—

“The second part of this Rubric is concerning the “*Ornaments of the Church and the Ministers thereof, at all times of their ministrations:*” and to know what they are, we must have recourse to the Act of Parliament here mentioned, viz: *in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI.; which enacts, that all and singular ministers, in any cathedral or parish church, etc., shall, after the Feast of Pentecost next coming, be bounden to say the mattins, evensong, etc., and the ministrations of the Sacraments, and all the common and open prayer, in such order and form as is mentioned in the said book, (viz. first book of Edward VI.,) and not other or otherwise.* So that by this Act we are again referred to the First Common Prayer Book of King Edward VI., for the habits in which Ministers are to officiate; where there are two Rubrics relating to them, one prescribing what habits shall be worn *in all public ministrations whatsoever*, the other relating to the habits that are to be used *at the Communion.*”

And then, after enumerating the several ornaments which were prescribed under the First Prayer Book of Edward, he observes: “These are the ministerial ornaments enjoined by our present Rubric.”

Archdeacon Sharp, in a Series of Charges pub-

lished in 1753, after quoting the 14th Canon, writes as follows:—

“And upon the 58th Canon, which enjoins Ministers reading Divine Service, and administering the Sacraments, to wear surplices, and graduates their withal hoods, I need say the less, because it is superseded by the Rubric before the Common Prayer in 1661, which is statute law, and determines that all the ornaments of the Ministers at all times of their ministration shall be the same as they were by authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI. So that the Injunction concerning the habits and ornaments of Ministers which is at the end of Edward VI.’s First Service Book, with its explanation in the Act of Uniformity by Queen Elizabeth, is the legal or statutable rule of our Church habits to this day, and is so far from being explained by this Canon that it rather serves to explain the Canon itself, as I shall show in an instance or two. For, first, this Injunction of King Edward’s referred to in our present Rubric, though it requires the surplice to be used in all parish churches and chapels annexed to the same, yet doth in express words give liberty to the clergy to use or not use the surplice in their ministrations in other places, which is an indulgence that the Canon doth not expressly give, and it may be, I even question, whether it can be fairly inferred from it.

“And the other thing that I would observe in the said Injunction is, that no order is given therein

concerning the use of the hood with the surplice in parish churches, though the same is allowed to be used by dignitaries in Cathedral Churches and in College Chapels. Therefore, as I take it, the clause in this Canon, which enjoins graduates to wear the hoods of their respective degrees in parish churches is not strictly binding, forasmuch as the present Rubric, which is of later date and decisive of all questions about the habits in ministration, refers us to a rule by which the said practice is not required."

My third authority is the late Bishop Philpotts of Exeter, in his well-known answer to the parishioners of Helston, when they desired him to prohibit the use of the surplice in the pulpit.

"On this particular," he says, "I have no difficulty in saying that Mr. Blunt has been right since he has preached in his surplice. The Sermon is part of the Communion Service, and whatever be the proper garb of the Minister in the one part of that service, the same ought to be worn by him throughout. The rubric and canons recognise no difference whatever. The rubric at the commencement of 'The Order for Morning and Evening Prayer,' says, 'That such ornaments of the Church, and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their ministration, shall be retained and be in use, as were in this Church of England by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI.'—in other words, 'a white alb plain, with a vestment or cope.' These were forbidden in King

Edward VI.'s Second Book, which ordered that 'The Minister at the times of the Communion, and at all other times of his ministration, shall use neither alb, vestment, nor cope, but being an archbishop or bishop, he shall have and wear a rochet; and being a priest or deacon, he shall have and wear a surplice only.' This was a triumph of the party most opposed to the Church of Rome, and most anxious to carry reformation to the very furthest point. But their triumph was brief. Within a few months Queen Mary restored Popery; and when the accession of Queen Elizabeth brought back the Reformation, she and the Convocation, and the Parliament, deliberately rejected the simpler direction of Edward's Second Book, and revived the ornaments of the First. This decision was followed again by the Crown, Convocation, and Parliament, at the Restoration of Charles II., when the existing Act of Uniformity established the Book of Common Prayer, with its rubricks, in the form in which they now stand.

"From this statement it will be seen that the surplice may be objected to with some reason: but then it must be because the law requires 'the alb and the vestment or cope.'

"Why have these been disused? Because the parishioners—that is, the churchwardens who represent the parishioners—have neglected their duty to provide them: for such is the duty of the parishioners by the plain and express Canon law of England (Gibson, 200). True it would be a very costly duty,

and for that reason, most probably, churchwardens have neglected it, and archdeacons have connived at the neglect. I have no wish that it should be otherwise. But be this as it may, if the churchwardens of Helston shall perform this duty, at the charge of the parish, providing an alb, a vestment, and a cope, as they might in strictness be required to do (Gibson, 201), I shall enjoin the minister, be he who he may, to use them. But until these ornaments are provided by the parishioners, it is the duty of the minister to use the garment actually provided by them for him, which is the surplice. The parishioners never provide a gown; nor, if they did, would he have a right to wear it in any part of his ministrations. For the gown is nowhere mentioned nor alluded to in any of the rubrics."

This decision is valuable not only on account of the great ability and legal acumen of Bishop Philpotts, but for two other reasons. In the first place it points to one main cause why the Eucharistic Vestments fell into desuetude, namely, the unwillingness of the parishioners to go to the expense of providing them. Centuries before the Reformation we have evidence of constant disputes between parishioners and incumbents as to the legal share of each in providing the necessary ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers. One of Archbishop Walter Gray's constitutions (A.D. 1250), for example, ordains as follows: *—

* I give the translation in Johnson's Version.

“ Wheras great Controversy often ariseth between the Rectors, or Vicars of Churches, within the Province of *York*, and their Parishioners concerning divers Ornaments, and things belonging to the Church; therefore that it may be known what the Rectors, or Vicars, are concern'd to uphold, and repair, and what things and Ornaments of the Church are to be repair'd by the Parishioners; we ordain that all our Parishioners be so well informed in the following Particulars, as that they do all in every respect observe them, that is the Chalice, the principal Mass-vestment of the Church, with the Chesible, the Alb, the Amyt, the Stole, the Maniple, the Girdle, with three Towels, and Corporals, and other decent Vestments for the Deacon [and Subdeacon] according to the Condition of the Parishioners and the Church, with a Silk Cope for the principal Festivals, and two others for presiding in the choice at the Feasts aforesaid, a Cross for Processions, and another lesser Cross for the dead, a Bier for the dead, a Vessel for the holy Water, an Osculatory, a Candlestick for the Paschal Taper, a Cense-pot, a Lanthorn with a little bell, a Lenten Vail, two Candlesticks for the Collets; the Legend, the Antiphonar, the Grail, the Psalter, the Troper, the Ordinal, the Missal, the Manual, which are the Books; the Frontal for the high Altar, three Surplices, a decent Pix for the Body of *Christ*, Banners for the Rogation-days, great Bells with their Ropes, the holy Font with a Lock and Key, the Chris-matory, the Images in the Churches, the principal

Image (in the Chancel) of the Saint, to which the Church is dedicated; the repair of the Books and Vestments, with all the things aforesaid, as occasion shall be; the Beam-light in the Church, the repair of the Body of the Church, and building of it, with the Steeple within and without, the Glass-windows, the Fence of the Churchyards, with the Wings of the Body of the Church, and everything which is known to belong to the Parishioners.

“All other things shall belong to the Rectors, or Vicars, according to their several Ordinations; that is the principal Chancel, with the Reparations thereof, as to the Walls, and Roofs, and Glass-windows, with Desks and Benches, and other decent Ornaments, that they may sing with the Prophet, *Lord, I have loved the comeliness of thy House*, together with the Manse of the Rectory, and the Reparation thereof from time to time. And let Rectors or Vicars know, that they may be compelled to these, and other things not written in this Book by the Ordinaries of the Places, according to this and other Constitutions approved in this respect.”

Bishop Philpotts's decision is valuable, in the second place, because it gives proleptically a practical refutation to an assumption which underlies the whole of the Purchas Judgment, namely, that it is inconceivable that the rulers of the Church should have allowed the Eucharistic Vestments to remain in abeyance if they had really believed that they were statutably binding. But here we have, in our own

generation, an eminent and fearless prelate insisting on the strictly binding force of the Rubric as regards the full Eucharistic Vestments, yet declaring his intention to rest satisfied with the use of the surplice, unless indeed the parishioners should provide the obsolete vestments; in which case the Bishop would put the law in force and compel their use. Why should it be thought incredible that bishops in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries should take the same view of their duty in this respect as the late Bishop of Exeter?

I do not feel sure that I rightly understand what the Court meant by the assertion that “a clear and abundant *expositio contemporanea* has been” supplied against Eucharistic Vestments from the year 1564 “to about 1840.” The phrase implies that decisive evidence exists to prove that the Vestments were not used within the period designated. But assuming the correctness of the facts on which their Lordships relied, and putting their evidence at the very best, it only amounts to this: that it is impossible to prove with certainty that the Eucharistic Vestments were used. This is a very different thing from proving that they were not used; and the latter proposition is the one which the Court was logically bound to establish.

But I have already shown that some of the essential premisses on which the conclusion of the Court rests are based on *data* which are historically inaccurate. I have produced positive historical

evidence of the use of the full Eucharistic Vestments long after the date at which the Court has fixed their abolition, and the impugners of the Vestments are therefore bound to show that they were abolished at any other date down to the Great Rebellion. They were abolished then certainly in common with many other things, such as the Surplice, Prayer Book, and Episcopate. Those twenty years of devastation effaced many landmarks, and destroyed much valuable evidence. At this moment there are many churches scattered all over the kingdom in which the highest ritual is in constant use, but as to which contemporary literature bears no record. How much more must this have been the case in days when there was no daily press, no telegraph, no Church Association. If the Eucharistic Vestments were positively forbidden by the Rubric, then indeed it would be reasonable enough to demand proof of their being in use. But since they are positively enjoined—that is to say, if the Rubric is interpreted in the "dry light" of an unprejudiced understanding—it is as unfair as it is irrelevant to lay upon a man who obeys the plain meaning of the Rubric the burden of proving that it ever had been obeyed from 1564 "to about 1840;" and this on pain of being branded as "lawless," reduced to beggary, and worried, as Mr. Purchas was worried, into an early grave.

Unreasonable, however, as the demand of the Judicial Committee is, it so happens that it is

capable of being satisfied. I have proved that the Eucharistic Vestments were in use some years after the date assigned by the Purchas Judgment for their extinction. I will now produce some evidence to show that the Eucharistic Vestments, and many other things which the Great Rebellion swept away, were in use down to the very eve of the overthrow of the Church and Monarchy. I have a curious and very rare tract now lying before me, bearing the following title:—“*Lambeth Faire, wherein you have all the Bishops Trinkets set to sale. Printed Anno Dom. 1641.*” It is a satirical description, in rhyme, of a public sale of “the ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers thereof” then in use. The Bishops, having been “put downe” by Parliament, are supposed to preside at the sale of the now useless “trinkets.” Let us see what sort of “trinkets” they were:—

“This being done of Bishops, all the Crew
Began with speed their wearing Robes to shew,
And with extended voyce they all did cry,
Come, Customers, see what you lack, and buy;
Here’s Vestments Consecrate, all sorts and sizes.”

Here we have two facts stated: first that “Vestments consecrate” were then among the ornaments of the Church of England; secondly, that they were then in use, for they are offered for sale as “wearing Robes,” not as antiquarian relics. Now the only “Vestments consecrate” being the Eucharistic Vestments properly so called, this reference to them as

"wearing robes" seems to me conclusive, at least so far as this, that they were then considered by the Puritans as among the chief grievances to be got rid of. But, according to the Purchas Judgment, they had been "swept away with severe exactness" more than seventy years previously.

Among other "trinkets" described in "*Lambeth Faire*," are the following: "a crucifix," "crosier staffe," "crosses," "high altars," "sacred fonts," "guilt (*sic*) cherubims," "bellowing organs," "curious hymnes," "mitres," "bells baptized," "golden slippers consecrated," and "emboss'd with Holines Divine." The following passage, moreover, seems to show conclusively that what are called altar lights were then in use:—

"Wax Candles, Tapors, another cries and calls,
These brought I with me from Cathedrall Paules;
They'l scare the Divele, and put him unto flight,
When he perceives a consecrated light;
When we at Mattens and at Even-song were,
We had them by us then devoid of feare;
They'l bring delight unto your eyes and nose,
They burn so cleare and smell so like a Rose,
And when you think that it hath burnt enough,
Then blow it out, you shall not smell the snuffe,
Or else you may on whom you will bestow it;
They'l joy to think a Bishop once did owe it."

"Yes," I hear some one say, "and you see the end of it all. Ritualism ruined the Church of England in the seventeenth century, and it may ruin it now unless it is put down." The objection, however,

would prove too much ; for the party who got the upper hand then, after nearly a century of implacable strife, opposed Ritualism, even in the mild form of surplice and square cap, because it symbolised the ancient constitution and doctrine of the Church as distinguished from the republican ecclesiasticism of Geneva. It is impossible to read carefully the polemical writings of that period without perceiving that questions much deeper than that of dress lay at the bottom of this controversy. Is the Church a divine organism founded by the Son of God more than eighteen centuries ago and endowed with the attribute of unceasing life? Or is she merely a human institution or school of opinions which men may remodel at their will, or for which they may substitute some different polity or philosophy that may appear to them preferable? That was the question implied or avowed in the Ritual Controversy of the seventeenth century; and as soon as Puritanism obtained the upper hand it immediately reduced its theory to practice by the abolition of the Episcopate and the establishment of the republican theory of Church government on its ruins. The same question is latent in the Ritual Controversy of our own day. The attack on "the sacerdotal principle" means nothing less than this, however confused may be the ideas—and they are very confused indeed—of those who engage in the attack. But more of that anon.

It is tolerably certain, however, that the Puritan

party would never have carried the majority of the nation with them against the Church in the seventeenth century if the Bishops had attended to their spiritual duties more and interfered in politics less. It was the introduction into the spiritual realm of the arbitrary maxims and despotic practices of secular politics which alienated the sympathies of the masses from the Episcopate. The Bishops showed themselves prone to lose sight of their spiritual character and functions amid the trappings of their political position and the schemes of party manœuvres. If they had been less Erastian, less political, less ambitious of Court favour, and more devoted to the proper duties of their office, the Church, which they dragged through the mire of earthly politics, and themselves with it, would probably have been spared the twenty years' captivity of which we still feel some of the disastrous effects. Laud's connection with the Star Chamber and with the policy of "Thorough" did more to ruin himself and his Church than all his ritualistic proclivities. It was the memory of Roman despotism more than aversion to Roman theology that drove the mass of the nation to arms against the Stuart dynasty. It was the "Popery" of the Bishops in the art of government and in their manner of life, much more than their views of purely theological questions, which tended to make them unpopular. Such, at all events, was the deliberate opinion of some of the leading men of the time. The great Lord

Falkland, for example, while defending prelacy in the abstract, was very frank in his criticism on the concrete representation of it which he saw around him. In a speech which he delivered in Parliament in the year 1641 he is reported to have spoken as follows:—

“He is a great stranger in Israel who knows not this kingdom hath long laboured under many and great oppressions, both in religion and liberty; and his acquaintance here is not great, or his ingenuity less, who doth not know and acknowledge that a great, if not a principal, cause of both these have been some bishops and their adherents.” They “have opposed the Papacy beyond the seas, that they might settle *one beyond the waters.*” And he suggests accordingly such reforms as these:—“I am content to take away all those things from them which, to any considerable degree of probability, may again beget the like mischiefs if they be not taken away. If their temporal title, power, and employment appear likely to distract them from the care of, or make them look down with contempt upon, their spiritual duty, and the too great distance between them and those they govern will hinder the free and fit recourse of their inferiors to them, and occasion insolence from them to their inferiors, let that be considered and cared for. I am sure neither their *lordships*, their judging of *tythes*, *wills*, and *marriages*, etc., nor their *voices in parliament*, are *jure divino*; and I am sure that these titles and this power are not necessary to their authority, as appears

by the little they have had with us by them, and the much that others have had without them. . . . If their revenues shall appear likely to produce the same effects, for it hath been anciently observed that *Religio preferit divitias et filia devoravit matrem*: let so much of that as was in all probability intended for an attendant upon their temporal dignities wait upon them out of the doors. Let us only take care to leave them such proportions as may seem in some good degree to the dignity of learning and the encouragement of students.”*

Absit omen! But I shall not be surprised if the first effect of the recent violent, and I must add unreasoning, attempt “to put down Ritualism,” be to put down the bishops from the position of temporal dignity which they occupy at present.

Before I leave the question of the use of the Eucharistic Vestments during the period between the Advertisements of Elizabeth and the Great Rebellion, it may be interesting to mention that there is in the north transept of Southwell Church a recumbent effigy of Archbishop Sandys (who died in 1588) wearing the following vestments:—a long tunic with tight sleeves, somewhat like an alb, but falling over the feet; a chasuble; a doctor’s hood, with good-sized tippet; and a small ruff round the neck. The chasuble is a peculiar one. It reaches to about the middle of the leg in front, and is cut square. On

* Rushworth, *Parl. Hist.* iv. pp. 184, 185. The italics are in the original.

the arms it comes about as far as the elbows; and it is so long behind that it would trail on the ground, and is turned back under the figure. It has no orphreys, and is fringed all round.*

Now the question is, Does this represent the dress actually worn by Sandys? *Primâ facie* I should be inclined to say No. Sandys was a Puritan, and took part with those who opposed the Vestments. But his opposition was not violent, like that of Hooper and others, and his promotion affords evidence that he knew how to temper his Puritanical proclivities with discretion. One thing, at all events, seems clear. The effigy cannot be a copy of the ordinary Eucharistic Vestments, for those on Sandys's tomb are by no means ordinary. Not only is the shape of the chasuble peculiar, but the collocation of Vestments is such as no sculptor would have employed if he had not seen them in actual use at the time. On the other hand, it is such a *mélange* as a man like Sandys might be likely to invent for himself. Anyhow, if the dress depicted on his effigy was not worn by him, it must have been worn by some one at the time; for the sculptor would hardly have invented it, and there was certainly no ancient model of which it could be a copy.

So much as to the evidence in favour of the Eucharistic Vestments previous to the Great Rebellion. Have we any evidence of their use after the Restoration?

* My attention was called to this interesting effigy by Mr. T. A. Lacey, of Balliol College.

Considering the circumstances of the case and of the time the probabilities are all against their use, as I have shown some pages back. Nevertheless I am able to produce some evidence which it appears to me difficult to explain except on the supposition that the ritual condemned by the Purchas Judgment was in use after the Restoration, at least in some Churches. Your Lordship is perhaps acquainted with some of the liturgical works of Jean Grancolas, Chaplain to Monsieur the brother of Louis XIV. He was born in 1660, and died in 1732. Among other works he wrote an "Historical Commentary on the Roman Breviary," which was written originally in French, and published in Paris in 1727. I have not a copy of the French Edition, but I am indebted to the Rev. S. Baring-Gould for the following extract from the Latin translation, published at Venice in 1734:—

"Post schisma novum sibi officii corpus Angli digessere, Psalmorum liber semel per mensem legitur;.....Psalmi sunt juxta Hebraicum textum, non juxta Vulgatum interpretationem. Vetus Testamentum legitur in prima lectione precum matutinarum, et vespertinarum, Novum autem in secunda. Vetus Testamentum semel per annum perlegitur, Novum ter. Isaias legitur post Adventus initium usque ad Septuagesimam; tunc vero incipit Genesis usque ad V. Dominicam Quadragesimæ, qua leguntur Exodus, Numeri, et Deuteronomius usque ad Dominicam Trinitatis. Inde Josue leguntur, Judices, Libri Regum, Hieremias, Ezechiel, Daniel, et prophetæ minores usque ad Adventum. Sunt etiam lectiones singularum per annum Dominicarum propriæ, Ascensionis præterea, et Feriæ secundæ et tertiæ Paschales, et Pentecostes, atque ceterorum Festorum. Festa vero hæc sunt. Januario: Circumcisio, Epiphania, S. Lucianus, S. Hilarius, S. Priscilla, S. Fabianus, S. Agnes, S. Vincentius, Conversio S. Pauli," and so on

throughout the year. “*Licet autem Sancti hi omnes sunt in ipsorum calendario, officia tamen non peragunt, nisi Festorum D.N. et B.V., ut Purificationis et Annunciationis, Assumptio vero ne in Calendario quidem ipsorum invenitur. Pro Festis aliis nullum Officium est, si duodecem Apostolorum Festa excipias, conversionis S. Pauli, S. Barnabæ, S. Marci, S. Lucæ, S. Stephani, et S. Joannis Baptistæ. Quare Reformata hæc Religio ex septem Horis Canonicis Matutinas tantum et Vespertinas preces servat. Multa ex Romanis Ritibus sumserunt, atque Anglice interpretati sunt, Collectas, Litanias, sine invocatione Sanctorum tamen, distributionem epistolarum, et Evangeliorum per anni cursum, Preces, Versiculos, Te Deum, Benedictus, Magnificat, Pater, Kyrie Eleison, Domine labia mea aperies, Gloria in excelsis, Præfationes, Quicunque. Quod Collectas Sanctorum spectat quorum officia celebrant, eas dumtaxat servaverunt, quæ mera constant historia, quibusque nulla sit intercessionis, aut invocationis mentio, quales sunt S. Stephani, S. Petri, etc. Presbyteri hæc omnia in Templis decantant per anni cursum, superpelliceo, pluviali et casulis induti. Puerorum chorus quoque habent, cantores, et organa.*”—Lib. I. c. xii., pp. 25-26.

Another French writer, for my acquaintance with whom I am also indebted to Mr. Baring-Gould, says:—*

“*L'Eglise Anglicane, en abolissant la Messe, a reténu une Ceremonie qui en approche, qui a été traduite des Offices Romains, et dans laquelle on observe l'ordre des Epîtres, des Evangeles, le symbole du Nicée, le Prône, et les Prefaces, qui sont ordinairement un petit éloge du Saint dont on fait la Fête, et une exortation au peuple de l'imiter, mais sans adresser leurs Prières à autres qu'à Dieu. Ils communient dans cette ceremonie, et le font avec respect et à genoux. Ils chantant ou recitent Matines, les autres Heures canoniales avec les Leçons, Collectes, Pseaumes, et autres Offices propre du*

* *Abrege des Histoires des plus fameux Heresiarques qui ont paru en Europe depuis l'anne 1040, et au précis historique des causes du schisma de l'Eglise Anglicane. Rouen, 1699. Pt. ii. p. 55.*

tems ; et tout cet Office et la Liturgie même est fait, recité et chanté en langue vulgaire."

" *On se sert des habits et des Ornaments à la Romaine, ou à l'usage des Orgues, les instrumens de musique, et des cloches. On observe dans les Baptêmes, et autres Benedictions le signe de la croix, et on a quantité de ceremonies dans leurs Offices et Services retenues ou imitées des ceremonies Romains,*" etc. etc.

The Abbé De Commanville, in his "Tables Géographiques de tous les Archeveschez et Eveschez," published at Rouen, in 1700 says (p. 117), of the English Church :—

"Elizabeth, étant montée sur le Trône, y établit une réformation à sa mode. Elle supprima le Dogme...de la Transsubstantiation, l'Invocation des Saints, le Purgatoire, le Celibat des Prêtres ; mais elle laissa la Liturgie, les Ceremonies, les Habits Sacerdotaux, le Chant," etc.

Both these writers concur in asserting that the old Vestments were retained and used in the English Church after the rupture between Queen Elizabeth and the Pope ; and Grancolas, in particular, is so accurate in the circumstantial account which he gives of other matters that it is hard to believe that he took no pains to inform himself on the subject of the Vestments. It is much more probable that he consulted some of the crowd of Englishmen who resided in France at the time he wrote ; and it is hardly probable that, writing about the year 1727, he would have asserted that the cope and chasuble, as well as the surplice, were worn by the clergy, if no chasuble had ever been seen after the first few years of Elizabeth's reign, or cope either except in Cathedral and Collegiate Churches, and even these only on high festivals.*

* This, by the way, is one of the numerous blunders of the

The following passage, too, is interesting as showing Sir Walter Scott's opinion. It is evident that he, at all events, believed that "copes and vestments" were part of the legal heritage of the Church of England after the Restoration:—

"I trow, gin ye were not blinded wi' the graces and favours, and services and enjoyments, and employments and inheritances of this wicked world, I could prove to you by the Scriptures in what a filthy rag ye put your trust; and that your surplices, and *your copes and vestments*, are but cast-off garments of the muckle harlot that sitteth upon seven hills."—*Speech of Gilfillan the Cameronian in "Waverley,"* ch. 36.

I think I may now dismiss the question of the Vestments; and in doing so I must repeat that the historical discussion into which I have been led by the extraordinary reasoning of the Judicial Committee in *Hebbert v. Purchas* is entirely irrelevant to the point at issue. The Ornaments Rubric prescribes in plain language the Vestments which were legally in use in the second year of King Edward VI.; and with all that happened in the interval between that date and the year 1662 we have nothing whatever to do. That this will be the view taken by the new Court of Appeal, when the ques-

Court in the Case of Mr. Purchas. The XXIVth Canon does not say that the cope shall be used "on solemn festivals" only, but that on solemn festivals the highest dignitary present, being dressed in a cope, shall celebrate the Holy Communion.

tion is fully argued, as it was the view of the Judicial Committee in *Liddell v. Westerton*, I cannot allow myself to doubt.

The controversy about the mixed chalice is one into which it is not necessary for me to enter. It has been sufficiently discussed by abler pens than mine; and the practice is, moreover, so innocent in itself and, as one of the most moderate of our bishops remarked to me lately, "so beautiful in its symbolism," that the new Court of Appeal will leave it, as I venture to hope, in the list of optional ceremonial. The Dean of the Arches Court, for reasons which I own appear to me insufficient, prohibited the mixing of water with the Sacramental wine during Divine Service, but permitted it if done in the vestry or elsewhere before the Service. A very superfluous sanction surely. It is the duty of the priest who is responsible for the due celebration of the Holy Communion to see that real bread and real wine are used, and so long as he does this in a manner which cannot possibly be offensive to anybody, neither courts of law, nor Ordinary, nor the three "aggrieved parishioners" of the Public Worship Act, have any more right to interfere than they have to dictate the particular vintage to which the Sacramental wine is to belong. There is, in fact, more or less of water in all wine, and a small addition at the celebration of the Holy Communion, while it is in harmony with immemorial custom, can be no grievance to any one. Practically, therefore, it is a matter of complete indifference

whether the practice of mixing water with the wine in the vestry is forbidden. Those who like the practice will continue it, all legal decisions notwithstanding, for they will regard the matter as *ultra vires* of any Court whatsoever. And a decision against it moreover, could never be enforced, inasmuch as no evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction could ever be produced.

One should have thought that considerations like these might have occurred to the distinguished persons who sat in judgment on Mr. Purchas. But with what really looks like a pragmatical disposition to be needlessly vexatious they condemned the very superfluous permission given by the inferior Court to mix a little water with the wine in the Vestry.

And their Lordships' reasoning is even more remarkable than the decision to which it leads them. After glancing at some of the arguments in support of the mixed chalice they remark:—"Their Lordships gladly leave these niceties of examination to observe, that they doubt whether this part of the Article is of much importance. As the learned Judge has decided the act of mingling the water with the wine in the Service to be illegal, the private mingling of the wine is not likely to find favour with any." Surely if the matter was so unimportant, the wise exercise of judicial discretion would have been to leave it in the category of things indifferent and therefore optional. But one very singular character-

istic pervades the Purchas Judgment. Confessions of doubt, uncertainty, and perplexity, or declarations that the matter in dispute is of little or no importance, are invariably the prelude to a sentence of conviction. "Not proven" is in the mind of the Court always equivalent to the verdict of "Guilty," and it is the accuser not the accused who systematically receives the benefit of every doubt. "They do not disguise from themselves that the task" of interpreting the Ornaments Rubric, "is a difficult one," and the question of wafer-bread presents similar difficulty to their Lordships' mind. I venture respectfully to think that these difficulties are not inherent in the Rubrics themselves but in the subjective prepossessions of their judicial interpreters. But granting, for argument's sake, that there are "difficulties," one might at least hope that they would serve, as "extenuating circumstances," to mitigate the offence of the accused. The inference would be as rash as it is certainly natural. The "difficulties" being confessed, "their Lordships are therefore inclined to think" that Mr. Purchas ought to have had no difficulties; and they condemn him accordingly. And so with regard to wafer-bread. "Upon this Sixteenth Article, however," says the Court, "*whether it be more or less important*, their Lordships allow the appeal, and will advise that a monition should issue against the Respondent." My Lord, I endeavour to restrain my indignation; but it is hard to feel respect for the

decisions of a Court which travesties after this fashion the elementary axioms of English law and the primary principles of eternal justice. The spectacle of a Court of last resort inflicting a ruinous sentence on a man of blameless moral character, because in a balance of "difficulties" his judgès are "inclined to think" that the "difficulties" in question led him, as they led the learned Judge of the inferior Court, to an erroneous conclusion, is a scandal which I trust will never again be witnessed in England.

"We consider," says the Judgment of the same Court in the Gorham Case, "that it is not the duty of any Court to be minute and rigid in cases of this sort. We agree with Sir William Scott in the opinion which he expressed in Stone's case, in the Consistory Court of London: 'That if any Article is really a subject of dubious interpretation, it would be highly improper that this Court should fix on one meaning, and prosecute all those who hold a contrary opinion regarding its interpretation.'"

It is no exaggeration to say that the Purchas Judgment is an outrageous parody on this excellent maxim. But Mr. Gorham was supposed to represent an influential party, and he had the support of that public opinion which is represented by the newspapers. Mr. Purchas, on the other hand, was supposed to represent only himself and possibly a score or two of wrong-headed clergymen, and the press was dead against him. Mr. Gorham was

accordingly acquitted in violation of the plainest language, and Mr. Purchas was condemned in spite of it. When such applications of the "Lesbian rule" are seen in the practice of foreign Courts of Justice the public opinion of England is not slow to denounce them. But is justice "a geographical expression," changing its complexion and essential features according to the degree of latitude in which it is administered?

It is from no disloyalty to the law of the land, nor from any disrespect towards those on whom is imposed the arduous task of administering it, that I feel constrained to express myself thus frankly. On the contrary, it is because I am jealous of the purity and integrity of our Courts of Justice, and wish to bear myself loyally towards them, that I consider it part of my duty as a good citizen to protest against a glaring miscarriage of justice like the Purchas Judgment. The way to make men lawless is to attempt to force upon their consciences an interpretation of the law which they know to be as untrue historically as it is radically unjust. This very matter of the mixed chalice is disposed of by the Court in the compass of little more than two octavo pages; yet within that brief space it contrives to commit itself to a blunder which would have been discreditable to the merest tyro in ecclesiastical history. "But neither Eastern or* Western Church,

* It is sufficiently evident that the Court acted as if it were making the law, not declaring it. Did it consider itself *super-*

so far as the Committee is aware, has any custom of mixing the water with wine, apart from and before the Services." And further on they assert that this "practice has not prevailed at all."

What the Court here declares to be no custom either in the Eastern or Western Church is, in fact, the rule of the former.

I now come to the question of wafer-bread. The statement of the question by the Court is as follows:—

"The Twentieth Article charges the Respondent with using on divers occasions 'wafer-bread, being bread made in the special shape and fashion of circular wafers, instead of bread such as is usual to be eaten,' and with administering the same to the communicants. The Rubric of the Prayer Book now in force runs thus:—'And to take away all occasion of dissension and superstition, which any person hath or might have concerning the bread and wine, it shall suffice that the bread be such as is usual to be eaten; but the best and purest wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten.' This is the same with the Rubrics of 1552, 1559, and 1604, with two exceptions. The present Rubric omits after 'eaten' the words 'at the table with other meats,' and it introduces words which have been prominent in the argument in this case. Instead of 'to take away the superstition,' it reads 'to take away all occasion grammaticus also? I was taught at school that "neither" ought to be followed by "nor."

of dissension and superstition.' In the First Book of Edward VI. the direction is different:—'For avoiding all matter and occasion of dissension, it is meet that the bread prepared for the Communion be made through all this realm after one sort or fashion; that is to say, unleavened and round, as it was afore, but without all manner of print, and something more larger and thicker than it was, so that it may be aptly divided in divers pieces; and every one shall be divided in two pieces at the least, or more, by the discretion of the Minister, and so distributed.' One of the Elizabethan Injunctions (of 1559) is at variance with the Elizabethan Rubric continued from the Second Book of King Edward, and provides as follows:—'Where also it was in the time of King Edward VI. used to have the Sacramental Bread of common fine bread, it is ordered for the more reverence to be given to these holy mysteries, being the Sacraments of the Body and Blood of our Saviour Jesus Christ, that this same Sacramental Bread be made and formed plain, without any figure thereupon, of the same fineness and fashion round, though somewhat bigger in compass and thickness, as the usual bread and wafer heretofore named Singing Cakes, which served for the use of the private Mass. . . .' The learned Judge calls this Injunction a *contemporanea expositio* of the Rubric, but it is in fact a superseding of the Rubric, nor can it be regarded as at all reconcileable with it. Upon these facts the learned Judge decides

as follows:—‘It appears, therefore, that while the first Rubric prescribed an uniformity of size and material, the later and the present Rubric are contented with the order that the purest wheaten flour shall suffice, and the bread may be leavened according to the use of the Eastern, or unleavened according to the use of the Western Church.’”

“Their Lordships,” continues the Purchas Judgment, “do not find any mention of flour, and apart from this slight inadvertence, their Lordships are unable to accept this view of the passages that have been quoted.”

The rebuke here administered to Sir R. Phillimore for his “slight inadvertence” is certainly a refinement of hypercriticism, and comes with an ill grace from a tribunal of which, to speak mildly, accuracy is assuredly not a distinguishing feature. “Their Lordships,” forsooth! “do not find any mention of flour.” But they find mention of “the best and purest wheat bread,” and “wheat bread,” I imagine, is “wheaten flour” in a baked condition. But let that pass, and let us examine the process of reasoning by which the Court arrived at the conclusion that Mr. Purchas transgressed the law in using wafer-bread. It is as follows:—

The First Prayer Book of Edward aimed at uniformity in the matter of wafer bread. The Second Book “is not so positive in form, for the words ‘it shall suffice’ are used; but it produced uniformity and not diversity, for the Injunction of 1559 says:

‘It was in the time of King Edward VI. used to have the Sacramental Bread of common fine bread.’” Then came the Injunction of 1559, which ordered the wafer bread, but without any figure on it; and this again was meant to be imperative and to “superse-
de” the Rubric. Lastly—for the Rubric of 1604 adopted that of Elizabeth—came our present Rubric, in which there is a slight alteration. Instead of “to take away the superstition which any person hath or might have,” it says: “to take away all occasion of *dissension and* superstition.” And instead of “such as is usually to be eaten at the table with other meats,” it says: “such as is usual to be eaten,” omitting “at the table with other meats.”

From this state of facts the Court concludes that the object all through was to enforce uniformity; nor are they staggered by the permissive form of the phrase, “it shall suffice.” “If these words left the whole matter open,” says the Court, “and only provided that the usual bread should be sufficient when it happened to be used, it is difficult to see how either dissension or superstition would be taken away.”

It is, of course, hard to enter into the difficulties of other minds, especially when they happen to be very superior to one’s own; but to my humble understanding there is no difficulty at all in the matter. The dissension and superstition had arisen all along from the attempt to enforce a rigid uniformity. To insist on the wafer-bread, to the absolute exclusion of

the ordinary bread, might with reason be considered superstitious, and would be certain to breed dissension, as in fact it did. To insist on the exclusion of the wafer-bread would have a similar result. And therefore "to take away all occasion of dissension and superstition" "it shall suffice that the bread be such as is usual to be eaten." That is to say, the preference is to be given to the wafer-bread, but it is not forced on those who object to it; and by this means all fear of superstition and cause of dissension would be removed. The Rubric is as clear and transparent as a mountain stream. Dissensions are not removed by a Procrustean uniformity but by a reasonable liberty. The word "dissension" ordinarily implies, not an agreement to differ, but an altercation more or less violent. "Debates, dissensions, uproars, are thy joys," says Dryden. The word is used in a similar sense in Acts xv. 2: When Paul and Barnabas "had no small dissension and disputation (*στάσεως καὶ συζητήσεως*)" with the Judaizing sticklers for uniformity, they appealed to the Apostolic College, and the Council of Jerusalem ruled the point as the Convocation of 1662 ruled that under consideration. It shall suffice, they said, that, in respect to the Law of Moses, "ye abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." And it is added that this decision brought "consolation" to the dissentients. The Judicial Committee's mode of laying dissensions in matters indifferent is the antithesis of this. They "put

a yoke upon the neck" of the party which has the fewest friends, and therefore naturally exasperate instead of giving "consolation."

Throughout the Purchas Judgment the Court eagerly presses against the defendant any alteration in Rubric or Statute which can at all have a hostile interpretation; but alterations which would tell in his favour are quietly ignored. The addition of the word "dissension" in the Rubric of 1662 is with perverse ingenuity made the basis of an argument against him;* while the omission of the words, "at the table with other meats," is put aside without a remark. But is it not fair to infer from the omission that the bread, "such as is usually to be eaten at the table with other meats," is no longer intended by the Rubric, "but the best and purest wheat bread?" Now "the best and purest wheat-bread" is unquestionably unleavened bread. It must be remembered that when the Rubric was written home-baked bread was very common even in towns, and universal in the country, and the ordinary home-baked bread was unleavened. In great houses the domestic baker prepared several kinds and qualities of bread suitable to the various departments of the

* I beg to repeat here, what I have said more than once already, that I am not imputing any deliberate or conscious unfairness to the Court. That it was conscientiously under the influence of a domineering bias every page of the Judgment seems to me to prove. I have some observations to offer on this part of the subject further on.

household; for the master's table the "manchet loaf;" for the side tables the fine "cherte," and for the board's end, or domestics, the brown bread, made of a mixture of flour and rye-meal, called mystelon or maslin. This brown bread was that generally used in the houses of the middle class. The poor seldom tasted wheat; they ate bread made of rye, lentils, and oatmeal. The manchet loaf was made of fine wheat flour, passed through a sieve or boulding cloth, and sometimes called boulded bread. The cherte was made of unboulded flour. In well-to-do households, moreover, various fancy breads were usually put on "the table with other meats."

It is necessary to bear these facts in mind when interpreting the Rubric. Even if the direction as to "the purest wheat bread" were imperative and exclusive, as the Court ruled, or only permissive as I contend, Mr. Purchas had a right to claim acquittal. The Rubric says nothing about the shape of the bread; and the quality of that which he used assuredly corresponded better to the description of "the purest wheat bread" than the concoction of flour, alum, potatoes, and yeast which is now usually set on "the table with other meats." In the Middle Ages, and certainly down to the time of Queen Elizabeth, the wafer-bread was frequently made of fine wheat flour, sugar and almonds. It was called masspane (mass-bread); but, under the name of payne-mayne, it came to be considered a great delicacy at the tables of the rich. We read in an

old Romance that Myldore the Bryzth, when entertaining Sir Degrevant,

“Payne-mayne prevayly,
Sche brought from the pantry.”*

It was no doubt the intention of the Reformers to banish this as well as other composite breads from Sacramental use, and to secure the use of unleavened bread, or of the nearest approach to it “that conveniently may be gotten.”

Let us now glance at the history of the question.

The First Prayer Book of Edward prescribed bread “unleavened and round as it was afore, but without all manner of print, and something more larger and thicker than it was, so that it may be aptly divided in divers pieces.”

The Second Book, “to take away the superstition which any person hath or might have,” ruled that it should “suffice that the bread be such as is usual to be eaten at the table with other meats, but the best and purest wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten.” This was clearly a permissive direction which left an option between the wafer-bread “and the best and purest wheat-bread” that could be got; and it was so understood by the moderate party. But the Puritans, as usual, thought they could not go far enough from ancient custom, and accordingly they used “ordinary bread,” without troubling themselves to consider whether it was “the best and purest wheat bread” or not.

* Thornton Romances, p. 235.

Then came the Prayer Book of 1559, leaving the Rubric of 1552 unchanged, but supplementing it with the Injunction already quoted. The intention of that Injunction undoubtedly was to restore generally the use of wafer-bread. And the Puritans understood it in that sense. In a letter from Miles Coverdale, Lawrence Humphrey, and Thomas Sampson to William Farell, Peter Viret, Theodore Beza, and others, they enumerate various points in which "our affairs are not altered for the better but, alas! are sadly become worse (*in deterius prolapsæ sunt.*)" And among the changes for the worse of which they complain as "settled and determined (*acta et transacta*)," is the obligation to use "an unleavened cake instead of common bread (*panis vulgaris*)."* George Withers, Percival Wiburn, and others make similar complaints; and there is little doubt that both Elizabeth and Archbishop Parker made a strong effort to enforce the Injunction about wafer-bread. In a letter of Parker to Secretary Cecil, April 12th, 1566, he relates the following instructive incident:—

"My Lord of London can best answer for his own jurisdiction; but this I can say, that where I have sent, divers days, three and four of my Chaplains to serve in the greatest parishes, what for lack of surplice and wafer-bread, they did mostly but preach. And one of my chaplains serving last Sunday (7th of April, the Sixth Sunday in Lent) at a parish, and

* Zurich Letters, Second Series, Lett. 50.

being informed that divers communicants would have received, the table made ready accordingly, while he was reading the Passion, one man of the parish drew from the table both cup and the wafer-bread, because the bread was not common, and so the Minister derided and the people disappointed.”*

I call this incident instructive, because it shows the utter lawlessness of the Puritans of that time. The Purchas Judgment innocently assumes that the intention of Elizabeth's Advertisements was to curtail high ceremonial, and that, in matter of fact, all the Clergy officiated in surplices after the year 1564. Yet here we find, two years after this date, that “three and four” of the Primate's own chaplains, “divers days,” and “in the greatest parishes” in the metropolis, could not celebrate the Holy Communion “for lack of surplice” as well as of “wafer-bread,” and therefore “did mostly but preach;” the inference being that they preached in their ordinary dress. The rest of the story shows that the reverence of these fanatics for sacred things was as conspicuous by its absence as their respect for episcopal and royal authority. Yet the Judicial Committee thought it the easiest thing in the world to enforce the use of the full ritual of 1549 in the midst of this saturnalia of Puritan lawlessness, if Queen Elizabeth and her counsellors had been anxious to do so! And they could not conceive the possibility of orders to that effect being successively and derisively dis-

* Parker Correspondence, p. 278.

obeyed! This really shows the absolute necessity of having men sitting in these Courts who have more than a superficial acquaintance with the ecclesiastical history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But let us proceed with the question of the wafer-bread.

Though Parker did his best to restore the use of the wafer-bread, he did not by any means read the Injunction in the rigid sense in which the Purchas Judgment regards it. This is evident from the following passage in a letter of his to Sir William Cecil, on January 8th, 1571:—The question of the sacramental bread, he says,—

“... is matter of much contention in the realme, where most part of Protestants think it most meet to be in wafer-bread, as the Injunction prescribeth; divers others, I cannot tell of what spirit, would have the loaf-bread. . . . They that like not the Injunction force much the statute in the Book. I tell them that they do evil to make odious comparisons betwixt Statute and Injunction, and yet I say and hold that the Injunction hath authority by proviso of the statute. And whereas it is said in the note, that to take away the superstition which any person hath or might have in the bread and wine, it shall suffice that the bread be such as is usual to be eaten at the table with other meats, etc.; ‘it shall suffice,’ I expound, where either there wanteth such fine usual bread, or superstition be feared in the wafer-bread, they may have the Communion in fine usual bread,

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which is rather a toleration in these two necessities than is in plain ordering, as in the Injunction." *

We learn from this letter that the Puritans who objected to the wafer-bread were but a small minority of those who accepted the Reformation. But they were noisy and unscrupulous, and London being their stronghold and its Bishop their patron, their voices were heard and trouble us still; while the vast majority of clergy and laity lived quietly, "thinking at most" to have divine service performed after the manner of the First Book of Edward. Your Lordship will observe that Parker's explanation of "it shall suffice" is that which grammar and common sense suggest, and is in flat contradiction to that of the Purchas Judgment. It had been well, too, if the Court which delivered that Judgment had been mindful of his warning, that "they do evil to make odious comparisons betwixt Statute and Injunction."

The next piece of evidence to which I wish to call your Lordship's attention is from a curious and rare little book called "A Counter-poyson, modestly written for the time, to make answer to the objections and reproches, wherewith the aunswerer to the Abstract would disgrace the holy Discipline of Christ." It is printed "at London" "by Robert Waldegrave," but without date. It is supposed by some to have been written by Henry Jacob, founder of the first Independent or Congregational sect in England;

* Parker Correspondence, p. 875.

while others attribute it to Dudley Fenner, who certainly wrote "A Defence of the Reasons of the Counter-poyson," published in 1586. Both these pieces are reprinted in the quarto volume of Puritan tracts known as "A Parte of a Register." The author, whoever he was, appears, in the title-page which I have quoted, to own the authorship of a somewhat libellous attack on the Church of England, called "An Abstract of certain Acts of Parliament." Archbishop Whitgift published "An Answer to the Abstract," and the Counter-poyson is the rejoinder. This fixes the date of the volume as not earlier than about the year 1584.

And now let us see what evidence the author furnishes on the subject of wafer-bread. On p. 187 he says,—“As for unleavened bread, it is but proper to Geneva, *and now our Church hath allowed the other*: why should we then make any difference or strife about it?” And on p. 195, “It is not lawfull for one *to be thrust out of the Ministry* for showing modestly in his sermons the inconvenience of unleavened bread in the Lord’s Supper.”

From these two quotations two inferences are inevitable: first, that twenty-five years after Queen Elizabeth’s Injunctions common loaf bread was allowed in the administration of the Holy Communion; secondly, that the use of wafer-bread was so much the rule that those who preached against it “modestly in their sermons” were “thrust out of the ministry;” in other words, the Puritans were not forced to use it,

the Injunction notwithstanding; but such as attempted a dog-in-the-manger policy were punished.

"But their Lordships," says the Purchas Judgment, "attach greater weight to the exposition of this Rubric furnished by the history of the question. From a large collection of Visitation Articles, from the time of Charles II., it is clear that the best and purest wheat bread was to be provided for the Holy Communion, and no other kind of bread."

What do their Lordships suppose wafer-bread to be made of? Evidently they think that it is something quite different from "the best and purest wheat bread;" whereas it corresponds with that description more exactly a great deal than ordinary baker's bread. It is called wafer-bread by reason of its shape and not of its material.

The same mistake runs through the argument which the Court founds upon the XXth Canon:—

"The words of the XXth Canon, to which the Visitation Articles refer, point the same way. The Churchwardens are bound to supply 'wheaten bread,' and this alone is mentioned. If wafer-bread is equally permitted, or the special cakes of Edward VI.'s First Book, and of the Injunctions, it is hard to see why the parish is to supply wheaten bread, in cases where wafers are to be supplied by the Minister, or from some other source."

But their Lordships forget that the XXth Canon is substantially a repetition of the Rubric of 1559, which is as follows:—

“ The bread and wine for the Communion shall be provided by the Curate and the Churchwardens, at the charges of the parish.”

What their Lordships' crude acquaintance with these unfamiliar subjects made it “hard” for them “to see” was nevertheless the literal fact. The parish was “to supply wheaten bread” contemporaneously with the Injunction which ordered the celebrant to use wafer-bread. The foundation of their Lordships' argument being thus removed, the superstructure built upon it tumbles of course to the ground. I am sorry, however, to be obliged once more to call attention to their invincible habit of careless quotation. According to the XXth Canon, they say, “the Churchwardens are bound to supply wheaten bread.” But the words of the Canon are:—“The Churchwardens of every parish against the time of every Communion shall, at the charge of the parish, *with the advice and direction of the Minister*, provide a sufficient quantity of fine white bread” (Lat. “*idoneam pro numero communicantium, panis siliginei . . . quantitatem.*”) The words which I have marked in italics give a very different complexion to the Canon from that conveyed by their Lordships' representation of it. The Churchwardens were simply to carry out the instructions of the Minister, and the only condition imposed upon the latter was that the material of the bread should be the finest and purest wheat flour. Do their Lordships really mean to tell us that this condition was violated

because the flour was baked in a particular shape, and without any admixture of a foreign element like yeast? They seem possessed with some occult suspicion that wafer-bread is not bread at all. But are they not aware that the First Prayer Book of Edward VI., which enjoins the use of wafer-bread, orders "the pastors and curates" to find "sufficient bread and wine for the Holy Communion." The confusion in their Lordships' minds results from their strange assumption that unleavened bread is not wheaten bread. On the contrary, the "purest wheat bread," if we are to interpret language strictly, must be unleavened. Their Lordships' conclusion, therefore, is a marvellous specimen of judicial paralogism:—

"Upon the whole, their Lordships think that the law of the Church has directed the use of pure wheat-bread, and they must so advise her Majesty."

Precisely so. But then, why did they suspend and fine Mr. Purchas for doing what "the law of the Church has directed?"

The question seems to me so plain that I shall trouble your Lordship with only one more authority. I happen to possess a copy of the Zurich Liturgy, "faithfully translated out of the Helvetian," as the title-page bears witness, "by John Conrad Werndly, formerly Minister of the French and Dutch Congregation of Santoff, in the Isle of Axholme, in the County of Lincoln: and now Minister of Wraisbury-cum-Langley, in the County of Bucks." The book

was published in 1693, and is dedicated to Queen Mary, and it bears on its frontispiece the following *imprimatur* :—

“November 25, 1692.

“We do approve of this, as a work that may be of
“very good Satisfaction and Use.

“H. LONDON.

“W. COV. AND LICH.

“H. BANGOR.

“J. NORWICH.

“ROB. CICESTRENS.

“RICH. PETRIBURG.”

Now in this Liturgy the Minister is ordered to use “unleavened bread, made in the form of a broad square cake or wafer.” It is to be “of the finest flour, almost as thin as paper, and as white as snow. . . . And the breaking thereof maketh a noise, or crack, which is easily heard throughout the whole Church, to express and represent the better the breaking of our Saviour’s Body on the Cross.” The translator adds, however, with unconscious prevision of the Purchas Judgment, that though the Zurich Protestants “use no Common Bread, yet it is really bread, and made of the best and whitest Flour of Meal.”

I have no wish to attach more importance to this book than it deserves. But I think it significant that five English bishops in 1692 should have publicly recommended, as “of very good satisfaction and use” a book which contains a dissertation in

defence of wafer-bread, as well as strict directions for its use. The translator, be it remembered, was at the time the book was published a beneficed clergyman in England, and he tells us that he "administered the Blessed Sacrament to one of His Majesty's Regiments of Horse Guards" at Windsor, Slough, and Colebrook, "*according to this Tigurine Form.*" It was not in a mere literary point of view, therefore, that the five bishops gave their *imprimatur* to the volume as "of very good satisfaction and use." They intended the word "use" to be understood literally. It seems a little strange then that what eminent bishops recommended for "use" in 1692 should subject a clergyman to penal consequences involving utter ruin in 1871, the law remaining unchanged meanwhile. The truth is, the eminent persons who sat in judgment on Mr. Purchas have evolved a great part of the ecclesiastical history of England out of their own imagination. They seem to have an idea that Rubrics had only to be made in order to be obeyed, and that all the Bishops of the English Church, from the time of Queen Elizabeth to the magic date of "about 1840," were imbued with the spirit and temper of Sir William Harcourt. That the Church of England is now in existence is a sufficient refutation of such a belief. I do not hesitate to say that there has been more conformity to the letter and spirit of the Rubric since "about 1840" than at any other period since the Reformation. The generation of clergy who are denounced

as "lawless" by bishops, and journalists, and members of Parliament, are unquestionably the most law-abiding, take them all in all, of any generation that can be named during the last three centuries; and they are certainly the most hardworking.

But let us assume that there is some doubt as to the legality of unleavened bread—in my humble opinion there is none—what then? Surely this, if anything, ought to come under the protection of the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in the Gorham Case: "that it is not the duty of any Court to be minute and rigid in cases of this sort." So that "if any Article is really a subject of dubious interpretation it would be highly improper that this Court should fix on one meaning, and prosecute all those who hold a contrary opinion regarding its interpretation." Assuming, for argument's sake, the historical accuracy and validity of reasoning of the Purchas Judgment on this point, can any one whose judgment is not perverted by prejudice deny that, even on the showing of the Court, it "is really a subject of dubious interpretation"? And if this be so, is there any hidden peril in the thing itself which could justify the Court in taking it out of the category of things with respect to which no Court ought to be "minute and rigid"? Are the reasons alleged or the preference of unleavened bread in the administration of the Holy Communion such as to justify a decree of pains and penalties against them? I can hardly persuade myself that anybody whose good opinion it

would be worth having would say so. Let us consider what the reasons are.

I suppose it will be admitted that our Lord used unleavened bread at the first institution of the Blessed Sacrament; nor can it be denied, I think, that S. Paul assumes the use of it in the following reference to the Holy Communion: "Christ our passover is sacrificed for us; therefore let us keep the feast; not with the old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." It does seem to me strange that a piece of symbolism, which S. Paul not only thought innocent but recommended as edifying, should be considered a high crime and misdemeanour by a Christian Court of justice in the nineteenth century.

The second reason alleged for the preference of unleavened over leavened bread arises from a feeling of reverence for the Sacrament. With ordinary baker's bread and the careless habit of receiving the consecrated element between the finger and thumb it is scarcely possible but that some crumbs will fall on the communicant's dress or on the floor; and I feel certain that pious Evangelicals would agree with High Churchmen in thinking it right to obviate accidents of that kind. Too much reverence for sacred things is certainly not the besetting sin of our day. Moreover, the Prayer Book directs that whatever portion of the consecrated elements remains after communion shall be "reverently" consumed; and

to leave crumbs lying about on the floor or dresses of Communicants is clearly an infraction of this direction: an infraction, however, which it is scarcely possible to avoid with the ordinary bread, but which it is scarcely possible to commit with the use of that condemned by the Purchas Judgment. Still, however, I am not pleading for the enforcement of unleavened bread; I merely advocate toleration for a practice which is certainly, to say the least, harmless, and which many among the laity as well as clergy find edifying

It is impossible to read what the Judicial Committee say on this part of the indictment against Mr. Purchas without being struck with the remarkable difference in the degree of importance which arguments assume according as they tell for or against the accused. A Rubric, sanctioned by Act of Parliament, is set aside by the authority of an Admonition published a century previously on no authority at all, except that of the Episcopal bench, with the tacit concurrence of Queen Elizabeth. On the other hand, one of Queen Elizabeth's Injunctions which distinctly orders wafer-bread is set aside by a forced construction of one of the Rubrics of 1662. That is to say, a Statutory Enactment of the year 1662 is ruled to have been repealed by an Episcopal Admonition of the year 1564, because it prescribes vestments which Mr. Purchas's Judges don't like. But a Royal Injunction of the year 1559 is impotent against another Statutory Enactment of 1662, because the

latter is made by a forced interpretation to forbid a certain usage prescribed by the Injunction, but of which their Lordships disapprove. And yet it is thought passing strange that the decisions of the Judicial Committee do not command the loyalty and respect of English Churchmen !

And now I come to the last Article of accusation against Mr. Purchas—the position of the celebrant while addressing Almighty God in the office of the Holy Communion.

Now, first of all, let us see what the patent facts of the case are. The whole difficulty arises from the ambiguous wording of the Rubrics in the revisions after 1549 ; for the Rubrics of the First Prayer Book are clear enough : they order the Priest to stand in front of the Altar. Let us examine then all the Rubrics in the subsequent revisions which bear on the point in dispute. The first direction given to the celebrant in all the revisions after 1549 is as follows :—

“ And the Priest standing at the North-side of the Table shall say the Lord’s Prayer with this Collect following.”

The only addition to this direction in the last revision are the words, “ the people kneeling.”

The next Rubric which touches the question is the following :—

“ Then shall the Priest rehearse distinctly all the Ten Commandments ; and the people kneeling shall, after every commandment, ask God’s mercy

for their transgressions of the same, after this sort ;” etc.

This remained unchanged till the revision of 1662, when it was altered as follows :—

“Then shall the Priest, *turning to the people*, rehearse distinctly all the Ten Commandments ; and the people, still kneeling, shall after every commandment ask God’s mercy for their transgression thereof for the past, and grace to keep the same for the time to come, as followeth ;” etc.

Here, for the first time since 1549, the celebrant is directed to “turn to the people.” In a subsequent Rubric indeed—that preceding the Absolution—the direction to “turn to the people” remained unchanged through all the revisions of Edward and Elizabeth, James and Charles I. The Book of 1552 no less than that of 1549 orders the Priest to “turn to the people” when he pronounces the Absolution. This is somewhat perplexing ; for if the revisionists of 1552 expected that the previous Rubric, which ordered the holy table to be placed in the midst of the communicants, was likely to be enforced and obeyed, why did they direct the celebrant to “turn to the people” in pronouncing the Absolution ? If the altar stood table-wise and the celebrant was on the north side of it, he was already facing the people, or at least a portion of them. How then could he turn himself to them ? The probable explanation is that the meddlesome “mistakers,” whom the Act of Uni-

formity blames for the revision of 1552, either overlooked the discrepancy between the two Rubrics ; or, feeling certain that in most dioceses both altar and celebrant would still retain their old positions, they left substantially unaltered the old Rubric which ordered the celebrant to "turn to the people" when pronouncing the absolution. These contradictory directions were in fact necessary, because two different modes of celebrating the Holy Communion prevailed side by side. Those who in our day are so impatient of the least appearance of "lawlessness" have but little notion of the "lawlessness" of that Reformation period to whose "principles" they are so fond of appealing. It was easy at that time to make laws for the regulation of public worship, but not so easy to enforce them. And no wonder, when the Bishops themselves were not seldom the most notorious offenders. I have already given reasons to suggest a doubt whether the Prayer Book of 1552 came into use at all outside the neighbourhood of the Metropolis, or even there in strict accordance with law. Even the far more moderate Book of 1549—far more moderate, I mean, in the estimation of the vast majority of the people of England at that time—came into use very gradually, and probably never universally. Men like Bonner disregarded it because it went too far; and zealots imbued with Continental ideas of Reformation disregarded it because it did not go far enough. In a letter addressed to Bonner by the King and his Council, he is blamed

because "our said book [of 1549] so much travelled for, and also sincerely set forth (as is aforesaid) remaineth in many places of this our realm *either not known at all, or not used, or at least, if it be used, very seldom.*" * Ridley, on the other hand, ordered on his own sole authority the demolition of the altars throughout his diocese.† This was a flagrant infraction of the Rubrics of the Prayer Book, though it was soon afterwards confirmed by an Order in Council. These Orders in Council and Royal Injunctions, modifying or setting aside Parliamentary Statutes, would be impossible in these constitutional days. But in the sixteenth century a Bishop had only to get the ear of a royal favourite, and he could without difficulty procure an Injunction authorizing him to override any Rubric in the Prayer Book.

Now let us remember that the "mistakers" who are responsible for the Prayer Book of 1552 lived for the most part in London or its neighbourhood; and let us further remember that as early as 1550 the altars throughout the diocese of London had been pulled down, and tables, placed in the choir or in the body of the Church, substituted for them. It is evident that the Rubric of 1549, which ordered the Priest to "stand humbly afore the midst of the altar," would be inapplicable to such a state of things. When the altar was placed against the

* Cardwell, Doc. Ann. i. p. 78. + Ibid. i. p. 94.

east end of the Church there could be no doubt as to what was meant by "standing afore the midst" of it: it meant standing on the west side of it, midway between the north and south ends, and could mean nothing else. But when, instead of an altar at the east end, there was an oblong table down among the congregation, it became necessary to give a new direction as to the position of the celebrant, and he was ordered accordingly to stand "at the north side of the Table." Thus his position was still "afore the midst" of the table, the only difference being that he was looking towards the south, instead of towards the east. There was no occasion therefore to bid him "turn to the people," since he was facing them, or at least a large portion of them, already. Accordingly in the Rubrics of 1552, 1559, 1664 there is no direction to the Priest to turn to the people when he is reciting the Commandments. He is ordered to do so, indeed, in all these Rubrics when he pronounces the absolution, probably because, as I have already suggested, the position of the altar and celebrant remained unchanged in the great majority of parishes throughout England.

Laud and the other divines of his school made a strong effort, as is well known, to restore the altars to their old position; and their success in this respect was one of the chief accusations made against them by the Puritans. To suppose that the eastward position of the celebrant is a modern

innovation of extreme Ritualists, and that the High Church party generally have never regarded it as a matter of great importance, is an error which is excusable enough in an ordinary layman, but which is not excusable in a Court of Final Appeal adjudicating on this very point. Jeremy Taylor is one of our strongest anti-Romanists, as well as one of the most liberal of our High Church divines, and therefore I shall summon him as a witness, in preference to any other, on this question. He touches on it in various passages scattered up and down his writings; but he has devoted one essay to it entirely, and my quotations shall be taken from that essay exclusively.

After some observations on worship in general, and on the reverence due to the Altar in particular, he goes on to say :—

“ The next step to the Altar is, that God is there specially to be worshipped where He is most presential. For, although God be present in all places alike in respect of His essence, yet He exhibits the issues and effects of His presence more in some than in others. And that thither the addresses of our adorations must be where God is specially present nature teaches us. We look men in the face when we speak to them; and if we may anywhere pray to God, and adore Him because He is everywhere present and hears us, then by the same reason we must specially adore Him where He is specially present, (because His presence is the

determination of our address), that is in heaven and in all holy places."

He illustrates this argument by copious references to the Old Testament, and then supposes an objector to exclaim : " Oh ! but what's all this to us ? The Jews might well do according to the exigence of the Ceremonial Law, but we must not. This was Judaical." "*Sic obgannire solent*" is the comment which this objection draws from him, and then he meets the objection seriously as follows :—

" Though we had no particular caution for this, we should not be much troubled with this objection. Firstly : Because there is enough in nature and reason to satisfy, because all this is no more than what the Patriarchs by the Law and Light of Nature did, as Jacob at Bethel. Secondly : God gave commands and rules for this whole business before the Ceremonial Law was taught, as to Moses, to Joshua, or at least to one of them. Thirdly : These commands were not peremptory, but reasonable ; grounded upon the equity of the thing : and when Moses did discalceate, he did it by virtue of the reason ; for either God commanded that veneration because it was essential reason it should be so, or else Moses did it for that reason, for else it was unreasonable to urge a reason to command an action if the reason were not sufficient of itself to enforce either the command or the action. Fourthly : Where did God command adoration towards the holy or consecrate places in the Ceremonial Law ?

And yet David did it, and Solomon prayed for a blessing upon such addresses; and yet none of these men loved a curse so well as to add anything to Moses' Law; therefore they did it by the dictate of the Law of Nature.

“But (thank God) we are sufficiently instructed in the New Testament for this particular; for the Law of Nature runs always through the veins of all true religions; only in the Church of the Jews this was the more explicate, because their Liturgy was much upon the external; and this also is as explicate in this particular in the Gospel, because it is an act of holiness.”

After two pages of argument to prove this he says:—

“This worshipping or adoration in Churches was not so indefinite but that it was instantly limited to be towards the east, or the place of the Altar, inso-much that, amongst the first blossoms of heresies, that of the Osseni was reckoned by Epiphanius, of whom Alxai the false Jew was a Coryphæus: *prohibet enim* (saith the Fathers) *orare ad orientes, asserens non oportere sic intendere*, saying we ought not to address our devotions or adorations that way. That was his heresy.”

After admitting that “the reasons of determination of Christian worship are diversely given by the Fathers according to their various conceptions,” Jeremy Taylor says for himself:—

“But this I know, that our adoration thitherward

and the placing of the Altar there were coætaneous for aught appears, and if I may have leave to conjecture, I think that this was the true reason of the address of our worship, even because the Altar was *Positum in Oriente*. My reason is this :—

“Firstly ; Because I find in antiquity—προσκυνεῖν πρὸς ἀνατολὰς, and ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου used promiscuously ; and, Secondly, because I find in antiquity the prerogative of holiness not given to the oriental part of heaven, but to the site of the Altar in the Church I do ; which two things put together methinks say, that therefore the adoration was always that way, because the Altar or Holy Table (for the difference is but nominal) being always, like the tree of Paradise, planted in the east, and being more holy than the other parts of the Church, I mean by a relative holiness, did best determine our worship, as having God there the most presential.”

Jeremy Taylor then proceeds to draw his argument out under five heads, which are well worth reading. I must content myself with a few sentences quoted from each head to show the drift of his argument :—

“Firstly : The Altar was always the place of Priests in the Christian Church ; the Priest's peculiar, for none but he was to enter in thither, in-somuch that S. Ambrose would not permit the Emperor Theodosius to enter παρὰ τὰς κιχλάδας, as

Theodoret reports, within the cancells of the Altar to make his oblation there." Etc., etc.

"Secondly: In proportion to this were the degrees of prerogative severally indulged to several people; the Altar being the *terminus* of reconciliation, the several stations of penitents were the degrees of approximation to it: the *καλόντες* in the Church-porch, the *ἀκροώμενοι* by the reading-place, the *ὑποπύπτοντες* at the chancel door, the *fideles* up to the very rails—that was their height."

"Thirdly: The Altars had always in all religions, as if by the Law of Nature, and so also by the same analogy in the Gospel, a *Jus Asyli*; it was a Sanctuary. Our Altars are therefore a mercy-seat, not only because Christ is on them, Who is our *ἰλαστήριον* (Rom. iii. 25), or mercy-seat, but also because offenders that fled thither were defended from death or violence." Etc., etc.

"Fourthly: Altars were the places where the Christians always performed their most solemn devotions, and in cases of afflictions went thither to impetrate God's favour. Thus Gorgonia went to the Altar to be cured of her fever, and was miraculously delivered; Alexander, Bishop of Constantinople, being persecuted by the Arians *ad altare progressus in faciem coram Sacra Mensa se prostravit, et cum lachrymis oravit*: saith Epiphanius." Etc., etc.

"Fifthly: And lastly (which contains the reason of the former, and of its holiness), the Altar or Holy Table is *Sedes Corporis et Sanguinis Christi*. . . .

And if the Altars and the Ark and the Temple in the Law of Nature and Moses were holy, because they were God's memorials, as I showed above, then by the same reason shall the Altar be *ὑπεράγιον*, highly holy, because it is Christ's memorial: there we commemorate His Death and Passion in the dreadful and mysterious way that Himself, with greatest mysteriousness, appointed: *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*, Do this for My memorial. Here are all the Christian Sacrifices presented. *Panem accepit, et calicem similiter, et Suum Sanguinem confessus est et novi Testamenti novam docuit oblationem quam Ecclesia ab Apostolis accipiens in Universo Mundo offert Deo*, saith that Apostolical man, S. Irenæus. We do believe that Christ is there really present in the Sacrament; there is the Body and Blood of Christ which are 'verily and indeed' taken and received by the faithful, saith our Church in the Catechism. Now if places became holy at the presence of an angel, as it did in Joshua's case, to whom the Captain of the Lord's Host appeared, and in Jacob's case at Bethel, and in all the old Law, for God always appeared by angels, shall not the Christian Altar be most holy where is present the blessed Body and Blood of the Son of God?" Etc., etc.

These quotations will suffice to show the importance which Jeremy Taylor attached to the eastward position. And that he was not arguing in this matter for argument's sake is evident from the deep feeling expressed in the following words: "Well!

Sit anima mea cum Christianis. I pray God I may go into the lot of the Christians: this is, and always hath been Christianity, to speak highly of the sanctity of Altars.”*

I do not discuss here either the value of Jeremy Taylor's opinions on this subject or the cogency of his reasoning. Nor do I cite him merely because he is the most eloquent and popular of our High Church divines, and one of whom the Church of England is justly proud, though five thousand of her clergy have lately signed a petition, which, if successful, would have the effect of compelling thousands of clergymen, who certainly do not go beyond Jeremy Taylor, either to forswear convictions which are dearer to them than aught this world can give, or to retire from positions which an ignorant bigotry had made untenable. I have quoted Jeremy Taylor to show the value set upon the eastward position by one of the most moderate divines of the Laudian school. That school was dominant at the last revision of the Prayer Book; and we may be quite sure therefore that any alterations, bearing on this question, which the revisionists of 1662 have made in the Rubrics must have been made in the direction of Jeremy Taylor's argument. Nor are we left in any doubt in the matter. Up to that date the only Rubric in the Communion Office which

* Jeremy Taylor's work; Vol. V., pp. 319, 320, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331. Eden's Edition. I have taken the liberty of modernizing the spelling.

directed the celebrant to turn to the people is the one preceding the Absolution. On that Rubric accordingly the Puritans at the Savoy Conference fastened at once. "The Minister turning himself to the people," they said, "is most convenient throughout the whole ministration."* To which the Bishops replied: "The Minister's turning to the people is not most convenient throughout the whole ministration. When he speaks to them, as in Lessons, Absolution, and Benedictions, it is convenient that he turn to them. When he speaks for them to God it is fit that they should all turn another way, as the ancient Church ever did; the reasons of which you may see, Aug. Lib. 2. de Ser. Dom. in monte."

The significance of this answer will be better understood if I quote the passage in S. Augustine to which the Bishops refer. After explaining the sense in which he understands the phrase *Qui es in Cælis* in the Lord's Prayer, S. Augustine proceeds as follows:—

"Cujus rei significandæ gratia, cum ad orationem stamus, ad orientem convertimur, unde cælum surgit: non tanquam ibi habitet et Deus, quasi mundi cæteras mundi partes deseruerit Qui ubique præsens est, non locorum spatiis, sed majestatis potentia; sed ut admoneatur animus ad naturam excellentiorem se convertere, id est ad Deum, cum ipsum Corpus ejus quod est terrenum ad Corpus

* Cardwell's *History of Conf.* p.320.

excellentius, id est ad Corpus cœleste, convertitur. Convenit etiam gradibus religionis, et plurimum expedit, ut omnium sensibus et parvulorum et magnorum bene sentiatur de Deo.”*

Here then we have a broad and explicit general principle laid down by the divines to whom we owe the last revision of our Prayer Book. Their attention was pointedly challenged to the question. The Puritans objected then, as their representatives object now, to the celebrant facing in the same direction as the congregation; and the Bishops repelled the objection and declared that when the Minister addresses God on behalf of his congregation “it is fit that they should all” face one way, that is, towards the altar. There is no ambiguity here, no loophole for any evasion. “In Lessons, Absolution, and Benedictions”—whenever, that is, the Minister is addressing the congregation—he is to “turn to them.” Whenever “he speaks for them to God,” on the other hand, they are to look *ad orientem*, that is, towards the altar, as Jeremy Taylor explains it. If this does not, to put it mildly, sanction the eastward position all through the Communion Office, *exceptis excipiendis*, then I submit that it is impossible for human language to sanction anything whatsoever. The proposition that two and two make four is not more plain than the proposition laid down by the Anglican divines at the Savoy Conference in favour

* Augustini Opera Omnia, tom. iii. p. 1558, Apud Gaume Fratres.

of the eastward position of the celebrant during the Eucharistic Office. And the Puritans, too, had no doubt on the subject. They understood perfectly what the Bishops meant. In their rejoinder they say :—

“ It is not yet understood by us why the Ministers or people (for which you meant by [*they all*] we know not) should *turn another way in Prayer* ; for we think the people should *hear the prayers* of the Ministers : if not, Latin prayers may serve, and then you need not except against extemporary prayers, *because the people cannot own them*, for how can most of them own what they *hear not*, whatever it be. As for Augustine’s reason for looking toward the east when we pray, [*ut ad moveatur animus ad [sic] moveatur animus ad naturam excellentiorem se convertere, id est ad Dominum, cum ipsum Corpus ejus quod est terrenum ad Corpus excellentius, id est ad Corpus cæleste convertitur :*] we suppose you will not suspect we should be much moved by it. If we should, why should we not worship towards any of the creatures visible when we can pretend such reasons for it, as minding us of superior things ? And why should we not look southward when the *sun* is in the south ? And we fear the worshipping towards the *sun*, as representing or minding us of *Christ’s Heavenly Body*, is too like to the prohibited worshipping before an *image*, and too like to that worshipping before the *Host of Heaven*, in which the old idolatry consisted, or at least which was the introduction of it ; of which our Protestant writers treat at large

against the Papists on the point of image worship.”*

At the end of the Savoy Conference the Bishops offered the Puritans certain concessions which, in my humble judgment, were nearly all improvements, and most of which are embodied in our present Prayer Book. But no concession was offered in respect to the eastward position; so that the rule laid down by the Bishops still remains in its inflexible rigour. Now it seems to me simply inconceivable that the Bishops should have given the Puritans the answer which they did give, and stuck to it, if they intended all the while that the celebrant should stand at the north end of the altar. Certainly it would not be true of him, in that position, that the congregation and himself were looking one way, namely, *ad orientem*, “as the ancient Church ever did.”

In short, my Lord, justice to the great men who represented the Church of England at the Savoy Conference must force us to the conclusion that they meant what they said when they declared that the proper position of the celebrant is to stand in front of the altar in those parts of the Communion Office in which he is addressing Almighty God

* An Account of the Proceedings of the Commissioners of both Persuasions. Appointed by His Sacred Majesty, according to Letters Patent, for the Review of the Book of Common Prayer, p. 105. All the Italics in the passage quoted above are in the original.

on behalf of the congregation. Here, too, we have the explanation of the direction inserted for the first time in 1662 in the Rubric before the Ten Commandments, that the celebrant should "turn to the people." The authors of that insertion acknowledged, as we have seen, but two positions for the officiating Priest—one facing the congregation, the other facing the east—that is, towards the altar. The direction, therefore, to "turn to the people" implies that the celebrant was facing eastward before. I do not say that the direction, taken simply by itself, would necessarily prove this; for a clergyman standing at the north end might be said, in a sense, to turn to the people when he faced westward. But if you take the direction with the explanation given to it by the Bishops in the Savoy Conference, the inference seems to me irresistible that strict obedience to the Rubrics necessitates the eastward position of the celebrant.

Another significant addition made in the revision of 1662 is the Rubric which follows the versicles after the "Comfortable Words." The celebrant, let us remember, had been directed to "turn to the people" in pronouncing the Absolution, and in that position "he speaks *to* them" in the "Comfortable Words" and the couple of suffrages which follow; after which "he speaks *for* them to God." Accordingly in the Rubric which follows the "Comfortable Words" in the Prayer Book of 1549 the Priest is directed to "turn him to God's board." But in

the Rubrics of 1552, 1559 and 1604, no direction is given before "It is very meet, right, and our bounden duty," etc. Before the Prayer beginning "We do not presume" the Priest is directed in the Rubrics of 1552, 1559, and 1604 to "kneel down at God's Board," and in that of 1662 to "kneel down at the Lord's Table." But the three former Rubrics leave us to conjecture in what direction he is looking while "kneeling down at God's board." He had been ordered to "turn to the people," and he has not been ordered to turn in any other direction.

This ambiguity was cleared away at the last revision. As soon as the celebrant has ceased to address the people, and when he is about to "speak for them to God," he is directed to change his position in the following words:—"Then shall the priest turn to the Lord's Table, and say," etc. Is it possible to doubt that the Bishops who inserted this Rubric did so in the sense which they took pains to explain so clearly to the Puritan objectors? Surely it is not.

The next Rubric which claims our attention is the one before the Consecration Prayer. In the revisions of 1552, 1559, and 1604, it is as follows:—

"Then the priest, standing up, shall say as followeth."

For this Rubric the following was substituted in 1662:—

"When the priest, standing before the Table, hath so ordered the Bread and Wine that he may

with the more readiness and decency break the Bread before the people, and take the cup into his hands, he shall say the Prayer of Consecration as followeth.”

The priest had been previously directed to “turn to the people,” then to “turn to the Lord’s Table,” then to “kneel down at the Lord’s Table.” And now, “standing before the Table,” he is directed to do certain things. Does not this imply that he had been kneeling “before the Table?” Where is then the faintest scintilla of an indication that he is to change his place? Nowhere, my Lord, but in the imagination of persons whose judgments are warped by traditional prejudices, and who look at these questions through the coloured medium of early prepossessions and preconceived theories. The following is the interpretation put upon this Rubric by the Court in the *Purchas Case*:—

“The words are intended to set the Minister free for the moment from the general direction to stand at the north side, for the special purpose of ordering the elements; but whether for this purpose he would have to change the side or not is not determined, as it would depend upon the position of the Table in the church or chancel, and on the position in which the elements were placed on the Table at first. They think that the main object of this part of the Rubric is the ordering of the elements; and that the words ‘before the Table,’ do not necessarily mean ‘between the Table and the

people,' and are not intended to limit to any side."*

This is marvellous. "The words 'before the Table,' forsooth, "do not necessarily mean 'between the Table and the people,' and are not intended to limit to any side!" In that case "before the Table" may mean "behind the Table!" And if "'before the Table' does not necessarily mean 'between the Table and the people,'" how are we to understand the direction to the priest to "turn to the people" at one time, and to "the Table" at another? Their Lordships' interpretation seems to me to make nonsense of very plain language. "The words," they tell us, "are intended to set the Minister free for the moment from the general direction to stand at the north side, for the special purpose of ordering the elements." But where did they get this information? Not in the words themselves, for they explicitly "set the Minister free" from kneeling, and from nothing else. Not from the authors of the words, for those have left us an interpretation of the Rubric which is diametrically the reverse of that given in the *Purchas Judgment*. Since the Court took the trouble to quote authorities at all, why did they omit the decisive authority of the framers of the Rubric? The previous Rubrics, up to 1552, simply said, "Then the priest, standing up, shall say," etc. Will anybody pretend that any motion is implied here beyond the motion

* Brooke's Report, p. 197.

from kneeling to standing? At the last revision, however, the Rubric was enlarged; partly in order, by the introduction of the word “before,” to emphasise the eastward position, on which the Bishops had insisted against the objections of the Puritans; and partly in order to make provision for the manual acts, all directions as to which had been omitted since the Book of 1549.

But it is urged, on the other hand, that if the priest is to consecrate with his face eastward, he cannot “break the bread before the people.” The objection implies that the intention of this part of the Rubric is to insist on the fraction of the bread being made *in the sight of the people*. Are we, then, to suppose that the eminent divines who revised the Prayer Book in 1662 went out of their way to frame a Rubric which would come in collision with the Article which says, that “the Sacraments were not ordained of Christ to be gazed upon.” According to the Purchas Judgment, intending communicants, instead of attending to their devotions, are to gaze with curious and critical eyes on what the priest is doing! And what, pray, can be the object of such scrutiny? Why is it of such vital importance that the people should see the fraction of the bread? Is it because such value is set on priestly consecration, that the whole congregation must be on the watch to see that the celebrant omits none of the ceremonies which pertain to the rite? If such objection came from extreme sacerdotalists it would be

intelligible enough ; but that it should be pressed by those who regard sacerdotalism as a deadly sin is indeed surprising.

The plain truth, however, is, that "before the people" does not necessarily mean "in the sight of the people." It means *coram populo*, in the presence of the congregation. That is to say, the bread is not (as was sometimes the case) to be broken in the parsonage or vestry, but on the altar, and in the presence of the people during the Prayer of Consecration. That the phrase "before the people" admits of this interpretation may be proved by one of the Rubrics in the Marriage Service. When the man and the woman have been married, the Minister is directed to declare "unto the people" as follows :—"Forasmuch as M. and N. have consented together in holy wedlock, and have witnessed the same before God *and this company* ; and thereto have given and pledged their troth either to other, and have declared the same by giving and receiving of a ring and by joining of hands ; I pronounce," etc. Now the bridal pair had their "backs to the people," to quote the slang phrase, all through the service, and yet the giving and receiving of the ring and the joining of hands are said to be "before . . . this company." Here it is evident that "before" means in the presence, not in the sight, of the congregation. Why should its meaning be different in the Rubric before the Prayer of Consecration, especially since that difference would make nonsense of the Rubric ?

But of course I shall be told to reconcile my interpretation of the Rubric before the Prayer of Consecration with the Rubric which orders the priest to stand "at the north side of the Table." Now I hold that in the case of two directions, which appear to be in conflict with each other, the plain should interpret the ambiguous, and not *vice versa*. The direction before the Prayer of Consecration is so plain that there can be no reasonable doubt as to its construction. So much cannot be said of the direction to stand "at the north side of the Table." Two interpretations have been suggested. One is, that the north side means the *cornu Evangelii*,* or north corner of the west side. This interpretation is not to be treated with contempt, for much may be said in favour of it. But the more probable interpretation is that which, I believe, is now generally accepted; namely, that the direction to stand "at the north side of the Table" is due to the practice, introduced by Ridley and others, of having the Holy Table in the midst of the congregation, with its ends to the east and west, and its sides to the north and south. Strictly speaking, the altars in nearly all our churches now have no "north side," unless we understand by that expression the

* The *cornu Evangelii* of the old English Uses was called the left side; and so it was in the Roman Office up to the end of the fifteenth century, when it was ruled that the right hand and the left were to be taken from the crucifix looking westward, and not from the celebrant looking eastward.

cornu Evangelii. They have a north and south end, and an east and west side; and literal obedience to the Rubric is therefore impossible. To reply to this objection by quoting the definition of a parallelogram is mere trifling. We may be sure that the compilers of the Prayer Book of 1552, when they prescribed the north side, were thinking in the ordinary language of the day, and not in the language of mathematical definitions. And the ordinary language of their day, as of ours, recognizes two sides and two ends in an oblong table.

But, in truth, this point has already been in a manner authoritatively decided. Peter Smart, in 1628, thus argues:—"Neither must the Table be placed along from north to south, as the Altar is set (that in Durham Cathedral), but from east to west, as the custom is of all Reformed Churches; otherwise the Minister *cannot stand at the north side*, there being neither side toward the north. And I trow there be but *two sides of a long table and two ends*: make it square, and then it will have four sides and no end, or four ends and no side, at which any Minister can stand to celebrate." (*Acts of High Com. Court, Com. Dunelm.*, p. 216, N.) Later, Bishop Williams ruled that "north side could not mean the same as north end, but that the phrase had a reference to the custom which prevailed in the latter part of the reign of King Edward VI., of placing the Holy Table (not altar-wise, but) table-wise, that is longitudinally, with its ends east and west."

He decrees that "this table (without some new Canon) is not to stand altar-wise, but table-wise, and you must officiate on the north *side* of the same." (Wilson on the Lord's Supper, Additional Notes, p. 155.)*

The state of the case then, as regards the revisionists of 1662, was as follows. They were quite clear, as their answer to the Puritans shows, that the right position for the altar was at the east end of the church, and that the priest ought to be in front of it. But on this question, as on vestments, Puritanism was then in possession. The altars were all table-wise in the body of the church, and their restoration to the ancient position would have to be a work of time. The Bishops, therefore, left the "north side" Rubric untouched, but they made alterations in other Rubrics which clearly implied the eastward position of altar and priest. While the altars were in the body of the church the north side was still the front; and the Bishops, being sensible men, probably thought that when the front was turned to the west instead of to the north the common sense of the officiating priest would teach him to follow the front, instead of placing himself at the end—a position which is extremely inconvenient, and which has nothing to recommend it but an unreasoning prejudice. Set anybody to do anything whatsoever on a table placed and shaped

* Mr. Humble's Letter to the Bishop of S. Andrew's, p. 55.

like an altar ; let it be a baker to knead bread, or a butcher to cut meat, or a tailor to cut cloth, or a laundry-maid to iron linen ; and who can doubt that the front position will at once be chosen ? The light of nature will forbid the north end, and refute the Purchas Judgment. And is the highest and most solemn service which mortal man can offer to his Maker the only service in which the Apostolic precept is to be reversed, and everything is *not* “ to be done decently and in order ? ” For I do not hesitate to say that the practice of consecrating at the north end is inconsistent with convenience, with common sense, with grammar, with logic, and with history. Talk of superstition, my Lord ! What superstition can be greater than that of those who first place the elements upon the middle of the altar, and leave them there till the Prayer of Consecration ; then walk deliberately round from the north end to the middle of the table, and remove the elements from the middle to the north end ? If the north end is the place at which the celebrant ought to begin and end the whole service, why should not the elements be placed there at once ? And if they *are* placed there, what can be the meaning of directing the priest to order the bread and wine while “ standing before the Table ” ? No possible construction of the English language will suffer us to admit that a priest standing at the north end of a table placed against the east wall can be legitimately described as “ standing before

the Table." And therefore I repeat that a Rubric which is plain in its meaning must govern the sense of one which is unquestionably ambiguous. The phrase "standing before the Table" is historical. It occurs repeatedly (*coram altari* or *ante altare*) in the Uses of Sarum, Bangor, Hereford, and York; and it means invariably in front of the altar. There can be no question, therefore, as to the meaning of "standing before the Table." The only ambiguity lies in the words "north side;" and the ambiguity is easily explained when we remember that it refers to a state of things which has passed clean away. There was a time when the north side was the front of the Holy Table, and the celebrant standing at the north side might then be fitly described as "standing before the Table." But that time exists no longer. What was formerly the north side of the Table has now become the west, and therefore to stand "before the Table" must necessarily mean to stand facing eastward.

The odious charge of superstition and formalism is sometimes made against those who claim for themselves the liberty of using the eastward position, while freely conceding to others a different usage which, at the same time, they consider less in harmony both with the letter and spirit of the Rubrics. But this charge recoils, in fact, on those who make it. For what can be more meaningless, and therefore more obnoxious to the accusation of formalism, than the general practice of those who

celebrate at the north end? The priest, first of all, places the elements on the centre of the Table, and leaves them there till the Prayer of Consecration. Then he walks solemnly round to the front, removes the chalice and paten to the north end, and then resumes his place and proceeds with the service. Does any one suppose that this is the natural construction of the Rubric? Yet it is the construction sanctioned by the high authority of the Judicial Committee in the *Purchas Case*.

The *Purchas Judgment* makes a point of the excuse made by Bishop Wren when he was committed to the Tower and impeached before the House of Lords for idolatry and superstition, one of the proofs being his custom of consecrating on the west side of the altar. Wren repudiated any superstitious intention, and excused himself on the ground that, being short of stature, the eastward position was the more convenient. I believe that Wren was here practising an "economy." The reason which he gave was a true reason, no doubt. It is very inconvenient for a man of short stature to consecrate at the north end. But that Wren had other reasons for his practice can hardly be questioned. Look, for instance, at the "Particular Orders, Directions, and Remembrances," which he issued to the clergy of Norwich at his primary visitation in 1636. In the XXth of these he orders, "that the Minister's reading-desk do not stand with the back towards the

chancel, nor too remote or far from it.”* Here we see his *animus* on the subject: he prohibited the practice of the Minister facing the congregation when addressing God on their behalf. But did he encourage the eastward position of the priest at the altar? His XVIIIth Direction, which is as follows, appears to me not only to encourage, but to order it:—

“That the holy oblations, in such places where it pleaseth God at any time to put into the hearts of His people by that holy action to acknowledge His gift of all they have to Him, and their tenure of all from Him, and their debt of all to Him, be received by the Minister *standing before the Table* at their coming up to make the said oblation, and then by him to be reverently presented before the Lord, and set upon the Table till the service be ended.”†

It seems to me impossible to understand this direction in any other sense than that of prescribing the eastward position. But are we to conclude, therefore, that Wren was dishonest, because the excuse which he made in the House of Lords, though true as far as it went, was not his only or even his principal reason for consecrating in front of the altar? Surely not. A man on his defence before his enemies, and standing possibly in jeopardy of his life, is not bound to criminate himself, is not bound to put weapons in the hands of his enemies that they may slay him. Wren was charged with idolatry

* Cardwell's Doc. Ann. ii., p. 257.

† Ibid. p. 256.

and superstition, because he celebrated with his face turned towards the east. To attempt to defend his practice on theological and liturgical grounds would simply have had the effect of intensifying the ignorance of his enemies, and exposing sacred things to ridicule. He would have been "casting pearls before swine," and provoking the fate divinely predicted for such folly. He fell back, therefore, on a line of defence true in itself, and which his accusers could understand and appreciate, but which was far in arrear of that which he would have occupied under happier circumstances. On offering this plea on behalf of Wren, I am not, I think, indulging in an illegitimate exercise of casuistry. Our Lord Himself on one occasion (S. John x. 34-36), seeing that His adversaries were incapable of understanding the truth about His Person, retreated from the claim which He had just made to one which they could not gainsay.

The Purchas Judgment, with that habitual inaccuracy which characterises it throughout, has contrived to veil the serious peril in which Wren stood on this occasion. It places his impeachment in the year 1636, when his friend Laud was at the height of his power, the Star Chamber in full activity, and the shadows of approaching doom had not yet fallen athwart the path of the King. An impeachment of a friend of Laud's at that date would have been likely to prove more perilous to the impeachers than to the impeached. But matters were very different

in the summer of 1641, when the impeachment of Wren really took place. Laud had been impeached six months previously, the King was powerless, and the House of Commons, which ordered the impeachment of Wren and had him committed to the Tower, was already supreme. That under such circumstances Wren should have observed great caution in defending himself, and used only such arguments as were likely not to exasperate his foes, is surely not surprising.

"Their Lordships entertain no doubt whatever," says the Purchas Judgment, "that when the Table was set at the east end, the direction to stand at the north side was understood to apply to the north end, and that this was the practice of the Church."

This is a bold assertion, and I am sorry their Lordships did not deign to offer some evidence in support of it. That in very many churches the facts were as they allege, I admit. That they were so universally, or in any ratio approaching to universality, I utterly deny, for there is positive evidence the other way.

I have now lying before me an edition of Sparrow's "Rationale," published in the year 1684. It contains several engravings by Hollar, and among them a frontispiece of a priest saying the Liturgy at a faldstool, and in front of him an altar vested with a linen covering fringed with lace, and having a book open in such a position as shows that the priest was intended to face eastward. There are editions of

the "Rationale" later than my copy, and I believe this engraving appears in all. It certainly appears in all the previous editions, namely, those of 1676, 1668, 1661, 1657, 1655, 1643, and 1622. In Sparke's "*Scintilla Altaris*" is a similar engraving. My copy is the sixth edition, and bears the date of 1678.

Another book of devotions, which had obtained great popularity, bears the following title: "The whole duty of receiving worthily the Blessed Sacrament: laid down in six days' preparation, consisting of prayers, meditations, soliloquies, before, at, and after the Lord's Supper. By the Author of *The Whole Duty of Man*. Necessary for all Communicants. The Fifth Edition. London: printed by and for Thos. Norris, at the Looking-glass on London Bridge. 1717."

In this little book there is a frontispiece representing the act of Communion. A number of people are kneeling in front of the altar, and the celebrant is in the act of administering the chalice. In the middle of the altar are two flagons, and between them an open Prayer Book, in a position which clearly shows that the priest celebrated in front of the altar, and with his back to the congregation.

Evidence of this kind, I know, is only inferential, and does not amount to positive proof. But if we can produce positive evidence that the eastward position was not only permitted but prescribed, and not in one diocese alone but in several, when

these books were published, then I venture to assert that the pictorial representation of it in successive editions of the most popular books of devotion of the time shatters the ruling of the Court in the *Purchas Case* to pieces.

Now it so happens that the Rev. J. Fuller Russell has lately unearthed and published a document which is decisive on this as on some other points condemned in recent Judgments of the First Court of Appeal. It is "The Form and Order of the Consecration and Dedication of the Parish Church of Abbey Dore, upon Palm Sunday, 1634, By the Right Reverend Father in God Theophilus Field, Lord Bishop of St. David's." The form of service is a long one, and is most carefully and minutely rubricated. In order to appreciate the cumulative force of the evidence, it is necessary to read the whole of Mr. Fuller Russell's pamphlet, which is published by Pickering. The following Rubrics must here suffice by way of specimen. The persons who took the leading part in the ceremony were the Bishop, attended by the parish priest and chaplain as Gospeller and Epistoler, and the Founder (Lord Scudamore); and the Rubrics which I am about to quote refer to their respective positions:—

"Then goeth he [Bishop] up to the Communion Table, which is to stand at the east end of the church," etc.

"Then turning about and there kneeling eastward (upon a pesse [hassock] before the Table), the

Founder on his left and the other two behind him, he saith," etc.

"After this, the Bishop beckoneth to the people to take their seats, and placing the Founder in the chancel with himself, and the Parish Priest in the reading-desk, the Bishop's Chaplain cometh forth, and kneeling in the midst of the chancel, eastward, he beginneth audibly,

"If we say we have no sin," etc.

"Dearly beloved Brethren, the Scripture moveth us in sundry," etc.

Here we have evidence that the eastward position was not restricted to the Communion Service. But let us proceed with our quotations:—

"As soon as the sermon is finished, the Bishop cometh from his seat, kneeleth down again before the Table, there where he kneeled before, and saith," etc.

The following Rubric is important, as suggesting that in the minds of the Caroline divines north side did not, after all, necessarily mean north end:—

"Then was there set before the Table, *not full in the middle, but TOWARDS the north end*, and at a convenient distance from that, a chair with a stool on either side: the Bishop seating himself in the chair calleth to him the Chancellor, and sets him at his right hand, and Mr. Thomas Manfield clrs [clericus], Mr. of Arts, in the absence of Mr. Archdeacon, on his left hand; and the Register delivering to his

Lordship an Act in parchment, the Bishop putteth on his cap and readeth it," etc.

"As soon as the Act is pronounced, the Chancellor and Mr. Thomas Manfield return to their seats; but the Bishop, kneeling down eastward, saith," etc.

"Then cometh the Bishop, and worshipping before the Table," etc.

Other Rubrics follow, which make it clear that the positions of the clergy at the altar were as follows:—the Bishop, as celebrant, stood *in medio altaris*, facing east; while the Epistoler and Gospeller were on his right and left, but "behind" him.

Compare with this explicit direction the confident *dictum* of the Judicial Committee:—

"Their Lordships entertain no doubt whatever that when the Table was set at the east end the direction to stand at the north side was understood to apply to the north end, and that this was the practice of the Church."

Comment is unnecessary. But the evidence in favour of the eastward position does not end here. In an Appendix, Mr. Fuller Russell gives the Consecration Service of three other parish churches: that of Fulmer, Bucks, by Barlow, Bishop of Lincoln, on All Saints' Day, A.D. 1610; that of S. John's Church, Leeds, by Archbishop Neile of York, A.D. 1634; and that of the chapel of S. Peter's College, Cambridge, by White, Bishop of Ely, March 17th,

1632. In all cases the position of the Bishop, as celebrant, is described as before the altar. Let a few extracts suffice.

“Then the Bishop, going into the middle of the church or chapel, shall there kneel down with his face towards the Communion Table, and say,” etc.

“Post concionem Dominus Episcopus, sede sua egressus, coram sanctissima mensa sese provolvit, et ait,” etc.

The following is from the Consecration Service used by Bishop Andrewes:—

“Epistolam Secundus Sacellanus, ante sacram mensam stans, legit,” etc. •

Mr. Russell also pertinently refers to “A copy of the Form used by the Lord Bishop of Ely (Andrewes) in consecrating the new church plate of the Cathedral Church of Worcester.” This Form contains the following Rubric:—

“The said Precentor taketh in his hands first the paten, and (after obeisance) cometh up to the Bishop, *standing before the midst of the altar*, and kneeling down, saith,” etc.

My attention has been called by the Rev. Mackenzie E. C. Walcott to the second volume of Oughton’s “Ordo Judiciorum,” where a good deal of additional evidence in favour of the eastward position may be found in the Forms of consecrating churches in several other dioceses besides those which I have mentioned. And these old Forms of occasional Services are also very important for ano-

ther reason. The Judicial Committee ruled, in the Mackonochie Case, that omission was prohibition ; that whatever was not prescribed in the Rubrics of the Prayer Book, unless it was a necessary adjunct to the service, was unlawful. Now, we find in these old Forms of consecrating churches the existence of various customs and ceremonies which have been recently revived, and which the Final Court of Appeal has declared illegal. In the consecration of the parish church of Abbey Dore, for example, there is the following Rubric:—

“Then the Bishop standeth up, and setteth ready to his hand the bread and wine, with the paten and chalice ; but first washeth his fingers with the end of the napkin besprinkled with water. Then layeth he the bread on the paten, and poureth of the wine into the chalice, and a little water into it, and standing with his face to the Table, about the midst of it, he saith the Collect of Consecration.”

There is a similar Rubric in the Consecration Service used by Bishop Andrewes:—

“[*The Priest standing up shall say the Prayer of Consecration.*] Here the Priest, having made adoration, poureth water upon the napkin ready for that purpose, and cleanseth his hands: mystice respiciens illud Psalmi, *Lavabo in innocentia manus meas, et sic introibo ad Altare Dei, ut annunciem vocem εὐχαριστίας.* Ps. xxvi. 6. *Moraliter et decore, uti cum magnatibus accubaturi sumus.* Postea panes e canistro in patinam ponit; dein vinum e doliolo, ad instar sanguinis

erumpentis in calicem haurit; tum aquam e triconali scypho immiscet; postremo omnibus rite, et quam fieri potest decentissime atque aptissime compositis, stans pergit et peragit."

The following Rubric also supplies a curious comment on the law laid down by the Judicial Committee :—

"Then the Bishop ascends [to the altar] with treble adoration, and lastly kneels down at the altar.

"Into his hands the priest, from a by-standing table on the south side, reaches first the wafer-bread, in a canister close covered and lined with linen."

The truth is, as I have already observed, the Great Rebellion and the Revolution of 1688 obliterated many customs and ceremonies in the public worship of the Church of England which had existed since the Reformation, though no provision was made for them in the Rubrics of the Prayer Book. For instance, I find, in a book already quoted, that fasting communion was the rule of the Church of England in the days of Queen Elizabeth; that nobody, from the Queen downwards, could eat flesh in Lent, or on Fridays and other fast days, without a dispensation from the Primate; and that a like dispensation was necessary for a marriage in Lent.*

I am afraid, too, that some of the following directions would be considered extreme if published by a

* A Counter-Poyson, pp. 8, 106, 194-6.

"Ritualist" of our day. Yet they are in a book of devotions which was very popular in the eighteenth century, and which was composed by the Author of "The Whole Duty of Man :—" I mean "The Whole Duty of receiving worthily the Blessed Sacrament." Among the "necessary instructions" given in the book are the following:—

"The precepts of the Church, *according to the Rubric or Kalender.* (The italics are in the original.)

"1. To observe the Festivals and Holy-Days appointed.

"2. To keep the Fasting Days with Devotion and Abstinence.

"3. To repair unto the public Service of the Church for Morning and Evening, also to hear Sermons, and other holy Offices at Times appointed, unless there be a just and an unfeigned Cause to the contrary.

"4. To receive the Blessed Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ with fervent Devotion, and three times a year at least, of which times *Easter* to be always one, and for better preparation therefore as occasion is, to disburthen and quit our Consciences of those Sins that may grieve us, or Scruples that may trouble us, to a learned and discreet Priest, and from him to receive Advice, and the Benefit of Absolution." (p. 14.)

"*At the Time of receiving.*"

"*When you are come to the Altar, kneel down prostrate before it, and say.*"

Then follows an ascription of praise and thanksgiving to God. (p. 155.)

On p. 157 the communicant is directed to say the *Agnus Dei* "whilst the Minister and others are communicating."

It is evident from some of the directions in the book, that those intending to communicate went up into the chancel before receiving, and remained there till the end of the service; showing that there were non-communicants present.

I now come to the conflict between the Purchas Judgment and the Mackonochie Judgment in respect to the position of the celebrant. So much has already been said and written on this point, that it is unnecessary for me to dilate upon it. But it is as well to place the facts on record, as an additional indication of the bias of the Court, and its determination to press every doubt *against* the accused. In the Judgment which Lord Cairns delivered in the Mackonochie Case, just before the Christmas of 1868, we have the following deliverance on the Rubric before the Prayer of Consecration:—

"Their Lordships entertain no doubt on the construction of this Rubric, that the priest is intended to continue in one posture during the prayer, and not to change from standing to kneeling, or *vice versa*; and it appears to them equally certain that the priest is intended to stand, and not to kneel. They think that the words, 'standing before the Table,' apply to the whole sentence; and they think

this is made more apparent, by the consideration that acts are to be done by the priest before the people as the prayer proceeds (such as taking the paten and chalice into his hands, breaking the bread, and laying his hands on the various vessels), which could only be done in the attitude of standing."

Surely, if "the words, 'standing before the Table,' apply to the whole sentence," the eastward position is secure; for "standing before the Table," when the altar is placed lengthwise against the east wall, cannot possible mean "standing at the north end of the Table." And this is the interpretation which the general verdict of common sense put upon this part of the Mackonochie Judgment. Many who had been in the habit till then of celebrating at the north end, the late Bishop of Winchester among them, conformed, as they believed, to the ruling of the Mackonochie Judgment, by at once adopting the eastward position. This, also, was the opinion of the Dean of the Court of Arches; so much so, indeed, that he considered himself absolved from the duty of arguing the point, as being one which had been already decided by the superior Court. "The question," he said, "appears to me to have been settled in the Case of *Martin v. Mackonochie*."

The Judicial Committee, however, came to an opposite conclusion in the Case of Mr. Purchas. "The question before their Lordships in that (the *Mackonochie*) Case was as to the posture, and not as

to the position, of the Minister." So says the Purchas Judgment; and their Lordships, after quoting the passage of the Mackonochie Judgment which is in dispute, argue as follows:—

"This passage refers to posture or attitude from beginning to end, and not to position with reference to the sides of the Table. And it could not be construed to justify Mr. Purchas in standing with his back to the people, unless a material addition were made to it. The learned Judge reads it as if it ran, 'They think that the words, "standing before the Table," apply to the whole sentence, and that before the Table means between the Table and the people on the west side.'"

Now, in the name of common sense and English grammar, what can the words in question mean if they do not mean what the Court suggests Lord Cairns ought to have said if he meant it? Lord Cairns, being a master of the English tongue, probably did not see the necessity of adding an absurd pleonasm to language which, to ordinary minds, was already sufficiently plain. Fortunately he is still alive, and he has publicly expressed his opinion of this part of the Purchas Judgment in words of which the meaning is not doubtful, in spite of the decorous drapery with which it is thinly veiled. In one of his speeches on the Public Worship Regulation Bill in the House of Lords last summer, he used these words—

"Upon that subject (of the eastward position)

there have been two decisions more or less final by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. I do not desire to say one word as to the law on the question; but every one knows how extremely difficult it is for any person—for any layman, perhaps for any lawyer—to be satisfied that those two decisions are reconcileable with each other. In one of those cases no defence was made, and only one side was heard. Those decisions, I think, cannot be regarded as final.”*

Yet denunciations of “lawlessness” and “disloyalty” have been fulminated in Parliament and newspapers, from platforms and from pulpits, against men who have been guilty of no more serious offence than taking the same view of a certain legal decision, which has been expressed in Parliament by the Lord High Chancellor of England.

I have now gone through all the leading points of the *Purchas Judgment*, and I must leave your Lordship and others, who may do me the honour to read my pages, to estimate the value of the facts and arguments which I have suggested for consideration. But there is an aspect of that Judgment which, I humbly think, has not received the attention which is due to it: I mean that part of it which ordered Mr. Purchas to pay the costs of both sides, not only in the Final Court, but in the Court below. Men’s memories are apt to be very short in matters of this sort, and it is necessary therefore to recall the facts.

* See *Guardian* of June 10, 1874, p. 729.

Mr. Purchas has been accused of contumacy for having declined to plead. But he did not decline to plead. On the contrary, he pleaded poverty as an excuse for not employing Counsel, and ill health as a reason why he could not conduct his own case. But he offered to defend himself if the Court would only supply him with professional assistance. The Court declined to do so. Nevertheless Mr. Purchas, undefended and unaided, was acquitted in the Court of Arches on all essential points. His adversaries appealed to the Judicial Committee, and Mr. Purchas was again arraigned, and again was undefended, though anxious to defend himself. The Court had to listen to an *ex parte* statement, elaborated against him by all the skill of practised and able advocates. There was no one to criticise, none to question, any of the evidence arrayed against him. Nevertheless his Judges appear to have found it very difficult to make up their minds. I infer this from the language of their Judgment, which is halting and hesitating almost throughout. On every point of importance they make confessions of difficulties and doubts, and are only "inclined to think" that the balance of evidence is against Mr. Purchas. And then, at the end of it all, they pass on the accused a sentence which could only be justified on the ground that Mr. Purchas was an incorrigible offender, whose conduct was all though utterly indefensible and inexcusable. His Judges might indulge in doubts and difficulties as to the points in dispute, but Mr.

Purchas must have none. True, that in the opinion of the Court below, and in that of most men who have gone carefully into the question, Mr. Purchas had simply acted in conformity with two previous decisions of this very Court. If ever there was a case in which the accused might plead extenuating circumstances; if ever there was a case in which the defendant was led astray, if astray he was, by the law itself; if ever there was a case in which the costs ought to have been shared, that case was surely the trial of Mr. Purchas. But the tribunal of Final Appeal thought differently. It passed on Mr. Purchas a sentence which—it is better to say the truth frankly—looks much more like vindictiveness than like justice.

Still the Court was afforded a means of escape out of the difficulties which it so profusely confessed, though indeed most of them were of its own creation. An opportunity was offered it of rehearing the Case before the Judgment of the Court had yet become law, and with the advantage of having it fully argued on both sides. After judgment had been delivered by the Judicial Committee, but before their report and recommendation had been presented, or any order made thereon by Her Majesty in Council, Mr. Purchas presented two Petitions addressed to Her Majesty in Council, of which Mr. Brooke* gives the following correct summary:—

The Petitioner stated that he “was disabled, by

* Privy Council Judgments, p. 201.

want of necessary pecuniary means, from incurring the expense of a defence by Counsel on the hearing of such appeal; and that the state of his health and his own incompetency to cope with Counsel prevented him from venturing personally to undertake to sustain the judgment of the Dean of Arches; that the appeal was thus heard without any opposing arguments on the various important points raised; and therefore that the report of the Judicial Committee on those important points, from the necessity of the case, must be submitted to Her Majesty upon an *ex parte* hearing only. That, as he stated, the result of these circumstances was, that the opinion of the Judicial Committee had been pronounced, with regard to the main particulars, in favour of the Appellant, in contradiction, as he, the Petitioner, was advised, in one essential point to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the Case of *Westerton v. Liddell*. That so grave are the consequences of the decision in the Case to which the Petitioner was a party, and so deep and painful an interest had, as he submitted, it excited amongst a very large body of clergy and laity of the Church of England, that, being now unexpectedly enabled to take upon himself the expense of employing Counsel on his behalf, which at the time of the hearing he was unable to do, and being, as he alleged, most anxious for the sake of himself and others that a full and complete discussion should be had of the several points raised by the appeal, he prayed that Her Majesty would not adopt the recom-

mendation of the Lords of the Judicial Committee in the Case *until an opportunity had been afforded to the Petitioner of having the Case re-heard*, in order that he might be duly represented by Counsel upon such hearing, and a full and satisfactory discussion might be had on the several points raised by the Appeal.

These Petitions were specially referred by Her Majesty to the Judicial Committee, and after hearing arguments on both sides, the Solicitor-General (Lord Coleridge) representing Mr. Purchas, the Court decided as follows:—

“Their Lordships are of opinion, in respect to the two Petitions addressed to the Crown, that no further proceedings should be taken therein. Having carefully weighed the arguments, and considering the great public mischief which would arise on any doubt being thrown on the finality of the decisions of the Judicial Committee, their Lordships are of opinion that expediency requires that the prayer of the Petition should not be acceded to, and that they should be refused with costs.”

It was ordered accordingly “that the Petition of the said John Purchas ought not to be granted, and that no further steps ought to be taken in regard thereto.”

That is to say, their Lordships deliberately refused to hear both sides of the question in dispute, because, forsooth! the dignity of the Court might suffer thereby; and then a cry of “lawlessness” is raised

against thousands of clergymen who thus find themselves suddenly and capriciously placed in the position of lawbreakers without any opportunity of self-defence. Your Lordship probably remembers the speech of Lord Hatherley in the House of Lords on the second reading of the Public Worship Regulation Bill. It was very meagrely reported; but I heard it, and I am not likely to forget it. In reply to the argument that the Purchas Judgment, having been delivered in an undefended case, could not be considered final, his Lordship censured severely what he was pleased to consider the unfair tactics of the Ritualists, who, he said, first refused to defend themselves, and then, when judgment went against them, refused to submit to it because it was given in an undefended case. Now I am one of those who think that even the Ritualists ought to have justice done to them, and that the flames of popular passions ought not to be fanned against them by means of accusations which have no foundation whatever in fact. Nobody cherishes a sincerer respect than I do for Lord Hatherley's piety and simplicity of character; but this charge of his against the Ritualists is absolutely unfounded. How stand the facts? The cardinal Ritual cases have been the prosecutions of Mr. Liddell, Mr. Mackonochie, and Mr. Purchas. The two former defended themselves, and submitted, with the bulk of the party, to the decisions of the Judicial Committee. The latter asked to be allowed to defend himself, and was refused. And this is what Lord

Hatherley calls first refusing to plead, and then refusing to submit to the judgment because the case was undefended. It is of course quite unnecessary for me to express my conviction that Lord Hatherley believed every word of what he said. But it was his own lips which refused a re-hearing to Mr. Purchas; and therefore, if theological prejudice against an unpopular party can so bias the mind of a man like Lord Hatherley as to make him turn the history of his own judicial deliverances upside down, those may be excused, I think, who distrust his version of facts which are seen through the haze of centuries.

But I have not yet exhausted what I have to say on the question of costs in the case of Mr. Purchas. I accuse the Court deliberately and before the public of gross partiality and injustice in this matter. It is a grave charge; but the facts are not less grave. To fine Mr. Purchas in the full amount of the whole costs throughout can only be defended on the ground that his interpretation of the Rubrics was altogether unjustifiable and frivolous. Yet that interpretation was not only upheld by the Dean of Arches, who probably knew more about the facts than all Mr. Purchas's Judges put together, but to ordinary minds it seems to be the only interpretation which harmonises with the previous decisions of the Supreme Court.

If, however, the Judicial Committee had always acted on a uniform system of impartial harshness, I should not complain. It is the partiality of the

Court to which I object; and that it *has* administered justice in a partial manner the following facts will, I venture to think, prove.

In the Case of *Liddell v. Westerton*, the judgment of the Court below was reversed in favour of Mr. Liddell on all material points. Yet the Final Court ruled that "each party must bear their own costs" in both Courts.

In the case of *Ditcher v. Denison*, the Court of Arches sustained the objection raised by Archdeacon Denison against the validity of the sentence pronounced against him by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Mr. Ditcher thereupon appealed to the Judicial Committee; and their Lordships decided "that, in their judgment, the present appeal should be dismissed, but without costs."

Mr. Bennett was acquitted in the Court of Arches, and also by the Judicial Committee, though his language was censured as rash. But there was no order as to costs.

Here, then, we have four prosecutions against High Churchmen. In the first of them the Respondent, having no means of defending himself, was acquitted in the Court below, but condemned by the Court of Appeal and refused an opportunity of defending himself when means had been provided for that purpose. In spite of these extenuating circumstances; in spite, too, of the fact that his interpretation of the disputed Rubrics appeared, in the opinion of competent judges, to be in agreement with pre-

vious decisions of the Judicial Committee; in spite of repeated confessions on the part of the Court of Appeal that the case was full of difficulties—in spite of all these considerations, Mr. Purchas was not only punished by a severe sentence, but he was charged with the costs on both sides throughout.

In the second case Archdeacon Denison's cause was sustained both in the Court of Arches and in the Final Court. Yet he had to bear his own costs.

In the third case Mr. Liddell, having been condemned in the Court of Arches, appealed to the Judicial Committee. His appeal was sustained, but he was ordered to bear his own costs.

In the fourth case Mr. Bennett was acquitted in both Courts; but no order was made as to costs.

I will add a further case, which is, perhaps, the most glaring of all. Mr. Liddell was attacked a second time before the Judicial Committee on the charge of having neglected to comply with the previous judgment, and he was acquitted in the following emphatic language:—

“Their Lordships are of opinion, therefore, that no disobedience, no impropriety, no irregularity has been established; and that the present application therefore fails.”

After so triumphant an acquittal Mr. Liddell was so simple-minded as to pray to be allowed the costs of his defence. But the Court refused to make any such order. The prosecution, it said, “has been conducted temperately and properly, and their Lord-

ships do not think it necessary to give any directions as to costs."

So much as to the question of costs before the Judicial Committee in cases where High Churchmen have been concerned. Let us now see how the Court dealt with the matter in cases where the criminated parties were not High Churchmen. And let us begin with the case of Mr. Head.*

This clergyman, having received the usual Episcopal Circular announcing the days and places of his diocesan's confirmations, wrote a letter to the *Western Times*, entitled "A View of the Duplicity of the present system of Episcopal Administration, in a Letter addressed to the Parishioners of Feniton, occasioned by the Bishop of Exeter's Circular on Confirmation."

This Letter was a most violent attack both on the Episcopate of the English Church and also on the Prayer Book. The following extract will serve as a specimen of its tone and substance:—

"As reformation in this respect is not hopeless, and as I also am pledged, by my ordination vows, as a Minister of the Church of England, to banish and drive away all erroneous doctrine, I do hereby decline and refuse to give any countenance whatever to the office of Confirmation, as it is now used by their Lordships the Bishops; and, instead of recommending, in compliance with the Episcopal Circular, the

* See Ecclesiastical Judgments of the Privy Council, by Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 80-88.

perusal and reperusal of that service to the young persons of this parish, I warn them all, young, old, and middle-aged, to beware, in the name of God, of the erroneous and strange doctrine which it contains."

Mr. Head was arraigned before the Court of Arches, whose jurisdiction he disputed, but without success. He then appealed to the Judicial Committee, which affirmed the Judgment of the Court below, "but without costs."

The particulars in the Cases of Mr. Gorham and the Essays and Reviews are, no doubt, fresh in the memory of the reader. It will suffice, therefore, to say that Mr. Gorham was condemned absolutely, and Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson on all material points, in the Court of Arches. The Judicial Committee reversed the Judgments in both cases, and allowed the accused parties the costs of the appeal.

"Look here, upon this picture and on that," and say whether Justice has held even scales. For latitudinarianism in any direction the tender mercies of the Judicial Committee are unbounded; but it is safer for a clergyman to be guilty of the grossest immorality than to wear a chasuble or worship his Maker with his face turned towards the East.

This is not the language of excited rhetoric, but of sober fact. A beneficed clergyman in the diocese of London, with a wife and several children, was, in the year 1861, tried before the Court of Arches for immorality of the most frightful description, and deprived. He appealed to the Judicial Committee

of Privy Council, and conducted his defence in person ; with the result that the sentence of the Court below was confirmed. The character of the offender's guilt may be inferred from the following extract from the Judgment of the Court of Appeal :—

“Their Lordships are at this stage to draw the inference of reasonable minds from the evidence before them ; it satisfies them that they have to deal with a Sentence pronounced on guilt of rare occurrence. They have been shocked to hear the appellant's remarks on Miss ——— ; remarks, be it observed, resting exclusively on the poor foundation of his own statement—remarks which, even if true, should never have proceeded from his mouth . . . But this is only to give him his own case. The real facts show him deliberately and systematically availing himself of his being supposed to be in a condition to offer honourable love, and so invading the security of respectable families” (then follow details which are too shocking to be quoted). “Of all who have heard his case he seems the only one who is insensible to its real character ; . . . he has come here in no spirit of repentance, apparently solely actuated by the miserable desire for restoration to the profits of his incumbency.”

From first to last there is absolutely not one extenuating fact in favour of this hoary-headed criminal. Yet the Court was too pitiful to mulct him in the costs. “The Appellant having been admitted to appeal *in formâ pauperis*, the confir-

mation of the sentence will be, therefore, without costs."*

Mr. Purchas was also *in formâ pauperis*, and was a clergyman of unblemished life into the bargain. But in his case—not the “confirmation,” but—the reversal of the sentence of the inferior Court was *with costs*. Is this justice?

When we see the Judicial Committee administering justice after this fashion it is no wonder that some of its individual members should, out of Court, forget the restraints and responsibilities which their judicial functions impose upon them. On the 5th of May, 1873, “a numerous and influential deputation waited on the Archbishops of Canterbury and York by appointment at Lambeth Palace, to present the Memorial prepared by the Council of the Church Association against Romish teaching in the Church of England.”† Of this Memorial and the speeches which introduced it I will only say that they abound in that kind of learning and charity which have become proverbially characteristic of Exeter Hall polemics. Suffice it to say, that the Archbishops were peremptorily recommended, “in the Admission of Candidates to Holy Orders, in the licensing of Curates, and also in the distribution of patronage,” to proscribe the whole High Church party. Two

* Ecclesiastical Judgments of the Privy Council, by Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 210, 211.

† See the “Church Association Monthly Intelligencer” for June, 1878, p. 182.

gentlemen, indeed, Mr. Andrews, the Chairman of the Church Association, and Lord Fitzwalter, one of its leading members, went so far as to tell their Graces that they were bound to enforce, not the letter of the Bennett Judgment, but its "spirit." And by its "spirit" Lord Fitzwalter explained that the Church Association meant "the opinions of the Judges." "It is not only the spirit of the Bennett Judgment, but the opinions of the Judges, that we want to have carried out."*

To this calumnious indictment of the whole High Church party, and to these insolent and iniquitous suggestions, the two Primates of all England were pleased to listen graciously. Not a hint escaped them that the High Church party might possibly not be altogether so black as it had been painted, or that, even if it were, the gentlemen of the Church Association were not exactly the fittest persons to cast the first stone at Rubric-breakers. On the contrary, their Graces assumed the immaculate accuracy of all the accusations; accepted the representatives of that Association as the only faithful exponents of Church of England doctrine, all others being characterised, by the Archbishop of York, as "those whose hearts are not so true;" and then delivered, each of them a speech of the most thorough-going partisan character. The Archbishop of Canterbury, for example, favoured the Church Association with the following inflammatory advice:—

* "Church Association Monthly Intelligencer," p. 186.

“Now I must say that I have thought the laity are not sufficiently attentive to their duty in reference to the office of Churchwarden. What is the real state of the case with regard to these newly-formed districts?—and it is almost always in these that the difficulties you are bringing before me to-day arise. A gentleman of extreme opinions, supported by a few friends, builds a church in a district assigned to it, and the law makes it imperative that there should be a vestry assembled in that district, and that that vestry should, as in the old parishes, elect churchwardens to represent their opinions. But what almost invariably takes place? No one pays any attention to the new vestry. The gentleman, who wishes the service to be conducted in a particular way, nominates one of his own friends; and in the only case which has recently occurred in my diocese that is exactly what has been done. Certain practices are represented to me as being such as I ought not to allow. I immediately take steps to prevent these practices from being continued, and thereon I receive a representation from the two churchwardens representing the laity, stating that, whatever I do, they beg I will not interfere with the practice and ritual that is carried on. This is not a solitary instance. It is the rule to be found throughout the whole country; and as we are met to instruct each other, and in the presence of such a large body of the laity, I beg to ask them to carefully consider their liabilities in the

newly formed districts in which almost all these practices originate."

Could partisanship go farther? Here is the Primate of All England, in a speech addressed to a persecuting Association, gravely impugning the good faith of all those munificent High Churchmen who, during the last forty years, have done so much in the way of building and endowing new schools and churches. The founders of All Saints', Margaret Street; of S. Alban's, Holborn; of S. Barnabas', Pimlico, and of hundreds of similar churches all over the land, are, in the opinion of the Archbishop of Canterbury, "gentlemen of extreme opinions, supported by a few friends, who build churches in which unlawful usages may be practised." He makes no reservation. It is not "a solitary instance" that he has in his mind. "It is the rule to be found throughout the whole country." And because "the two churchwardens, representing the laity," beg that the Bishop "will not interfere with the practice and ritual that is carried on," his Grace chooses to consider that the churchwardens in all these districts are improperly elected; and so he makes what I am sincerely sorry to say I can only understand as an appeal to the mob.

Nor was the partisanship of the Archbishop of York a whit less pronounced. He caught eagerly at the suggestion that "the opinions of the Judges" in the Bennett Case, and not the Judgment of the Court, ought to be the rule of Faith to the Church of

England. "I hope," he said, "we shall not adopt a cowardly policy, because, on account of the Bennett Judgment, certain persons have left the Church of England. Do they not see in the Bennett Judgment a declaration of the Church of England far more valuable on the one side than the failure of justice against an individual on the other?" So, then, the Bennett Judgment is, in the opinion of the Archbishop of York, whose own mouth pronounced it, "a failure of justice," because it acquitted the accused!

Eleven days afterwards the two Primates sent to the Chairman of the Church Association a written reply, in which, among other things, they say:—

"There can be no doubt that the danger you apprehend of a considerable minority, both of clergy and laity, among us desiring to subvert the principles of the Reformation is real; and it is not unnatural that you should appeal to us for counsel and support. Since we had the honour of receiving your deputation, our attention has been directed to a petition presented by upwards of four hundred clergymen to the Convocation of the Province of Canterbury in favour of what they designate as Sacramental Confession. We believe that through the system of the Confessional great evil has been wrought in the Church of Rome, and that our Reformers acted wisely in allowing it no place in our Reformed Church; and we take this opportunity of expressing our entire disapproval of any such innovation, and our firm determination to do all in our

power to discourage it. We feel justified in appealing to all reasonable men to consider whether the very existence of our national institutions for the maintenance of religion is not imperilled by the evils of which you complain. In your memorial, you ask us—first, whether we are ready ‘to exercise all the authority vested in us for the entire suppression of ceremonies and practices adjudged to be illegal; and, in the event of that authority proving insufficient, to afford all other needful facilities for the due enforcement of the law.’ We answer that we can have no doubt that it is our bounden duty to use our best endeavours to see that the law is obeyed, and to afford all needful facilities for its enforcement, when we are duly called upon so to do. Secondly, you appeal to us to take ‘especial care’ to guard against such ‘architectural arrangements and ornaments in our Churches as may facilitate the introduction of superstitious practices and erroneous doctrines.’ We answer that in the administration of our dioceses we have ever been watchful on this point. Thirdly, you ask us, in the admission of candidates for holy orders, and in other ways, to be careful lest persons be entrusted with the ministerial office who teach doctrines subversive of those ‘truths to which our Protestant Church, as keeper and witness of holy writ, has ever borne its faithful testimony.’ We answer that we consider ourselves bound to this duty by our consecration vows.”

On receipt of this Reply the Church Association

passed the following Resolutions, which it circulated far and wide:—

“14, Buckingham Street, Strand, W. C.
London, 7th July, 1873.

“(Extract from the Minutes of the Council of the Church Association, under date the 4th of July, 1873.

“Read the reply of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, dated June 16th, to the Memorial presented at Lambeth on the 5th of May last.

“After careful and anxious consideration,

“Resolved:

“That the reply of the Archbishops to the Memorial of 60,200 lay members of the Church, presented to them through the Church Association at Lambeth on the 5th of May, having naturally excited much attention and observation throughout the country, the Council feel that they may with propriety express their opinion on the subject-matter of that reply.

“The Council assume that their Graces’ reply expresses the opinion not of the Archbishops alone, but of the whole Episcopal bench, and in that point of view no part of it has produced such painful anxiety as that which expresses their conviction of the existence of ‘a considerable minority both of Clergy and Laity amongst us desiring to subvert the principles of the Reformation;’ whereupon they appeal ‘to all reasonable men to consider whether the very existence of our national institutions for the

maintenance of religion is not imperilled by the evils of which you complain.' It was this conviction in the minds of others which called the Church Association into existence eight years ago; and it is well that those in highest authority have at last arrived at the same conclusion, if it be not now too late to avert the threatened danger.

"It is obvious that a body of persons in the Church banded together, as this minority is, in close union to accomplish its overthrow, is in fact engaged in a conspiracy, which, if it related to the State instead of the Church, would be justly branded as treason.

"It seems inconceivable that, when the fact of such a conspiracy is known to the guardians and leaders of the Church, they should not feel irresistibly constrained without a moment's delay or hesitation to adopt the most effective measures in their power for the removal of those conspirators, whose presence within the walls of the citadel necessarily increases the danger day by day."

Now, my Lord, I ask you to consider the serious import of these proceedings. The Church Association has been the real prosecutor in all the so-called Ritualistic suits, and the two Archbishops are among the most eminent members of the Final Court of Appeal. That is to say, two of the Judges in the Court of last resort receive a visit from the prosecutor, listen to his wholesale accusations, express their entire approval of them, denounce the defendant, suggest means of worrying him, and virtually pass

judgment beforehand on every point likely to come before them in their judicial capacity! And yet people wonder that the Ritualists treat with scant respect the decisions of a Court, two of whose members set at nought not merely the substance, but even the outward forms and decencies of justice. I venture to say that if in civil matters any two Judges in the land were to act as the Archbishops of Canterbury and York have acted in this matter, the voice of public indignation would speedily compel their removal from the bench. But unfortunately the British public will put up with almost any outrage on justice provided the victim belongs to an unpopular theological party.

But I have not yet done with my illustrations of the kind of justice which, not the Ritualists only, but the whole High Church party have been taught to expect from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In a speech delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords on July 15th, 1873, he characterised a certain petition addressed to Convocation as having "a dangerous aspect;" and then he indulged in the following reflections:—

"It was one from undergraduates at Oxford, and was signed by four out of six Professors of Theology. When I see men whose duty it is to teach the doctrines of the Reformed Church to young men who are to be her ministers encourage such a petition as that, I am led to ask who is responsible for the appointment of those Professors? I do not mean to

say that those who advise Her Majesty now, or who may have done so at any other time, have not exercised a conscientious judgment in selecting those Professors to be trainers of young men about to enter the Church; but as we are in times of great difficulty and danger, I may express a hope that in future more thought will be given to such selections—that there may be more consultation with those who are in a position to know what are the qualifications requisite for Professors appointed to such positions.”

The four Professors who are thus held up to the reprobation of the British public, without an opportunity of self-defence, were Dr. Pusey, Dr. Bright, Dr. Liddon and Dr. King; and they were appointed respectively by the late Duke of Wellington, Mr. Disraeli, all the Heads of Houses in the University, and by Mr. Gladstone. These are the eminent persons whom the Archbishop of Canterbury deemed it his duty to censure for having presumed to exercise their right of selection without consulting “those” whoever they may be, “who are in a position to know what are the qualifications requisite for Professors appointed to such positions.”

The Petition of “dangerous aspect” which called forth these severe strictures on the part of his Grace is as follows:—

“We, the undersigned clergy and lay communicants of the Church of England, being members of the University of Oxford, humbly entreat your Right

Reverend House not to pass the New Rubric proposed by the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury, to discourage the attendance throughout the Communion Office of worshippers who do not then intend to communicate, because such a Rubric would be an inroad on the liberties of the faithful laity, and would interfere with their devotions without being necessary to afford relief for a grievance to any other persons."

A very innocent petition surely. What right has Convocation or any other authority to forbid the presence, during the celebration of the Holy Communion, of devout persons who receive edification from the service, though they may not intend to communicate, having probably done so at a previous service? The proposed Rubric was a distinct innovation, and those who respectfully petition against the innovation are denounced by the Primate of All England as persons who are unfaithful to "the doctrines of the Reformed Church," and therefore unfit to be the instructors of "young men." His Grace then went on to make a special attack on Dr. Liddon, Canon Gregory, and the Dean of St. Paul's, in the following language:—

"I consider it also a great misfortune that the central Cathedral of this Metropolis should exhibit violations of the law of the Church. I consider that in appointing persons to such posts the greatest responsibility rests upon those who are called upon to make the selection to see that they appoint persons

who are perfectly loyal, not only to the general principles of the Church of England, but also to the law of the land and of the Church, as interpreted by the highest Courts in the land."

Now it so happens that all the principal points involved in the Purchas Judgment are again before the Courts of law, and will in all probability come before the Judicial Committee. Whether the two Archbishops will then take their places on the Judgment-seat, I know not. But if they do, and the Purchas Judgment should be confirmed, it is quite impossible that the decision can command either obedience or respect.

It is no pleasure to me, my Lord, but much the reverse, to criticise in this manner the acts and sayings of one of our high Courts of Law. But we have confessedly reached a crisis, and the conviction has been irresistibly forced upon a large body of the clergy and laity of the Church of England that the law has been strained in order to include the schools denominated as Broad and Low, and contracted, in violation of justice, in order to exclude the High Church party. How far this conviction is well-founded I leave the readers of the preceding pages to determine. For myself, I confess that my tastes do not lie in the direction of elaborate ritual. I never saw Mr. Purchas, and I own to having felt deeply annoyed at the reports of his doings which reached me through the newspapers. But the treatment which he received from the Judicial Committee

changed my indignation into sympathy; and I felt the necessity of making a stand against the Purchas Judgment, not in the interest of this party or that, but in the interest of English justice.

Let me not be misunderstood, however: I make no imputation on the good faith and perfect integrity of any member of the Final Court of Appeal. My own diocesan was one of those who sat in judgment on Mr. Purchas, and I know enough of him to feel assured that he is utterly incapable not only of injustice, but of unkindness. I accuse him of nothing worse than the non-possession of superhuman faculties; for without superhuman faculties it is impossible that a Bishop of London, who conscientiously strives to do his duty, should find time to master questions which involve careful and elaborate research. He must, of necessity, leave to his colleagues the task of investigation, and must simply take on trust the accuracy of the conclusions at which they may arrive. Nor have I any doubt at all that the other members of the Court acted with the most entire conscientiousness. But conscientiousness is a word of elastic meaning, and it is quite possible that the very conscientiousness of a judge may tempt him unconsciously to bend the law from the straight line of justice in the direction of some interest which he conceives to be of paramount importance. So that his conscientiousness, instead of being a protection to him, is a snare. The late Sir George Cornewall Lewis has some observations on

this subject, which are so pertinent that I shall take the liberty of quoting them :—

“ It is universally admitted that no man ought to be a judge in his own case. But, if the case were not his own, his competency to form a judgment upon it might be indisputable. So if any political measure be proposed which affects the interest of a profession, it may happen that persons belonging to that profession, though peculiarly competent to form an opinion respecting it, on account of their experience and knowledge, are disqualified on account of the probable bias of their judgment by personal considerations; and that the requisite *indifference* is only to be found among those who do not belong to the profession. Such out-lying persons may be the only impartial judges in the matter. . . . The operation of a personal interest in perverting the judgment is so insidious, that great honesty, combined with perpetual vigilance, is necessary in order to guard against its influence. Men utterly incapable of telling a deliberate untruth, or deliberately expressing an insincere opinion, are nevertheless liable to be warped by personal interest in the deliberate formation of opinions. When a strong bias of this sort exists, their minds, ready to receive every tittle of evidence on one side of a question, are utterly impervious to arguments on the other. Hence we see opinions, founded on a belief (and often a radically erroneous belief) of self-interest, pervade whole classes of persons. Frequently the great majority of

a profession, or trade, or other body, adopt some opinion in which they have, or think they have, a common interest, and urge it with almost unanimous vehemence against the public advantage. On occasions of this kind, the persons interested doubtless convince themselves of the reasonableness of the view which they put forward; they are guilty of no hypocrisy or insincerity; but their judgment is warped by their belief as to their interest in the question."*

But the bias of self-interest is not always the most powerful bias. Many a man who knows himself too well to suffer the promptings of self-interest to bias him is readily influenced by the interest which he feels in a great cause or institution. Take, by way of illustration, the case of Bishops trying ecclesiastical causes in the Final Court of Appeal. It is hardly possible that they can possess what Sir George Lewis calls "the requisite indifference." They have their dioceses ever before them, and the House of Lords and the newspaper press. A certain decision, they think, will break up the peace of the Church and imperil the Establishment; whereas a contrary decision will give general satisfaction, and put down an insignificant minority who, even though they may possibly have the rigid letter of the law on their side, cannot be tolerated without danger to higher interests. And so, by this sophistry of the intellect, strong

* "Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion," pp. 84-86; cf. "Mill's Logic," ii. pp. 286-7. Third Edition.

evidence is overborne by weak, and a judgment is delivered on grounds of expediency rather than of strict law.

Nor is it bishops only who are exposed to this kind of temptation; lay judges also have their prejudices which, upon occasion, they may allow to colour their interpretations of the law. That the perfect impartiality of our Judges cannot always be trusted in matters political has been admitted, in the following language, and by an eminent authority whom your Lordship will respect:—

“Judges, like other men, have their politics; but at present cases in which political bias might be supposed to affect their minds were rare, although in those cases they frequently gave their Judgments according to their politics.”*

“Judges, like other men,” have their theology also, and I see no more security in the one case than in the other against the intrusion of the Judge’s private opinions into his public declarations of the law. It is, indeed, the wide-spread conviction that the ecclesiastical decisions of the Judicial Committee have been tainted in this manner which has destroyed the confidence of Churchmen in its interpretations of the law, and which, partly at least, explains the fact that sentence of death was passed upon it with all but the unanimous approbation of Parliament, the two Primates being the only persons in

* Speech by Sir Roundell Palmer on Mr. Disraeli’s Bribery Bill. See Hansard, Third Series, vol. 192, pp. 286-7.

either House who had a good word to say for it. The Bishop of London pointedly declined to defend the Court when appealed to by the Marquis of Salisbury. I trust that the New Court of Appeal will establish for itself a better reputation. Let it show no respect for persons or for parties. Let it declare what the law is, and not what it is expedient it should be. In short, let justice be done regardless of consequences, and I venture to predict that even the Ritualists will forget their aversion to a purely secular tribunal in the confidence which an impartial administration of justice never fails to inspire. They would much rather, I believe, that the law should be constitutionally altered to their prejudice than that it should be judicially misconstrued in order to put them down.

When I asked your Lordship's permission to address you publicly on the question of "lawlessness," it was not my intention to trouble you with more than a short pamphlet. But I found it impossible to do justice to the subject within such narrow limits, and my pamphlet has consequently grown into a book. For this I do not hold myself altogether responsible. The truth is, that the more the question of Ritualism was discussed the more it was seen that it was not a mere matter of ceremonial observances, but, on the contrary, involved principles and doctrines which went down to the very foundations of the Christian Religion. With an instinct, which was true though ill-informed, the popular dislike to Ritualism con-

centrated itself upon one word—Sacerdotalism. Ritualism was declared to be intolerable, not¹ for its own sake, but as the visible and moving representation of “the principle of Sacerdotalism.” Now, for myself, I always consider it a great point gained in any controversy when the parties engaged join issue on first principles. And I admit that the whole question of Ritualism hangs on the further question whether the principle of Sacerdotalism is, or is not, one of the first principles of Christianity. It is labour lost to have established the legality of certain ceremonial observances if the doctrine more or less symbolised by that ceremonial is, as has been alleged, a pernicious corruption of Christianity.

The truth is, however, that those who clamour against Sacerdotalism have no clear conception of what is meant by the word. Sacerdotalism, in some sense, is unquestionably taught in our Book of Common Prayer; nay more, it is unquestionably taught in the New Testament. It becomes necessary to examine, therefore, what Sacerdotalism really means, and I propose accordingly to submit to your Lordship some observations in explanation of what I understand by it. But it will be more convenient that I should do this in the form of another Letter. For the present, then,

I have the honour to remain,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

MALCOLM MACCOLL.

LETTER II.

SACERDOTALISM.

MY LORD,

It is a pity that those who denounce the doctrine of Sacerdotalism do not take the trouble to explain what it is precisely that they wish to condemn under cover of that unpopular word. I read carefully the debates on Ritualism in both Houses of Parliament last summer, but I could discover nothing very definite beyond the general opinion that Sacerdotalism was an abominable doctrine which ought to be summarily put down. I take it, however, that what the opponents of Sacerdotalism wish to repudiate is that aspect of the Christian religion which has been condemned in the following language by an able and cultivated writer of the day:—

“So long as its Sacramental principle remains the Established Church rests upon a theory of religion utterly at variance with all the residuary varieties of Puritan faith, and amounting, as many of us conceive, to a reversal of the very essence of Christianity, for it reverses that *immediateness of relation* between the

human Spirit and the Divine which is the distinctive boon of Jesus to the world, and it reinstates that resort to *mediation*, and "channels of grace," and magically endowed men, which it was His special aim to sweep away and render impossible."*

It is therefore the Sacramental principle and the doctrine of mediation which are in question. I do not mean that all who declaim against Sacerdotalism would go quite so far as Mr. Martineau; but that is only because they are not so clear-headed as he, and do not perceive the conclusion necessarily involved in their premisses. Mr. Martineau admits, as indeed every candid and unprejudiced person must, that "the Established Church rests upon" the doctrine of Sacerdotalism, which, however, he thinks it was the "special aim" of our Lord "to sweep away and render impossible." Of that more anon. Meanwhile let us see what the Old Testament has to say upon the subject.

It seems to me quite impossible for any one who is not committed to the defence of a foregone conclusion, to read the Old Testament without acknowledging that the principle of Sacerdotalism runs all through it from Genesis to Malachi. A few instances may suffice by way of illustration.

When Abimelech took Abraham's wife, thinking her to be his sister, and pleaded afterwards that he had done it "in the integrity of his heart and innocence of his hands," God is represented as saying,—

* Why Dissent?" By James Martineau, p. 14.

“Yea, I know that thou didst this in the integrity of thy heart. . . . Now therefore restore the man his wife; for he is a prophet, and he shall pray for thee, and thou shalt live; and if thou restore her not, know thou that thou shalt surely die, and all that are thine.”* Abraham’s intercession for the doomed Cities of the Plain is another instance in point.

In the Twelfth Chapter of the Book of Numbers we have an account of an outburst of rebellion against the authority of Moses on the part of Miriam; her consequent punishment by the infliction of leprosy; and her subsequent cure at the prayer of Moses.

In the last chapter of the Book of Job I read as follows:—

“And it was so, that after the Lord had spoken these words unto Job, the Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee and against thy two friends: for ye have not spoken of Me the thing that is right, as My servant Job hath. Therefore take unto you now seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt offering; and My servant Job shall pray for you; for him will I accept, lest I deal with you after your folly, in that ye have not spoken of Me the thing which is right, like My servant Job.”

Here then are a few typical illustrations, which might be multiplied indefinitely, of the doctrine that God bestows His benefits on man, not immediately,

* Gen. xx. 5-7.

but through the intervention of human agents ordained for that end. And what is the Mosaic dispensation but a development, through rite and sacrifice, of the same idea? One family is set apart and endowed with the exclusive right to act mediatorially between God and His people; and when Korah and his company, relying on the fact that the whole congregation of Israel was holy, as being, in some sort, "a royal priesthood," attempted to usurp the office of the priesthood, Almighty God is represented as vindicating by a terrible punishment the exclusive priesthood of the family of Aaron.

To parry the force of this argument the opponents of Sacerdotalism are wont to decry the Mosaic dispensation not merely as a system of ordinances which has been superseded by the Christian dispensation, but as involving doctrines which are essentially antagonistic to Christianity. Mr. Martineau says distinctly that the sacramental principle and the doctrine of mediation "amount to a reversal of the very essence of Christianity." Mr. Martineau is a Unitarian; but on this question he is in full agreement with the great mass of anti-Sacerdotalists. What authority he would be willing to concede to the Mosaic legislation, and whether he considers the Old Testament inspired, I know not. But the Evangelical party, who in this matter are in the same boat with Mr. Martineau, hold very stringent views indeed as to the unqualified Divine inspiration of all the Books of the Old Testament. I beg them, therefore, to consider

seriously whither their attack on the principle of Sacerdotalism leads them. They condemn it as something essentially wrong in itself. It is certain, however, if the Old Testament is Divinely inspired, that Sacerdotalism is a doctrine not only sanctioned but peremptorily enjoined by Almighty God Himself. But can God enjoin what is essentially wrong? And let it be considered, moreover, that our Lord has expressly declared that he came "not to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it." The Law was developed into the Gospel. But development implies the conservation of the norm or radical idea. Now the radical idea underlying the Sacrificial system of the Old Testament was man's need of expiation, combined with his personal unworthiness to make an atonement for himself.

It is remarkable that the immediate occasion of the appointment of the Aaronic priesthood seems to have been the public acknowledgment of unworthiness made by the general congregation. During the patriarchal period the head of the family was also its priest; and even when the Law was delivered to the Israelites from Mount Sinai there was no regular priesthood to stand between God and His people. They were all regarded as a nation of priests until their own sense of unworthiness caused them to shrink back aghast from the awful privilege.

The circumstance is related by Moses as follows:—
"And it came to pass when ye heard the voice out of the midst of the darkness (for the mountain did burn with fire), that ye came near unto me, even all the

heads of your tribes, and your elders; and ye said, Behold, the Lord our God hath shown us His glory and His greatness, and we have heard His voice out of the midst of the fire: we have seen this day that God doth talk with man, and he liveth. Now therefore why should we die? for this great fire will consume us; if we hear the voice of the Lord our God any more, then we shall die. For who is there of all flesh that hath heard the voice of the living God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as we have, and lived? Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God shall say: and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee; and we will hear it and do it. And the Lord heard the voice of your words, when ye spake unto me; and the Lord said unto me, I have heard the voice of the words of this people, which they have spoken unto thee: they have well said all that they have spoken."

Accordingly Aaron and his sons were consecrated to the office of the priesthood soon after this incident, and they became the appointed mediators between Jehovah and the general congregation. Still the people were not suffered to rest in this as a final and unchangeable arrangement. Their true ideal was always kept before them. They were reminded that, in spite of the Aaronic priesthood, they still continued ideally "a kingdom of priests, a holy nation." They were unworthy now to realize that high ideal; but they were not to lose sight of it, and to keep them in perpetual remembrance of it there

were several rites of a sacerdotal character, such as the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb, in which the people at large were allowed to participate.

So much as to the teaching of the Old Testament on the subject of Sacerdotalism. Where is the evidence that it was our Lord's "special aim to sweep away and render impossible" such teaching? On the contrary, if we are to believe the Gospel narrative, He ordained a certain order of men to occupy in the Christian Church a position and to fulfil functions analogous to those of the Aaronic priesthood. Once before his death, and once after, He charged them with the following commission—"As My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you. And when He had said this He breathed on them and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whosoever sins ye remit they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain they are retained."

I cannot imagine a stronger sanction of the Sacerdotal principle than these words imply; and it is clear that our Lord's Apostles understood them in a sacerdotal sense. Why was Philip bidden to "go near" the chariot of the Ethiopian eunuch and instruct and baptize him? Why was Ananias sent to Saul the persecutor, that he might "put his hands on him," in order that he "might receive his sight, and be filled with the Holy Ghost?" Why was Cornelius directed to "send men to Joppa" to fetch Peter that he might receive the pious centurion into the Christian Church?—Why all this, if it was one

of the special designs of Christianity to abolish the sacerdotal principle and to forbid all "resort to mediation, and 'channels of grace,' and magically endowed men?" It is undeniable that the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles supply abundant evidence of a public ministry during the period which they embrace. And that ministry is represented, not as a human institution, but as of Divine appointment. Candidates are set apart with solemn rites, by means of which spiritual powers are supposed to be conferred upon them for the discharge of their new duties. And with this agrees the language by which the ministerial office is designated. S. Paul speaks of himself and his colleagues as "ministers and stewards of Divine mysteries," and as "ambassadors" accredited from God to men. Surely the Sacerdotal principle could not be asserted in stronger language than this; and therefore, for the Church of England to repudiate the sacerdotal principle would be to repudiate all connection with the Christian ministry of the Apostolic age.

And yet it must be admitted, on the other hand, that there is a sense in which it is as true now as it was under the Mosaic dispensation, that all Christians are in some way priests, and are charged with Sacerdotal functions. S. Peter addresses the whole congregation of Christians in his day in the language in which Moses described the priestly character of ancient Israel. He calls them "a royal priesthood;" an ideal of Christian perfection which S. John saw

realized when he heard the saints in bliss giving thanks for having been made "kings and priests unto God." A layman can validly baptize, and he has his share in the offering up of the Eucharistic Sacrifice—a fact which was symbolised in ancient times by the custom of the faithful laity formally offering their oblation of the Sacramental elements to their representative, the officiating priest, who then consecrated them to God, in order that Christ, the true Priest, might make them, according to his own promise, the Sacrament of His Body and Blood.

We are all intended, laity as well as clergy, to be "kings and priests unto God." If man had never fallen there would have been no need of a special priesthood. All would have been alike worthy to offer God an acceptable service, as all will be hereafter in Heaven. This is the ideal towards which we are to strive; and in order to keep our unworthiness always before us, and thus help us to fulfil our Christian calling, it has pleased God to ordain an order of men, personally as unworthy as the rest, to be His "ambassadors" on earth, and the "ministers and stewards of His mysteries." To characterise such a doctrine as implying a caste of "magically-endowed men" is to substitute offensive caricature for serious argument. Mr. Martineau may, indeed, be excused for not understanding a doctrine which it has probably never fallen to his lot to study seriously. But what shall we say when we find even Bishops surpassing Mr. Martineau in his ignorance of what is

really meant by the grace of Orders. The late amiable Bishop of Argyll, whom I had not the honour of knowing, but who had the ear of a considerable number of thoughtful men, gravely assured the readers of the *Contemporary Review*, in an Essay on "Anglo-Catholicism," that Episcopal Ordination "presumes that a materialistic process akin to physical vaccination will produce spiritual results." "Orders alone," he thought, "have no intrinsic life, and they cannot give it to others." So that the only true Bishops are they who show by their work that they have been consecrated by God; "such as Luther, Calvin, Latimer, Knox, Wesley, Chalmers, Irving . . . Who can refuse to these the titles of great Bishops of the Lord?"

I am not quite clear as to what the good Bishop meant by "Orders alone having no intrinsic life." Undoubtedly the act of ordination has in itself "no intrinsic life." But what has? Absolutely nothing except the uncreated Source of all life, and the question is whether "the Lord and Giver of Life," as the Nicene Creed speaks, can impart that life how and when He pleases.

In truth, the objection which I am considering implies a confusion between two things which are totally distinct: individual merit and official commission. To affirm that every man who shows eminent capacity for the Episcopal office is in fact a bishop is as reasonable as it would be to argue that every good strategist is *ipso facto* a general, or every good financier *ipso facto* Chancellor of the Exchequer. Of course it

would be much better if the men best fitted for the office were appointed bishops, just as it would be much better if the best men were appointed Commanders-in-Chief, Ambassadors, and Prime Ministers. To be qualified for an office, however, is one thing : to be appointed to it is quite another. Men see this well enough in secular matters. How is it that so obvious a truth offends them when the sphere of its operation is spiritual? I believe the reason is to be found in man's natural reluctance to believe in the reality of powers whose source and mode of action are invisible. Unless he sees signs and wonders he finds it hard to believe that God has founded in the midst of men a spiritual polity, the administration of whose laws and powers He has committed to a hierarchy of mortal men, the validity of whose credentials can be tested by the methods of ordinary evidence. Assuming that the Christian Church is a Divine and not a human creation—I am not arguing here against those who deny that assumption—I do not see anything more unreasonable in supposing that He should transmit spiritual life through the instrumentality of a sacramental and sacerdotal agency than in believing that he propagates natural life through the process of natural generation. No *antecedent* objection can be urged against the one which is not equally valid against the other.

But it is said that the doctrine of Apostolical succession, which is of the essence of Sacerdotalism, cannot be maintained because it is incapable of

proof. That depends, however, on the kind of proof which the objector demands. If he insists on such proof as shall preclude all doubt, I admit at once that no bishop in Christendom can produce valid credentials. But, in that case, the belief in Apostolical Succession is not the only belief which must be surrendered at the summons of an inexorable criticism.

Dr. Ewing, from whom I have quoted already, does not hesitate, however, to assert emphatically that "it is impossible to prove the existence" of Apostolical Succession. "At all events, it is impossible to prove it for the purpose in view, and for this its existence must be absolutely certain." So far, however, from there being any such certainty, "forgeries of documents in after times," may have been perpetrated. And so, he thinks, "it will be felt how unequal is the chain to the weight which it sustains; and besides that, even were it not so, how unlikely and incredible it should be that God would hang the whole work and benefit of redemption on such a hair!"

Be it so, for the sake of argument. But how will the Canon of Scripture stand such a test? If "absolute certainty" in such matters is necessary, how many of the Books of either the Old or New Testament can be traced back to their reputed authors? Not one. The Bible nowhere asserts its own inspiration; and though habit has accustomed us to regard it as one book, it is in fact a collection of

writings marked by every variety of time and place, subject and authorship. They consist of poems, histories, proverbs, biographies, religious discourses, songs and hymns, letters both on public and private affairs, a code of civil and religious laws, prophecies. And the authors of these belonged to every class of human society, and were separated from each other, in some cases, by a thousand years. They were kings and warriors, priests and prophets, legislators, herdsmen, fishermen, tax-gatherers, physicians. Some of them did not even belong to the Commonwealth of Israel—such as Balaam, whose discourses are part of inspired Scripture, and the author of the Book of Job. The several books, moreover, are nearly all anonymous, and the authorship of some of them is absolutely unknown. As far as internal evidence alone goes, the Bible is nothing more than a haphazard collection of writings, which the art of the binder has made into one book; nor did it exist as we have it for several generations after the death of the latest of its reputed authors. Then, again, on what principle were some books admitted into the Canon and others rejected? The Book of Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom appear more edifying than those of Ecclesiastes and Esther. And then the evidence for the Canonical authority of more than one Book of the New Testament is far from strong. And as regards “forgeries of documents” in support of Apostolical Succession, the possibility of such a thing falls to zero when compared with the facility

which existed for forgery in the case of Holy Scripture. In short, a person reasoning from the premisses of the objection which I am criticising would be bound to dispute the genuineness of every page of the Bible ; for he must deny that it is the Word of God unless he can trace out its genealogy, verse by verse, in print and manuscript, through all the editions up to the autographs of all the writers from Moses to S. John.

Indeed, there are no limits to the havoc which the demand for "absolute certainty" would make among the cherished beliefs of mankind. It would undermine the foundations of society, and throw all human institutions into chaos. Any one would be entitled to question the authority of Queen Victoria, and to call upon her to demonstrate, not only her own legitimacy, but the legitimacy of all her ancestors, back to him from whom she inherits her title. Nay more ; there is not a peer in the realm, or a proprietor in the United Kingdom, whose title and title-deeds would not be invalidated by the kind of evidence which is usually demanded on behalf of Apostolical Succession.

In fact, the possibility of a flaw in the chain of Apostolical Succession is indefinitely remote as compared with the possibility of bastardy in the case of succession to an earthly inheritance. For, after all, on what does the proof of legitimate birth ultimately rest ? Simply on the veracity of a single witness, who has the strongest possible inducement to conceal

the fraud, if there be any. While it must be admitted, then, that Apostolical Succession cannot be established in any given case with the rigorous accuracy of a mathematical demonstration, it must be added that it shares this disability with numberless other facts as to which no one entertains any reasonable doubt. But the evidence in favour of Apostolical Succession is as strong as any historical evidence can be. How stand the facts? Dr. Lightfoot admits, in his "Dissertation on the Christian Ministry," that "unless we have recourse to a sweeping condemnation of received documents, it seems vain to deny that early in the second century the Episcopal office was firmly and widely established. Thus, during the last three decades of the first century, and consequently during the lifetime of the latest surviving Apostle, this change must have been brought about"—the change, that is, from the Apostolate to the Episcopate. To admit as much as this is surely to admit everything. For if Episcopacy "was firmly and widely established" "during the lifetime of the latest surviving Apostle," it can hardly be disputed that it is the form of Church Government which is according to the mind of Christ. "The latest surviving Apostle,"—"the disciple whom Jesus loved,"—must have known the mind of his Master, and it is inconceivable that he should have sanctioned any ecclesiastical polity which was not in full harmony with his Lord's instructions during the interval between His Resurrection and Ascension.

Granting then—what indeed no well-informed and candid student of ecclesiastical history can deny—that Episcopacy is coeval with the Apostolic age, it may be affirmed with confidence that the chances of a break in Episcopal succession are mathematically so improbable as to amount positively to moral certainty in its favour. Consecration by one bishop is perfectly valid. But to ensure certainty, three have always been required to take part in every consecration ; and it is so highly improbable that three spurious bishops should have succeeded in foisting a fourth impostor on any diocese, that those who make the objection are bound to produce a positive case before they can be admitted to have established even a *prima facie* claim on our attention. And even so the fraud would die with the impostor without tainting in the smallest degree the general line of Episcopal succession.

The plain truth is, that there is not a single article of the Christian faith with respect to which we have evidence enough to preclude doubt, if we choose to be captious. It was so in the case of the Jews of old. The entire validity of their religious system depended on the untainted descent of their priesthood from the family of Aaron. Yet every link in the chain hung on the unsupported testimony of a fallible woman. There was much in the writings of the Prophets, too, that was actually calculated to mislead the people of Israel, both as to the character of the Mosaic dispensation and as to the real nature of

the Messiah's kingdom. And when Christ appeared His contemporaries complained, and not altogether without reason, that He was "keeping them in suspense." He resolutely refused to give additional evidence to those who were not satisfied with what they saw and heard. They who refused to "hear Moses and the Prophets" were not to be persuaded by evidence of an extraordinary character. And as then, so now. He who demands evidence of a kind which shall overwhelm every objection must seek it in vain, alike for Apostolic succession and for the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture.

So much by way of general answer to a vague objection. I have no doubt, however, that the popular aversion to the principle of Sacerdotalism is due to the claims made on behalf of the Christian priesthood in the sphere of the Christian Sacraments, and in the direction of the individual conscience. How far such claims are in agreement with right reason and with the teaching of the Church of England, I shall now, according to my lights, endeavour to show.

But this must form the subject of another Letter ; and in the mean time, I ask leave to subscribe myself,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,
MALCOLM MACCOLL.

LETTER III.

DOCTRINE OF THE EUCHARIST.

MY LORD,

It is admitted on all hands that there need be little or no objection to Ritualism viewed merely as a matter of æsthetics: it is condemned because it is supposed to symbolize erroneous doctrine. And the particular doctrines which are alleged to be symbolized by it are the Real Presence and the Eucharistic Sacrifice. I am persuaded, however, that those who assail these doctrines mean by them something very different from that which they convey to the minds of those who believe in them; and I have for a long time been of opinion that the true remedy for our dissensions is not to be found in repressive Acts of Parliament, but in a better understanding between the different parties in the Church. I am not so sanguine or so conceited as to think that I shall contribute much to that happy result. But it is the duty of every one to do what he can, be it much or little, in so blessed a work; and it is in this spirit

that I submit the following observations to your Lordship's kind attention.

My appeal is addressed chiefly, if not exclusively, to persons who accept the primary facts of the Christian Faith, and therefore I do not argue, I assume, the doctrine of man's Fall and of his Redemption through Christ.

It was the teaching of Calvinism, and, with certain qualifications, of Lutheranism, that the Fall of Man involved the total ruin of the race. The image of God in man was not merely marred, it was absolutely extinguished, and human nature was vitiated at its core. Luther maintained that "man, as he is born of his father and mother, together with his whole nature and essence, is not only a sinner, but sin itself."* But this view of the Fall has much more in common with Manicheism than with Christianity. It is utterly alien to the Sacramental system, and consequently it has never been able to take root inside the Catholic Church. According to her invariable teaching, his Fall entailed upon man the loss of those supernatural endowments, which resulted from the free and intimate union of his will with that of God, and as a consequence of that loss a certain bias towards evil. He "became subject to vanity." His affections strayed from their proper objects, and had not strength sufficient to resist the earthward attraction of the senses. In a word,

* Moehler's "Symbolism," p. 78: Robertson's Translation.

human nature was sorely wounded; but it remained human nature still—subject, indeed, to the possibility of utter ruin by self-determination of the will to evil, but equally capable of working out its own salvation by the aid of Divine grace.

* It is the doctrine of the Church then, as of Holy Scripture, that Christ the Son of God became Incarnate for the purpose of reversing this downward attraction of fallen humanity. He came to be “the Way, the Truth, and the Life,” that is, to place humanity in connection with new objects, and in communication with a new Source and Principle of life. The old channels had been dammed up by man’s sin; the old trunk had become well nigh sapless, and was hastening to decay. Therefore a New Head of our race appeared as the True Vine on which the members of the Old Man might be engrafted, and from which they might derive spiritual nourishment. “As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.” How did all men die in Adam? Was it not by deriving from him a perverted life? How are they to be made alive in Christ? Is it not by receiving from Him the germ of a perfect life, which, if they do not resist its influence, will so leaven their old nature that it shall become gradually transformed into the image of the Second Adam? The remedy must cover the disease; the Redemption in Christ must

* A good deal of what follows on the next few pages has appeared already in my book on the Athanasian Creed.

be commensurate with the Fall in Adam; else the Gospel is a fiction and Christianity a dream. From the First Adam we inherited a depraved life: the fact must be admitted even by those who refuse to admit its cause. It is with no heritage of *imputed* ills that we are born, but with a very real perversion of our natural faculties; and it is by no figment of an *imputed* righteousness that we are to be saved, but by a veritable participation in the Redeemed Humanity of our Incarnate Lord. We are to be made, and not merely accounted, righteous. Unless we admit that we are really and actually partakers of Christ's Humanity, partakers in a sense as real as our participation in the corrupt humanity of Adam, a great deal of the language of the New Testament becomes irrelevant and misleading rhetoric. What is the meaning of the antithesis, which runs through S. Paul's Epistles, between the First Adam and the Second, the Old Man and the New, unless we are to understand that each is a fountain-head of humanity—the one, of the humanity which fell in Eden, the other, of the humanity which triumphed on the Cross?

Now our connection with fallen humanity is an organic connection; the First Adam has passed on his own injured nature to all his descendants. If, then, the Son of God became incarnate that He might be the Second Head of our race and infuse a supply of new life into our impoverished nature, does it not follow that our connection with him must be organic

too? How else could we be "members of Christ," as our Catechism says all Christians are? And the Catechism merely follows the still stronger language of S. Paul, who compares the connection between Christ and His members with that between Adam and his wife, who was made "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh." The baptized, he says, are "limbs of Christ's Body, (growing) out of His flesh and of His bones." He asserts the same doctrine in another way in his great chapter on the Resurrection of the body. "The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a life-giving (*ζωοποιούν*) spirit. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy: the Second Man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." S. Peter does not hesitate to say that Christians are made "partakers of the Divine Nature;" and our Lord Himself conveys the same idea under the image of the Vine and its branches, and still more emphatically in that wonderful Sacramental discourse recorded in the sixth chapter of S. John's Gospel. He calls Himself "the Bread of life," "the living Bread which came down from heaven." And then more plainly, "The Bread that I will give is My Flesh, which I will give for the life of the world."

And when His hearers questioned the possibility of such a gift, He repeated His assertion with a solemn asseveration: "Verily, verily I say unto you, Except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His Blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood *hath* eternal life, and I will raise him up at the Last Day."

I dare not explain away these solemn words. I must believe that they contain some deep meaning; for it is incredible that our loving Saviour permitted Himself to indulge in language which if not true in some real sense, is misleading and mischievous. He saw that His very strong and solemn language was liable to be misunderstood—that, in fact, it was misunderstood by the bulk of those whom He was addressing. But he had not to think of them alone. Numberless generations yet unborn were in His thought, in whose ears those words would sound as the glad tidings of a life from the dead. Like His own Incarnation, it was the lot of the doctrine on which He was insisting to be "set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel, and for a sign which should be spoken against." But not one jot or tittle of that doctrine would He explain away. Rather than do so He was willing to risk not merely the desertion of the offended multitude but of His own small band of disciples. "Will ye also go away?" They did not, for they acknowledged that His words were "the words of eternal life." But the question clearly implies that he would have preferred their

forsaking Him to the alternative of watering down the "hard saying" which had offended and repelled the multitude.

With such an example before me I dare not trifle with our Lord's emphatic words. I will not presume to say that they are metaphorical, seeing that Himself pointedly declined to admit any such interpretation of them when the people of Capernaum challenged them. But if not metaphorical, what are they? Our reason revolts against their apparent meaning, and we may be tempted to ask, with the puzzled multitude,—“How can this man give us His flesh to eat?” Our Lord Himself has supplied the answer. His words were true, and had a most real meaning. But they were not to be understood in any gross materialistic sense. “It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life.” In other words, when He spoke of giving His Flesh and Blood as the food of His people, He did not mean by flesh and blood anything that the bodily senses could apprehend or a chemist could analyze into its elements. In that sense our Lord's Flesh and Blood are certainly not present either in the Eucharist or elsewhere. It is true that He called on His disciples to testify to the reality of His “Flesh and Bones” after His Resurrection. True also, that the Fourth Article asserts that “Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His Body, with flesh, bones, and all things pertaining

to the perfection of man's nature; wherewith He ascended into Heaven, and there sitteth until He return to judge all men at the Last Day." But it is evident that whatever is meant by the Flesh and Bones of our Lord's Resurrection Body they are very different from flesh and bones in the ordinary sense. What we call flesh and bone is simply a consolidation of certain gases which may be resolved into their original elements; and then they cease to be flesh and bone. But while they remain flesh and bone they are subject to decay, and the ceaseless waste of tissue requires to be repaired by the assimilation of congenial nutriment. Therefore a body of such flesh and bone as we have any experience of cannot subsist without food; nor can it pass through material substances, such as a closed door, nor mount up in the air contrary to the law of gravity, nor become visible and invisible without apparent cause. But our Lord's Body did all this. It is incorruptible, and therefore needs no food. It passed repeatedly through a closed door.* It ascended through the air

* Dr. Vogan ("The Doctrine of the Eucharist," pp. 558-560) denies this. He admits that our Lord's sudden appearance, "the doors being shut," and His sudden invisibility, were miraculous; but he maintains that in each case the subject of the miracle was not our Lord's Body, but in the first case the material substance of wood, and in the other the circumambient air. "We can suppose that by His divine power the doors opened of their own accord for his admission." "A body will disappear to one if the rays of light from it be intercepted, or if he will even close his eyes. And He who could 'still the raging of the sea' could also change or suspend the properties of the

in a manner contrary to all the known properties of a human body. It appeared suddenly, and as suddenly vanished out of sight. Even before His Resurrection our Lord's Body exhibited properties which ours do not possess, or possess only in germ. He walked upon the waves, and gave Peter power to do so till his faith failed him. He made Himself invisible on more than one occasion when His enemies were about to seize Him; and He was transfigured on Mount Tabor. This seems to show that His Body was in Its essence always a spiritual body; so that It could be emancipated at will from the laws of matter, and could retire within the sphere of spiritual laws.*

air, so as to prevent his person from being seen through it." Such reasoning appears to one to be a rationalistic explaining away of the sacred narrative.

* Dr. Swainson has, on the strength of this passage, in my book on the Athanasian Creed, publicly accused me of teaching "a modified Eutychianism," and says, in fact, that I "have almost avowed that I am a Docetic," and would "three hundred years ago and more have been in danger of being burnt as a heretic." * I am not sure that the "danger of being burnt as a heretic, three hundred years and more ago," is a sufficient proof of heterodox opinions, and I have a shrewd suspicion, moreover, that in this matter Dr. Swainson has at least as good reason as I to be duly grateful for the recent date of his birth. But the charge which he has made against me is a serious one, and shall be seriously met. A few words will suffice to show how utterly groundless it is.

My assertion is, that our Lord's Humanity was, in an essential point which carries a number of important consequences, always different from ours. Dr. Swainson stigmatises this as

* Formation of the Athanasian Creed, p. 25.

Of course His absolute sinlessness, and the union of His Sacred Humanity with His Divine Person, must "a modified Eutychianism," and "almost an avowal of Docetism." Let us test the matter.

According to the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union, every Christian is bound to believe that our Lord had no human personality. He had a human body and a human soul, with all the essential properties belonging to each, including a human will; but He had no human person. To affirm that He had is to be an avowed Nestorian. A human personality, on the other hand, belongs necessarily to the definition of all other members of the human race. In other words, it is of the essence of a right belief in the Incarnation to deny a human personality of our Lord, and to affirm it of all other men.

Does not this constitute a "generic difference" between our Lord's Humanity and ours? I am surprised that a Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge should have written so loosely as Dr. Swainson has done on this subject. To be a Docetic is to affirm that our Lord's Humanity was but a phantom, without substantial reality. To be a Eutychian is to affirm that His Human Nature was absorbed and effaced by commixture with the Divine. Where have I said anything that looks like an expression, "modified" or otherwise, of either heresy? I assert that the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union constitutes an essential difference between our Lord's Humanity and ours, inasmuch as it affirms of ours, while it denies to His, a human personality. I assert, as a consequence of this, that His Body was in its essence always a spiritual Body, and that its submission to the laws of the physical creation, though a fact, was in virtue of His condescension and not from any inherent necessity; whereas our bodies, on the other hand, belong to the natural sphere, but with the promise of being hereafter changed into spiritual bodies. And this is the teaching of S. Paul in the following classical passage:—

"Ἔστι σῶμα ψυχικόν, καὶ ἔστι σῶμα πνευματικόν, οὕτω καὶ

always have made a certain difference between His Body and those of ordinary men. Sin, however, with

γέγραπται, Ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν· ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν. Ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν. Ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκὸς ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. Οἷος ὁ χοϊκὸς τοιοῦτοί καὶ οἱ χοϊκοί, καὶ οἷος ὁ ἐπουράνιος, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ἐπουράνιοι. Καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανοῦ.

Surely the Apostle here teaches that our Lord's Body was, from the first, different from ours in this respect—that His was always, what ours will be after the Resurrection, *πνευματικόν*, and therefore not subject to the conditions of the fallen body *ex necessitate*, but because He willed it so to be. He took a Body which was *susceptible* of the sinless infirmities of humanity, but which was not *necessarily* subject to them, like ours. His Body, for instance, was not necessarily subject to the law of gravitation even before His Resurrection, else how shall we account for His walking on the sea?

Dr. Swainson has quoted S. Leo against me; but his quotations do not touch the point. On the contrary, S. Leo says that our Lord "*willed His Flesh to be mortal up to the Resurrection*;"* which is precisely the point on which I am insisting. S. Hilary of Poitiers is even more explicit:—

"*Passus ergo est Deus, quia se subiecit voluntarius passioni. . . . Habens ad patiendum quidem corpus, et passus est; sed naturam non habens ad dolendum. Naturæ enim propriæ et suæ corpus illud est, quod in cælestem gloriam conformatur in monte, quod tactu suo fugat febres, quod de sputo suo format oculos. . . . Cum potum et cibum accepit, non se necessitati corporis sed consuetudini tribuit. . . . Non sibi tristis est; neque sibi orat, sed illis quos monet orare pervigiles. . . . Non sibi flevit, sed nobis.*"†

It would be easy to multiply authorities; but it is unneces-

* Sermons translated by Dr. Bright, p. 59. † In Psalm. liii,

its consequences, does not belong to the integrity of human nature; it is a foreign element suppressing

sary. If Dr. Swainson really believes that our Lord's risen Body is a Body of flesh and bones like ours, there is not much use in arguing with him. In what sense does he believe that his own body will rise from the grave? Does he believe that the flesh and bones which he now bears about with him will ever rise again in a strictly literal sense "to meet the Lord in the air?" If he does, I beg to refer him to another Cambridge Doctor of Divinity, the late Dr. Mill, who says truly, in his *Analysis of Pearson on the Creed* (p. 185), that the point under discussion "belongs to philosophy rather than to theology," and that "we may well take up an opinion less pregnant with obvious difficulties than that which is adopted by" Pearson, and in a more exaggerated form by Dr. Swainson.

I wish to write inoffensively; but the claims of truth must supersede all other considerations, and I am obliged to say that the Norrisian Professor of Divinity at Cambridge appears to me to have a somewhat hazy view of some of the necessary consequences of the Incarnation. Look, for instance, at the following passage in a pamphlet which he has lately published:—

"I cannot dissociate Christ's Glorified Body from the Saviour Himself; neither can I dissociate the Body of His Humiliation from the Saviour, so long as that Body was animated by His Soul. All reverence and worship paid to it" (our Lord's *living* Body) "was paid, of course, to Him. But the Body as *broken*, the Blood as *poured out*, could not be objects of adoration. Respect, reverence, love, of the utmost extent that man is capable of, are and were due to them. But it is inconceivable that JOSEPH of Arimathea or either of the *MARIES worshipped* the lifeless Body of their Lord."*

* A Brief Historical Inquiry. By C. A. Swainson, D.D., Canon of Chichester, Norrisian Professor of Divinity, Cambridge, p. 61.

the natural development of our bodies, so that they cannot realize their perfection without the violent dissolution which we call Death. But surely the properties of the spiritual body are even now latent in our mortal frame, and, but for sin, might show themselves independent of the laws of matter, as our Lord's Body did occasionally before His Resurrection, and normally after that event.

When, therefore, the Fourth Article affirms that "Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His Body, with flesh, bones, and all things pertaining to the perfection of man's nature, wherewith He ascended into Heaven," it does not all follow that the phrase, "His body, with flesh and bones," connotes the same thing as it does in the case of our bodies. In fact, it cannot do so; for "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth

I have copied Dr. Swainson's italics and capitals, and I ask your Lordship to consider what the Professor and Doctor of Divinity commits himself to. It is a necessary inference from the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union, and is therefore *de fide*, that our Lord's Divine Person has never been separated from any portion of His Humanity from the first moment of the Incarnation, nor ever can be. His Person was, therefore, as truly present with His lifeless Body as with His Soul in Hades, and consequently Divine adoration was as much due to the one as to the other.

What Dr. Swainson by implication denies is, in fact, one of the rudimentary articles of the Christian Faith. In his fear of "a modified Eutychianism" he has fallen into a modified Nestorianism.

corruption inherit incorruption." Our Lord's Body possesses, of course, "all things pertaining to the perfection of man's nature." But it is certain that flesh and blood, bone and muscle, do not belong "to the perfection of man's nature." They belong to the region of decay and death, and therefore our Lord has them not. The terms may express the nearest approach which our minds can now make to the conception of a spiritual body; but they cannot be pressed literally without violence both to Holy Scripture and to right reason.

What, then, did our Lord mean by saying that He would give His Flesh and Blood for the food of His people? I admit that His words were, in a sense, figurative; but they were figurative only in the sense in which all human language is figurative when it attempts to deal with the realities of the spiritual world. They were figurative because they expressed less, not because they expressed more, than He intended to convey. "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." That is to say, even in material things it is not the gross mass of material particles that "profiteth," but that inner essence which is too subtle for the apprehension of the senses, and which eludes all the skill of science. A chemist can take any organized body, from that of a man to that of an acorn, and separate it into its component parts; but the principle of life escapes in the process, and he cannot restore it with all his science.

He can make, unmake, and remake a crystal ; but he cannot make a blade of grass, nor restore its vitality when it has fled. The lisping infant knows why a blade of grass grows just as well as the wisest philosopher. "It is the spirit that quickeneth." All things that live have their root in a spiritual cause, and that cause, in its last analysis, is God. "In Him we live, and move, and have our being," and apart from Him there can be no life. In this sense the whole universe of life may be said to feed upon its God, and it is a glimpse of this truth which has given such vitality to Pantheism through all its manifold phases.

Taking our Lord's explanation, therefore, together with the "hard saying," of which the people of Capernaum complained, it is easy enough to understand, though not easy to comprehend, the doctrine which He taught. By "flesh and blood" He meant His real substantial humanity. In Baptism we are "born again," as He explained to Nicodemus ; we are made "members of Christ"—that is, we are brought into organic connection with His sinless humanity. And that connection is supernaturally maintained through the channel of the Holy Eucharist. Other ordinances bring us within the influences of His grace ; this places our humanity in actual contact with His, so that virtue goes out of It to feed us and gradually "transform our vile bodies, so that they may be fashioned like unto His glorious body."*

* See Appendix, Note A.

It is no answer to this doctrine to say that it encourages "Sacerdotalism," and implies the existence of a class of men dealing in "magical rites" and endowed to work "invisible miracles." As a matter of fact, it is not a bit more wonderful that the Second Adam should transmit His humanity to His members by means of two Sacraments than that the First Adam should pass on his humanity to his descendants through the instrumentality of two parents. The one is just as much an "invisible miracle" as the other. They are equally beyond the ken of human intellect, and they are equally reasonable.

But it is asked: How is possible that our Lord's body can be present at one and the same moment on ten thousand different altars? "For though a spirit is so much more subtile than a material body; and a body, supposed to move like a spirit, may also be supposed to have inconceivable rapidity of motion, and the power of intimate penetration into and under other substances; yet no finite body can, in its very substance, be in more places than one at the same time. If it can, why not in many places? Why not everywhere? And so the finite would be, not finite, but infinite."*

It would be just as reasonable to ask: How is it possible that the flesh and blood of a man living in Australia should be present in his children here in

* Dr. Vogan on "The True Doctrine of the Eucharist," p. 561.

London? As a matter of fact, Adam's flesh and blood, that is, his essential humanity; is present really and substantially in all the millions of his descendants. And shall we declare that to be impossible to God the Son which is an admitted fact in the case of the fallen Adam? Shall the First Adam be capable of disseminating his perverted nature among all the human beings who have come out of his loins? And shall the Second Adam be incapable of imparting His life-giving Humanity to the members of His Body through channels which He may graciously vouchsafe to ordain?

But the plain truth is, antagonism to the doctrine of the Real Presence arises mainly from misapprehension as to what the doctrine really means. Those who adopt the Zuinglian theory seem unable, like the inhabitants of Capernaum, to lift their minds out of the slough of naturalism, and they suppose accordingly that when we speak of the Real Presence of our Lord's Body in the Sacrament we mean the presence of so many cubic inches of ponderable matter. Can they not see that even their own bodies do not consist, after all, of the gross mass of material particles which sight and touch can apprehend. These are in a state of perpetual flux, passing away with every respiration, and entering into new combinations. So that literally we have not the same body from hour to hour, viewed on its material side. Underlying this material covering, however, is an informing substance which remains

unchanged, and which is able to multiply itself indefinitely through the process of natural generation. But our Lord's Body is not a natural body, and does not belong to the natural, but to the supernatural, order of things. He came to create us anew, to place our poverty-stricken nature in communication with His own vivifying Humanity, so that a new life might circulate through our frame, and make us "new creatures." The Sacraments are thus the "continuation of the Incarnation," as I think Moehler calls them; they are the channels through which the nature of the Second Head of our race is conveyed to His members. I know of no other way, for Holy Scripture reveals none, in which we can be made partakers of Christ. Faith is of course necessary; but faith is useless if we refuse to use the means. Naaman's faith led him all the way to the Prophet of Israel; but if he had acted on his first impulse and refused to "wash seven times in Jordan," what would his faith have availed him? And just as little will faith now avail the Christian who prefers the Abana and Pharpar of his own devices to the one simple way which the wisdom of God has provided for the cure of spiritual leprosy. There was no inherent virtue in the waters of Jordan to heal the leper any more than in the "rivers of Damascus." But God had chosen to energize through the one and not through the other; and that made all the difference. So now: there is no virtue in water or in bread and wine to heal the sinner of his hereditary malady. But

if God has chosen, for the trial of our faith, to make those "beggarly elements" the channels of His grace, have we any right to reject the channels and still expect the grace? To my mind it does not appear at all more wonderful that bread and wine should, under God's appointment, be able to sustain our spiritual nature than that bread and wine should be able to sustain our physical nature. Of themselves they could do neither; as the channels through which His power acts they can, with equal facility, do both.

If objectors could only get rid of their prejudices and look the facts of Christianity fairly in the face, they could hardly avoid seeing that the Sacramental system is the natural complement of the Incarnation. But in the minds of numbers of people who sincerely believe in the Divinity of Christ the Incarnation is regarded as an historical event that took place some eighteen centuries ago, and whose interest for us is practically bounded by the Sacrifice on Calvary. According to this view Christianity is absorbed in the Atonement, and the Atonement is not regarded as a process going on continually in its application to us, but as a past fact consummated once for all on the Cross, and having no direct relation to our life except in the way of having appeased an angry God, and therefore supplied a motive for lively gratitude on our parts. Accordingly, in the Holy Communion no positive gift is supposed to be imparted. The Sacrament is only a symbolical picture of the death of Christ, well calculated to bring that event vividly

before us, and to stir up grateful emotions in our hearts in consequence. But the God-Man is absent in some region beyond the sidereal firmament; and we are to ascend where He is in imagination and feeling. This is what is called the "spiritual presence" of Christ in the Holy Communion, or rather in the heart of the worthy communicant. It is manifestly no presence at all. It is as if a man should think that he was spiritually present in India by dwelling in thought on a loved brother who happened to live there. In truth, the reality of our Lord's Humanity, as subsisting and energizing now, has gradually and silently dropped out of the practical belief of a great many among us. Their gaze is ever backward, and they live in the memory of the past rather than in the enjoyment of the present. This explains why Ascension Day, which testifies to Christ's continued Humanity, has fallen into disuse among those who reject the Sacramental system.

All this is a grave misconception of the central idea of Christianity. We are not to regard Christ as an historical character belonging to the past, but as a present Person out of whose life-giving Humanity virtue is continually going out for the healing of the nations. Human nature, viewed in the abstract, fell when Adam sinned; but his descendants were made partakers of the Fall by their organic connection with the first parent. In like manner humanity, viewed in the lump, was saved when Christ triumphed over sin and death. But the indi-

vidual members of the race cannot be partakers of that salvation except by organic connection with Christ. It was no mere gazing on the aboriginal calamity of Eden that has involved us in the consequences of that calamity, nor is it by any mental gazing on the crucifixion of Calvary that we can be regenerated. The Human Nature of Christ must be communicated to us as truly as the nature of Adam, else we have no part or inheritance in the God-Man. Adam is present in all of us, truly, really, and substantially; and if the Second Adam is not present in as real a sense we are not yet redeemed. But there is this difference. The *nature* of Adam is literally present in all of us, but not his person: that is incommunicable, and being finite it is limited and circumscribed in space. Our Lord's Personality, on the other hand, resides in His Divine Nature, and that is everywhere. So that He is Personally present, and necessarily so, wherever His Humanity is present.

I trust that I shall be pardoned for saying that the doctrine of the Atonement current in Evangelical circles appears to me to take a very partial and incomplete view of the Incarnation, and to fasten down the significance of some of the cardinal facts of Christianity to what logicians call their "inseparable accidents." It practically regards the Sacrifice of Christ as beginning and ending on Calvary. What a poor notion such a view gives of the love and condescension of our Incarnate Lord! To us, with our limited vision and sense of guilt, death appears a

great calamity. It puts an end to all our plans, tears us from a thousand endearing associations, and dismisses us to an unknown world and uncertain destiny. To Him death was but a temporal incident in a life-long sacrifice. He "drank of the brook in the way," and passed behind the veil to offer Himself as a "perpetual sacrifice."* The essence of self-sacrifice is in the consent of the will. That once accomplished, the sacrifice is complete so far as the sufferer is concerned, though circumstances may require its consummation in the death of the victim. Abraham's self-sacrifice was complete when, in obedience to the Divine command, he raised his arm to strike his child; and the Church has always conceded the crown of martyrdom to those whose martyrdom was only in will. God has been sacrificing Himself from eternity. He is self-sufficient, absolutely happy in the eternal harmony of His incommunicable attributes. He needs nothing from without, and the created universe, therefore, with all its joyous sights and sounds, is but the overflowing of an infinite love which delights to share its blessedness. To Him this perpetual self-sacrifice involves no pain because His love is perfect, and therefore "hath" no "torment." But when the eternal Son laid aside His manifold perfections, and circumscribed His infinitude by the imperfections of humanity, the pain that is latent in the love of all finite natures—the pain of unsatisfied

* Both the argument and the sense seem to require that εἰς τὸ διηνεκές, in Heb. x. 12, should be connected with προσεvéγκας.

yearning—became manifest “in strong crying and tears.”* He felt the outpourings of His self-sacrifice repelled on all sides by the sins of men, and driven back upon their source. “He could do no mighty work there because of their unbelief,” and His human soul felt the pangs of baffled love.

In self-sacrifice, therefore, lies the happiness of God. And this self-sacrifice is eternal; first, in the relations of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity to each other, and then in the sphere of created life. In self-sacrifice lies our happiness also, if we only knew it. “Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for My sake shall find it.” We must therefore somehow be partakers of Christ’s sufferings. We must be brought *en rapport* with his enduring sacrifice; and if we are to credit the testimony of Christian antiquity the Holy Eucharist is the means by which this is effected. Whatever we may think of the doctrines of the Real Presence and of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, it is the plainest matter of fact that they are the doctrines of the ancient Liturgies and the early Fathers. It would be easy to prove this; but it would require too long a digression from my immediate subject.

Of course He is present to those only who have faith—that is to say, they alone can “discern” Him.

*

“The best of men

That e’er wore earth about Him him was a sufferer—
A soft, meek, patient, humble, tranquil spirit—
The first true gentleman that ever breathed.”—*Dekker.*

Others may come in contact with Him, but they know it not. Blind men do not "discern" the light of the sun; but it is there for all that. Its existence is an objective reality independent alike of the vision or blindness of those on whom it shines. And so, in the Holy Communion, the faith of the communicant has nothing to do with the fact of Christ's Presence. Faith creates nothing; its province is to receive some gift already existing independently of it. If it were not so, it would follow that when all the communicants happened to be without faith, a contingency by no means improbable, there would be no Sacrament at all. What the doctrine of our Lord's real objective Presence in the Sacrament, independently of the faith of the recipient, means is simply this: that the virtue of the Sacrament is rooted in a cause external to man. To insist, therefore, on an exclusively subjective Presence is, in reality, to be a Pelagian. It is a curious "Nemesis of faith" that those who began by decrying human nature as utterly depraved, and denouncing good works as "filthy rags," should end by ascribing to an act of man the whole credit and merit of human salvation. In their view it is not by Divinely ordained Sacraments, not by any real participation in Christ's Humanity, not by anything external to himself, that man is saved, but by faith, which is an internal act of his own soul. And so depraved humanity, after all, is able to save itself! How different is such a doctrine from that of those who accept the Sacramental principle! For the essence

of Sacramentalism lies in believing that everything beautiful and good and true comes from God, but almost invariably through intermediate, and generally material, agency. So that the whole material creation is one vast veil of Sacramentalism behind which "the Father worketh hitherto" through all the forms of animated existence, from a daisy to an archangel.

I have now given what I conceive is a fair exposition of the doctrines of the Real Presence and Eucharistic Sacrifice as they are held by the High Church party in common, I believe, with the Church of those "best and purest ages" to whose teaching our own Church has never ceased to appeal. I must next crave your Lordship's indulgence while I endeavour to show, as briefly as may be, that at no period since the Reformation would either of these doctrines have been condemned by the Church of England.

Dr. Thirlwall, in a passage which has been quoted more than once of late, has laid down the position occupied by the Church of England on this subject in language so clear and accurate that I am tempted to quote it once more :—

"The Church of England . . . has dealt with this subject in a spirit of true reverence as well as of prudence and charity. She asserts the mystery, inherent in the institution of the Sacrament, but abstains from all attempts to investigate or define it, and leaves the widest range open to the devotional feelings and

the private meditations of her children with regard to it. And this liberty is so large, and has been so freely used, that apart from the express admission of Transubstantiation, or of the grossly carnal notions to which it gave rise, and which, in the minds of the common people, are probably inseparable from it, I think there can hardly be any description of the Real Presence, which in some sense or other is universally allowed, that would not be found to be authorized by the language of eminent divines of our Church; and I am not aware, and do not believe, that our most advanced Ritualists in fact outstepped those very ample bounds."*

Such testimony from such a man is important, and I shall now proceed to show that it rests on a solid foundation.

In considering the testimony of the Anglican divines on the subject of the Eucharist the first thing that strikes one is the fact that both sides in the controversy are wont to appeal to them with equal confidence, and produce copious evidence in support of their respective positions. But there is, after all, nothing very surprising in this when we regard the circumstances of the case. At the time of the Reformation our Church and nation were engaged in a death-struggle with a politico-ecclesiastical polity, the most marvellous creation of human craft which the world has ever seen except perhaps the

* Charge delivered by the Bishop of S. David's in 1866, pp. 97-8.

pagan Roman Empire. Historians the least friendly to sacerdotal claims, like Guizot and Hallam, have freely admitted the immense debt rendered to the cause of political progress and of civilization in general by the Church of the Middle Ages. But it is a fallacy to credit the Papacy with all this service. Some of the Popes, no doubt, deserve all the praise that their most zealous admirers can bestow upon them; but it is certainly open to question whether the Papacy, as a system and in the long run, has not done more to retard than to advance the civilization of Christendom. In defending the liberties of the Church against the encroachments of a licentious and tyrannical feudalism great prelates, like Anselm, were undoubtedly champions of the cause of freedom in the State as well as in the Church. But if the Papacy gave a languid support to Anselm in his contest with William Rufus, it instigated and supported King John the Infamous in his conspiracy against the rights and liberties of the Church and State of England, and suspended the patriotic Langton from the primacy for his share in securing the Great Charter. It has been the rule of Papal policy, in fact, to support either the cause of freedom or of despotism according as either seemed likely to further the aggrandisement of the Papacy. So that its very contributions to the cause of freedom have proceeded rather from the calculations of an astute selfishness than from any spontaneous love of freedom for its own sake.

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At the period of the Reformation the Papal Power, though shaken, was still, both in religion and politics, the most formidable in Europe. And it was against this Power that the leaders of the Reformation in England had to contend. They were in rebellion against the supremacy of the Pope, with its long tale of accumulated extortions and abuses: a righteous rebellion, but still a rebellion, and therefore in need of justification. The Reformers had to make out a case against a system which, with varying fortunes, had the prescription of centuries on its side, and they acted as men in such circumstances are apt to act. Intent on damaging their adversary, they were not always careful to discriminate between the true and the false. "There is," as Bacon says,* "a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstition formerly received;" and Cranmer and his colleagues yielded to this superstition. In protesting against Roman errors they sometimes trespassed against Catholic truth. In doing battle against Rome they courted the dangerous alliance of Geneva; so that, as Thorndike says, "the tares of Puritanism were sown together with the grain of the Reformation." Cranmer and Ridley, in short, use language which makes it possible to quote them on both sides of the controversy, and which consequently goes far to destroy the value of their evidence. What we have to consider is the broad

* Essay on Superstition.

fact that the Zuinglian leanings of these men have left so little mark upon the Prayer Book. Nor is it always safe to conclude, even in the case of men like Cranmer and Ridley, that their occasional Zuinglian language always conveyed to their own minds a strictly Zuinglian meaning.* It is the custom of all reformers to insist strongly on that side of the truth which has been denied or obscured, and to take the other side for granted. When S. Paul, for example, wrote his *Epistle to the Romans* he had before his mind those Judaizing Christians who rested in the mere letter of the law, and disregarded its spirit; who thought that *works* were everything, *faith* nothing; who, in a word, believed that *works without faith* would save them. S. Paul, therefore, states broadly that we are saved by faith, and *not* by works. Take that statement as an isolated proposition, and it is not true. But S. Paul, of course, condemned works in the sense in which the Judaizing Christians understood that word. By works they meant works

* At his trial in 1553 Cranmer "offered to join issue upon this point, that the order of the Church of England set out by the authority of the innocent and godly Prince Edward VI. in his High Court of Parliament is the same that was used in the Church fifteen hundred years past." Jeremy Taylor's Works, vol. v. p. 298, Eden's Edition. Assuming Cranmer's honesty, it is difficult to reconcile this statement with the opinion that he was introducing a new doctrine on the subject of the Eucharist, except in the repudiation of Transubstantiation, which, however, is not recognised, though the Real Presence is, in any of the old Liturgies, including the Roman.

done in their own natural strength—that is, without faith—and by *such* works S. Paul tells them they cannot be saved. On the other hand, when S. James wrote his Epistle he had in view a class of men whom we now call Antinomians; men who fancied that if they had faith, *i.e.*, the mere intellectual apprehension of truth, they might discard works of obedience. Writing to such men, S. James says that we are saved by *works*, and not by *faith*. And, singularly enough, the instance—that of Abraham—which S. Paul had adduced as an illustration of justification by faith, S. James cites as an illustration of salvation by works. Take the respective statements of the two Apostles apart from the different circumstances under which they were written, and they contradict each other. Take these circumstances into consideration, and they are easily harmonised. When S. Paul condemns works, he means *works without faith*. When S. James condemns faith, he means *faith without works*. In the same manner, when Anglican divines deny, as they sometimes do, that the substance of Christ's Humanity is present in the Eucharist, they mean substance extended, localised.*

* This might very easily be proved, if it were necessary, by extracts from their writings. Take the following from Bishop Jeremy Taylor's treatise on the Real Presence, vol. vi. p. 28: "They that deny the spiritual sense, and affirm the natural, are to remember that Christ reprov'd all senses of these words which were not spiritual. And, by the way, let me observe that the expressions of some chief men among the Romanists are so

This is evident in the case of some of them, for they elsewhere affirm a substantial presence. In like manner early Christian Apologists, like Minucius Felix and Arnobius, when engaged in controversy with the heathen, affirm that the Christians had no altars. Yet we know from Tertullian and others that altars, both name and thing, were undoubtedly used in the Christian worship of that time. In the same way Minucius Felix says that the Christians had no temples. Yet Christian temples are recognised in the Diocletian edicts, and Eusebius vouches for their existence. The explanation, of course, is that in repudiating temples and altars on behalf of Christianity Minucius and Arnobius meant such temples and altars as were used in Pagan

rude and crass that it will be impossible to excuse them from the understanding the words in the sense of the men of Capernaum; for, as they understood Christ to mean His 'true flesh natural and proper,' so do they; as they thought Christ intended they should *tear Him with their teeth and suck His blood*, for which they were offended; so do these men not only think so, but say so, and are not offended." And then he proceeds to give instances of this gross belief among Romanists. So Usher, in his *Answer to a Jesuit*, pp. 62-64, argues against these carnal notions of the Real Presence, which were then so prevalent. He mentions a horrible legend "of a Roman matron, who found a piece of the Sacramental bread turned into the fashion of a finger, all bloody; which afterwards, upon the prayers of S. Gregory, was converted into its former shape." *This was the shocking doctrine which our divines condemned; this was the sense in which they denied that Christ was substantially present in the Eucharist.*

worship. In fact, all men who are bent upon a single object must, for the time being, be more or less one-sided; and controversialists, of all others, are likely to be so; for it is the tendency of every dominant system to force those who are in arms against it into the most opposite and jealous attitude, from the apprehension which they naturally feel lest, on those points in which they approximate towards it, they should be misrepresented and overborne by its authority. Thus the idolatries of Paganism tended to repress the ritual of the early Church; and a similar reserve on the subject of the Eucharistic Sacrifice was necessary while the Jewish Temple was still standing, with all its carnal associations.

The question, however, as far as my argument is concerned, is not what the leaders of the English Reformation in the sixteenth century believed themselves, but what they wished to enforce as a test of communion on others; and my conviction is that at no period in the reign of Edward VI. and Elizabeth would belief even in Transubstantiation have disqualified a Clergyman for office in the Church of England, provided he took care not to force his belief on the understandings and consciences of others. There can be no doubt that a large majority of the clergy of that time did believe in Transubstantiation, and probably taught it. This is true, at all events, until the Bull of Excommunication against Queen Elizabeth. Till then multitudes of the clergy, who held benefices under Queen Mary, continued to hold them unmolested

under Elizabeth; and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the probability is that they made little or no change either in their preaching or ritual.

But we are not left to mere conjecture in the matter. In the year 1550 the Council of Edward VI., with the sanction of the Bishops, solemnly recognised and continued to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Coutances his jurisdiction as Ordinary over the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, though they were separated from the Pope and used the reformed Liturgy. The Bishop accepted the reformed Liturgy for that part of his diocese, and continued to govern it till the eighth year of Elizabeth, when, owing to the hostile action of the Pope, the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Coutances was abolished. The Bishop protested against what he considered an act of arbitrary violence, and offered, on condition of his jurisdiction being allowed, to give institution to such priests as the Queen might nominate from Oxford and Cambridge, waiving the right of presentation in the case of certain Abbots in Normandy.*

This proves two things: first, that there was no question then as to the validity of Anglican Orders; secondly, that belief in Transubstantiation, so long as it was not enforced on others, was no disqualification for office in the Church of England until the violent action of the Pope compelled the English Government to treat Roman Catholicism as treason. It is

* Falle's *Hist. of Jersey*, p. 187.

true, of course, that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is condemned in one of the Thirty-nine Articles; but it is important to remember that when several Roman Catholics, who sat in the Convocation which revised the Articles in 1562, objected to some of them, they were persuaded to subscribe them in their own sense.* So far were the Reformers of that era from wishing to close the door of the Church of England even against the believers in Transubstantiation, so long as it was held as a mere opinion of the schools. They recorded, indeed, their own judgment that it was false as an opinion; but "not liking," as Bacon says, "to make windows into men's hearts and secret thoughts except the abundance of them did *overflow into overt and express acts or affirmations*," the authorities in Church and State were willing to tolerate a very lax interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles. A direct attack upon the Article which condemns Transubstantiation might have exposed a clergyman to penalties; but, short of that, he might have preached as high a doctrine as he pleased, provided he proved himself a good and loyal subject in other respects. This, I believe, was the policy of those who guided the Reformation movement in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and nobody will suspect the Laudian school of divines of having adopted a more Protestant policy. Nevertheless it may be as well to produce some evidence on that point.

The reaction against Puritanism which had begun

* Heylin's Hist. p. 159.

in the reign of Elizabeth was not arrested even by the excommunication of the Queen and the apparition of the Spanish Armada. Puritanism was declared, in solemn State papers, to be as serious a danger on the one hand as Popery was on the other. This is stated in so many words in a letter addressed by Sir Francis Walsingham to Monsieur Critoy, Secretary of France, explaining the proceedings of the English Government towards both Roman Catholics and Puritans. After narrating the measures adopted against the former, and the reasons which made them necessary, the Letter turns to the Puritans as follows:—

“For the other part, which have been offensive to this State, though in another degree; which named themselves Reformers, and we commonly call Puritans; this hath been the proceeding towards them. A great while, when they inveighed against such abuses in the Church as pluralities, non-residence, and the like, their zeal was not condemned, only their violence was sometimes censured; when they refused the use of some ceremonies and rites as superstitious, they were tolerated with much connivancy and gentleness; yea, when they called in question the superiority of bishops, and pretended to bring a democracy into the Church, yet their propositions were heard, considered, and by contrary writings debated and discussed. Yet all this while it was perceived that their course was dangerous and very popular. And because Papistry was odious, therefore it was ever in

their mouths that they sought to purge the Church from the relics of Popery ; a thing acceptable to the people, who love ever to run from one extreme to another. Because multitudes of rogues and poverty were an eyesore and dislike to every man, therefore they put it into the people's head that if discipline were planted, there should be no beggars nor vagabonds ; a thing very plausible. And in like manner they promised the people many other impossible wonders of their discipline. Besides, they opened the people a way to government by their consistory and presbytery ; a thing though in consequence no less prejudicial to the liberties of private men than to the sovereignty of princes, yet in the first show very popular. Nevertheless, this (except it were in some few that entered into extreme contempt) was borne with, because they pretended but in dutiful manner to make propositions, and to leave it to the providence of God and the magistrate. But now of late years, when there issued from them a colony of those that affirmed the consent of the magistrate was not to be attended ; when, under pretence of a consession (*sic*) to avoid slanders and imputations, they combined themselves by classes and subscriptions ; when they descended into that vile and base means of defacing the government of the Church by ridiculous pasquils ; when they began to make many subjects in doubt to take an oath, which is one of the fundamental parts of justice in this land and in all places ; when they began both to vaunt of the strength and number

of their partisans and followers, and to use comminations that their cause would prevail though with uproar and violence; then it appeared to be no more zeal, no more conscience, but mere faction and division; and therefore, though the State were compelled to hold somewhat a harder hand to restrain them than before, yet it was with as great moderation as the peace of the Church and State would permit." *

This reaction against Puritanism was naturally increased on the accession of James, whose close contact with the Presbyterianism of Scotland had inspired him with a peculiar aversion to that form of ecclesiastical polity. Puritanism was now the extreme which was to be specially avoided; and union with Rome was not only conceived as possible, but openly talked of. The points of doctrine in which we differed from Rome appeared under the gentle euphemisms of "inferior questions," "secondary points," "things from which *offence* was taken," "logomachies," "scholastic subtleties," "not so important in themselves as for excommunicating others on account of them." Anglican divines and Roman Catholic dignitaries mingled with each other in familiar intercourse, compared notes, and devised plans for reconciling and re-uniting the Churches. Roman Catholic theologians, like Cassander, Maldonatus, Santa Clara, and

* Lord Bacon's Works, vol. viii. pp. 100, 101. Spedding's Edition. Mr. Spedding thinks, apparently on good evidence, that Walsingham's Letter was drawn up by Bacon.

De Dominis, are quoted with approbation by English Bishops and Archbishops, when treating of the Eucharist and other doctrines.

“ I prefer,” says Bramhall, “ one page of Wicelius, or Cassander, or Grotius, for true judgment, before the works of a hundred yawning wishers for peace, who do nothing that tends to the procuring of peace ; particularly I do admire the two former (who were Roman Catholics) for this reason, because their clear judgment did pierce so deep into the controversies of religion before they were rightly stated.”—Vol. iii. p. 511.

Bishop Montague held several conferences with Panzani, the Papal Nuncio, on the subject of union with Rome ; and a Roman Catholic writer of the period remarks :

“ Its (Church of England) doctrines are altered in many respects . . . Its professors, they especially of high authority, love temper and moderation, and the Thirty-nine Articles seem patient, if not ambitious, of some Catholic sense.”

This “ Catholic sense ” was put upon them by an eminent Roman Catholic Divine of that day, Santa Clara, who wrote a treatise with a view to reconcile the Thirty-nine Articles with the decrees of the Council of Trent. It is this treatise which is supposed to have suggested to Dr. Newman the idea of Tract XC. But how different the reception which the two treatises met with ! Tract XC. was denounced by almost the entire Episcopate of England.

On the other hand, Santa Clara not only maintained that the Thirty-nine Articles could be reconciled with the decrees of Trent; he even supported his position from the writings of Bishop Andrewes, Bishop Montague, Bishop White, Archbishop Bramhall, and other Anglican divines of eminence, who were alive to reject his mediation, and to correct his misrepresentations, if he made any. So far, however, were they from doing anything of the kind that they lived on terms of familiarity and friendship with him, and openly commended his attempt to reconcile the two Churches. "Well fare our learned and ingenuous countryman, Santa Clara!" says Bramhall. Other divines expressed themselves in a similar way. In short, the divines of the sixteenth century regarded the isolated position of the English Church as a calamity. Union with Rome was an object of desire to them; and they encouraged every attempt, from one side or the other, that tended to facilitate such a consummation. This might be shown by copious extracts. I must restrict myself to a few samples.

"I will confess that freely," says Bramhall, in his Reply to Baxter, "which Mr. Baxter neither doth know nor could know but by me, that about thirty years since, when my body was stronger and my wits fresher, when I had some books and notes of my own, and could have had what supply I had desired and opportunity to confer with whomsoever I pleased, I had then a design indeed to do my weak endeavour to disabuse the Christian world by the right stating and

distinguishing of controversies between the Church of Rome and us, and to show,—

“First, how many of them are mere logomachies, or contentions about words without any just ground ;

“Secondly, how many of them are scholastic subtleties, whereof ordinary Christians are not capable, and consequently no points of faith ;

“Thirdly, how many of them are not the controversies of the Churches, but of particular persons or parties in those Churches ;

“Fourthly, how many of our controversies are about rites and ceremonies, and things indifferent in their own nature.

“When all these empty names and titles of controversies are wiped out of the roll, the true controversies between us may be quickly mustered, and will not be found, upon a serious inquiry, to be so irreconcilable as some persons have imagined. The two dangerous extremes are, to clip away something from saving truth, whereof I do not find the *Church* of Rome to have been guilty ; and to obtrude erroneous or probable opinions for articles of faith, whereof I find *many* in the Church of Rome to have been most guilty.

“These were my thoughts in my younger days, *which age and experience hath rather confirmed and radiated in me than altered.*”—Works, vol. iii. p. 539.

Baxter, however, lived to modify the opinions which Bramhall felt obliged to combat, as the following passage, “faithfully published from his own

original MSS. by Matthew Silvester, 1696," plainly shows :—

“My censures of the Papists do much differ from what they were at first. I then thought that their errors in the doctrines of faith were their most dangerous mistakes. But now I am assured that these misexpressions and misunderstanding of us, with our mistakings of them, and inconvenient expressing of their own opinions have made the difference in most points appear much greater than it is ; and that in some it is next to none at all. But the great and unreconcilable differences lie in their Church tyranny ; in the usurpations of their hierarchy and priesthood, under the name of spiritual authority exercising a temporal lordship ; in their corruptions and abasement of God's worship ; but, above all, in their sytematic befriending of ignorance and vice.

“At first I thought that Mr. Parkins well proved that a Papist cannot go beyond a reprobate ; but now I doubt not that God hath many sanctified ones among them, who have received the true doctrine of Christianity so practically that their contradictory errors prevail not against them to hinder their love of God and their salvation ; but that their errors are like a conquerable dose of poison, which a healthful nature doth overcome. And I can never believe that a man may not be saved by that religion which doth but bring him to the true love of God and to a heavenly mind and life ; nor that God will ever cast a soul into hell that truly loveth him. Also at first

it would disgrace any doctrine with me if I did but hear it called Popery and anti-Christian; but I have long learned to be more impartial, and to know that Satan can use even the names of Popery and Antichrist to bring a truth into suspicion and discredit." Baxter's Life, Part I., p. 131.

The Puritans had charged Laud with a design to form a union between the Churches of England and Rome, and Heylin admits the charge, and defends his master on the ground that "many men of eminence," besides the Archbishop, thought such a union both desirable and possible; and he quotes with approbation "a tractate of Franciscus Santa Clara, in which he puts such a gloss upon the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England *as rendereth them not inconsistent with the doctrines of the Church of Rome.*"—Life of Laud, p. 413.

Heylin's assertion, that "many men of eminence" besides Archbishop Laud desired reunion with the Church of Rome, is borne out in a remarkable degree by a contemporary writer,* who says that—

"As to a reconciliation between the Churches of England and Rome, there were made (to Signor Panzani) some general propositions and overtures by the Archbishop's agents, they assuming that his Grace was very much disposed thereunto, and that if it was not accomplished in his lifetime 'twould prove a work of more difficulty after

* Letter of Venetian Ambassador in Somers's Tracts, Third Collection, vol. i. pp. 888, 889.

his death; that in very truth for the last three years the Archbishop had introduced some innovations approaching the rites and forms of Rome; that the Bishop of Chichester (Montague), a great confidant of his Grace, and the Lord Treasurer, and eight other Bishops of his Grace's party, did most passionately desire a reconciliation with the Church of Rome; that they did day by day recede from their ancient tenets, to accommodate with the Church of Rome; that therefore the Pope on his part ought to make some steps to meet them, and the Court of Rome remit something of its rigour in doctrine, otherwise no accord could be. And in very deed the Universities, Bishops, and Divines of this Realm, do daily embrace Catholic opinions, though they profess not so much with open mouth, for fear of the Puritans. For example, they hold that the Church of Rome is a true Church; that the Pope is superior to all Bishops; that to him it appertains to call General Councils; that it is lawful to pray for the soul of the departed; that altars ought to be erected of stone: In sum, they believe all that is taught by the Church, but not by the Court,* of

* Archbishop Bramhall makes the same distinction. His Roman Catholic opponent had urged that it was not the Roman "religion, nor any public tenet in their Church, that binds any to these rigorous assertions which the Protestants condemn." "I know it is not their 'religion,'" Bramhall replies. "*Our religion and theirs is the same.* I know it is not the general tenet of their Church. But it is the tenet of the Court of Rome, and the governing party amongst them."—Vol. ii. p. 816. And on

Rome Both the Archbishop and the Bishop of Chichester had often said that there were but two sorts of persons likely to impeach and hinder reconciliation, to wit, the Puritans among the Protestants, and Jesuits among the Catholics."

This despatch was written privately to his own Court by the Venetian Ambassador; he had therefore no motive for misrepresenting the case, but, on the contrary, every inducement to state it fairly and accurately. His statement that the Puritans on the one side, and the Jesuits on the other, were the only persons likely to hinder reconciliation, is borne out by Heylin, who says,* that "it was the petulancy of the Puritans on the one side, and the pragmatism of the Jesuits on the other, which made the breach" so difficult to heal; "and had those hot spirits on both sides," he adds, "been calmed awhile, moderate men might possibly have agreed upon such equal terms as would have laid a sure foundation for the peace of Christendom."

"Though I sincerely blame," says Thorndike, "the imposing of new articles upon the faith of Christians, and that of positions which I maintain not to be true,

p. 112 he talks of "the secession of the English Church from (not the Church, but) the Court of Rome." The distinction occurs over and over again in his writings; and one of his treatises is entitled "Schism Guarded, and beaten back upon the right owners, showing that our great controversy about Papal power is not a question of faith, but of interest and profit, not with the Church of Rome, but with the Court of Rome,"

* Life of Laud, p. 418.

yet I must and do freely profess that I find no position necessary for salvation prohibited, none destructive of salvation enjoined to be believed in it (Roman Church). And therefore I must necessarily accept it for a true Church, as in the Church of England I have always known it to be accepted. There remains in the present Church of Rome the profession of all that which is necessary to believe, either in point of faith or manners. Idolatry I grant to be possible, but not necessary, to be found in it, by the ignorance and carnal affections of particulars, not by command of the Church, or the laws of it.”—*Conclusion to Epilogue.*

The Bishop of Chalcedon, writing against Bramhall, says, “the Church of Rome is not homogeneous with the Protestant Church.” Bramhall replies—

“This is true *quà tales*,—as they are Roman and Protestant. The Roman Church is not a Protestant Church, nor the Protestant Church a Roman Church. Yet both the one and the other may be homogeneous members of the Catholic Church. *Their difference in essentials is but imaginary.**

Again :

“A great many of those controversies which raised the highest animosities among Christians at the first Reformation are laid aside already by moderate and judicious persons of both parties, without any miracle, and are only kept on foot by some blunderers, who follow the old mode when the fashion is grown out

* Vol. ii. p. 86.

of date, either out of prejudice, or pride, or want of judgment, or all together. And as many controversies of the greatest magnitude are already as good as reconciled, so more may be.

“It was not the erroneous opinions of the Church of Rome, but the obtruding them by laws upon other Churches, which warranted a separation.” *

Speaking of those “erroneous opinions” elsewhere, he says,—

“I do profess to all the world, that the transforming of indifferent opinions into necessary articles of faith, hath been that ‘*insana laurus*,’ or cursed bay-tree, the cause of all our brawling and contention.”

He was quite willing to leave Transubstantiation, and other dogmata protested against at the Reformation, in the class of “indifferent opinions” or “questions of the schools,” as both he and Andrewes express it, provided they were not imposed as articles of faith. And, as a consequence of this view, he declares emphatically and repeatedly that the Thirty-nine Articles are articles of *Religion*, not articles of *Faith*; and that the Church of England obliges none of her clergy to accept them as *de fide*, though she engages them, and even that much only “for peace’ sake,” not to controvert them. †

Such was the opinion of the Laudian school of Divines with regard to our differences with Rome in general; and when they came to express their thoughts on the particular subject of the Eucharist

* Vol. iii. pp. 571, 552, 572.

† Vol. ii. pp. 476, 598.

they one and all declared that their differences with Rome were *entirely* respecting the *mode*, not the *fact*, of the Real Presence. They allow the *Substantia*, but they object to a *con* or a *trans*. "The disagreement is only *de modo præsentiæ*," say Bishops Montague and Bilson. "All the controversy is about *the mode*," says Bishop Andrewes. "The question is not concerning a Real Presence," says Bishop Morton, "which Protestants do also profess." "I cannot see," says Cosin, "where there is any real difference betwixt us (and the Church of Rome) about this Real Presence, if we would give over the study of contradiction, and understand one another aright. Maldonatus *De Sacr.*, p. 143, after a long examination of the matter, concludes thus at last with us all." And he adds, "And so have I heard my Lord Overall preach it a hundred times."* Again, "It is confessed by all Divines, that upon the words of Consecration the Body and Blood of Christ is really substantially present, and so exhibited and given to all that receive it." And with regard to the opinion that the Body of Christ is present "only in the use of the Sacrament, and in the act of eating, and not otherwise,"† he says, "They that hold the affirmative, as the Lutherans and all Calvinists do, *seem to me to depart from all antiquity*, which place the Presence of Christ in the virtue of the words of con-

* Notes on the Book of Common Prayer. First Series, pp. 155, 181.

† The doctrine propounded by the Scottish Bishops.

secration and benediction used by the priest, and not in the use of eating the Sacrament, for they tell us that the virtue of that consecration is not lost though the Sacrament be either reserved for sick persons or other." And, though he condemns the abuse of solitary Masses, yet he gives it as his opinion, that "better were it to endure the absence of the people than for the minister to neglect the usual and daily Sacrifice of the Church, by which all people, whether they be there or no, reap so much benefit. And this was the opinion of my lord and master, Dr. Overall."* So also Laud, in his Conference with Fisher, agrees with Bellarmine, that there is a substantial Presence of the Body and Blood

* Notes, p. 127. It is true that the latter series of Notes indicate, if not a change in Cosin's views, at least a less friendly feeling towards the Church of Rome. There were reasons for this. While holding the post of Chaplain to the English refugees in Paris his own son was seduced to the Church of Rome, and attempts were continually made by the Jesuits, and often successfully, to draw away other members of his congregation. This threw Cosin into the attitude of a controversialist, and naturally led him to make the most of his differences with Rome. This only illustrates what I have already said on the natural tendency of controversy. What is really to the point is, that Cosin could maintain, without being censured for it,—1. That the Body and Blood of Christ are substantially, *i.e.*, in real substance and not in figure, present in the Eucharist; 2. That there was no real difference between the Churches of England and Rome as to the Real Presence, if theologians on both sides would only take the trouble to understand each other's language; 3. That "the daily Sacrifice of the Church" is beneficial.

of Christ after Consecration; he only objects to the word "conversion" as descriptive of the change which takes place.—Vol. ii. p. 322.

Bramhall says,* "Abate us Transubstantiation, and those things which are consequent on this determination of the *manner* of the Presence, and we have no difference with them on this particular." He thinks there is "no difference between the Churches, if rightly understood;" and he mentions his own view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice as *agreeing with that of Bellarmine*.

His words are :

"The Holy Eucharist is a commemoration, a representation, an application of the all-sufficient propitiatory Sacrifice of the Cross. If his (Bishop of Chalcedon's) Sacrifice of the Mass have any other propitiatory power or virtue in it than to commemorate, represent, and apply, the merit of the Sacrifice of the Cross, let him speak plainly what it is. *Bellarmino knew no more of the Sacrifice than we.*"†

And then he proceeds to quote Bellarmine in proof of his assertion. Again, on p. 276, he calls the Eucharistic Sacrifice "commemorative," "representative," "impetrative," "applicative;" but denies, and challenges any Roman Catholic to affirm, "that it is a suppletory Sacrifice, to supply the defects of the Sacrifice of the Cross."

From these extracts two things are clear; 1. That Bramhall believed himself to be at one with Bellar-

* Vol. ii. p. 211; iii. p. 165.

† Vol. ii. p. 88.

mine on the question of the Eucharistic Sacrifice; 2. That what he objects to is not a real presentation or offering of Christ in the Eucharist, but "a supplementary" Sacrifice," as if the Sacrifice of the Cross were defective*—a notion of which he evidently acquits the *Church* of Rome, however he may have thought it countenanced by parties in her communion.

On the question of Eucharistical Adoration Bramhall is equally clear and explicit. Replying to the Bishop of Chalcedon he says:†

"In the places alleged by him I do not charge the Church of Rome with idolatry. In the one place I speak of the adoration of the Sacrament as an abuse, but not one word of idolatry. In the other place, I speak of the peril of idolatry, but not one word of the adoration of the Sacrament. . . . 'The Sacrament is to be adored,' said the Council of Trent: that is 'formally the Body and Blood of Christ,' say some of your authors; we say the same;—'the Sacrament is to be adored,' that is, 'the species of bread and wine,' say others; that we deny, and esteem it to be idolatrous. Should we charge *the whole Church* with idolatry for the error of *a party*."

* Cf. vol. v. pp. 188, 221, 222.—"But for any (Eucharistic) Sacrifice that is meritorious, or propitiatory, *by its own power or virtue, distinct from the Sacrifice of Christ*, I hope the author will not say it. If he do, he will have few partners" (even in the Roman Church). He calls the difference between the Churches of Rome and England on this question "a show of empty names to no purpose."

† Vol. ii. pp. 86, 87.

Bramhall, however, says, in a previous passage, that we adore Christ "in the use of the Sacrament," and hence it has been argued that he understood the Real Presence in a subjective sense—a Presence, that is, not in the Sacrament as a consequence of consecration, but in the heart of the communicant as the result of his own faith. But if this is all that Bramhall meant it is impossible to acquit him of very serious equivocation. His Roman Catholic opponent had accused him of "charging the Church of Rome with idolatry in the adoration of the Sacrament." Bramhall replies in effect: "I do not charge the *Church* of Rome with idolatry. I accept the doctrine of the Council of Trent as interpreted by some of your authors, such as Bellarmine; but I reject as idolatrous the doctrine, maintained by others in your communion, that adoration is due not merely to the Body and Blood of Christ in the Sacrament, but also to the species of bread and wine." In fact, Bramhall himself explains, in his "Schism Guarded," what he meant by the phrase "in the use of the Sacrament." They (Greek Church), he says, "adore Christ in the use of the Sacrament, so do we: they do not adore the Sacrament, no more do we." This is decisive as to Bramhall's meaning. He asserts that the Church of England is at one with the Eastern Church on this question; and the Eastern Church, I need hardly say, insists on a Real Presence in the Eucharist independent of either reception or faith on the part of the communicant. Does not this show the unfairness of

quoting a telling phrase from an Author without explaining the sense in which he used it? Bramhall is not the only one of our great divines who has suffered in this way; but *ex uno disce omnes*.

The next piece of evidence which I shall adduce is the case of Bishop Montague.

In 1662, some Roman Catholics having attempted to proselytise one of his parishioners at Stamford-Rivers, Montague sent them three propositions in writing by way of challenge in defence of the doctrine of the Church of England. In reply they wrote a pamphlet called, "A New Gag to the Old Gospel;" which drew from Montague "An answer to the late Gagger of the Protestants, 1624." Some tenets advanced in this book excited the wrath of the Puritans, and they drew up articles, charging him with Popery and Arminianism with the view of impeaching him before Parliament.

Montague applied to the King for protection; and his Majesty gave him leave to defend himself, and also to publish his defence, if Dr. White, Dean of Carlisle, afterwards raised to the Episcopal bench, should approve his doctrine *as agreeable to that of the Church of England*. Under these auspices and with this imprimatur, his famous treatise, entitled "Appello Cæsarem; a Just Appeal from Two Unjust Informers," was published in 1625, soon after the accession of Charles I. to the throne. In this book, so far from retracting or explaining away any of his former statements, he repeats and defends them. The first

Parliament of Charles I. cited him to the bar of the House of Commons; committed him to the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms; and afterwards bound him over in £2000 to appear when called for. On the other hand, "Laud and some other Bishops applied to the Duke of Buckingham in his favour, and not in his favour chiefly, but in favour of the Church of England, *whose cause they represented to be the same with his.*"*

The following extract from the indictment will show the nature of the charges against Montague:—

"Article I. Whereas in the tenth Homily it is determined, that the Church of Rome, as it is at present, and hath been for the space of nine hundred years and upwards, is so far gone from the nature of a Church that nothing can be more, he, the said R. Montague, in several places doth advisedly maintain and affirm, that the Church of Rome is, and ever was, a true Church since it was a Church. Article II. Whereas in the said Homily it is likewise declared, that the Church of Rome is not built on the foundation of the Prophets and Apostles; and in the twenty-eighth of the said Articles, that Transubstantiation overthroweth the nature of a Sacrament; and in the twenty-fifth of the said Articles, that five other reputed Sacraments of the Church of Rome are not to be accounted Sacraments, yet *contrary*, and *repugnant hereunto*,† he, the said Richard

* "New and General Biographical Dictionary." Vol. xi. p. 81.

† The *italics* are in the original.

Montague, doth maintain and affirm that the Church of Rome hath ever remained firm upon the same foundation of Sacraments and Doctrine instituted by God. Article III. Thirdly, in the nineteenth of the same Articles, it is further determined, that the Church of Rome hath erred, not only in their use and manner of ceremonies, but also in matter of faith. He, the same Richard Montague, speaking of those points which belong to faith and manners, hope and charity," doth [here and elsewhere I omit, for brevity's sake, the references to Montague's writings which are given in the indictment,] affirm and maintain, that none of those are controverted *inter partes*, meaning the Protestants and the Papists; and that, notwithstanding in the thirty-fourth Article it is resolved, that the Sacrifices of Masses, in which, as is commonly said, the Priest did offer CHRIST for the quick and dead, to have remission of pain and guilt too, are blasphemous follies and dangerous conceits: this being one of the points controverted between the Church of England and the Church of Rome; the said Richard Montague doth affirm and maintain, that the controverted points are of a less and inferior alloy."

He was also charged with having taught reverence to images, honour to relics, invocation of Saints, auricular confession, that "Priests have power not only to *pronounce*, but to *give*, remission of sins." Nor can it be said, nor indeed was it, by himself or his

friends, that Parliament misrepresented his teaching in any material degree.

I will add two or three quotations from his writings, which are not given in the indictment:—

“A figure is but a phantom. He (Christ) gave *substance and really subsisting essence*, Who said, *This is My Body*,” etc.

“A Protestant (of the Church of England) is as *real and substantial as any Papist*, (i.e., holds the Real and Substantial Presence as truly.)”*

He adopts as his own words “*verissime*,” “*realissime*,” and “*substantially*,” as descriptive of the Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Eucharist; and tells his Roman Catholic opponent:

“The Devil bred you in a faction, and brought you up in a faction, and sent you abroad to do him service in maintaining a faction; otherwise acknowledge, there is, there need be no difference (between us) in the point of the Real Presence.”†

The indictment of the House of Commons concludes as follows:

“The scope and end of the said Richard Montague, in the books aforementioned, is to give encouragement to Popery, and to withdraw his Majesty’s subjects from the true religion established to the Roman superstition; and, consequently, to be reconciled to the See of Rome. All which he laboureth by subtle

* Answer to the late Gagger of Protestants, ch. 85.

† Ibid. ch. 86, and Appeal to Cæsar, ch. 80.

and cunning ways; whereby God's true religion has been much scandalized.

“ All which offences being to the high dishonour of Almighty God, and of most mischievous effect and consequence against the good of His Church and common weal of England, and all of his Majesty's realms and dominions; the Commons assembled in Parliament do hereby pray, that the said Richard Montague may be punished according to his demerits, in that exemplary manner as may deter others from attempting so presumptuously to disturb the peace of Church and State, and that the books aforesaid may be suppressed and burnt.”

The King, at the instance of the House of Commons, laid the whole matter before a Committee of the Bishops, consisting of the following:—George Montaigne, Bishop of London; Richard Neyle, Bishop of Durham; Launcelot Andrewes, Bishop of Winchester; John Buckeridge, Bishop of Rochester; William Laud, Bishop of S. David's (afterwards Lord Primate.) Their Judgment it as follows:—

“ To the Right Honourable, our very good Lord,
the Duke of Buckingham, his Grace,

“ May it please your Grace,

“ Upon your late Letters, directed to the Bishop of Winchester, signifying His Majesty's pleasure, and taking to him the Bishops of London, Durham, Rochester, Oxford, and St. David's, or some of them, he and they should take into consideration the business concerning Mr. Montague's late book, and deliver

their opinions touching the same for the preservation of the truth and the peace of the Church of England, together with the safety of Mr. Montague's person; we have met and considered, and for our particulars do think that Mr. Montague in his book, *hath not affirmed anything to be the doctrine of the Church of England, but that which in our opinions is the doctrine of the Church of England, or agreeable thereunto.*

“Your Grace's faithful and humble servants,

“(Signed) GEO. LONDON.

“R. DUNELM.

“LA. WINTON.

“JO. ROFFENS.

“GUIL. MENEVE.

“From Winchester House,

“January 16, 1625.”

It only remains to add that on the death of Dr. George Carleton, Bishop of Chichester, and one of Montague's most bitter opponents, Montague was appointed to the vacant See, and translated to Norwich ten years afterwards.

So much as to the testimony of the Caroline divines, who would be universally recognised as fit representatives of that “great historic school of High Churchmen,” for whom even the fiercest anti-Ritualists profess to claim toleration. Then came the Great Rebellion, and after it the profligate orthodoxy of the Restoration, to be succeeded by the chilling latitudinarianism of the Revolution, which

reduced the Church of England to a state of religious catalepsy from which the Wesleyan first, and then the Oxford Movement, aroused her. Yet I venture to assert, that even during that frigid period the highest doctrine on the subject of the Eucharist short of transubstantiation might have been taught with impunity. It is certainly remarkable that the Lower House of Convocation, in the end of the seventeenth century, peremptorily rejected the latitudinarian alterations of the Prayer Book which were recommended by the Royal Commissioners, and backed by the Erastian Upper House.* And it is no less remarkable that the only man who was put on his trial in the eighteenth century for erroneous Sacramental doctrine was tried and condemned by the Lower House of Convocation for teaching *low* views.

But I am afraid of wearying your Lordship with extracts, and I shall therefore dismiss this part of my subject with the evidence of Archbishop Wake, who, if a High Churchman at all, was certainly a very mild and moderate specimen.

Writing on the subject of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, Bossuet had explained that Romanists "understand the word 'offer,' when they apply it to the Mass, in

* Among those alterations were the omission of the "verily and indeed" applied to our Lord's Eucharistic Presence in the Church Catechism. It was proposed to say that what was "verily and indeed" received was the benefit of Christ's Sacrifice, and that His Body and Blood were only "signified,"

a larger signification than what the Apostle (in the Epistle to the Hebrews) gives it; as when we are said to offer up to God whatever we present before Him; and that it is thus they pretend to offer up the Blessed Jesus to His Father in the Mass, in which He vouchsafes to render Himself present before Him."

"That this," the Archbishop retorted, "is to pervert the meaning of that phrase, the doctrine of the foregoing Article (of the Council of Trent) plainly shows. If Christ be in the Mass *a true and proper Sacrifice*,* as was there said, it will necessarily follow that then He must be *truly and properly sacrificed*: and one essential property (of Sacrifice) being the true and *real destruction of what is offered*; inasmuch, that where there is not a *true and proper destruction*, neither can there be, as they themselves acknowledge, a *true and proper Sacrifice*: it must be evidently false in these men to pretend, that by *offering* in this matter is meant only a *presenting of Christ before God*, and not a *real change and destruction of His Body* offered by them." "Though Christ be acknowledged to be *really* present, after a divine and heavenly manner, in this Holy Eucharist, yet will not this warrant the adoration of the Host, which is still only bread and wine, nor will such a *real* presenting of our Blessed Lord to His Father, to render Him propitious to us, make the Eucharist

* The italics, here and throughout, are Wake's.

any more than a *metaphorical*, not a *true and proper propitiatory Sacrifice*.”*

With Wake's charge of prevarication against Bossuet I have nothing to do. What we have to do with are the following points:—

1. That Wake objected to a true and proper Sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist.
2. That by a true and proper Sacrifice he meant the true and real destruction of the Victim.
3. That he believed in a “metaphorical” offering in the Eucharist.
4. That by a “metaphorical offering” he meant “a *real* presenting of our Blessed Lord to His Father, to render Him propitious to us.”

Is this language consistent with a belief in a *mere* offering of bread and wine in the Eucharist! And does not the whole passage supply a key to the meaning of those seventeenth century, and some of the Nonjuring, divines who insisted on a “metaphorical,” or “figurative” Sacrifice in the Eucharist, in contrast to a “true and proper one?”

Again, in his correspondence with the French ecclesiastics about a union with the Gallican Church, Wake expresses a wish to get both Churches “to agree to communicate in everything we can with each other . . . and yet leave one another in the free liberty of believing Transubstantiation or not, so long as

* Wake's Exposition, pp. 69, 70.

we do not require anything to be done by either in pursuance of that opinion.” *

To this I may add, since it is short, the following passage from a “Discourse on the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper,” by Dr. Edward Pelling, who lived between the latter half of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, and held a canonry in Westminster Abbey besides other important preferment:—

“Though there may be no grounds in the world for the opinion of transubstantiation, yet we must not conceive that Christ is not verily, really, and of a truth, in the Sacrament; He may be really present, though there may be no reason to believe that He is present after a corporal manner. *For two different substances and natures may be joined and go together, though they remain distinct in themselves and in their properties*; as the soul and flesh of a man are united in the same person, and as the humanity and divinity of Christ were joined together in the same Lord.”

The doctrine here stated by Dr. Pelling is sometimes, but erroneously, called “consubstantiation.” But the meaning of consubstantiation, as applied to the Eucharist, would be that the Humanity of Christ is *of the same substance* with the Sacramental bread and wine; just as we say that, as God, He is consubstantial with the Father, and, as Man, consubstantial with us. I am not aware that any school or party in

* Mosheim, Hist. vol. ii. p. 558.

the Church of England holds such a monstrous opinion as that. The word, "consubstantiation" was originally applied to the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist; but the Lutherans have always rejected it as a term invented by their adversaries.

I have now, I think, produced sufficient evidence to show that Dr. Thirlwall is more than justified when he says, "that apart from the express admission of Transubstantiation, or of the gross carnal notions to which it gave rise . . . there can hardly be any description of the Real Presence . . . that would not be found to be authorized by the language of eminent divines of our Church;" and that "he is not aware, and does not believe, that our most advanced Ritualists have in fact overstepped those very ample bounds." Our divines do not condemn Roman writers on the Eucharist *en masse*, vaguely and indiscriminately, as making too much of the Sacrament. They do not warn the Anglican off from all entrance upon Roman Catholic ground; on the contrary, they tell him that the ground is common to both up to a certain point. He is not to define the *manner* of the Presence; but, with that single reservation, he is to consider himself at one with the Roman Catholics. He is to believe in the Presence as "real," "true," "substantial," "actual,"—in a word, *objective*; that is, subsisting by the power of God, independently of man's faith or unbelief. To say that the Presence is objective is not to define the manner, but merely to assert the reality of it. On

the other hand, to deny that the Presence is objective is in fact to deny that there is any Presence at all except by a figure of speech. For how can there be a merely subjective Presence of Christ to the soul of the communicant? If the Presence is there at all, it must have a separate and independent existence; it must have *come into* the soul, and the question is whether the Sacrament is the medium of its communication. Our representative divines teach that it is; and this is also the doctrine of the Catechism and of the Twenty-eighth Article. If "the Body and Blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received," if they are "given, taken, and eaten," they must be objective to the recipient before he makes them subjectively his own by means of faith, and, of course, "only after an heavenly and spiritual manner." Nor is it a valid objection to say that this is to localise the Presence. For the truth is, that it is impossible to express these high mysteries in human language at all without clothing them in forms which are more or less inadequate. The words, "Body and Blood" themselves have an earthly colouring and imply local conditions and limitations; yet we believe that the mystery which they represent in the Eucharist is not thus conditioned. Indeed, those who insist on a simply subjective Presence are quite as amenable as their opponents to the charge of localising the mystery; for a Presence in the soul of the communicant is just as local as a Presence on the altar; unless embodied

spirits are supposed to have no relation to space at all—a notion which is not likely to find many supporters.

The fact is, my Lord, we live in an age in which, for various reasons, the minds of men, and of our most popular intellectual guides not the least, are so fixed on the visible and the tangible, that they find it hard to realize any existences which elude the scrutiny of the senses. And yet those very discoveries of physical science, which are supposed to be fatal to the old belief in a spiritual world underlying and interpenetrating this, seem to me, on the contrary, to confirm that belief in a wonderful manner.

But this will more fitly form the subject of another Letter, and, therefore, I remain for the present,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

MALCOLM MACCOLL.

P.S. Lest I should be considered presumptuous in the view of Anglican doctrine on the subject of the Eucharist, which I have taken in the preceding pages, I beg leave to quote some extracts from a writer who holds an acknowledged position in modern Anglican theology. Sir W. Palmer, in his "Treatise on the Church of Christ," says (vol. i. pp. 508, 518):—

"It is a fact that *no new formulary* of doctrine

whatever" (the italics are not mine) "was published by authority of the Church during the whole reign of Edward VI. . . . That no new doctrine was established in the Church of England during this reign appears from Burnet, who observes with reference to the above articles: 'It seemed to be a great want that this was so long delayed, *since the old doctrine had still the legal authority on its side*; yet these articles (of 1552), 'as we have seen, were never actually in force. It seems plain that *during the whole reign of Edward VI. the doctrine of the Church of England was most authentically* represented by the formulary of instruction formally approved by the Convocation in the reign of Henry VIII., A.D. 1543, entitled "The Necessary Doctrine and Erudition," a book which was most assuredly quite opposed to the Zuinglian doctrines. . . . Not only does Cranmer disclaim the notion that Gardiner had been brought to trial for his doctrine on the Eucharist, but none of the Bishops of the Popish party, who were expelled from their sees in Edward's reign, were deprived on pretence of holding doctrines contrary to those of the Church, but for disobedience to the royal council, or for treason. Thus it appears that the authorized doctrine of the Church of England, during the whole of Edward VI.'s reign, was that of the Real Presence, in the strongest and most decided sense."

There is, of course, no pretence for saying that the Church of England has changed or modified her doctrine on this subject *since* the reign of Edward

VI.; on the contrary, all the alterations in her formularies since then have been in a Catholic direction. Palmer states as follows the authorized doctrine of the Church of England :—"She believes that the Eucharist is not the sign of an *absent* body, and that those who partake of it receive not merely the figure, or shadow, or sign of Christ's Body, but the reality itself. And as Christ's Divine and Human Natures are inseparably united, so she believes that we receive in the Eucharist, not only the Flesh and Blood of Christ, but Christ Himself, both God and Man."—Treatise on the Church, i. p. 527, 528.

LETTER IV.

A SPIRITUAL WORLD REVEALED BY THE BIBLE AND SUGGESTED BY PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

MY LORD,

I concluded my last letter with the observation that the discoveries of physical science, so far from invalidating the doctrine of a spiritual world lying behind the veil of material phenomena, seemed to me to confirm it. I shall now give my reasons for that opinion. And, first of all, let us see what Holy Scripture has to say upon the subject.

If we are to believe the Bible, the spiritual world is not a region far away in space, but close to us; and we do not see its sights or hear its sounds simply because our present organs are too dull to apprehend them. We are thus in the condition of a man born deaf and blind into this world of sense. He is in the midst of two worlds, of which, however, he knows next to nothing. For him the abounding beauties of nature in the sphere of sight and sound are as if they were not. Let his eyes be opened, and he finds himself at once in the midst of a world of which before he had no conception—nothing but the vaguest notion from the report of those who had

eyes to see. Open his ears, and another world is disclosed to him which his want of hearing had till then concealed from him.

This is the sort of relation in which Holy Scripture represents us as standing towards the spiritual world. Let us take a few instances.

When Elijah was about to leave the earth, and Elisha prayed for "a double portion of the spirit" of his departing master, the latter answered, "Thou hast asked a hard thing. Nevertheless, *if thou see me* when I am taken from thee, it shall be so unto thee; but if not, it shall not be so." What did the prophet mean by "*if thou see me* when I am taken from thee?" Surely this: that if Elisha was able to see the spiritual transformation which his master was about to undergo, that would in itself be a sufficient proof to him that spiritual organs were opened within him which placed him in communication with the spiritual world. Elisha did see the translation of his master, and found himself at once endowed with the gift of seership, which enabled him to reveal the secret counsels of the Syrian King, who consequently sent an army to arrest him. "And when the servant of the man of God was risen early, and gone forth, behold, an host encompassed the city, both with horses and chariots. And his servant said unto him, Alas, my master ! how shall we do ! And he answered, Fear not : for they that be with us are more than they that be with them. And Elisha prayed and said, Lord, I pray thee open his eyes that he may see.

And the Lord opened the eyes of the young man, and he saw; and, behold, the mountain was full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha."

It is evident that the "eyes" which the prophet prayed might be opened were not the bodily eyes of the young man. These were open before, and saw nothing but the Syrian host. A new sense was opened which revealed to the youth the agencies of Divine Providence invisible to mortal sight, which protect the servants of God.

In S. Luke's Gospel (iii. 21, 22) we read:—"Now when all the people were baptized, it came to pass that, Jesus also being baptized and praying, the heaven was opened, and the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove upon Him, and a voice came from heaven which said, Thou art my beloved Son; in Thee I am well pleased." In S. Matthew's account the expression is, "The heavens were opened unto Him."

The meaning evidently is that prayer on the part of Jesus was in fact the opening of His sinless soul to that spiritual world which the gross environment of the mortal body hides from the multitude.

Another incident of similar import in our Lord's life is related in S. John's Gospel (xii. 27-29):—

"Now is My soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save Me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify Thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glorified it and will glorify it again. The people,

therefore, that stood by and heard it said that it thundered : others said, An angel spake to Him."

That is to say, the heavenly voice which fell in articulate accents on the sensitive ear of our Saviour sounded like the rumbling of distant thunder on the duller organs of those who were about Him.

I believe that several of the discrepancies in the Gospel record of our Lord's Resurrection may be explained in the same way. Woman's more refined and delicate organisation is probably more sensitive to spiritual influences than man's, and this is probably the reason why the devout women who visited the tomb of the risen Saviour saw more of the spiritual world than Peter and John. Mary, whose absorbing love and intense grief had, no doubt, quickened her spiritual perceptions, saw two angels; the other women saw only one; Peter and John saw none. In fact, each saw more or less according as the spiritual organs were in each case rendered more or less sensitive to spiritual influences.

My next illustration shall be from an incident in the account of the martyrdom of S. Stephen, recorded in Acts vii. 55-57 :—

"Being full of the Holy Ghost, he looked up stedfastly into heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God, and said, Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God."

Now where was the heaven into which the dying martyr gazed? Millions of miles away, beyond the

starry firmament? Was his mortal sight miraculously endowed with a telescopic power of traversing in a moment the planetary spaces and looking into a world of supersensuous glories behind them? Is it not plain, on the contrary, that a new sense was opened in himself, which enabled him to see through the integuments of the natural life into the world of unseen realities which lie above it, not in space, but in altitude of being? The "everlasting doors" were "lifted up," and the proto-martyr was vouchsafed a glimpse into a world of unearthly splendours close to him, where his Divine Master was standing ready to receive His faithful servant. But the persecutors of S. Stephen saw nothing but the rapt gaze of their victim; for the world which was revealed to him is "spiritually discerned," and they lacked that spiritual insight.

Another illustration in point is the narrative of the conversion of S. Paul. The account given in Acts ix. says that "the men which journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man." S. Paul himself, on the other hand, says, "And they that were with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid; but they heard not the voice of Him that spake to me." (Acts xxii. 9.) And cavils against the inspiration of the Acts are sometimes founded upon this seeming discrepancy. What is the explanation? Evidently, that S. Paul's companions heard the sound, while his ear alone caught its articulate language: τὰ φωνήεντα συνέτοισι.

These examples will suffice to show the general teaching of the Bible touching the relation between the world of sense and that of spirit. And now let us see what physical science has to say upon the subject.

We talk of five bodily senses; but in strictness of speech we have only one sense—that of touch. Our vision of external objects is nothing else but sensations made on the retina of the eye by contact with the vibrations of an external substance. To produce the sensation of scarlet, 477 billions of vibrations break upon the retina every second, while a ray of violet is caused by no fewer than 700 billions of vibrations. Waves of light above or below these limits in number are invisible to the human eye; that is, they move too rapidly or too slowly to make any impression on the optic nerve. This is but another way of saying that objects innumerable may exist in the midst of us which are of so subtle a nature as to elude our visual organs. “Myriads of organised beings may exist imperceptible to our vision, even if we were among them.”*

And the same observation is applicable to the phenomena of sound. Notes above or below a certain pitch, though the air be resonant with them to more delicate organisations, are inaudible to the human ear. In his interesting book on the Glaciers of the Alps Dr. Tyndall tells the following anecdote:—

* Grove's “Correlation of Physical Forces,” p. 161. Fourth Edition.

"I once crossed a Swiss mountain in company with a friend; a donkey was in advance of us, and the dull tramp of the animal was heard by my companion; but to me this sound was almost masked by the shrill chirruping of innumerable insects, which thronged the adjacent grass. My friend heard nothing of this; it lay quite beyond his range of hearing."

Another illustration of this fact is given in Mr. Skretchly's "Dahomey as it is."* Speaking of the large bats of that region, he says:—

"They utter a sharp chirrup, something like the squeak of a rat, but very much higher in pitch, so high, indeed, that I have frequently come across individuals whose acoustic powers had not sufficient range to permit of their hearing the note; and on more than one occasion I have said to Buchan" (his half-caste servant), 'What a noise these bats are making?' Upon which he has observed to me, 'Bats have no mouths for talking,' he being perfectly unconscious of their vocal powers."

The following letter appeared lately in the *Times* in the course of an interesting correspondence on the superior power of hearing possessed by insects:—

"SIR,—Adapting the concluding sentences of the letter of the Rev. F. O. Morris, in the *Times* of Saturday, it may be observed that there are doubtless more sounds uttered on the earth and in the air than can reach our ears. It is well known that to many

* Pp. 50, 51.

persons both the grasshopper and the bat are dumb, and it is probable that moths and other insects attract each other by calls inaudible to us, rather than by scent.

“One night, a few years ago, I had a female tiger-moth in a gauze cage, in a room opening into a garden. I had reared the moth from a caterpillar myself. The room was full of tobacco smoke, and the garden was in the middle of a town; yet in less than two hours no less than five male tiger-moths flew to the cage. Though I have sat in the same room hundreds of nights with the window open and a light burning, I never before or since knew a tiger-moth to be attracted thither. It seems almost impossible that these moths could have been led to the spot from other walled in, and in some cases distant, gardens, in any other way but by a call in the stillness of the night. But the captive mother made no perceptible noise, even with its wings.

“I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

“C. J. G.”

“November 12th, 1874.”

There is nothing unreasonable, therefore, in believing that persons in a state of spiritual tension may be cognisant of sights and sounds which make no impression, or only a vague and meaningless impression, on the multitude. When we reflect, to quote the words of an eloquent writer, “that there are waves of light and sound of which our dull senses take no cognisance, that there is a great difference

even in human perceptivity, and that some men, more gifted than others, can see colours or hear sounds which are invisible or inaudible to the great bulk of mankind, you will appreciate how possible it is that there may be a world of spiritual existence around us—inhabiting this same globe, enjoying the same nature—of which we have no perception; that, in fact, the wonders of the New Jerusalem may be in our midst, and the songs of the angelic hosts filling the air with their celestial harmony, although unheard and unseen by us.”* Truly “there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy.”

All this, I know, will sound supremely foolish to some of the robust critics of the day. A well known writer, for example, contributed lately to the *Fall Mall Gazette*,† a long and most scornful attack on the doctrine of Sacramentalism. His argument brought him naturally into collision with the scholastic distinctions between matter and form, substance and accident; and here is the sort of criticism to which his superficial study of the question tempted him:—

“I suppose it requires no argument to show that far the greater part of this is nonsense. ‘Virtual contact’ and forms without matter, for instance, are unmeaning expressions and make nonsense of the propositions in which they occur. The whole specula-

* Religion and Chemistry, p. 107. By Professor J. P. Cooke.

† Letter signed “S.” in *Pall Mall Gazette* of Jan. 26, 1875.

tion is spun out of the very distinction about matter and form, substance and accident, which is essential to the controversy about the Sacraments. So much of the theory as is not nonsense is simply a play of fancy, resting on no foundation at all, and which an ingenious person might twist into any shape he pleased. I quote this partly in order to show the character of what is called scientific theology and the silliness of the results which its method of procedure produces, and partly because it shows how of two doctrines, the intrinsic value of which is identical, one falls into neglect and contempt because it does not interest mankind, while the other lives and flourishes because it relates to specific tangible objects upon which people can gratify the longing for idolatry, which lies so deep in the human heart, and which serves as a foundation for the most exalted ideas of priestly power. . . . I think it may furnish matter of reflection to some of the clergy to hear the undisguised expression of a layman's opinion on this matter. Others probably think as I do. Well, then, I for one look upon these doctrines not merely as being intellectually absurd, but as being morally injurious in the highest degree. I would as soon see my son or daughter lie or steal as I would see them bow to the Host or believe that the Communion is anything but a bare figure or symbol."

In contrast with this supercilious sciolism I have much pleasure in quoting the following passage from one of the ablest philosophical treatises of the day:—

“ Provided that there be no clear and absolute conflict with known laws of nature, there is nothing so improbable or apparently inconceivable that it may not be rendered highly probable, or even approximately certain, by a sufficient number of concordances. In fact the two best founded and most conspicuously successful theories in the whole range of physical science involve the most absurd suppositions. Gravity is a force which appears to act between bodies through vacuous space; it is in positive contradiction to the old dictum that nothing could act but through some intervening medium or substance. It is even more puzzling that the force acts in perfect indifference to all intervening obstacles. Light, in spite of its extreme velocity, shows much respect to matter, for it is almost instantaneously stopped by opaque substances, and to a considerable extent absorbed and deflected by transparent ones. But to gravity all media are, as it were, absolutely transparent, nay non-existent; and two particles at opposite points of the earth affect each other exactly as if the globe were not between. To complete the apparent impossibility, the action is, so far as we can observe, absolutely instantaneous, so that every particle of the universe is at every moment in separate cognizance, as it were, of the relative position of every other particle throughout the universe at that same moment of absolute time. Compared with such incomprehensible conditions, the theory of vortices deals with common-place realities. Newton’s celebrated saying,

hypotheses non fingo, bears the appearance of pure irony; and it was not without apparent grounds that Leibnitz and the greatest continental philosophers charged Newton with re-introducing occult powers and qualities.

“The undulatory theory of light presents almost equal difficulties of conception. We are asked by physical philosophers to give up all our ordinary prepossessions, and believe that the interstellar space which seemed so empty is not empty at all, but filled with *something* immensely more solid and elastic than steel. As Dr. Young himself remarked, ‘the luminiferous ether, pervading all space, and penetrating almost all substances, is not only highly elastic, but absolutely solid!!!’ Sir John Herschel has calculated the amount of force which may be supposed, according to the undulatory theory of light, to be exerted at each point in space, and finds it to be 1,148,000,000,000 times the elastic force of ordinary air at the earth’s surface, so that the pressure of the ether upon a square inch of surface must be about 17,000,000,000,000, or seventeen billions of pounds. Yet we live and move without appreciable resistance in this medium, indefinitely harder and more elastic than adamant. All our ordinary notions must be laid aside in contemplating such an hypothesis; yet they are no more than the observed phenomena of light and heat force us to accept. We cannot deny even the strange suggestion of Dr. Young, that there may be independent worlds, some possibly existing in

different parts of space, but others perhaps pervading each other unseen and unknown in the same space. For if we are bound to admit the conception of this adamantine firmament, it is equally easy to admit a plurality of such. We see, then, that mere difficulties of conception must not in the least discredit a theory which otherwise agrees with facts, *and we must only reject hypotheses which are inconceivable in the sense of breaking distinctly the primary laws of thought and nature.*"

Again :—

"Scientific method leads us to the inevitable conception of an infinite series of successive orders of infinitely small quantities. If so, there is nothing impossible in the existence of a myriad universes within the compass of a needle's point, each with its stellar systems, and its suns and planets, in number and variety unlimited. *Science does nothing to reduce the number of strange things that we may believe. When fairly pursued it makes large drafts upon our powers of comprehension and belief.*"*

Leibnitz was a man who was not only master of all the knowledge of his time, but who, moreover, occupies intellectually a place hardly inferior to any philosopher of ancient or modern times. And this is what he says on the doctrine of the Real Presence in one of his letters to Arnauld :—

"As I have been the first to discover that the

* The Principles of Science, vol. ii. pp. 144, 145, 467. By W. S. Jevons.

essence of a body does not consist in extension, but in motion, and hence, that the substance or nature of a body, even according to Aristotle's definition, is the principle of motion (*ἐντελέχεια*) and that this principle or substance of the body has no extension, —I have made it plain how God can be clearly and distinctly understood to cause the substance of the same body to exist in many different places.”*

The athletic theologian of the *Pall Mall Gazette* “thinks it may furnish matter of reflection to some of the clergy to hear the undisguised expression of a layman's opinion on this matter.” And he accordingly treats us to his own, which, I confess, has undoubtedly “furnished matter of reflection” to me at least; but I fear that if I were to reciprocate my “undisguised” impression “of a layman's opinion,” he would not consider it complimentary. Suffice it to say, that when a writer, however vigorous his intellect may be within the domain of his knowledge, ventures to characterize, as “intellectually absurd,” doctrines which are sheltered under the ægis of the most eminent names in philosophy and science, he invites comparisons which literary courtesy would fain avoid.

I cannot dismiss this part of my subject without calling attention to an extraordinary letter written by the present Dean of Ripon to the *Times* of June 27th, 1872. In criticising the Bennett Judgment, the

* Compare his “System of Theology,” pp. 99, 100; also Sir W. Hamilton's “Discussions in Philosophy,” pp. 604-7.

Dean committed himself to the following startling propositions. Referring to the evidence in favour of our Lord's Resurrection, Dr. M'Neile writes as follows :—

“All such proofs were addressed to the senses of the Apostles, and the result was a process of clear and conclusive reasoning. The human mind is not capable of clearer proof on any practical subject than that which is derived from the testimony of the senses, and the consequent deductions of the reason. Such was the proof, satisfactory, and, as far as human consciousness is concerned, infallible, which was given of the Resurrection of Christ. Before His death, His flesh was similar to ours. ‘Forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same’ (*αὐτὸς παραπλησίως μετέσχε τῶν αὐτῶν*). His flesh, then, was an object of sense, concerning which men might fairly reason—concerning which reasonable men could not but reason.

“If, after His Resurrection, His flesh had been something altogether different—if it had been something not comprehensible, or very imperfectly comprehensible by the human understanding—if the province of reasoning as applied to it had been, therefore, very limited—if the terms employed to describe it had not, and could not have, that precision of meaning which a proof of His Resurrection demanded—had this been so, how could His Resurrection have been proved, and if His Resurrection be not proved, reason-

ably and conclusively proved, where is Christianity itself?

“But His flesh after His Resurrection was appealed to as a matter of sense and argument and proof, and, therefore, it was quite comprehensible by the human understanding, and, therefore, the province of reason as applied to it was perfect, and therefore the terms employed to describe it had, and could not but have, the precision of meaning indispensable for establishing the fact that He was indeed risen from the dead.

“Deny the clear and conclusive province of reason as applied to the risen flesh of Christ, and you cannot prove the resurrection of His Body.

“Admit the clear and conclusive province of reason as applied to the risen flesh of Christ, and you cannot prove any presence whatever of His flesh in the Lord’s Supper. Nay, you can prove its absence, for human reason is altogether competent to the conclusion that what cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted cannot be flesh, whatever else it may be, and the question here is not about something else but about flesh.”

This pamphlet elicited what appears to me a crushing *argumentum ad hominem* Reply from a gentleman who has devoted, with great frankness, his means, his talents, and his learning to the propagation of works written expressly against the fundamental dogmas of the Christian Religion: I mean Mr. Thomas Scott, late of Ramsgate, now of Upper

Norwood. After quoting Dr. M'Neile, Mr. Scott proceeds as follows:—

“ If these words mean anything, they mean that we may predicate of the risen or reanimated Body of Jesus everything that may be predicated of human bodies generally, or, in other words, of all flesh and blood, and by parity of reasoning that we may not predicate of it anything which cannot be predicated of flesh and blood generally; for, if this be allowed, the matter is at once removed beyond the province of reason and the senses, within which the Dean of Ripon insists that it is to be retained. Now, there are certain things which must be predicated of the bodies of all men. If we speak of them as eating and drinking, we presuppose the processes and phenomena of digestion and excretion; if we speak of them as walking or moving, we presuppose not merely exertion and consequent weariness, but exertion and motion under certain definite and invariable conditions. . . . But the Body of Jesus, after His Resurrection, can appear and vanish at will. This is so far common to all the Christophanies, that it is unnecessary to specify instances. It can also go through closed doors, for it is an evasion, from which Dr. M'Neile would doubtless shrink with horror, to say that anything else can be meant when in the Johannine narrative we read that ‘when the doors were shut, where the disciples were assembled, Jesus came and stood in the midst.’ It is ridiculous, if not profane, to suppose that one who had just burst

the barriers of the grave should have to knock at the door to ask for admission, and if the doors were open, it cannot be said that they were shut. Again, His risen Body, which moves by mere volition, may be seen and handled; but human experience certainly knows nothing of any man capable of walking about while through his hands and his feet might be seen the perforations caused by the nails used in crucifixion, and with a wound in his side so large that a human hand might be thrust through it. Further, unless He ascended into Heaven with these perforations and this wound, it must be supposed either (1) that He had the power of putting on the appearances of these wounds at will, so that they would thus be pretences rather than realities; or (2) that these wounds were gradually healed in the interval between the Resurrection and the Ascension, if according to the Acts we are to assume that forty days passed between the two events. Yet more, the Body of Jesus can eat and drink; but the narratives which speak of His doing so manifestly ascribe the acts not to any need of the sustenance, but simply to the desire of showing to the disciples that He can eat and drink,—to prove, in short, that He is not a ghost (whatever this may be),—a fact which at other times He bids them to test by handling Him. Here already we have a number of acts predicted of the risen Jesus which could not possibly be predicated, according to all human experience, of any man whatsoever. Any one of them would be held universally to interfere with

the very definition of man, of flesh, and of blood. Lastly, the Body of which these acts, utterly impossible according to human experience and the conclusions of reason, are predicated, and which before the crucifixion has walked on the water, leaves the earth from the top of a hill, and rises into the air, until at last a cloud veils Him from the sight of His disciples, who are told by the two men in white apparel who then appear, that He has gone away into Heaven."

Mr. Scott drives home his conclusion, a most legitimate one, as it seems to me, in the following manner:—

"We are, therefore, by the canons laid down by Dr. M'Neile, driven to the conclusion that for the physical resurrection of Jesus we have absolutely no evidence whatever.

"That this conclusion is the death-blow of Christianity, I am really not at all concerned by the argument to say. It may be fatal to Christianity as conceived by Dr. M'Neile; but the term is unfortunately, or fortunately, an elastic one, and, as in the case of flesh, body, blood, etc., we need an accurate definition of the term. It is possible that in a sense which, to others, and perhaps hereafter to himself, may be very real, Christianity may continue to exist apart from a foundation which is seen to be one of imagination, not of fact. Certain it is that the Christianity of Butler's Analogy does not need it." *

* The Dean of Ripon on the Physical Resurrection of Jesus, pp. 24-5, 81-8, 88.

This is a specimen of the way in which our good Evangelical brethren are unconsciously playing into the hands of the aggressive Rationalism of the day. For myself, I am persuaded that the revolt of educated men, which, alas! is but too apparent, against Christianity, is not at all against the Christianity of the Catholic System, but against the extravagant developments of Ultramontanism on the one hand, and the repulsive features of the Calvinistic theology on the other. Such books as Mill's "Autobiography," Greg's "Enigmas of Life," and the anonymous work on "Supernatural Religion," are instances in point. The Christianity assailed in these and similar works is, I am bound to say, very unlike the Christianity in which I believe, and in whose consolations I hope to die.

I trust that I have now shown that the doctrine of the Eucharist, as I have endeavoured to explain it, is as little repugnant to a sound philosophy as it is to the teaching of our great divines. In my next Letter I shall deal with the question of Sacerdotalism.

I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

MALCOLM MACCOLL.

LETTER V.

SACERDOTALISM.

MY LORD,

In the joint Reply, which the Archbishops of Canterbury and York made, in May, 1873, to the Memorial of the Church Association, they say: "We believe that through the system of the Confessional great evil has been wrought in the Church of Rome, and that our Reformers acted wisely in allowing it no place in our Reformed Church."

What does this mean? If by "the system of the Confessional" their Graces meant the compulsory auricular confession of the Church of Rome, they were taking refuge in an unworthy equivocation; for those whom they were addressing did not object to compulsory confession merely, but to all confession, and they undoubtedly understood the Archbishops in the latter sense. I dismiss, therefore, as incredible the supposition that what the two Primates wished to condemn was merely the Roman system of the Confessional, and with respect to which "our Reformers acted wisely in allowing it no place in our

Reformed Church." But unfortunately the alternative is hardly less incredible, for it is simply this: that our Reformers allowed "no place" to a system of voluntary confession "in our Reformed Church." That is the position to which the two Archbishops have deliberately committed themselves in the face of the public. I say "deliberately committed themselves," for it was not an *impromptu* opinion—though even as such it would have been extraordinary—but a manifesto carefully prepared for publication. "Before I make any general remarks," said the Archbishop of Canterbury to the deputation from the Church Association, "I wish to say that it ~~has~~ seemed to the Archbishop of York and myself that the most respectful course to so large and important a gathering as the present, and with regard to so important a paper as that which you have placed in my hands, will be that we should quietly together draw up a written answer to the paper. In a meeting such as this it is difficult sometimes so to express one's self that the exact meaning of what one wishes to put forward is conveyed to the public. Therefore, as I have said, I and my Rev. brother will carefully prepare a reply to your paper and place it in the hands of your Chairman, Mr. Andrews, as soon as we possibly can."*

The statement which I am criticising, therefore, was "carefully prepared" by the two Primates, and

* Church Association Monthly Intelligencer of June 1st, 1878, p. 140.

“quietly drawn up together,” after several days’ meditation, as “the exact meaning of what” they “wished to put forward to the public.” This is satisfactory so far as their Graces’ intention is concerned. But where is the evidence on which their *dictum* rests? They have furnished no clue, and I must therefore examine it in the light of such commonplace sources of information as are open to ordinary students of history. And let me say, by the way, that the question is not now whether the system of voluntary auricular confession is a good or a bad system—on that point I shall have something to say presently—but whether “our Reformers allowed it no place in our Reformed Church.” Everybody would have understood their Graces if they had said,—“We think that the system of auricular confession, whether compulsory or voluntary, is pernicious; but our Reformers unfortunately retained the system while they abolished its compulsory obligation, and while it is retained it would be unjust to censure those who act upon it. We are anxious, however, to undo the principles of the Reformation in this matter, and we shall do our best accordingly to uproot these principles out of the Prayer Book.” Such an answer, whatever might be thought of its policy, would at least have been intelligible; which is more than can be said for the assertion to which the Most Reverend Prelates have pledged their reputation.

Let us begin, then, with the First Prayer Book of

Edward VI., though, in matter of fact, the Reformation began some twenty years or more earlier. In one of the exhortations in the Communion Office I read as follows: "And if there be any of you whose conscience is troubled or grieved in anything, lacking comfort or counsel, let him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned priest, taught in the law of God, and confess and open his sin and grief secretly, that he may receive such ghostly counsel, advice, and comfort, that his conscience may be relieved, and that of us (as of the Ministers of God and of the Church) he may receive comfort and absolution, to the satisfaction of his mind, and avoiding of all scruple and doubtfulness; requiring such as shall be satisfied with a general confession not to be offended with them that do use, to their further satisfying, the auricular and secret confession to the priest; nor those also which think needful, for the quietness of their own consciences, particularly to open their sins to the priest, to be offended with them that are satisfied with their humble confession to the Church. But in all things to follow and keep the rule of charity; and every man to be satisfied with his own conscience, nor judging other men's minds or consciences; whereas he hath no warrant of God's Word to the same."

In the subsequent editions of the Prayer Book the intending communicant, "who cannot quiet his own conscience," is bidden to go to his parish priest, "or to some other discreet and learned minister of God's

Word and open his grief; that by the ministry of God's Holy Word he may receive the benefit of absolution, together with ghostly counsel and advice, to the quieting of his conscience and avoiding of all scruples and doubtfulness."

In the Office for the Visitation of the Sick, through all the editions of the Prayer Book, the sick person is directed to make a special confession of sins preparatory to absolution; but in the last revision the priest is ordered to "move" him to such confession; after which he is to absolve him in the following words:—

"Our Lord Jesus Christ, Who hath left power to His Church to absolve all sinners who truly repent and believe in Him, of His great mercy forgive thee thine offences. And by His authority committed to me I absolve thee from all thy sins, in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen."

Ten years ago Dr. Newman delivered a challenge on this question which is worth quoting, and which, as far as I know, has never been answered. It is as follows:—

"Let candid men consider the form of Absolution contained in the Prayer Book, of which all clergymen, Evangelical and Liberal, as well as High Church, and (I think) all persons in University offices declare, that 'it containeth *nothing contrary* to the Word of God.'

"I challenge, in the sight of all England, Evan-

gelical clergymen generally to put on paper an interpretation of this form of words, consistent with their sentiments, which shall be less forced than the most objectionable interpretations which Tract XC. puts upon any passage in the Articles." *

Dr. Newman then quotes the form of Absolution in the Prayer Book, and contrasts it with the Roman, which, of the two, is certainly the milder form.

The right of pronouncing this Absolution is by the Church of England strictly confined to an Episcopally ordained priesthood. On the head of every priest in the Church of England, be he High, or Low, or Broad, a bishop laid his hands and pronounced these words:—

“Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a Priest in the Church of God. Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins thou dost retain they are retained. And be thou a faithful dispenser of the Word of God and of His Holy Sacraments: in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.”

Thus much for the direct evidence of the Prayer Book. Let us now turn to another class of evidence.

In one of the Injunctions set forth in the first year of Edward VI. there is an inquiry whether “parsons, vicars, curates, chantry priests, and other stipendiaries,” “have every Lent required their parishioners in their confession to recite their Pater Noster, the Articles of our faith, and the Ten Com-

* *Apologia*, p. 171. First Edition.

mandments in English ;” and this inquiry is repeated in the Visitation Articles of Archbishop Cranmer in the second year of Edward.* The regular practice of confession is here assumed.

Queen Elizabeth, soon after her accession, put forth Injunctions, of which Archbishop Parker and other Bishops afterwards published, “ Interpretations and further Considerations.” Among them is the following:—“ *Ecclesia Christi est, in qua purum Dei Verbum prædicatur, et Sacramenta juxta Christi ordinationem administrantur; et in qua clavium auctoritas retinetur.*” †

Among “ Certain Articles of Religion, set forth by the order of both Archbishops, Metropolitans, and the rest of the Bishops, for the uniformity of Doctrine, to be read by all parsons, vicars, and curates at their possession-taking, or first entry into their cure,” is the following:—“ I do acknowledge also that Church to be the spouse of Christ, wherein the Word of God is truly taught, the Sacraments orderly administered according to Christ’s institution, and the authority of the Keys duly used.” ‡

In the 113th Canon of 1603, the regular practice of confession is taken for granted, as follows:—

“ If any man confess his secret and hidden sins to the Minister, for the unburdening of his conscience and to receive spiritual consolation and ease of mind from him, we do straitly charge and admonish

* Cardwell’s Doc. Ann. vol. i. pp. 26, 51.

† Ibid. p. 240.

‡ Ibid. p. 264.

him, that he do not reveal and make known to any person whatsoever any crime or offence so committed to his trust and secrecy, under pain of irregularity."

In the year 1696 Sir John Friend and Sir William Parkins were executed at Tyburn for conspiracy against the life of William III. Three English clergymen, Messrs. Cooke, Snatt, and Collier, attended them on the scaffold, and, with imposition of hands, gave them absolution in the sight of the assembled multitude. This was considered a grave scandal, and the two Primates of the day (Tenison and York), together with twelve other Bishops then "in and about London," immediately put forth a "Declaration" against this irregular proceeding. But the ground which they take is not that the system of private confession has been disallowed "in our Reformed Church;" on the contrary, they quote with approbation the Rubric which enjoins the Minister to "move" the penitent "to make a special confession of his sins," and censure the offending Ministers for not obeying it. "If those Ministers," they say, "knew not the state of these men's souls, how could they, without manifest transgression of the Church's order, as well as the profane abuse of *the power Christ has left with His Ministers*, absolve them from all their sins?"*

I do not know whether the office of Confessor of the Royal Household has ever been formally abolished. It certainly existed in comparatively recent

* Cardwell's Doc. Ann., pp. 892-6.

times, and down to the Great Rebellion at least it was no sinecure.

In the 19th Canon of the Irish Church, passed when Usher was Primate and Bramhall Bishop of Derry, it is ordered that "The Minister of every parish shall, the afternoon before the said administration (of the Lord's Supper) give warning by the tolling of the bell, or otherwise, to the intent that if any have any scruple of conscience, or desire the special ministry of reconciliation, he may afford it to those that need it. And to this end the people are often to be exhorted to enter into a special examination of the state of their own souls; and finding themselves either extremely dull, or much troubled in mind, they do resort to God's Ministers to receive from them as well advice and counsel for the quickening of their dead hearts and the subduing of those corruptions whereunto they have been subject; as the benefit of absolution likewise for the quieting their conscience by the power of the keys, which Christ hath committed to His Ministers for that purpose."*

Let this suffice as to the law of "our Reformed Church" on the subject of Confession, as embodied in the Prayer Book and other formal and authoritative documents. And that auricular confession was commonly practised in our Communion, at least down to the religious catalepsy of the eighteenth century, and even then by devout members of the

* Phillimore's *Ecclesiastical Law*, vol. i. p. 698.

Church, is a fact which admits of abundant demonstration, as a few examples will show.

Hooker, as we learn from Isaak Walton in his life of him, was absolved on his death-bed by Saravia, "they being supposed to be confessors to each other." Bishop Andrewes, too, not only taught but practised confession. In his "Devotions" he thanks God "*qui aperuisti mihi portam spei confitenti et roganti ex mysteriorum et clavium potestate.*"* And it is related of him that when he was Prebendary of St. Paul's it was his custom during Lent to be in the Cathedral daily at certain hours to hear confessions. Bishop Bull also, the great defender of the Nicene Creed, who died in 1710, confessed and received absolution more than once during his last illness.† No one at all familiar with the diaries and chronicles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries will need to be told that they afford abundant evidence that the practice of auricular confession and absolution was then recognised as one of the ordinary means of grace. Let me quote two extracts from Kennet's "Register and Chronicle" by way of example:—

"I was chosen by the Duchess of York, as soon as as she was known to be so, (saith Bishop Morley) to be her spiritual director and guide in those things that concerned her spiritual and everlasting condition; and the reason why she made choice of me to be so, rather than any other of my order, was because she

* *Preces Quotidianæ*, p. 266.

† *Last Hours of Eminent Christians*, p. 182.

knew me better, and because I had been her first instructor in matters of religion many years before. In this relation of mine to the Duchess I continued until after her father's banishment, and all that time I must bear her witness that she was not only a zealous Protestant herself, according as it is by law established in the Church of England, but zealous to make Protestants, as appears by what she did for that counterfeit pretended convert Macedo (whom the 'foresaid libeller Maimbourg magnifies so much, though he knows he proved himself to be an arrant impostor and profligated wretch) and in her own deportment as devout and charitable as ever I knew any of her age and sex : insomuch as that besides her private prayers, morning and evening, which she never omitted, she daily and hourly observed the Canonical Hours of the Public Service of God in her Chapel with those of her family. Neither did she ever (as long as I was with her) omit the receiving of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper once every month at least, besides that of solemn Festivals which she always received with the King in the Royal Chapel. *And always the day before she received she made a voluntary confession of what she thought she had offended God in, either by omission or commission, professing her sorrow for it, and promising amendment of it, and then kneeling down she desired and received absolution IN THE FORM AND WORDS PRESCRIBED BY OUR CHURCH.*"*

* Kennet's Register and Chronicle, p. 885. Edition of 1728. Those who object to the practice of confession are

Mr Lenthall, Speaker of the Long Parliament, who died on the 3rd of September, 1662, was attended in his last illness by Dr. Bredock (also spelt Brideoake), Rector of Witney, and afterwards Bishop of Chichester, who gives, in a letter preserved by Kennet,* an interesting account of his conversation with the penitent Puritan. "When I came to his presence," says Bredock, "he told me 'he was very glad to see me; for he had two great works to do, and I must assist him in both; to fit his body for the earth and his soul for heaven:' to which purpose he desired me to pray with him. I told him the Church had appointed an Office of the Visitation of the Sick, and I must use that. He said 'Yes, he chiefly desired the prayers of the Church'; wherein he joyned with great fervency and devotion. After prayers he desired absolution; I told him I was very ready and willing

sometimes put to hard shifts in explaining the language of the Prayer Book. To the mind of any one not blinded by prejudice or ignorance, the Exhortation in the Communion Office plainly advises private confession, to be followed by the only form of private absolution prescribed by the Church, to all who have any scruples about their fitness for partaking of the Sacrament. It would never occur to him that all that was meant was that the penitent should have a private conversation with his pastor, and listen to some passages of Holy Scripture, that he might thereby "receive the benefit of absolution"! Yet this explanation has been gravely offered by persons in authority. We see the traditional, as it is indeed the only legitimate, interpretation of the passage in the place marked by capitals in the quotation in the text.

* P. 762.

to pronounce it ; but he must first come to a Christian confession and contrition for the sins and failings of his life : ‘ Well, sir,’ said he, ‘ then instruct me to my duty.’ I desired him to examine his life by the Ten Commandments, and wherein he found his failings, to fly to the Gospel for mercy. Then I read the Ten Commandments in order to him, mentioning the principal sins against each commandment.” Dr. Bredock then goes on to say that of course he omits what the penitent told him “ under the seal of this Office,” and only states what Mr. Lenthall authorized him to publish. “ After this Office,” he adds, “ wherein indeed he show’d himself a very hearty penitent, he again desired the absolution of the Church, which I then pronounced, and which he received with much content and satisfaction : ‘ For,’ says he, ‘ Now, now indeed do I find the joy and benefit of that Office which Christ hath left in His Church’ ; . . . The next day he received the Sacrament, and after that work I desired him to express himself to Dr. Dickenson (a learned physician, Fellow of Merton College, who received the Sacrament with him) concerning the King’s death, because he had only done it to me in Confession ; which he did to the same effect as he had to me.”

So much as to the doctrine of the Church of England on this subject, as prescribed in her authorized formularies, and illustrated in her practice. It would be easy to show that the same doctrine is taught and enforced by all her great divines ; but I

must again content myself with fairly representative specimens.

The Catechism of Justus Jonas, which was translated, adopted, and authoritatively recommended by Cranmer, contains the following passage :—

“Now God doth not speak to us with a Voice sounding out of heaven ; but He hath given the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the *authority to forgive sin, to the ministers of the Church*. Wherefore let him that is a sinner go to one of them. Let him *acknowledge and confess his sin*, and pray him that, according to God’s commandments, he will give him absolution, and comfort him with the word of grace and forgiveness of his sins. And when the minister doth so, then I ought stedfastly to believe that my sins are truly forgiven me in heaven. . . . Wherefore, good children, give good ear to this doctrine ; and when *your sins do make you afraid and sad, then seek and desire absolution and forgiveness of your sins of the ministers which have received a commission and commandment from Christ Himself to forgive men their sins* ; and then your consciences shall have peace, tranquillity, and quietness. But he that doth not obey this counsel, but being either blind or proud, *doth despise the same, he shall not find forgiveness of his sins*, neither in his own good works, nor yet in painful chastisements of his body, or any other things whereto God hath not promised remission of sins, wherefore *despise not absolution, for it is the commandment and ordinance of God*.*

* Catechism, p. 202.

In the Sixth of Archbishop's Parker's Articles of Visitation, in 1567, those are condemned who teach "that mortal or voluntary sins, committed after baptism, be not remissible by penance."*

The following will show Hooker's opinion :—

"But concerning Confession in private, the Churches of Germany, as well the rest as Lutherans, agree all, that all men should at certain times confess their offences to God in the hearing of God's ministers, thereby to show how their sins displease them; to receive instruction for the wariier carriage of themselves hereafter; to be soundly resolved, if any scruple or snare of conscience do entangle their minds; and, which is most material, to the end that men may at God's hands seek every one his own particular pardon, through the power of those keys, which the minister of God using according to our blessed Saviour's institution in that case, it is their part to accept the benefit thereof as God's most merciful ordinance for their good, and, without any distrust or doubt, to embrace joyfully His grace so given them according to the word of our Lord, which hath said, 'Whose sins ye remit, they are remitted.' So that grounding on this assured belief, they are to rest with minds encouraged and persuaded concerning the forgiveness of all their sins, as of Christ's own word and power, by the ministry of the keys."†

* Cardwell's Doc. Ann. i. p. 841.

† Eccl. Pol. B. VI. ch. iv. 14.

Latimer, while condemning compulsory confession, adds:—

“To speak of right and true confession, I would to God it were kept in England, for it is a good thing.”*

Dr. Donne, Dean of St. Paul's, whom De Quincey calls “one of the subtlest intellects that England has produced,”† is severe upon “that torture of the conscience, that usurpation of God's power, that spying into the counsel of princes, with which the Church of Rome hath been deeply charged;” but he is equally clear in favour of the system of confession sanctioned by the Church of England. For example:—

“*Confitebor Domino*,” says David, “I will confess my sins to the Lord: sins are not confessed if they be not confessed to Him; and if they be confessed to Him, *in case of necessity it will suffice*, though they be confessed to no other. Indeed, a confession is directed upon God, though it be made to His minister: if God had appointed His angels or His saints to absolve me, *as He hath His ministers*, I would confess to them. . . . Men come not willingly to this manifestation of themselves, nor are they to be brought in chains, as they do in the Roman Church, by a *necessity* of an exact enumeration of all their sins, but to be led with that sweetness with which our Church proceeds, in appointing sick persons, if *they feel their conscience troubled with any weighty matter*

* Sermons, ii. 899, edit. 1824.

† Works, vii. 276.

*to make a special Confession, and to receive absolution at the hands of the priest ;” and then we are to remember that “ every coming to the Communion is as serious a thing as our own transmigration out of the world, and we should do as much here for the settling of our conscience as upon our death-bed.” **

It is only in a very modified sense that Bishop Hall has any claim to the name of a High Churchman, yet here is a specimen of his teaching on the subject of auricular confession :—

“ If after all these penitent endeavours you find your soul still unquiet, and not sufficiently apprehensive of a free and full forgiveness, betake yourself to God’s faithful agent for peace: run to your ghostly physician ; lay your bosom open before him ; flatter not your own condition ; let neither fear nor shame stay his hand from probing and searching the wound to the bottom ; and that being done, make careful use of such spiritual applications as shall be by him administered to you. This, this is the way to a perfect recovery and fulness of comfort.”

And again; “ Although therefore you may perhaps, through God’s goodness, attain to such a measure of knowledge and resolution as to be able to give yourself satisfaction concerning the state of your soul ; yet it cannot be amiss, out of an abundant caution, to take God’s minister along with you, and making him of your spiritual counsel, to unbosom yourself to him freely, for his fatherly advice and concurrence :

* Sermons, lvi.

the neglect whereof, through a kind of either strangeness or misconceit, is certainly not a little disadvantageous to the souls of many good Christians. The Romish laity make either oracles or idols of their ghostly fathers: if we make ciphers of ours, I know not whether we be more injurious to them or ourselves. We go about to rack your consciences to a forced and exquisite confession under the pain of no remission; but we persuade you, for your own good, to be more intimate with and less reserved from those whom God hath set over you, for your direction, comfort, and salvation." *

Bishop Overall, the author of the latter part of the Church Catechism, makes the following inquiry in the 21st Article of his Visitation in 1619:—
“Whether doth your Minister, before the several times of the administration of the Lord’s Supper, admonish and exhort his parishioners, if they have their consciences troubled and disquieted, to resort unto him, or some other learned Minister, and open his grief, that he may receive such ghostly counsel and comfort as his conscience may be relieved, and by the Minister he may receive the benefit of absolution, to the quiet of his conscience and avoiding of scruple. And if any man confess his secret and hidden sins, be he sick or whole, to the Minister, for the unburthening of his conscience, and receiving such spiritual consolation, doth or hath the said Minister at any time revealed and made known to

* Works, vii. 458-5.

any person whomsoever any crime or offence so committed to his trust, contrary to the 113th Canon?"

Bishop Cosin, who was always proud to appeal to the authority of "My Lord and Master Overall," writes as follows:—

"The Church of England, howsoever it *holdeth not Confession and Absolution Sacramental, that is, made unto and received from a Priest, to be so absolutely necessary, as that without it there can be no remission of sins*; yet by this place it is manifest what she teacheth. . . . Our 'if he feel his conscience troubled' is no more than his 'if he find out his sins' ('si inveniat peccata'); for if he be not troubled with sin, what needs either Confession or Absolution? Venial sins that separate not from the grace of God need not so much to trouble a man's conscience. If he hath committed any mortal sin, then we require confession of it to a priest, who may give him, upon his true contrition and repentance, the benefit of absolution, which takes effect according to his disposition that is absolved. . . . The truth is, that in the priest's absolution there is the true power and virtue of forgiveness, which will most certainly take effect, 'unless an obstacle is imposed,' as in Baptism."*

Jeremy Taylor says:—

"It is a very pious preparation to the Holy Sacrament that we confess our sins to the Minister of religion: for since it is necessary that a man be

* Notes on Common Prayer, First Series, p. 168.

examined, and a self-examination was prescribed to the Corinthians in the time of their lapsed discipline, that though there were divisions amongst them, and no established governors, yet from this duty they were not to be excused, and they must in destitution of a public Minister do it themselves, but this is in case of such necessity: the other is better: that is, it is of better order and more advantage that this part of repentance and holy preparation be performed under the conduct of a spiritual guide. And the reason is pressing. For since it is life or death that is there administered, and the great dispensation of the keys is in that ministry, it were well if he that ministers did know whether the person presented were fit to communicate or no; and if he be not, it is charity to reject him, and charity to assist him that he may be fitted. There are many sad contingencies in the constitution of ecclesiastical affairs, in which every man that needs this help, and would fain make use of it, cannot; *but when he can meet with the blessing, it were well it were more frequently used and more readily entertained.*"

Again:—

"But the priest's proper power of absolving, that is, of pardoning (which is in no case communicable to any man who is not consecrated to the ministry) is a giving the penitent the means of eternal pardon, the admitting him to the Sacraments of the Church and the peace and communion of the faithful; because that is the only way really to obtain pardon

of God ; there being in ordinary no way to heaven but by serving God in the way which He hath commanded us by His Son, that is, in the way of the Church, which is His body, whereof He is Prince and Head." *

For the following quotation from Chillingworth, the author of the much abused saying, "The Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants," I am indebted to the Rev. C. N. Gray's "Confession, as taught by the Church of England," (p. 33.):—

"Since Christ hath given such authority to His ministers, upon your unfeigned repentance and contrition, to absolve and release you from your sins, . . . therefore, in obedience to His gracious will, and as I am warranted, and even enjoined, by my holy mother the Church of England expressly, in the Book of Common Prayer, in the rubric of visiting the sick (which doctrine this Church hath likewise embraced so far), I beseech you that by your practice and use you will not suffer that commission which Christ hath given to His ministers to be a vain form of words without any sense under them ; to be an antiquated, expired commission, of no use nor validity in these days ; but whensoever you find yourselves charged and oppressed, especially with such crimes as they call 'Peccata vastantia conscientiam,' such as do lay waste and depopulate the conscience, that you have recourse to your spiritual physician, and freely disclose the nature and malignancy of

* Jeremy Taylor's Works, vii. pp. 452, 484. Eden's Edition.

your disease, that he may be able, as the cause shall require, to proportion a remedy either to search it with corrosives, or comfort and temper it with oil. And come not to him only with such a mind as you would go to a learned man experienced in the Scripture, as one that can speak comfortable, quieting words to you, *but as one that hath authority delegated to him from God Himself to absolve and acquit you of your sins.*"

I do not know whether Bishop Kenn's Manual, composed for the use of Winchester scholars, is still used in that illustrious School. A copy of it, which I still possess, was given to me by the clergyman who prepared me for my first communion, a very moderate man, and it contains the following direction:—

"In case, good Philotheus, you do find this examination too difficult for you, or you are afraid you shall not rightly perform it, or meet with any scruples or troubles of conscience in the practice of it, I then advise you, as the Church does, to go to one of your superiors in this place to be your spiritual guide, and be not ashamed to unburthen your soul freely to him; that, besides his ghostly counsel, you may receive the benefit of absolution; for though confession of our sins to God is only matter of duty, and absolutely necessary, yet confession to our spiritual guide also is by many devout souls found to be very advantageous to true repentance."*

* "A Manual of Prayers for the use of the Scholars of Winchester College, and all other devout Christians. To which are

Archbishop Wake says :—

“The Church of England refuses no sort of confession either public or private, which may be any way necessary to the quieting of men’s consciences, or to the exercise of that power of binding and loosing which our Saviour Christ has left to his Church. We have our penitential canon for public offenders; we exhort men, if they have any the least doubt or scruple, *nay, sometimes though they have none, but specially before they receive the Holy Sacrament, to confess their sins.* We propose to them the benefit *not only of ghostly advice how to manage their repentance, but the great comfort of absolution too*, as soon as they have completed it. . . . When we visit our sick, *we never fail* to exhort them to make a special confession of their sins to him that ministers to them; and when they have done it, their absolution is so full that the Church of Rome itself could not desire to add anything to it.”*

In his well known “Rational Illustration of the Book of Common Prayer” (chap. xi. sect. iv.), Wheatley, after explaining the distinction between the compulsory system of Rome and our own, proceeds :

“So that we may still, I presume, wish, very con-

added Three Hymns; for Morning, Evening, and Midnight. By the Right Reverend Father in God, Thomas Kenn, D.D., late Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells. The thirty-fifth edition.” P. 24.

* An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England, p. 81.

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vestige remains of ecclesiastical law for the restraint of vice.”*

My duty does not lead me to discuss the doctrine of foreign Protestantism on this subject ; but, as a matter of fact, the Saxon, the Bohemian and the Augsburg Confessions of Faith insist on the duty of private confession with a view to absolution through the ministerial exercise of the power of the keys.

And yet the Archbishops of Canterbury and York have calmly and deliberately assured the public that our Reformers acted wisely in allowing auricular confession “no place in our Reformed Church ;” and that “a considerable minority both of clergy and laity amongst us desire to subvert the principles of the Reformation,” because they maintain the right of English churchmen to make, and of English clergymen to receive, confessions ! Their Graces are, no doubt, perfectly sincere in the opinion which they have thus expressed. So are the Pope and Archbishop Manning in believing that the dogma of Papal infallibility has always been part of the original deposit of faith. But error does not cease to be error because it happens to be patronised sincerely by men who occupy exalted positions ; on the contrary, this circumstance makes it all the more dangerous, and renders the duty of exposing it all the more imperative. I object to all falsifications of history, whether they hail from the Vatican or from Lambeth, and whether the cause on whose behalf

* History of the Church of England, p. 170.

they are invoked be a good or a bad cause. If auricular confession is a bad thing, let it be put down in a formal and constitutional manner; but let us have no more attempts to rouse the passions of the ignorant by inflammatory appeals to "the principles of the Reformation," as if, forsooth! those "principles" condemned, whereas they strongly inculcate, the practice of confession.

And now let me say a few words on the merits of the question. It divides itself into two parts: I. Absolution; II. Confession.

Let us take them separately.

I. The objection made to the doctrine of absolution is that which was made of old against our Lord: "Who is this which speaketh blasphemies? Who can forgive sins but God alone?" This objection is true in one sense, and false in another. It is true, of course, that God alone can forgive sin as an originating cause. But it is equally true that in this sense God alone can give health, knowledge, and fruitful harvests. Yet we consult a physician when the body is out of order; we send our children to school to imbibe knowledge from the lips of human teachers; we sow, and plant, and reap, though we also pray God to "give us day by day our daily bread." And the physician, or the teacher, or the husbandman who should claim as his own the skill which enables him to benefit others, would "speak blasphemies" as truly as the priest who should impiously claim in his own right and person the power to

forgive sins. The physician of the soul acts ministerially; and so does the physician of the body, whether he acknowledges it or not. The latter examines his patient, sketches the diagnosis of his complaint, prescribes a regimen, and bestows his medicine. But if the patient has not told the truth, or disregards the treatment, the medicine may become a poison to him. And so in spiritual matters the absolution becomes a curse, and not a blessing, to him who has not received it in the spirit of true penitence.

The truth is, the usual cavils against the doctrine of priestly absolution are founded on a very shallow conception of God's ordinary government of mankind. As a matter of fact, He has committed the everlasting destiny of men to the custody of one another. Any one of us may ruin for ever souls for whom Christ died. We have all received some talent or another from God: external talents of wealth, of social rank, of official position, and the like; or personal gifts, like beauty of person or charm of manner, an eloquent tongue or a musical voice. No one is so humble as not to have some means or other of influencing those who come within his reach. And, indeed, it is very terrible to think how unceasing is this reciprocal influence of men upon each other, and how unconsciously it is generally exercised.

Now these various gifts of personal influence, which God has given to all, in great measure or in

small, every one of us may use to the ruin of his neighbour. The Almighty Father wills us to be each his brother's keeper; but we may act the part of the first murderer, and kill the life committed to our trust. I cannot imagine any torment of hell more awful than the horror of those who shall meet, face to face, before the judgment-seat of Christ, the souls whom they have ruined. It seems incredible that there ever can be a heaven for a soul through whose evil influence another soul has perished. Surely the very splendours of the Beatific Vision would but increase his remorse on remembrance of the never-ending mischief he had wrought on earth. What is there in the doctrine of Sacerdotalism that approaches in point of mystery to this fearful power which God has given to every one of us? When a priest absolves a penitent he knows full well that the efficacy of his absolution depends, after all, on the state of the heart which receives it; and he knows also that he cannot use the gift against the will and intention of the Almighty Giver. He who reads the heart will ratify or confirm, in virtue of His perfect knowledge, the words of pardon uttered by His minister on earth. But personal influence, in whatever form, *may* be used against the will of the Divine Giver. So that, in matter of fact, God has given to each of us, laic and cleric, a power of the keys, a power of opening or closing heaven, of a far more awful kind than that which He has bestowed upon the "ministers and stewards of His mysteries." I

wish that those who cry out against Sacerdotalism, as an encroachment on the liberties of the laity, would consider the very awful sacerdotal power which the laity themselves are discharging day by day, whether they think of it or not.

In truth, the argument against Sacerdotalism cuts deeper and wider than those who use it appear to perceive. If Christ is the only Mediator, to the absolute exclusion of all other mediators, this is fatal not only to every kind of public ministry, but to all acts of intercession whatsoever, and indeed to any kind of personal influence. If "the fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much," what is that but an instance of successful mediation? The mother who pleads for a sick or erring child is surely a mediator; and so is the eloquent preacher or writer who turns men from sin to righteousness. In one sense of course it is true that there is but "One Mediator between God and men, the Man Christ Jesus;" since it is from His Atonement alone that all human mediation derives its worth. But in another sense all Christians are bound to be mediators, for it is their duty to intercede for each other. In short, what is the Gospel dispensation but a paramount example of Sacerdotalism? Christianity has now been in the world for upwards of eighteen centuries, and yet the vast majority of mankind are still outside its pale. In the first ages of its career the Faith of Christ carried all before it. The philosophy of Greece and the statecraft and legions of Imperial Rome were

alike powerless to arrest its progress. It penetrated into the hut of the savage and into the palace of the Cæsars, and led captive Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian, bond and free. What has the Christian Church done in comparison with this during the last few centuries? On balancing its gains and its losses, must it not be sorrowfully admitted that it has done little more than hold its own? And what explanation can be given, except the humiliating fact that Christians have turned against each other the arms which they ought to have employed in extending the frontiers of their Master's kingdom? In other words, the purposes of God are so far baffled, because He has entrusted the execution of them to the ministry of a fallible and selfish race.

And yet, mysterious as all this seems, I think we may see a reason for it. There is an inborn tendency in human nature towards selfishness; and to counteract this tendency, to which even the best of men are more or less liable, God has made us necessary to each other. On the right hand and on the left, from the cradle to the grave, we need the help of others. Neither in sickness nor in health, in joy nor in sorrow, in temporal nor in spiritual matters, can we afford to stand alone.

And thus our very selfishness is turned into an antidote against itself. If we could go through this mortal life to our eternal home as isolated units, there would be nothing to check our innate selfishness. But human beings are no mere aggregate of

independent units, each complete in itself and striving after its own perfection alone. They are members of one family—"the whole family in heaven and in earth"—and their mutual interdependence radiates from the centre of the family to the circumference of the race. Even the geographical arrangements of the globe, its varieties of climates and productions, are made to minister to the same end; and the dictates of enlightened selfishness are slowly teaching the nations of the earth that they have need of one another; that if one member suffers, the rest will in the long run suffer with it; that exclusiveness is, therefore, a suicidal policy, the true secret of a nation's prosperity lying, not in jealous hugging of its peculiar treasures, but in freely exchanging them for those of its neighbours.

Thus does God contrive, in the domain of things temporal, to make our very selfishness the instrument of its own destruction. And His mode of treatment is the same in things spiritual. Through all the ordinances of the Christian Church He alone is the Giver and the Source of all spiritual blessings. "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights;" but these gifts reach us, as a rule, through the ministry of human mediators.

The power is from God; but He imparts it through human agents and material channels. This is the essence of Sacerdotalism; and it is the advocates of the doctrine and not its impugnors who magnify the

power of God and emphasise the feebleness of man. For the objection to Sacerdotalism is in reality, though not consciously, rooted in the belief that man has *any* power apart from God. The truth, however, is that I should be guilty of just as much blasphemy in claiming to hold with any strength of my own the pen which writes these words as I should be if I claimed in my own right to forgive a fellow creature his sins. Sacerdotalism is, in fact, nothing else but an example in one department of God's providential government of a principle which runs through the whole of it; namely, that it is His rule to work by the use of means.

It is remarkable how emphatically not only the Church of the first centuries, but the mediæval Church also, claimed for the laity a quasi-sacerdotal power even in respect to sacramental confession. I need not remind your Lordship that private confession came into vogue by way of relaxation on the original discipline, which enjoined on penitents a public confession in the sight of the congregation. And the absolution pronounced was the absolution of the Church through her authorised Minister. This share of the faithful laity even in the power of the keys is fully recognised by the leading men among the schoolmen. S. Thomas Aquinas, for example, discusses the question, "*Utrùm in aliquo casu liceat aliis quam Sacerdotibus confiteri,*" and decides that a layman may hear a penitent's confession, just as he may administer baptism, in case of necessity, and that a penitent is in such a case

bound to confess. The layman cannot, indeed, complete on his part the sacrament of penance since he does not possess the power of granting absolution. But this defect "the High Priest supplies." And therefore "confession made to a layman in the absence of the priest is in a manner Sacramental." *

Peter Lombard decides in the same manner the question, "*An sufficiat confiteri laico?*" "If a priest cannot be had," he says, "confession must be made to one's neighbour or companion." A priest must, in the first place, be diligently sought after; but "so great is the virtue of confession that, if a priest cannot be found, confession should be made to one's neighbour (*tanta itaque vis confessionis est, ut si deest sacerdos, confiteatur proximo*). For although he to whom the confession is made has not the power of giving absolution, nevertheless he who confesses to his neighbour is worthy of pardon from his desire for a priest. For the lepers were cleansed on their way to show themselves to the priests, before they reached them." †

* *Sed quando necessitas imminet, debet facere pœnitens quod ex parte suâ est, scilicet conteri et confiteri cui potest; qui quamvis Sacramentum perficere non possit, ut faciat id quod ex parte Sacerdotis est, absolutionem scilicet, defectum tamen sacerdotis Summus Sacerdos supplet. Nihilominus confessio laico ex defectu sacerdotis facta sacramentalis est quodammodo, quamvis non sit sacramentum perfectum, quia deest ei quod est ex parte Sacerdotis. Summ. Theol. Supplem. Ter. par. Quæst. viii. Art. ii.*

† *De Sacram. Lib. iv. Distinct. xvii.*

Albertus Magnus, another great name, goes beyond this; for he affirms that a layman possesses, in case of necessity, the power of absolving.*

Indeed, we find the duty of confessing to a layman in case of necessity not only defended by theologians in their studies, but commanded by synodical canons and provincial constitutions. The Synod of Treves, A.D. 1310 (Can. 116) directed that confession should be made to a Catholic layman when there was danger of death, and no priest was at hand. The twelfth of Archbishop Edmund's Constitutions allows a deacon to hear confessions and give penances in cases of necessity; as "when no priest could be had, or he was away from home, or stupidly or indiscreetly unwilling; and death was imminent." And Lyndwood says that not only may a deacon do this, but also a layman, or even a woman.†

Two remarkable instances of confessions to laymen have come down to us from the Middle Ages. It is related in "*Le Loyal Serviteur*" that when Bayard, the Chevalier *sans peur et sans reproche*, received his death-wound on the field of Romagnano, and was carried to his tent, he clasped his sword in his hand,

* He distinguishes five kinds of *potestas absolvendi*. The fourth "*est officio ministrorum concessa Sacerdotibus. Et ultima ex unitate fidei et caritatis, et hæc pro necessitatis articulo descendit in omnem hominem ad proximo subveniendum: et hanc potestatem habet laicus in articulo necessitatis.* Sent. Lib. iv. dist. 17, Art. 58, 59.

† See Johnson's *Canons*, vol. ii. ; year 1286; and Maskell's *Mon. Rit.* iii. p. cix.

and, fixing his eye on the hilt for a cross, bade his faithful esquire hear his confession.

The other example is related in Joinville's "*Histoire de S. Louis*." When Joinville and his companions were taken prisoners by the Saracens, and were waiting in hourly expectation of death, the Constable of Chippre knelt down and made his confession to Joinville; "and I gave him," says Joinville, "such absolution as God enabled me to give." *

II. It is possible, however, to allow the doctrine of absolution in the abstract, and yet condemn, as many do, the practice of confession as an unmitigated evil. And since the Church of England is but a part of the Catholic Church, and cannot claim infallibility, it is also possible that she may be in error in encouraging her children to confess and be absolved.

Now I will admit at the outset that the confessional is capable of being greatly abused, and that very serious dangers surround the system. I put aside the usual accusations of Exeter Hall orators, as being, for the most part, nothing better than baseless calumnies. To quote extracts from Manuals written for the exclusive use of confessors, and generally in one of the learned languages, as a sample of the ordinary intercourse between a confessor and his penitents is as fair and decent as it would be to make

* Encouste moy se agenolla messir Guy d'Ebelin, constable de Chippre, et se confessa a moy : *et je lui donnay telle absolucion comme Dieu m'en donnoit le pouvoir.* Hist. de S. Louis, p. 296.

quotations from a manual of anatomy by way of illustrating the ordinary conversation between a doctor and his patients. The opinion of a man of such a singularly judicial mind as the late Sir George Cornwall Lewis on a subject of this sort is worth quoting. He was no advocate of habitual confession; but he could see both sides of a question, and could deal fairly even with that of which he did not approve:—

“It may be here remarked,” he says, “that an unjust prejudice has not unfrequently been raised in Protestant Countries against the treatises which are prepared for the use of confessors in the Church of Rome. . . . The more difficult and doubtful of the cases likely to come before the confessor have been discussed separately, and have given rise to the branch of practical divinity called *casuistry*. *Casuistry* is the jurisprudence of theology; it is a digest of the moral and religious maxims to be observed by the priest, in advising or deciding upon questions which come before him in confession, and in adjudging the amount of penance due to each sin. As confession discloses the most secret thoughts and acts of the penitent, and as nothing, however impure, is concealed from the confessor, it is necessary that he should be furnished with a manual in which these subjects are discussed. Now such a manual, if properly considered, is not more justly obnoxious to the charge of gratuitous indecency than a legal or medical treatise, in which similar

subjects are expounded without any reserve of language.”*

And as regards the general system, he says:—

“The system of *Auricular Confession* and the direction of consciences, as practised in the Church of Rome, is founded on a theory similar to that on which the custom of professional consultations rests. The confessor may be considered as a vicarious conscience, in like manner as professional advice is vicarious prudence. If the penitent makes a full and true confession, the confessor or spiritual director pronounces or advises with a complete knowledge of the circumstances of the case, probably with a knowledge of the penitent’s character and position, and always with the impartiality of a judge—free from personal concern in the matter, and unbiassed by passion or interest. Seeing how blind and partial a judge each man is in his own case, and how unconsciously the moral judgment with respect to our own actions is perverted by the inclinations, it cannot be doubted that such a counsellor, in ambiguous cases of conduct, such a *ductor dubitantium*, would be generally beneficial, if the moral code which he administers was well framed, and if his opinion or advice was always honest and enlightened. Unfortunately, however, it happens that the system of moral rules which guides the discretion of the Catholic confessor is founded on a narrow-minded

* On the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion, p. 126.

and somewhat superstitious theology, so far as it proceeds upon the distinctive tenets of the Church of Rome; and that the desire of domestic dictation, and of regulating the affairs of families, so natural in an unmarried clergy, gives too often an improper bias to the influence of the spiritual director.”*

De Quincey, too, while condemning the abuse of casuistry, maintains that “without casuistry of some sort or other no practical decision could be made in the accidents of daily life. Of this, on a fitter occasion,” he adds, “I could give a cumulative proof.”†

And Hallam, a critic who will not be suspected of partiality towards the Roman system, and who disapproved of confession, writes as follows:—

“It is very difficult, or perhaps beyond the reach of any human being, to determine absolutely how far these benefits, which cannot be reasonably denied to result from the rite of confession, outweigh the mischiefs connected with it. There seems to be something in the Roman Catholic discipline (and I know nothing else so likely) which keeps the balance, as it were, of moral influence pretty even between the two religions, and compensates for the ignorance and superstition which the elder preserves: for I am not sure that the Protestant system in the present age has any very feasible advantage in this respect; or that in countries where the comparison can fairly be made, as in Germany and Switzerland, there is

* On the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion, pp. 124, 125.

† Works, vol. xiii. p. 34.

more honesty in one sex, or chastity in the other, when they belong to the Reformed Churches.”*

The second passage which I have quoted from Sir G. Cornwall Lewis undoubtedly hits the chief sources of danger in the system of the Confessional as practised in the Church of Rome. And it is to be observed that the distinguished author himself confines his strictures to the Roman system. A great deal of the moral theology now in vogue in the Church of Rome appears to me, so far as my reading enables me to judge, to be exceedingly well calculated to enslave the conscience of the penitent and place his will very much at the mercy of his director. The system is elaborated out into such a complicated network of details, and is withal so full of pitfalls, that those who conscientiously resort to it must soon feel the necessity of leaning on the arm of the confessor in everything—even in the petty trivialities of daily life. The Jesuits, in particular, have so developed the system of direction as to destroy, in a large measure, the sense of personal responsibility in those who come under its control. This, indeed, is no more than might have been expected, for the long and severe discipline of a Jesuit's novitiate has for its prime object the complete extinction of the slightest quiverings of independence in the human will. When, therefore, the Jesuit novice becomes himself the director of other consciences he will naturally aim at reducing them to the same condition of

* Constitutional History, vol. i. p. 120.

unquestioning dependence which his own training must have taught him to regard as the very ideal of Christian perfection. The penitent is therefore advised to confess frequently, and to confide to his director every wayward fancy and every evanescent peccadillo that may chance to flit across his mind.

With a certain class of minds this sort of discipline becomes at once a necessity and a luxury, and the effect of it is to diminish the sense both of personal responsibility and of the heinousness of sin. This is an opinion which, I am confident, I share with a large number of Roman Catholics; so at least I have been told by thoughtful and devout members of the Church of Rome, ecclesiastics as well as laymen, both in England and on the Continent. I have no doubt that the School of Loyola has produced some of the noblest types of self-sacrifice and saintliness; but is it unfair to say of it as a religious system that it seems admirably calculated to impress upon the mind the wisdom of endeavouring to make the best of both worlds? It is coeval with the Renaissance, and owes, no doubt, to that semi-pagan reaction against the religion of the Cross much of its original impulse and of its rapid success. It caught the sentiment of the age on the bound, and adroitly adapted itself to the new phase of Christianity which the Revival of Letters had made popular in Western Europe. The ascetic side of religion was now odious and out of fashion, and the Jesuit sought to guide the new

current by swimming with it. The world had learnt to love a less strict and less austere religion, and a less strict and less austere religion it should have. One sees the contrast in everything on which the Jesuit has left his mark. His very architecture is of the earth, and is redolent of the boudoir. Go into any old cathedral—it need not be Gothic—which was reared under the influence of the sad, yet triumphant, feelings inspired by the Sacrifice of Calvary, and then enter a Jesuit Church—I care not where—and you cannot fail to see that you have virtually visited the shrines of two different kinds of religion. The former suggests sublime and melancholy reveries, a sentiment of human misery, the vague divination of “a city which hath foundations” somewhere beyond the shifting sands of time, and in which the weary heart shall at last find peace and happiness, and be enabled to solve many a dark riddle that now perplexes and distresses it.

A Jesuit Church awakes sentiments of quite another description. You feel that this world is not so bad after all. Health and comfort and prettiness surround you. Smiling angels beam upon you from every cornice, and the Madonna is no longer the Mater Dolorosa with sad pale face, but a drawing-room *belle* who has an eye for the last fashion. Religion, in short, has laid aside her grave and sombre aspect, and has become gay and coquettish. “Our business,” says Addison, “is to be easy here, and happy hereafter.” The Jesuit has reduced the

maxim to a system, and works it through the confessional. Trust him, submit your will to his, and you will indeed find that the yoke of Christ is easy and His burthen light. He is provided with a comprehensive and most accommodating code of casuistry that knows how to evade obligations which it may be inconvenient to fulfil.

No wonder that the Jesuits became, and still are, the most popular of confessors. No wonder that wealth flowed rapidly into their coffers, and that their Churches and Colleges glittered with marble and precious stones. But the result has been unfortunate. The popularity of the Jesuits in the confessional and the hold which they obtained over the education of a great part of Europe had the effect of creating a school of casuistical divinity which has been prejudicial to morality, and which is mainly responsible for the popular odium to which the entire system of confession is exposed.

Whether Sir George Lewis was right in thinking that it is "natural" for "an unmarried clergy" to have "the desire of domestic dictation and of regulating the affairs of families," I have no means of knowing. But I do not see why it should be so. I have never felt such a desire myself, though an unmarried clergyman. I am fond of many things, some good and probably a good many bad; but "domestic dictation and regulating the affairs of families" is a species of pleasure of which I have never felt the thrill even in imagination. It is, I believe, a great

mistake to suppose that the clergy, married or unmarried, take any pleasure in hearing confessions. On the contrary, I am convinced that nothing but a strong sense of duty could overcome one's natural repugnance to so painful a task. The question of confession in the Church of England is in reality a layman's question. It is now some time since I was ordained a priest, and I have heard just one confession in the whole course of my ministerial life; nor would I have heard that one if I could have helped it. I have always shrunk with dismay from a responsibility which appears to me to be one of the heaviest which a human being can undertake. And it so happens that I have never felt imperatively called upon to undertake it; for very little of my ministerial life has been spent in the sole charge of souls. When therefore persons have asked me to hear their confessions—and many have done so without any encouragement on my part—I have felt myself at liberty to send them to “some other discreet and learned Minister of God's word.”

But though I cannot see that an unmarried clergy must necessarily be tempted to interfere in family affairs, it can hardly be doubted that the universal enforcement of celibacy must have the effect, among other evils, of raising the barrier of caste between the clergy and the laity. The clergy learn to regard themselves as a separate body, with separate interests as well as separate duties, and are apt to resent any claim on the part of the laity to a share in the

management of ecclesiastical affairs. The laity of the Roman Communion have now no voice whatever in the counsels of their Church. Bishops and priests are set over them without their consent, and they must receive, with implicit obedience, whatever rules of discipline, or articles of faith, or system of education, their spiritual rulers may choose to impose upon them.

To this kind of Sacerdotalism no one can object more strongly than I do. But what likelihood is there of its ever taking root in the Church of England? The pulse of the English clergy responds to all the movements of the national life just as freely as that of the laity. Their politics, indeed, may preponderate in one direction, though certainly not so much as formerly; but, at all events, it is not in the direction of a spiritual supremacy. They can have no temptation whatever, that I can imagine, to interest themselves in "family affairs," and we may therefore dismiss that objection to the confessional, so far at least as it concerns the clergy of the Established Church of England. And, indeed, even in the Church of Rome the objection lies more against the system of *direction* than against that of confession. The two may generally go together; but they need not, and the office of director has frequently been exercised by a layman. I frankly own that the practice of direction is becoming more prevalent than I like in our own communion. I am not disposed to deny that it may be useful occasionally in some cases;

but its tendency is to generate a morbid scrupulosity and to blunt the sense of personal responsibility. And I think that frequent confessions are, as a rule, liable to the same objection.

But the remedy for these and other dangers is not an indiscriminate denunciation of confession, but a frank recognition of it, by the rulers of the Church, to the extent and within the limits which the Church herself has plainly prescribed. Nothing can be worse than the present state of things, and it says much for the purity and discretion of our clergy that no scandal has arisen from it. There is not the slightest check upon the youngest and most inexperienced curate except his own sense of what is right. The Bishops know that the practice of confession is prevalent and on the increase; but instead of trying to regulate it and keep it within safe bounds, most of them endeavour to propitiate an ignorant public opinion by futile denunciations; and the two Primates stigmatize, as traitors to "the principles of the Reformation," the 483 priests who dutifully petitioned for Episcopal guidance and control.

If people would only look at the question calmly and rationally, they would surely see nothing objectionable in the system of confession which the Church of England sanctions. Let me glance at some of the arguments in its favour.

"Because the knowledge how to handle our own sores is no vulgar or common art," says Hooker, "but we either carry towards ourselves, for the most part,

an over-soft and gentle hand, fearful of touching too near the quick; or else, endeavouring not to be partial, we fall into timorous scrupulosities, and sometimes into those extreme discomforts of mind from which we hardly do ever lift up our heads again; men thought it the safest way to disclose their secret faults, and to crave imposition of penance from them whom our Lord Jesus Christ hath left in His Church to be spiritual and ghostly physicians, the guides and pastors of redeemed souls, whose office doth not only consist in *general persuasions unto amendment of life*, but also in the *private particular cure of diseased minds*." *

Self-knowledge is proverbially the hardest of all to master,† and no progress at all can be made towards it without the practice of strict periodical self-examination. But how many practise this? Now one of the uses of confession is that it necessitates a habit of self-examination. Moreover, persons commit sins frequently from ignorance of what they are doing. And this is true especially of young people. We are apt to give the youth, of both sexes, credit for more innocence than many of them are entitled to. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is as alluring now as it was of old, and young minds often pluck

* Eceles. Pol. B. vi. c. iv. [7.] Ed. Keble.

† E cœlo descendit Γνωθι σεαυτὸν. Juvenal, Sat. xi. 27. Juvenal's allusion, as any schoolboy knows, is to the legend that this command, which was written in golden characters on the porch of the temple of Delphi, had Apollo for its author.

the forbidden fruit, and have their minds "opened" to an extent which would astonish parents and teachers if they knew it. If the hidden life of our public, and still more of our private schools, whether for boys or girls, could be written, it would throw a lurid light on the records of many a crime and premature death. I am persuaded that if the dispassionate opinion of medical men could be got they would say that their art, sometimes unavailing, would in many cases have been unnecessary if some of their patients had "opened their grief" to some "discreet and learned minister of God's Word." Sermons are all very well; but even the best of sermons must deal in generalities, and must avoid some subjects altogether. It may be thought by some that this is an advantage. I doubt it. Many a moral sore goes on festering unto death because there is no skilful hand to probe the wound. But this can only be done in private confession.

Again, why are so many of the sermons one hears jejune and pointless when they deal with the interior life? Is it not because our clergy have, for the most part, so little practical acquaintance with the anatomy of the human soul? Their sermons want directness and are apt to evaporate in platitudes. Who would trust himself to a physician who derived all his knowledge from books, having never walked a hospital or studied the anatomy of the human frame? I can say for myself that the solitary confession which I have heard gave me an insight into human nature which

I never had before, and has been useful to me ever since. So much impressed am I with this conviction that I believe I could very soon tell from his sermons alone whether a preacher was in the habit of hearing confessions. Dissenting preachers often excel the English clergy in point of directness and force, chiefly, I believe, because confession is largely practised among the Dissenters, especially the Wesleyans, though without the safeguards of the Church system.

In truth, all persons of any pretence to earnest religion make their confessions sometime or other, and that into mortal ears or through material *media* : one class to the friend of their soul or the wife of their bosom; another in their poems; another in their sermons; another in what are technically called “confessions.” It is a natural craving of the human heart for sympathy and help, coupled with a desire to disclose its sins.

But may we not confess to God and obtain forgiveness without the intervention of human agents? Unquestionably. But let this be considered. In the first place, why should we *confess* to God at all? Certainly not with the view of telling Him anything of which He is ignorant, but because words react upon impressions, and fix and deepen them in the mind. It is very hard to realize the omnipresence of God—that He hears every word we utter and knows our most secret thoughts; and the consequence is that in confessing our sins to God alone it is not easy to have that sense of shame, which is of the essence of true

contrition, and which is such a powerful preservative against temptation. Private confessions to God are therefore too commonly couched in those general terms in which, according to the adage, "deception lurks."

But why not confess to some friend or relation? Why go to a priest? Far be it from me to say that this would not be useful. But such confession is subject to two defects, and is exposed to at least one danger. It cannot give the sense of relief consequent on a confession followed by absolution, and it lacks that combination of authority with sympathy which is characteristic of what is called "Sacramental Confession."* And, after all, it is easier to "make a clean breast of it" to an authorised Minister of God than to the most tender of friends or relatives. The knowledge that he acts ministerially, and that the secret will be religiously kept, gives the necessary courage, which would otherwise, in most cases, be lacking. The very strength of our love is apt to forbid a full disclosure of our inner

* I cannot understand why this term should be exposed to so much approbrium, for it has virtually the sanction of the Book of Homilies. "Absolution is no *such* Sacrament as Baptism and Communion are; . . . but in a general acceptation the name of a Sacrament may be attributed to anything whereby an holy thing is signified." Sermon on Common Prayer and Sacraments, part i.

This is common sense. But your thorough-going Protestant is, of all creatures, the last amenable to common sense in regard to any subject in which he thinks he smells Popery.

self to an object of ordinary human attachment, for fear lest the discovery might alienate his love. For, as the poet sings:—

“ Each in his hidden sphere of joy or woe,
Our hermit spirits range and dwell apart ;
Our eyes see all around in gloom or glow
Hues of their own, fresh borrowed from the heart.

And it is well

For what, if heaven for once its searching light
Lent to some partial eye, disclosing all
The rude bad thoughts that in our bosom's night
Wander at large, nor heed love's gentle thrall ?

Who would not shun the dreary uncouth place ?
As if, fond leaning where her infant slept,
A mother's arm a serpent should embrace ;
So might we friendless live, and die unwept.”

And there is also the risk, in private confession to a friend, of ostentation. So subtle are the devices of self-love that egotism may lurk in the very confession of our sins unless there be some special guarantee for that element of shame to which I have referred above. The Wesleyan relations of “experiences” are admitted, I believe, to minister largely to spiritual pride. But when the confession is invested with a religious sanction, and is made on bended knees and to Almighty God (for every auricular confession is addressed primarily to God, and to the Priest only as His Minister), there is a solemnity and reality about it which is fatal to pride and self-conceit. Confession to a Minister of religion impresses, I

believe, upon the mind a consciousness of guilt which does not ordinarily come of confession to a friend, or even to God. "The flesh is weak" in the best of us, and they are very few to whom religious ordinances are not a help in realising their relation to the unseen, but omnipresent, God.

I have admitted that the practice of confession is by no means free from danger; but the dangers are not generally those which are commonly supposed. Persons, who know nothing about the subject practically, imagine that because manuals written for the guidance of confessors go into a number of details, confessors are therefore in the habit of examining their penitents on these details. This, of course, is quite a mistake. Mr. Capes, in a letter on this subject to the *Guardian*, declared that all the time he was a Roman Catholic, though he was in the habit of confessing regularly, no question was ever asked him which he would object to see published in the newspapers; and I believe that this is the experience of almost every one who makes a habit of confession. There may be cases in which questions of a certain kind may be necessary; but they are cases in which there is no danger of *suggesting* the sin to the penitent, for it has already left its stain. Besides, our Catechism bids us examine ourselves in preparation for the Holy Communion; and the Exhortation in the Communion Office directs that this examination should be "by the rule of God's commandments," which is also the usual rule in auricular confession.

Now a real self-scrutiny as to our transgressions against the Ten Commandments, to be effectual, must involve self-examination in details; and this seems to me far more hazardous than enumeration in confession, just in proportion as the security for shame is less complete, and the accompaniments of place and circumstances are less solemn. Self-examination, if it be really searching, is one of the most difficult of mental processes. Its real value is in the degree of its minuteness, and even persons who are used to it, and really do know something of themselves, can hardly dispense with the use of manuals. Your Lordship must be acquainted with Bishop Kenn's Manual for Winchester Scholars, to which I have already referred, and you will remember that a form of self-examination is given in it which goes into considerable details.

In a remarkable passage in his Autobiography Goethe attributes his own defection from Christianity to the inefficiency of the Lutheran system of auricular confession, which deals in generalities and avoids all details. The passage is really a beautiful exposition of the Sacramental system, "the Protestant worship," in his opinion, "lacking fulness in general," and having "too few Sacraments." The passage is too long to quote; the following extract will suffice for my purpose:—

"In my time I had been confided to the religious instruction of a good old infirm clergyman, who had been confessor to the family for many years. The

Catechism, a *Paraphrase* of it, and the *Scheme of Salvation*, I had at my fingers' ends. I lacked not one of the strongly proving biblical texts, but from all this I reaped no fruit; for as they assured me that the honest old man arranged his chief examination according to an old set form, I lost all pleasure and inclination for the business, spent the last week in all sorts of diversions, laid in my hat the loose leaves borrowed from an older friend, who had gotten them from the clergyman, and unfeelingly and senselessly read aloud all that I should have known how to utter with feeling and conviction.

“But I found my good will and my aspirations in this important matter still more paralyzed by a dry, spiritless routine, when I was now to approach the confessional. I was indeed conscious to myself of many failings, but of no great faults; and that very consciousness diminished them, since it directed me to the moral strength which lay within me, and which, with resolution and perseverance, was at last to become master over the Old Adam. We were taught that we were much better than the Catholics for this very reason: that we were not obliged to acknowledge anything in particular in the confessional, nay, that this would not be at all proper even if we wished to do it. *This last did not seem right to me*; for I had the strangest religious doubts, which I would readily have had cleared up on such an occasion. Now, as this was not to be done, I composed a confession for myself, which, while it well

expressed my state of mind, was to confess to an intelligent man, in general terms, that which I was forbidden to tell him in detail. But when I entered the old choir of the Barefoot Friars, when I approached the strange latticed closets in which the reverend gentlemen used to be found for that purpose, when the sexton opened the door for me, when I now saw myself shut up in the narrow place, face to face with my spiritual grandsire, and he bade me welcome with his weak nasal voice, all the light of my mind and heart was extinguished at once, the well-conned confession-speech would not cross my lips; I opened, in my embarrassment, the book which I had in hand, and read from it the first short form I saw, which was so general, that anybody might have spoken it with quite a safe conscience. I received absolution and withdrew, neither warm nor cold; went the next day with my parents to the Table of the Lord, and, for a few days, behaved myself as was becoming after so holy an act.

“In the sequel, however, there came over me that evil, which from the fact of our religion being complicated by various dogmas, and founded on texts of Scripture, which admit of several interpretations, attacks scrupulous men in such a manner, that it brings on a hypochondriacal condition, and raises this to its highest point, to fixed ideas. I have known several men who, though their manner of thinking and living was perfectly rational, could not free themselves from thinking about the sin against the

Holy Ghost, and from the fear that they had committed it. A similar trouble threatened me on the subject of the communion, for the text, that one who unworthily partakes of the Sacrament, *eateth and drinketh damnation to himself*, had, very early, already made a monstrous impression upon me. Every fearful thing that I had read in the histories of the middle ages, of the judgments of God, of those most strange ordeals, by red-hot iron, flaming fire, swelling water, and even what the Bible tells us of the draught which agrees well with the innocent, but puffs up and bursts the guilty,—all this pictured itself to my imagination; and formed itself into the most frightful combinations, since false vows, hypocrisy, perjury, blasphemy, all seemed to weigh down the unworthy person at this most holy act, which was so much the more horrible, as no one could dare to pronounce himself worthy, and the forgiveness of sins, by which everything was to be at last done away, was found limited by so many conditions, that one could not with certainty dare appropriate it to oneself.

“This gloomy scruple troubled me to such a degree, and the expedient which they would represent to me as sufficient seemed so bald and feeble, that it gave the bugbear only a more fearful aspect, and, as soon as I had reached Leipsic, I tried to free myself altogether from my connection with the Church.”*

I am pleading, however, for nothing more than liberty in this matter, and for a rational treatment

* Autobiography, vol. i. p. 248, 250. Engl. Transl.

of a most important and delicate subject. I wish people to see that there are two sides to the question, and that it cannot be cavalierly dismissed by rhetorical platitudes about "the principles of the Reformation." Let the Bishops grapple with it openly and courageously. Let them see that only competent persons are allowed to hear confessions; and by competent persons I mean persons who are "discreet and learned," that is, trained in moral divinity and certified to be otherwise fit for the office. This is what the words "discreet and learned" mean in the Exhortation in our Communion Office. It is a technical expression, and occurs frequently in, for example, Peter Lombard, Aquinas, and Bonaventura, in the sense of an authorised confessor. Let the Bishops inquire into the facts before they hastily condemn a discipline of whose practical working many of them are entirely ignorant. The public mind is saturated with groundless prejudices and misapprehensions which none could so effectually dissipate as the Bishops. The fear, for instance, that the privacy of family life is likely to be invaded in the confessional is, I believe, quite unfounded. Penitents go to confess their own sins, not those of others, and the mention of names is emphatically discouraged. Would it not be well to inquire, too, whether English Clergymen are ever in the habit of receiving the confessions of any against the wishes of their natural guardians? But if children go to confession with the full approbation of their parents, and wives with the consent of their husbands, what

right have irresponsible outsiders to interfere in the matter? It is these meddlers who, in fact, invade the sanctity of private houses. "The heart knoweth its own bitterness, and a stranger" has surely no right to dictate the method of its treatment. I read, some time ago, an account of an anti-confessional meeting in Sheffield, at which a clergyman, an incumbent of the town I believe, illustrated his opinion on the subject by an anecdote. A man called upon him one day, he said, and astonished him by asking him to hear his confession. As soon as he recovered his self-possession he said to his visitor "Get thee behind me, Satan," and dismissed him. Now it does seem to me a little hard that God's Minister should on Sunday invite to confession any one whose conscience is troubled, and then on the Monday tell him to go to the Devil for being such a fool as to accept the invitation. And I cannot help thinking that the clergyman in question displayed a spirit of lawlessness far more outrageous than he would have done by wearing a chasuble or celebrating the Holy Communion with his face towards the East.

Your Lordship, however, will probably think that I have said enough upon this subject, and therefore I remain, for the present,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

MALCOLM MACCOLL.

LETTER VI.

THE RATIONALE OF RITUALISM.

MY LORD,

THE Archbishops of Canterbury and York, in language which recalls a tragic incident in Hebrew history, have on various occasions of late called upon the High Church party to separate themselves from the Ritualists, and leave them to their fate. But the appeal has fallen on unheeding ears; nor is the reason far to seek. Their Graces have forgotten that "Surely in vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird," else would they not have spread theirs so plainly in the sight of High Churchmen. The attack on Ritualism is, in truth, an attack on the High Church party along the whole line of its theological position. It has been very emphatically impressed upon us that the question at stake is not a question of æsthetics, but of doctrine—the doctrine, to wit, of Sacerdotalism; which means, in the minds of those who commonly make the objection, the Sacramental System in general. It will be admitted, I suppose, that Dr. Pusey, Dr. Liddon, Dr. Bright, the Dean of St. Paul's, and Canon Gregory are fair representa-

tives of the varying types of High Churchmanship as distinct from Ritualism. Yet these are the men whom the Archbishop of Canterbury has publicly denounced as not "perfectly loyal, not only to the general principles of the Church of England, but also to the law of the land and of the Church," * and whose promotion therefore to the posts which they severally occupy was discreditable to those responsible for it, however honest their intentions may have been. Let it be made perfectly plain that the thing which it is desired to "put down" is not the system of doctrines always held by the High Church party, but only such unhealthy excrescences as the Ritualistic movement may have grafted on it; and I venture to say that High Churchmen will do their best to second the efforts of those who desire to put such excrescences down. This point may be easily settled. The questions in debate relate to the doctrines connected with the Holy Communion and with Auricular Confession; and I have shown what the traditional and prescriptive position of the High Church party is on these points. Is it intended to drive them from that position? Then let the intention be plainly and honestly avowed. But if there is no such intention, it follows that doctrines which have ever been held and taught in the Church of England may be fitly symbolised in her worship. I know it is said by some that doctrines may be taught in the pulpit which may not be symbolised out of it. The Arch-

* See p. 287.

bishop of York holds that opinion and expressed it the other day in his place in Convocation. "But there is at least this distinction," he said, "between preaching and symbolising a doctrine. The worshipper sometimes says, 'I am no more committed to the statements of a preacher than I am to his dulness or eloquence. It is part of him, not of me. But if I go to the Holy Communion as a humble worshipper, I am committed to what the rites there used symbolise.'" *

There are no limits to the odd and crude things which "the worshipper sometimes says"; but I am surprised that a prelate of the Archbishop of York's position should have given his sanction to so transparent a fallacy. The preacher, *quâ* preacher, is the authorized exponent of the doctrine of the Church, and of nothing else. He ceases to be a private person the moment he enters the pulpit. He is there as her commissioned officer to deliver her message to his hearers, and he has not a particle of right to deliver from that vantage ground anything which is not part of her message. "His dulness or eloquence" is his own; the doctrine which he preaches is not; he commits the Church to it, and therefore all of her members who hear him, unless they protest against it. When Nestorius proclaimed his heresy from the pulpit of his cathedral, the congregation felt that they were committed to it unless they disowned it on the spot; and a faithful layman among

* *Guardian*, March 8, p. 270.

them rose and repudiated on their behalf the teaching of their Archbishop. Every priest in the Church of England is bound by his ordination vow "to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrines," and to teach only such doctrines "as this Church and Realm hath received." But the Archbishop of York dispenses him from the obligation, and even allows him to teach the doctrines which he has sworn to "drive away," provided always that he does it in explicit language from the pulpit, and not in figure and symbol at the altar! He may teach his people from the pulpit that the eastward position is the proper position for the celebrant; but he must give the lie to his words by going back to the north end of the altar! The argument is untenable and demoralizing, and I trust, for the sake of English honesty, that we shall hear no more of it. There is, of course, a wide field of open questions in which the preacher may expatiate at will; but when he enters upon theological ground he has no right to affirm as the doctrine of the Church anything which she has not declared to be her doctrine, or which is not fairly deducible from her authoritative statements. If, on the other hand, the doctrine in question be a necessary inference from anything which the Church has authoritatively declared, it may be taught through the medium of the eye as fitly as through that of the ear, and the worshipper is committed by the one just as much as by the other; or rather, he is much more likely to be committed by the latter than he is

by the former. Take the eastward position, for example. Those who deny the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist may see in the eastward position nothing but the appropriate attitude of the official representative and spokesman of the congregation. But a sermon in defence of the sacrificial significance of the eastward position commits the congregation, inasmuch as the preacher *is* not, while he is in the pulpit, a private person, but a public officer delivering an official message. What should we think of a man who gravely argued that our ambassador in Paris could not commit his country by publicly advocating, at one of President MacMahon's *levées*, the restoration of the Monarchy in the person of the Comte de Chambord, but would commit his country if he presumed to wear a *fleur-de-lis* in his button-hole? I think we should say that he was a very unfit person to be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Bennett, let it be remembered, taught the doctrines of "the Real and Actual Presence of our Lord, under the form of bread and wine upon the altars of our Churches," and, as a consequence, the duty of Eucharistical Adoration and the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and he taught these doctrines, not as private opinions at all, but as part of "the faith once delivered to the saints." * And Mr. Bennett was acquitted. His Judges censured his words, indeed, as "rash and ill-judged," and "perilously near a violation of the law;" but the upshot of

* Brooke's Six Privy Council Judgments, pp. 219, 220.

it is that any clergyman in the Church of England may, even in "words," go as "perilously near a violation of the law" as Mr. Bennett is supposed to have done, and yet be no offender. Now to tell reasonable beings that a clergyman may teach all this in the pulpit, but must on no account use any dress or attitude that *may*, but *need not*, express the same thing, is surely to betray a very poor opinion of their understandings.

But let us, for the sake of argument, grant the distinction suggested by the Archbishop of York, and see what follows. If the eastward position and the Eucharistic vestments are so intimately associated with the doctrine of the Real Presence and of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, that the worshipper who witnesses their use is necessarily committed to these doctrines, it follows that the north-end position and the absence of the Eucharistic vestments will commit High Churchmen to a denial of the doctrine of the Real Presence and of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. And are High Churchmen the only Churchmen whose consciences are not to be considered in this matter? Is this the sort of policy by which it is hoped to separate them from the Ritualists? Is this the meaning of the toleration which is so ostentatiously offered to the High Church School as distinguished from the Ritualists? Again I say, "In vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird." Low Church clergymen—I don't say all—refuse to obey the plain Rubric which orders them to address each communi-

cant separately in delivering the Sacrament, because they do not believe that Christ died for every man; and the communicants are thus committed to an anti-Christian doctrine. Yet I have not seen any condemnation of this very flagrant lawlessness on the part of our Bishops.

I dismiss, therefore, as unworthy of serious consideration, the distinction sought to be drawn between teaching by word of mouth from the pulpit and teaching through the imagery of symbolism at the altar, and I assume, as an incontestable truism, that what a clergyman may teach in the one way he may teach in the other way. I accept, at the same time, the sincerity of the offer of toleration so kindly, if somewhat unnecessarily, made to the High Church party. The doctrines historically identified with that party I have, I trust, sufficiently explained in the preceding pages, and toleration for them must therefore carry with it toleration for any ritual which does not go beyond them. I am, therefore, now in a position to discuss Ritualism on its own intrinsic merits. Those who are disposed to admit its utility in divine worship have no reasonable ground of objection on the score of doctrine, unless they can show that the doctrine to which they object is outside the circle of those which I have proved to belong to the heritage of the High Church party.

I am inclined to think that the Church of England, ever since the Reformation, has made far too meagre a use of the dramatic element in religion, by which I mean here the presentation of truth through appropriate symbols. The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination and the feelings, and these are affected by moving images presented before the eyes much more than by words addressed to the ear. And this is true especially of the young and the uneducated. Parents have now the sense to use the element of ritual largely in the education of their children. They employ illustrated alphabets and object lessons to impress on the imagination and memory the teaching which they address through the ear to the reason. Now the poor are in this respect very much in the condition of children. When the intellect is cultivated it can apprehend truths in an abstract form; though even then it cannot fully realize them without giving them, so to speak, a body of some kind. The most cultivated man instinctively clothes his ideas in words, even while he thinks mutely in his study; his thoughts, as they arise, array themselves in a dress of some sort.

But the poor cannot grasp truths in an abstract shape. In order to make an impression, they must be addressed to them in the concrete. And popular lecturers on secular subjects understand the need, and do their best to supply it. What should we think of a lecturer on science who disdained the use

of illustrations addressed to the eye? Professor Tyndall, eloquent as he is, and master of his subject—when he sticks to it,—would think a man a fool who recommended him to appeal to the naked reason of his audience, and dispense altogether with the illustrative element which adds so much to the charm and the instructiveness of his lectures. Faraday always appealed to the sight as well as to the intelligence. He one day said to a young lecturer, “If I said to my audience, ‘This stone will fall to the ground if I open my hand,’ I should not be content with saying the words; I should open my hand, and let it fall. Take nothing for granted. Inform the eye at the same time that you address the ear.” “In conveying ideas to the mind by the eye,” says Dr. Morrison, in his introduction to his Anglo-Chinese dictionary, “the Chinese language answers all the purposes of a written medium as well as, perhaps better than, the alphabetic system of the West. Ideas reach the mind more quickly and vividly by the eye than by the ear. To natives the Chinese writing darts upon the mind with singular force and beauty.”

Look, again, at the important part which ritual plays in the affairs of temporal government. What is the meaning of all the pomp and splendour which surround the Queen when she appears in state among her subjects? What mean the antique dresses of the heralds and “beefeaters,” and all the other pageantry of court ceremonial? The cynical may

laugh at them, but wise men recognize their use. These quaint dresses connect the England of to-day with the England of a hoary past, and teach, in a manner more vivid and instructive than school-books, that though the individual monarch dies, the monarchy ever lives, and that England is none the less fresh and vigorous for being Old England. Who can tell how much of the stability of English institutions is due to the ritualism in which they are enshrined? Let the Queen dispense with the usual ceremonial; let her drive down to Parliament in a private brougham, and in the ordinary dress of an English gentlewoman, and let the assembled peers and faithful Commons receive her in their usual attire; let the same absence of ceremonial prevail in all other meetings between her Majesty and her subjects; let all distinctions of rank be abolished, except in name—and who can doubt that in a few years England would be a republic? Who can doubt, too, that the order and sobriety with which the debates of the House of Commons are, on the whole, conducted, are mainly due to that atmosphere of ritualism which pervades all its forms? What is the meaning of the unfailing reverence which every member pays to the mace? What mean the Speaker's chair of office, and silk gown, and awful wig? What means the peremptory rule which compels all members to wear the regulation hat? I remember the sensation that was caused some years ago when Mr. Bright suggested that members should be allowed to

attend the Speaker's dinners in ordinary dresses. Why should they not if ritualism is nothing better than the plaything of fools? When Cromwell abolished the monarchy and established a despotism he acted consistently in commanding one of his soldiers to "take away that bauble." The mace had in truth become a "bauble" when the idea which it symbolized had perished.

This principle of symbolism runs, in fact, through all our institutions. Propose to take away the uniform of our soldiers and dress them in plain clothes, and you will soon see whether the army thinks ritual a matter of no significance. And why should "ecclesiastical millinery" be the only millinery which is contemptible? We do not laugh at regimental millinery. We do not despise the officer who defends the flag of his regiment with his life-blood, and wraps it round him in the agony of death. It is but a trifle, perhaps a blood-stained rag; but to him it is the symbol of glorious battle-fields, and a bond of union with generations of brave men who upheld their country's honour, of which that flag was a symbol. And why should the clergy of the Church of England be the only class of Englishmen in whom it is criminal to indulge in the poetry and sentiment of their calling? The lives of many of them, God knows, are dull and prosaic enough, and if it cheers them to think, when they return from the bed of sickness and perhaps of infection, that in their public ministrations they wear the same official dress which "the noble army of

martyrs" wore before them, is it kind to "exasperate them"—I quote the language of the late Mr. Robertson of Brighton—"with cold unsympathising reproofs" or supercilious gibes? To call the Eucharistic Vestments Popish is childish. They are Popish in the sense in which hats and coats are Popish—that is to say, Roman Catholics use them; but so also do the priests of the Greek Church and of the Armenian, the priests of Abyssinia and of Protestant Norway. They are therefore a link of connection with the rest of Christendom, and I am conservative enough to object to the abolition of old things merely because they are old. "Only once," says Niebuhr, "has the world beheld universal contempt invoked upon the whole of the past." The allusion is to the French Revolution; and what has been the history of France since that violent rupture with the past but a series of alternate oscillations between anarchy and despotism? And is there no warning in the fact that those Churches of the Reformation which severed their connection entirely with the past have been gradually drifting away from Christianity, till, in some cases, they have lost sight even of its shores? What can be more melancholy than the account recently given by the *Times* correspondent at Berlin, himself a German, of the state of "religious thought in Germany?" * No one who reads the signs of the times can think that we are in any serious danger of bearing

* "Religious Thought in Germany, reprinted by permission from the *Times*." *Passim*.

ourselves too reverently towards the past. The tendencies are all in the opposite direction ; and for this reason, as well as for others, I should regret any decision which the popular mind would inevitably interpret as an open breach between the past and present of the Church of England.

Is it not well to pause, then, before we too rashly condemn a mode of worship which may be peculiarly adapted to the needs of the poor, and in which even some of the educated classes may find edification ? The language of signs is, in reality, the *lingua franca* of mankind. I have seen at Naples a play performed in dumb show so admirably that it was quite easy to follow all its incidents from beginning to end. Captain Cook says of the Tahitians that "when they were conversing with each other they joined signs to their words, which were so expressive that a stranger might easily understand their meaning." Humboldt remarked the same peculiarity in the American Indians, and Mr. Tylor, in his learned "*Researches into the Early History of Mankind*," supplies a great deal of very interesting corroborative evidence on the same point. The following passage is worth quoting:—

"In the Berlin Institution of the Deaf and Dumb," he says, "the simple Lutheran Service—a prayer, the Gospel for the day, and a sermon—is acted every Sunday morning in the gesture language for the children in the school and the deaf and dumb inhabitants of the city, and it is a very remarkable sight.

No one could see the parable of the man who left the ninety and nine sheep in the wilderness and went after that which was lost, or of the woman who lost the one piece of silver, performed in expressive pantomime by a master in the art, without acknowledging that for telling a simple story and making simple comments on it, spoken language stands far behind acting. The spoken narrative must lose the sudden anxiety of the shepherd when he counts his flock and finds a sheep wanting; his hurried penning up the rest; his running up hill and down dale, and spying backwards and forwards; his face lighting up when he catches sight of the missing sheep in the distance; his carrying it home in his arms, hugging it as he goes. We hear these stories read as though they were lists of generations of antediluvian patriarchs. The deaf and dumb pantomime calls to mind the 'Action! action! action!' of Demosthenes."*

There are, of course, degrees of ritual. There may be too much ceremonial as well as too little. The picture may be lost in the gorgeousness of its frame; but it surely does not follow that there need be no frame at all to set it off. I am contending for the principle of Ritualism, rather than for the degree of ritual which is admissible in religious worship. The latter depends on a variety of circumstances which will suggest themselves to the reader, but which it is not necessary here to discuss.

What I wish to insist on is, that the principle of

* *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*, p. 88.

Ritualism has been too much ignored in the ordinary worship of the Church of England. Look at the great majority of our churches. Where is there any appeal to the eye, either in the furniture of the church or in the ritual of the service? The ear is the only sense addressed, and that sometimes after a fashion by no means edifying. There is nothing to suggest to the worshipper that he is in the house of God. He comes ostensibly to worship his Maker; in reality, to be entertained by a state official. Unconsciously, of course, but in matter of fact, his thoughts are more occupied about himself than about the Great Presence which is there, though invisible. This unconscious self-worship is really at the bottom of much of the popular dislike to Ritualism. It is one of the evils of reforms which have been delayed too long, that they are apt to run into the opposite extreme by force of the recoil. The rights of the individual were unduly depressed under the mediæval system. Can it be denied that the tendency of the Reformation has been to exalt them unduly? What is the feeling which secretly lies at the bottom of the objection to the priest "turning his back upon the people?" Is it not a feeling of wounded self-love? It is not God so much as the congregation whom the officiating minister is expected to honour. The idea of self is predominant, that of God vague and unreal. The truth is, no small part of the dislike to Ritualism is based on an imperfect grasp of God's Omnipresence. His Person is not believed to be present

among us, but only His graces and influences. His Person is supposed to be in some distant region far beyond the skies, and the natural consequence of such a view is a very faint conception of what Divine worship means. According to the other view God is in very truth present in the midst of us. The material world and the spiritual are not divided from each other by inconceivable distances of space, but by states of existence. Death is not a transit through space, but an ascent in the sphere of being. In the poet's words, "Heaven lies about us " as the sights and sounds of this fair earth lie about a man born deaf and dumb, and it probably requires nothing more than the opening out of undeveloped senses within us to reveal to us the wonders of the new creation.

It is obvious that these two views will show themselves in two distinct kinds of worship. Those who believe that God is not here at all, except in figure and in energy, will be careless in their mode of worshipping Him. They see no necessity for decorating the temple or beautifying the service of an absent God, and any attitude which implies a belief in His Real Presence is an offence to them. A northern bishop not long ago publicly rebuked some persons whom he noticed bowing at the name of Jesus in the course of Divine Service. He regarded it as a superstitious custom ; and so it was from his point of view. When the priest "turns his back upon the people," or to speak more accurately, when

he and the people are looking in one direction, the natural inference is that he is, as the representative of his flock, addressing their petitions or thanks to a Being there invisibly present. But those who do not believe in such Presence are annoyed at the affront, as they conceive it, which has been offered to themselves. Of course, God is not more present at the east end of the church than at the west, for He cannot be localised or confined in space. But it is impossible to realize His presence at all unless we think of Him as localised. *Dolus latet in generalibus.* General statements about God's omnipresence leave no definite impression on the mind. And so God Himself condescends to our infirmities and encourages us to think of Him as "placing His name" or His "presence" in certain localities. Thus, too, Daniel prayed at stated periods with his face towards Jerusalem, not because he believed that God was not present by "the waters of Babylon," but because Jehovah had "placed His name" on Mount Zion, and Daniel found it a help to devotion to image Him there. And he chose to be cast into the den of lions rather than give up what was to him, doctrinally, the "eastward position." Those who believe that God is actually in the midst of them will of necessity demean themselves differently from those who think that He is far away. Is it an exaggeration to say that the mode of conducting service in too many of our churches has frozen to death the idea of worship?

But I shall be told that God is to be worshipped "in spirit and in truth," and that such worship is inconsistent with Ritualism. That argument, however, proves either too much or too little. If it means that God is to be worshipped "in spirit and in truth" *only*, then it proscribes all worship by the body whatever. To kneel, to sing, to utter prayers, are all acts of the body. The spirit can offer its homage without a single movement on the part of its material organ. But common sense teaches even the most violent Anti-Ritualist that a worship which is purely spiritual will soon degenerate into no worship at all. If, on the other hand, it be admitted that to worship God "in spirit and in truth" need not exclude the body from all participation in the homage of the spirit, the whole principle of Ritualism is allowed. Any interpretation of the text which shall include Dean Close cannot logically exclude Mr. Mackonochie. There may be some to whom an ornate ritual is a hindrance rather than an aid to devotion; but there are certainly others who find themselves able to worship God "in spirit and in truth" all the more earnestly from having their bodily senses enlisted in the service.

Since, however, Scripture is appealed to, let us see what it has to say on the subject of Ritualism. Was there ever a more ritualistic worship than that which was prescribed by God Himself to His ancient people? Let us take a few illustrations.

The dominating idea of the character of God

which had to be implanted in the minds of the Israelites was His holiness or purity. The idea had well-nigh vanished from the minds of men. All the religions of heathendom were impure at the core. Many of them had their central idea in impure associations and conceptions. Idolatry is essentially impure, and finds in men's sensual propensities its strongest fascination. Now, how was the lost idea of the divine purity to be restored? The Israelites were to be the teachers of mankind. But, in order to be teachers to any good purpose, they must themselves be effectually taught. How did God do this? By means, mainly, of the ritualistic element. To the right hand and to the left, in all his ordinary avocations as well as in all the functions of religious worship, the Hebrew was reminded continually of the irreconcilable contrast between the pure and the impure. The initiatory rite of his religion was meant to impress that lesson upon him for ever. Man was sternly forbidden to approach Him Who was "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity," in the careless way he might approach his fellow-man. Even God's faithful servants, those Whom He deigned to call His friends and to admit to a closer communion than the multitude, must be careful to remember where they are and Who He is. When Moses turned round to see "the great sight" on Mount Horeb, a mysterious voice warned him to be reverent. "Draw not nigh hither; put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the

place whereon thou standest is holy ground." And when the Law was given from Mount Sinai: "The Lord said unto Moses, Go unto the people, and sanctify them to-day and to-morrow, and let them wash their clothes and be ready against the third day: for the third day, the Lord will come down in the sight of all the people upon Mount Sinai. And thou shalt set bounds unto the people round about, saying, Take heed to yourselves, that ye go not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it. Whosoever toucheth the mount shall be surely put to death. There shall not an hand touch it, but he shall surely be stoned, or shot through; whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the trumpet soundeth long, they shall come up to the mount." What a profound impression all these solemn instructions were calculated to make on the slaves who had escaped from the bondage of Egypt! How far above them must they have conceived that Being to be whose purity required to be fenced round with these minute precautions!

Consider, further, the diversified machinery by which this idea of the Divine holiness was exemplified in all the ritual and sacrificial worship of the Israelites. All through the different parts of Divine Service the comparison between what was pure and what impure was constantly obtruded upon their bodily senses. All the animals of Palestine were divided into two classes—clean and unclean; and those belonging to the former class alone could be offered in sacrifice to God. Nor was this all. The

animal must not only be from the class denominated as clean, but itself, as an individual, must be "without spot or blemish." And then when all this was accomplished, the people themselves were not deemed worthy to make the offering. It was to be offered by a class of men who were distinguished from their brethren, consecrated in a solemn manner, and set apart for the service of the priest's office. Thus the idea of purity was borne in upon the minds of the Israelites in two ways: a pure victim, and a priest purified and set apart to offer it to Jehovah, combined to impress the worshipper with the unapproachable purity of the God of Israel. But, yet again, before the sacrifice could be offered, it was washed with clean water; and the priest had in some cases to wash himself, and officiate without his sandals. And then, when one process of comparison after another had attached the idea of surpassing purity to the sacrifice, one thing more was added, to complete the contrast between the purity of God and the highest degree of earthly purity. Neither priest, people, nor sacrifice was deemed sufficiently pure to come into the Divine Presence, and therefore the offering was made outside the Holy of Holies.

Who does not see that this elaborate acting out of the idea of infinite purity was incalculably more likely to impress it on the mind than any number of sermons, however eloquent?

What mean, too, those minute directions in all that concerned the worship of Jehovah? the vest-

ments of His ministers, and their material, and shape, and colour? the furniture of the Tabernacle, with its gold and silver, and precious woods and costly gems? What means all this, if God loves what men call "a simple worship?" When necessity so ordains it, He is as acceptably worshipped in upper rooms and catacombs as in the most gorgeous edifices. He heard the cry of His people Israel from among their brick-kilns, and sent a deliverer to break their chains. But when they departed from the house of bondage, laden with the spoils of Egypt, He would accept nothing short of their costliest gifts. All the apparatus of His worship was to be "for glory and for beauty." Does this tally with the notion so popular in some quarters—I mean the notion that the only worship worthy of Almighty God, and which is acceptable in His sight, is a worship bereft of all that pomp and splendour which are considered due to earthly Majesties? Such a notion finds no sanction either in reason or in Scripture. "When God created this lower world," says a sober writer, "He created it according to the pattern of the world above, in order that this world might be the image of the world above; and His reason for so doing was, that the one world might be connected with the other." * We are too forgetful of the profound truth here hinted at. There is nothing in this world of fleeting phenomena which possesses an independent existence. All things that live have their root in a spiritual

* Dean Lyall's *Propædia Prophetica*, p. 264.

cause, and must ultimately be referred to Him in Whom "we live, and move, and have our being." The repugnance to the doctrine of the Real Presence in the Sacrament is really due to the popular misconception that God is far away instead of being very close to us. In one sense, and that a very real one, the whole visible creation may be said to feed upon its God, for all its life is derived from Him. Its teeming fruitfulness and ravishing—though evanescent—beauty, are but the fruitage and the efflorescence of the eternal uncreated Beauty energizing behind the veil of material phenomena. This is the reason, as I have already observed, why Pantheism has always kept so tenacious a hold on the imaginations of men. It expresses a deep truth, though a distorted one. It is an unconscious protest against that cold and barren theology which makes of God a mere epicurean deity living in a distant place called heaven, out of which He will emerge one day in order to destroy this world and transport a fraction of mankind to the heavenly mansions which He has prepared for them. The truth is that it requires no energy on the part of God to destroy the creation. On the contrary, it is His pervading energy which unceasingly sustains it, and if that energy were withdrawn but for a moment nature would immediately collapse, and there would be a universal silence of the spheres. We talk of laws of nature; but what are these but our human mode of expressing the methodical

operation of Him who "worketh hitherto" behind forces which science may classify but cannot account for?

Now if it be true, as Dean Lyall has said, that "when God created this lower world, He created it according to the pattern of the world above," we see at once why all the ritual arrangements of His worship should be designed "for glory and for beauty." He is emphatically "the King in His beauty," and this earth, though the slime of the Serpent has passed over it, and strewn though it be with moral ruins, still bears manifold witness to His love for all that delights the eye and charms the ear. To my mind the wealth of beauty expended on the plumage of a humming-bird, or on the gauzy wings of some ephemeral insects, is almost more wonderful than the creation of an archangel. Ransack the whole kingdom of nature and you will find no organic existence, from the minutest to the most stupendous, which does not give evidence of a love of beauty for its own sake. The tiniest atom of organized matter, insects which can only be seen under the microscope, are each and all formed on a distinct type, and fashioned after some pattern of exquisite beauty. This proves that beauty of form and colour was not created merely in order that men might see and admire it. God's love of beauty for its own sake is written on the imperishable rocks and on the everlasting hills. Long before man was created the world was full of beauties which gladdened no

human eye, though they have left their records on the rocks. And even now man sees but a small portion of the beauties of nature. Look at the ocean alone, and think of the world of wonders, buried in its bosom, which eye of man has never seen. There is not a shell in all its depths or along its innumerable shores which does not bear witness to a love of beauty on the part of Him Who made it.

I am tempted to quote, in illustration of these remarks, an appropriate passage from Mr. Gladstone's address on Wedgwood in 1863.

"Beauty," he says, "is not an accident of things, it pertains to their essence, it pervades the wide range of creation, and wherever it is impaired or banished we have in this fact the proof of the moral disorder which disturbs the world. Reject, therefore, the false philosophy of those who will ask what does it matter, provided a thing be useful, whether it be beautiful or not, and say in reply that we will take one lesson from Almighty God, Who in His works hath shown us, and in His Word also has told us, that 'He hath made everything,' not one thing or another thing, but, 'everything beautiful in His time.' Among all the devices of creation there is not one more wonderful—whether it be the movement of the heavenly bodies, or the succession of the seasons and the years, or the adaptation of the world and its phenomena to the conditions of human life, or the structure of the eye or hand, or any other part of the frame of man—not one of all these is

more wonderful than the profuseness with which the Mighty Maker has been pleased to shed over the works of His hands an endless and boundless beauty.

“And to this constitution of things outward the constitution and mind of man, deranged although they be, still answer from within. Down to the humblest condition of life, down to the lowest and most backward grade of civilization, the nature of man craves, and seems as it were even to cry aloud, for something, some sign or token at the least of what is beautiful, in some of the many spheres of mind or sense. This it is that makes the Spitalfields weaver, amidst the murky streets of London, train canaries and bullfinches to sing to him at his work, that fills with flower-pots the windows of the poor, that leads the peasant of Pembrokeshire to paint the outside of his cottage in the gayest colours, that prompts in the humbler classes of women a desire for some little personal ornament, certainly not without its dangers (for what sort of indulgence can ever be without them?), yet sometimes, perhaps, too sternly repressed from the high and luxurious places of society. But, indeed, we trace the operation of this principle yet more conspicuously in a loftier region—in that instinct of natural and Christian piety which taught the early masters of the fine arts to clothe not only the most venerable characters associated with the objects and history of our faith, but especially the idea of the Sacred Person of our Lord in the noblest forms of beauty

that their minds could conceive or their hands could execute."*

If, then, we find the love of beauty inherent in the nature both of God and man, does it stand to reason that "a simple worship"—that is, a worship which gives no response to man's craving after what is beautiful in sight and sound—is, of necessity, the most pleasing to God and the most edifying to man? If this be so, what shall we say of the ornate ritual of the Tabernacle and the Temple—a ritual fashioned after the pattern shown to Moses in the mount? But I shall be told that the Mosaic ritual was prescribed for a particular epoch, and for a rude people, but that Christ has abolished all that, and that we who live beneath the sunlight of the Gospel ought to worship God "in spirit and in truth"—that is, without the aid of any appeal to our bodily senses. Well, I confess I should not like to have to prove that the Jews of Solomon's time and of our Saviour's, or even those whom Moses led out of Egypt, were much ruder than the great mass of our peasantry. And as to our Lord prescribing "a simple worship," it is enough to say that the assertion rests on an unproved assumption. He was a constant attendant on the ritualistic services of the Temple, and never dropped a hint of disapproval. Nay, more, the dramatic, or symbolical, or ritualistic element (however we may term it) is very prominent in His own

* "Wedgwood : an Address," p. 14. Cf. the Duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law," pp. 197-204.

ministerial acts and teaching. His miracles were hardly ever performed "in spirit and in truth" in the sense in which that phrase is ignorantly understood; the exertion of His Divine Power was always accompanied by some outward gesture, and sometimes by very elaborate and mysterious details, such as when, spitting on the ground, and making clay with the spittle, He anointed the blind man's eyes, and bade him go and wash in the pool of Siloam. When He sent out His disciples to preach, He told them "to shake off the dust of the village or city" which rejected them as a witness against it. And what could have been more dramatic than the lesson of humility which He taught them at the Last Supper when "He laid aside His garments, and took a towel, and girded Himself;" and then "poureth water into a basin, and began to wash the disciples' feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith He was girded;" adding, "I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you?" He acted the virtue before their eyes. And can any one doubt that this was likely to make a much more lasting impression than any precept? When, in after days, any of that chosen company happened to feel the temptation of pride and hardness towards others, would not his thoughts revert instinctively to that supper chamber and to the figure of his Divine Master girding Himself with a towel, and stooping down to wash His disciples' feet? What sermon, though spoken by the tongue of an archangel, could

soften the heart like the imperishable memory of that tender, solemn incident?

What, moreover, are we to say of the ritual described in the Apocalypse? It is not altogether the ritual of the Temple; but it is like it, and we must either believe that "the disciple whom Jesus loved" has given us a description of what he actually saw in heaven, or (which is more probable) that he has clothed his heavenly visions in the garb of the Christian ritual with which he was familiar. In either case, we have very high authority for preferring an ornate to "a simple," which too often means a slovenly, worship. Certainly an Apostle who believed that an elaborate ritual was condemned by the Gospel would hardly have given us so very ritualistic a representation of the worship of heaven.

One of the best, and certainly one of the most eloquent answers ever made to the objection, that the style of worship presented in the Mosaic system has been abolished by the Gospel, is given by Mr. Ruskin in the first chapter of his "Seven Lamps of Architecture." The passage is too long to quote, but the following extract will give an idea of the argument:—

"It is a most secure truth that although the particular ordinances divinely appointed for special purposes at any given period of man's history may be by the same authority abrogated at another, it is impossible that any character of God, appealed to or described in any ordinance past or present, can ever

be changed. God is one and the same, and is pleased or displeased at the same things for ever, although one part of His pleasure may be expressed at one time rather than another, and although the mode in which His pleasure is to be consulted may be by Him graciously modified to the circumstances of men."

He goes on to show that costliness and beauty were two attributes of the Mosaic ritual which appealed to an unchangeable part of God's nature, and that these attributes must therefore enter, as much as possible, into the ritual of the Christian Church. We may extend the scope of Mr. Ruskin's argument and say that man, too, is the same all over the world in the essential characteristics of his nature, and therefore it follows that any system of teaching which appeals to an essential element in humanity must be true for ever. It may vary in its form; but in its essence it can never become obsolete. If it be true, as I believe it is, that impressions conveyed through the eye are generally more deep and lasting than any other, and that ideas addressed directly to the understanding are more likely to fix their roots in the mind if they are, at the same time, envisaged before the gaze of the bodily eyes; then, however much you may vary the method of your appeal to the eye, the appeal itself can never be abrogated without a serious loss of teaching power.

But, then, it is said that an ornate ritual leads to superstition and is, in fact, Popish. I believe, how-

ever, that we are rapidly passing that stage of intellectual *cretinism* which condemns a thing merely because it is Popish. And as to the danger of superstition, we have need to be reminded of Bacon's warning, that "there is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstition formerly received: therefore, good care would be had that (as it fareth in ill purgings) the good be not taken away with the bad." On this point, too, Mr. Ruskin—an anti-Romanist if ever there was one—furnishes a conclusive answer, the drift of which will be apparent from one sentence:—

"The probability, in our times, of fellowship with the feelings of the idolatrous Romanist is absolutely as nothing compared with the danger to the Israelite of a sympathy with the idolatrous Egyptian; no speculation, no unproved danger; but proved fatally by their fall during a month's abandonment to their own will; a fall into the most servile idolatry; yet marked by such offerings to their idol as their leader was, in the close sequel, instructed to bid them offer to God."

I appeal, then, to reason, to Scripture, and to common sense against the unwise policy of placing an indiscriminate ban on a movement which may indeed be disfigured by some extravagances and eccentricities, but which, nevertheless, at bottom appeals to instincts in our nature which cannot be ignored with impunity. Why are the peasantry of

England the least æsthetic in the world? Go abroad, to Spain, or Italy, or France; go even to the northern latitudes of Russia and of Norway, and you will find an eye for beauty, and an instinctive appreciation of the harmony of colours. But the æsthetic sense seems to be almost crushed out of our peasantry; and this I attribute in no small degree to the Puritanical coldness and baldness of our worship. And this defect reacts upon all classes, and has made us as a nation singularly deficient in matters of taste. Yet at the bottom of our nature there is a craving for the Beautiful; and this is true in a remarkable degree of the poor, as any one who has had much to do with them can testify. We have, in truth, driven them from our churches by our "simple worship." Give them a bright service—something that interests their eyes and ears, cheerful sights and joyful sounds—something that shall penetrate the crust of their seeming apathy, and touch their feelings; give the poor a worship of that sort, and they will gladly flock back to the churches which now know them not. Let them feel that the parish church is indeed the poor man's home where he can retire for a season from the tyranny and the turmoil of the world around him, and be reminded that there is indeed an invisible world above and behind this material scene of weariness and pain, and they will require no other inducement to fill again our deserted temples. The poor man comes to us in his complete humanity, with all his feelings, his imaginations, his memory, his five

senses, and we treat him as if he were a disembodied spirit, composed of nothing but pure reason. He asks for bread, and we give him a stone. And what is the result? He does not come again. He goes to the gin palace or the casino, where "the children of this world, in their generation wiser than the children of light," understand full well the use of ritual—of bright colours and cheerful sounds. We refuse to give him what his soul longs for in the way of religion, and he takes it in the way of sin. Wesley said once, to one who objected to cheerful music in the service of the Church, that "he did not see why the devil should have all the good music to himself." And, for my part, I do not see why the devil should have all the good ritual to himself. Let us tolerate each other. Do not let us have a Procrustean system of worship which shall reduce everything to one dreary monotony of uniformity. Let a wide latitude of ritual be conceded where clergy and congregation are of one mind. Above all, let us have charity, and cease to call each other names. And then, perhaps, we may see the day when "Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim."

For indeed I believe that there is far more real unity between us at bottom than appears on the surface. Under varying phraseology we often mean the same thing. I remember a conversation which I had on some of these topics with that Apostolic man, Dr. Dollinger, while he was still in communion with the See of Rome. He gave me an explanation

of the doctrine of Transubstantiation which appeared to me to differ but little from what I understood the Anglican doctrine of the Real Presence to mean; and I was so struck with the explanation that I wrote it down. Some time afterwards I happened to broach the subject with a devout and intelligent Evangelical layman, and I quoted Dr. Döllinger's explanation of Transubstantiation without telling my Evangelical friend whose it was. He listened attentively, and then replied, "If that is your High Church doctrine of the Real Presence, I have believed it all my life." If we could only lay aside our controversial weapons and have "a truce of God" for a season, I verily believe that, putting a minority of uncharitable irreconcilables aside, the vast majority of churchmen would find no insuperable difficulty in drawing up a concordat. The Bonn Conference is an illustration of what may be done in this respect when men meet in the spirit of love and not of contention. I trust I shall not give offence to any one in saying that the Evangelicals, as a party, are not trained in scientific theology; and the consequence is that they are constantly crediting High Churchmen with doctrines which they repudiate; such, for instance, as a belief that the Eucharistic Sacrifice is a "repetition" of the Sacrifice on the Cross.

On the other hand, Evangelicals often manifest a reverential awe towards the Blessed Sacrament which is entirely inconsistent with the doctrine which they

theoretically profess. As an illustration of this let me quote the following anecdote :—

“ Before I conclude this point, I will add a short, but a very remarkable history, to let you see how high a respect and esteem the Tigurines have for that mysterious Sacrament. A gentleman of no mean rank (as I heard it often at the mouth of my good parent and many other eye-witnesses) being one of those candidates of divinity that once administered the Blessed Sacrament, during that holy Action, while he was holding the Cup, fixed his eyes upon a gentlewoman who was betrothed to him. She asked him some days after (when he met her in her father’s house) the reason why he looked thus earnestly upon her in the church, during the administration of the Sacrament? He told her, Because he had almost a fancy to drink her health : whereupon she began to hate and utterly detest him ; and the matter being spread, he was taken prisoner, and some weeks after *condemned and beheaded.*”*

But if the Lord’s Supper is only a pious and edifying meal, the figure of an absent Christ, not the sign and medium of His Presence, it is hard to see what this unfortunate “ gentleman of no mean rank ” did to deserve so cruel a punishment. A believer in the Real Presence would have cause to be shocked at what, according to his belief, would be an exhibition of profane levity, though I trust he would not consider decapitation the most Christian penalty. But why should

* Liturgia Tigurina, pp. 185, 186.

a Zuinglian feel shocked? Because the instinctive belief of his heart gives the lie to the scepticism of his understanding. Even the Dean of Carlisle professed his belief in the Real Presence the other day in the York Convocation; and if he were to compare notes with High Churchmen it is possible he might find himself more in agreement with them than he has ever allowed himself to imagine.

What then is the moral? Surely that we should bear with each other and try to come to an understanding. Let the Evangelicals look at the questions in dispute dispassionately, and they will find that they are really "disquieting themselves in vain." Take the question of the Vestments. It will be admitted, I suppose, that the clergy when they are performing Divine Service, and especially when they are celebrating that Sacrament which a layman has never been allowed to administer, should wear a distinctive dress. When a surpliced choir was a rare phenomenon the surplice sufficed for this purpose. But as surpliced choirs have multiplied, the courts of law have abridged the official vesture of the clergy, till at last they are left without any distinctive dress at all. The surplice is not a clerical vestment, and the stole, black as well as coloured, has been judicially forbidden. The clergy who wear a black stole are quite as "lawless" as those who wear a chasuble.

Why, then, should there be such a prejudice against the resumption of the Eucharistic Vestments? Have those who oppose them considered the polemi-

cal advantage which they are surrendering to the Church of Rome? These Vestments are used widely outside the Roman Communion, and they are certainly very ancient. To condemn them as Popish would therefore be to give Popery an antiquity and a catholicity which I, for one, should be sorry to do.

See, too, how readily men see the beautiful symbolism of artificial light in the Service of the Sanctuary as soon as they emancipate their reason from the thralldom of prejudice. In his charming "Commentary on the Epistles to the Seven Churches in Asia," Archbishop Trench has occasion to touch upon this subject, and after some interesting remarks, he proceeds as follows :—

"In accordance with this view of the matter, in the Levitical tabernacle the seven-branched candlestick stood in the Holy Place (Exod. xxvi. 35 ; xl. 4), which was the pattern of the Church upon earth, as the Holy of Holies was the pattern of the Church in heaven; and the only light which the Holy Place received was derived from that candlestick; the light of common day being excluded from it, in sign that the Lord God was the light thereof, that the light of the Church is not the light of nature, but of grace." *

There is one aspect of the Ritual controversy which, as it seems to me, has been a great deal too much neglected: I mean its bearing on the mass of our wage-receiving population.

* *Seven Churches in Asia*, p. 26.

A new power has quite recently appeared among the social and political forces of our time; a power which *may* work harmoniously with these forces, but which may, on the other hand, come into collision with them and overthrow them. The progress of education is gradually awakening the working-classes of the old and new worlds to a consciousness of their power; and the various appliances of modern civilization enable them to combine, if they so will, in a league which shall be irresistible against the upper strata of society. Political power everywhere is passing into the hands of the working men. In England it has passed into their hands already. And this is a most serious consideration. For, remember, the political condition of England is, in this respect, unique among civilized states. The world has seen many democracies built upon the broadest basis of the franchise; but never till now a State in which the great majority of those who vote the laws are men living on wages, with no property in the soil. The democracies of antiquity are no exception, for then the working-classes were slaves, who had no means of making their power felt except by the expedient of a servile war. Nor is France, with its universal suffrage, an exception, for the agricultural population of France is nine times larger than the trading population; and the great bulk of the agricultural population have property in the soil, and have consequently always shown themselves Conservative. In America, too, the wage-receiving classes

are in a decided minority; and, besides, land there is so abundant that even a working-man may, with intelligence and thrift, hope some day to become a landed proprietor. But in England those who live by wages are the majority; and they have no hope of acquiring property in land on any considerable scale except by a revolution, legislative or otherwise. What is to prevent them from making such a revolution? They control the House of Commons; they man our navy; they supply recruits for our army; and by stopping the supplies they have it in their power to paralyse the Executive Government.

I am not afraid of the working-classes, so long as Christianity holds its sway over them. But let that spell be broken, and I see no security for the stability of our institutions. Listen to the following ominous warning in the leading organ of social democracy in Berlin—a city which, by the way, is honeycombed with Socialistic and revolutionary principles:—"They who take heaven from the people must give them the earth. . . . When the priesthood bowed the neck of mankind, it gave to the suffering son of man the kindly hope of another and a better world. In all the misfortunes of life—in sorrow, need, and sickness—a sweet hope was still left to a believing mind. But what is now the case? There are still poverty and privation, sorrow, need, and sickness. And these are artificially enhanced and heaped upon one class, while the pleasures and good things of the world continue to enrich the other. What, then, have the

favoured of human society to offer to those millions through whose sickness, increased by poverty and care, *they* enjoy the pleasures of life? We tolerate no half measures, no evasions. . . . Ye wretched Pharisees, . . . who have deprived the people of the consolations of faith, . . . where is your logic? The logic of history is sterner than yours: the people have done with heaven; and now they are justified in demanding the earth."

Can any one suppose that this spirit can be cast out by a better knowledge of the laws of nature, and by lessons on political economy? To my mind the reasoning is irresistible on any other basis than that of Christianity. If there is no certainty of a world beyond the grave, where the wrongs of this world shall be redressed, it is mockery to tell the weary and heavy-laden, who constitute the majority, that they must remain for evermore contented with their wretched lot, and respect the so-called sacred rights of property. Why should they consider them sacred, if this life is all, or at least all of which we know anything certain? "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die," is the prudent philosophy, unless Christianity be true.

Mr. W. R. Greg, who knows the working classes well, comes to the same conclusion as the communistic writer of Berlin, though from a different point of view and for a different purpose. Read the following passage:—*

* *Rocks Ahead*, pp. 141-148.

“There can, I think, be little question that the doctrine of Christianity, which has exercised the widest influence—the widest *police* influence, so to speak, though perhaps not the most wholesome moral influence—has been its delineation of the future life as one of *compensation* for the troubles and inequalities of this. The teaching of the Gospel is startlingly explicit on this head. The last are to be first; the poor are to be rich; the slave is to be free; those who had a bad time of it here are to have a good time of it there—and *vice versâ*. The doctrine has been ridden hard; it has had much to do, and has done it well. ‘This light affliction, *which is but for a moment*,’ is to be repaid by an exceeding, even an eternal recompense. The joys and pains of earth are so poor and so short in comparison with those of the next world, that those who have drawn blanks in the lottery of life below ought to esteem themselves in truth the favoured of fortune, and would be foolish as well as rebellious to murmur or to envy. This sublunary scene is only the first act of the drama; the last act will set all right—will reverse as well as rectify the balance. No doctrine could have been devised so admirably qualified to instil endurance and content amid the privations and inequalities of human lots, to make the needy, the suffering, and even the oppressed, patient under what they have almost been induced to regard as a passing cloud or an insignificant distinction. No bolts or bars, no laws, no army of retainers, have been such effective guar-

dians of the possessions of the great and affluent ; the established order of things had no defence half so cheap, half so mighty, or of half such unsleeping vigilance. Why, indeed, should men of sense seek to overthrow arrangements and distributions of the elements of happiness that the brief space of fifty years will reverse for ever in their favour? What will be the result, what the possible catastrophe, when this doctrine is no longer accredited—when it is discarded as a delusion—when it is represented as a convenient deception and instrument of oppression ;—when the poor man is convinced that there is no wealth of gold and jewels awaiting him in the spiritual kingdom—that if he is wretched here he is wretched altogether—that what he lacks now will never hereafter be made good to him—that the promises and hopes dangled before him to keep him quiet have been mere moonshine, and that in very truth the bank in which he had insured his fortune, in which he had invested all his savings, to have a provision in which he had toiled with indefatigable industry and endured with exemplary patience, is a fraudulent insolvent ;—when, in fine, he wakes up with a start to the bewildering conviction that *if he is to rest, to be happy, to enjoy his fair share of the sunshine and the warmth of life, he must do it now, here, at once, without a day's delay?* Will there not come upon him that sort of feverish haste to be in luxury and at peace, to *immediatize* all that earth can yield him, to sink the uncertain future in the

passing present, which has been depicted in such vivid colours as pervading and maddening the daily thought and talk of the Socialists and Communists of the French metropolis?"

The salutary and restraining influences thus vividly depicted by Mr. Greg are rapidly on the wane, he tells us, among the working classes of this country. "Among working men it is for the most part absolute atheism, and is complicated by a marked feeling of antagonism towards the teachers of Religion, a kind of resentment growing out of the conviction that they have been systematically deluded by those who ought to have enlightened them." And then he adds in a note, "I am assured, however, that this can scarcely be stated as broadly as a few years ago—*considerably owing to the Ritualists.*"*

Is it wise, I venture to ask, in the face of these facts, to set all the machinery of Parliament in motion in order to "put down" a movement which, whatever else we may think of it, is rapidly winning the working classes back to the Church from which our pew system and "simple worship" expelled them? I am happy to find my opinion on this point corroborated by the late Bishop of Exeter in the following passage:—

"When the congregation consists mainly of the poorest orders, then we commonly observe a great love of a majestic and even elaborate service. The ornaments of their church—the storied glass—the

* *Rocks Ahead*, p. 181.

painted, and, it may be, gilded walls—the Table of the Lord, elevated above the rest, and decked with sober yet costly furniture—the pealing organ—the chanted Psalms—the surpliced choristers—the solemnity of the whole ritual—gladdens, while it elevates their minds; they recognize in it their own high privilege as Christians, and rejoice to find themselves equal participants with their richest neighbours in the homage thus paid to the common Lord and Father of all. In truth, when we consider the little which the poor man has to delight his heart, and touch his imagination, in his own squalid home, we ought to rejoice that he can find enjoyment in the House of Prayer, his Father's House. For this reason, few occurrences have affected me more than the lamentations of the poor worshippers in one of the districts of the metropolis, when they saw, or thought they saw, at the dictation of a riotous and lawless mob, the approaching surrender of the ritual which they loved, and which was their weekly—to many among them the daily—solace of that poverty to which the providence of God had consigned them. Incidents such as this cannot be separated from the general character of the proceedings of the past winter. The rioters at S. Barnabas's were stimulated to their violence by the words and deeds of men of a far higher order than their own.”*

I shall have something to say about the S. Barnabas

* A Pastoral Letter by the Bishop of Exeter (A.D. 1851) p. 88.

riots presently. Meanwhile I should like the country squires, who ran amuck at Ritualism in the dog days of last summer, to consider whether there may not be something worse than Ritualism, after all. They may succeed in "putting down Ritualism"—though I hardly think they will—but if they do, the day may come when they will rue their own success. Let them try to look at the question from the point of reason and common sense. Let them inquire. Anybody can shout; but the example of the Ephesian devotees of Diana is not a good precedent for the members of the House of Commons. Let them examine facts and see whether Ritualism draws people to church who would not otherwise be attracted. Does it help to make them better citizens and better Christians than they were? Does it supply a want not sufficiently recognised in our mode of conducting Divine Service? If it does not, we need not make ourselves uneasy about it, for it will die of atrophy. But if it does supply such a want, we shall not succeed in suppressing it, though we may possibly succeed in driving it out of the Church. *Naturam expellas furcâ; tamen usque recurret.* Truth will in the long run always avenge herself on those who try to crush her. Why cannot we learn wisdom from the past? Must we pursue for ever a policy of proscription without inquiry in the case of every religious movement which goes a little out of the ordinary grooves? As a nation we are accustomed to plume ourselves on our glorious liberty of

private judgment—especially in matters of religion. Yes, our judgment is free enough from external restraint; but we make very little use of our liberty. Our habitual attitude towards any religious movement which happens to conflict with our traditions is one of unreasoning hostility. “Innovation” is an abomination to us, and we straightway suppress it by an Act of Uniformity, or damn it with an epithet and cast the innovators out of our synagogues. Thus were the energy and the devotion of Wesleyanism lost to the Church of England in the last century. Thus did she lose the splendid intellect and the tender heart of the incomparable Newman in our own generation. Who that has read the pathetic story of his persecutions, as it is given in his own *Apologia*, can avoid a feeling of burning indignation at the stupid bigotry which knew not how to use such gifts as his? Or what English Churchman, even at this distance of time, can read without emotion the passionate outburst of despairing fondness in which the great leader of the Tractarian Movement bade farewell to the ungrateful mother whose harsh treatment drove him from her service?

“O my mother, whence is this unto thee, that thou hast good things poured upon thee and canst not keep them, and barest children yet darest not own them? Why hast thou not the skill to use their services, nor the heart to rejoice in their love? How is it that whatever is generous in purpose and tender or deep in devotion, thy flower and thy

promise, falls from thy bosom, and finds no home within thine arms? Who hath put this note upon thee, to have 'a miscarrying womb and dry breasts,' to be strange to thine own flesh, and thine eye cruel towards thy little ones? Thine own offspring, the fruit of thy womb, who love thee and would toil for thee, thou dost gaze upon with fear, as though a portent, or thou dost loathe as an offence; at best thou dost but endure, as if they had no claim but on thy patience, self-possession, and vigilance, to be rid of them as easily as thou mayest. Thou makest them 'stand all the day idle' as the very condition of thy bearing with them; or thou biddest them be gone where they will be more welcome; or thou sellest them for nought to the stranger that passes by. And what wilt thou do in the end thereof?"

Still more recently the late Mr. Robertson, of Brighton, made the same complaint.

"I wish to God," he says, "we had a little soldier's spirit in our Church! But no! the Church of England will endure no chivalry, no *dash*, no effervescing enthusiasm. She cannot turn it to account as Rome turns that of her Loyolas and Xaviers. We have nothing but sober, prosaic routine; and the moment any one with heart and nerve fit to be a leader of a forlorn hope appears, we call him a dangerous man, and exasperate him by cold, unsympathising reproofs till he becomes a Dissenter and a demagogue. . . . Well, I suppose God will punish us, if in no other way, by banishing from us all

noble spirits, like Newman and Manning in one direction, and men like Kingsley in another, leaving us to flounder in the mud of commonplace, unable to rise or sink above the dead level."

Coleridge, too, another choice spirit, protested more than forty years ago against the unstatesman-like policy of our ecclesiastical authorities.

"There seems to me at present," he says, "to be a curse upon the English Church, and upon the governors of all institutions connected with the orderly advancement of national piety and knowledge: it is the curse of *prudence*, as they miscall it; *in fact, of fear.*"

These words are true to-day. Look at the joint Pastoral recently issued by the two Primates and all their suffragans except two. I wish to speak of that document with the respect due to the signatures attached to it. But it suggests many reflections. The opening paragraph is one of the most instructive passages of contemporary history I ever read. "We acknowledge humbly and thankfully," it says, "the mercies vouchsafed by Almighty God to the Church of England. By His blessing on the labours of the clergy and laity our Church has of late been enabled in a marvellous manner to promote His glory and to advance His Kingdom, both at home and abroad. If we judge by external signs—the churches built, restored, and endowed during the last forty years; the new parishes formed in that time, especially in our great towns and cities; the vast

sums of money voluntarily contributed for the promotion of religious education; the extension of the Church in the Colonies and in foreign countries, including the foundation of more than fifty new Sees; the great increase in the number of persons of all classes who by prayers and labours assist in the work of converting souls to Christ—all bear witness to the zeal and earnestness of the clergy and laity of the English Church."

The accuracy of this review will be admitted by every one. Nor will it be disputed that this display of "earnestness and zeal" is "not confined to any section or party." Still their Lordships have given a date, and the predominating influences of that date have been those connected with the Tractarian and Ritualistic movements.* The Tractarian movement commenced about forty years ago, and there is hardly a Bishop on the Bench now who would refuse to acknowledge the debt of gratitude which the Church of England owes to it. But how was it greeted by the Bishops of that day? The greatest of its leaders

* The following statistics are instructive. They are taken from a return made to Convocation:—

Comparative Estimate of work done in Church of England.

		Ten years ending	Churches consecrated,
"Evangelical" period	...	1832	857
"Tractarian" "	...	1842	711
		1852	661
		1862	861
"Ritualistic" "	...	1872	1150

*

has told the story in words which will live for ever. After quoting the obsequious deference which the "Tracts for the Times" rendered to the Bishops, Dr. Newman relates as follows how this deference was repaid:—*

"'You will, in time to come,' says the Tract, 'honour us with a purer honour, than many men do now, as those who are intrusted with the keys of heaven and hell, as the heralds of mercy, as the denouncers of woe to wicked men, as intrusted with the awful and mysterious privilege of dispensing Christ's Body and Blood.' And a first Episcopal charge replies in the words of the homily, 'Let us diligently search the well of life, and not run after the stinking puddles of tradition, devised by man's imagination.' A second, 'It is a subject of deep concern that any of our body should prepare men of ardent feelings and warm imaginations for a return to the Roman Mass-book.' And a third, 'Already are the foundations of apostasy laid: if we once admit another Gospel, Antichrist is at the door. I am full of fear: every thing is at stake; there seems to be something judicial in the rapid spread of these opinions.' And a fourth, 'It is impossible not to remark upon the subtle wile of the Adversary; it has been signally and unexpectedly exemplified in the present day by the revival of errors which might have been supposed buried for ever.' And a fifth,

* Difficulties Felt by Anglicans. By John Henry Newman. Pp. 91-94.

‘Under the spurious pretence of deference to antiquity and respect for primitive models, the foundations of our Protestant Church are undermined by men who dwell within her walls, and those who sit in the Reformers’ seat are traducing the Reformation.’ ‘Our glory is in jeopardy,’ says a sixth. ‘Why all this tenderness for the very centre and core of corruption?’ asks a seventh. ‘Among other marvels of the present day,’ says an eighth, ‘may be accounted the irreverent and unbecoming language applied to the chief promoters of the Reformation in this land. The quick and extensive propagation of opinions, tending to exalt the claims of the Church and of the Clergy, can be no proof of their soundness.’ ‘Reunion with Rome has been rendered impossible,’ says a ninth, ‘yet I am not without hope that more cordial union may, in time, be effected among all Protestant Churches.’ ‘Most of the Bishops,’ says a tenth, ‘have spoken in terms of disapproval of the “Tracts for the Times,” and I certainly believe the system to be most pernicious, and one which is calculated to produce the most lamentable schism in a Church already fearfully disunited.’ ‘Up to this moment,’ says an eleventh, ‘the movement is advancing, under just the same pacific professions, and the same imputations are still cast upon all who in any way impede its progress. Even the English Bishops, who have officially expressed any disapprobation of the principles or proceedings of the party, have not escaped such

animadversions.' 'Tractarianism is the masterpiece of Satan,' says a twelfth.

"But there was a judgment more cruel still, because its apparent tendency lay the other way; but it was the infelicity of the agents in the movement, that, the National Church feeling as it did, their doctrines could not be sheltered except at the expense of their principles. 'A Bishop's slightest word, *ex Cathedra*, is heavy,' said a writer of the 'Tracts for the Times.' 'His judgment on a book cannot be light. It is a rare occurrence.' And an Archbishop answered, 'Many persons look with considerable interest to the declarations on such matters that from time to time are put forth by Bishops in their Charges, or on other occasions. But on most of the points to which I have been alluding, a Bishop's declarations have no more weight, except what they derive from his personal character, than any anonymous pamphlet would have. The points are mostly such as he has no official power to decide, even in reference to his own diocese; and as to legislation for the Church, or authoritative declarations on many of the most important matters, neither any one Bishop, nor all collectively, have any more right of this kind, than the ordinary magistrates have, to take on themselves the functions of *Parliament*.'

"It is hardly necessary to prolong the exhibition of the controversy, or to recall to your recollection the tone of invective in which each party relieved the keen and vehement feelings which its opponents

excited; how the originators of the [Oxford] Movement called Jewell 'an irreverent Dissenter;' were even 'thinking worse and worse of the Reformers;' 'hated the Reformation and the Reformers more and more;' thought them the false prophet of the Apocalypse; described the National Church as having 'blasphemed tradition and the Sacraments;' were 'more and more indignant at the Protestant doctrine of the Eucharist;' thought the principle on which it was founded 'as proud, irreverent, and foolish, as that of any heresy, even Socinianism;' and considered the *Establishment* their '*upas-tree*,' '*an incubus on the country*;' and its reformed condition, '*a limb badly set, which must be broken before it could be righted*;'—and how they were called in turn, 'superstitious,' 'zealots,' 'mystical,' 'malignants,' 'Oxford heretics,' 'Jesuits in disguise,' 'tamperers with Popish idolatry,' 'agents of Satan,' 'a synagogue of Satan,' 'snakes in the grass,' 'walking about our beloved Church, polluting the sacred edifice, and leaving their slime about her altars;' 'whose head,' it was added, 'may God crush.'"

The ritualistic element was almost entirely ignored by the early Tractarians; but their teaching inevitably led to the development of Ritualism. At first the development did not go beyond the decoration of Churches and the establishment of Choral Services. How did the Bishops meet that mild development? Just as they met the Tractarian movement. I am not old enough to have any vivid recollection of the

St. Barnabas riots. But I have put myself through a course of reading on the subject, and I find that on March 29th, 1851, the two Primates of that day, with twenty-two of their suffragans, issued a joint Pastoral bearing a wonderful family likeness to that which their successors issued on March 8th, 1875. The Bishops of Salisbury and Durham have withheld their names from the latter Pastoral. The Bishops of Exeter, Bath and Wells, Manchester, and Hereford, refused to put their names to the former. The burden of complaint is much the same in both documents—the alienation of the laity, all owing to the innovations of the clergy, the innovations in question consisting of hearty choral services, preaching in the surplice, credence tables, and floral decorations. These things the Bishops of 1851 wished to put down. One of them refused to license any curate in his diocese unless he made “a statement in writing that he would not preach in his surplice.” And when the incumbent, assenting to this, pleaded that the surplice might be permitted on Communion Sundays, “to avoid inconvenience,” the Bishop refused peremptorily to grant this indulgence, because “his doing so involved a sanctioning the practice in general, which practice he deemed not in accordance with the spirit and intention of the law of the Church.”* Just the sort of language in which the Bishops of to-day condemn the use of the chasuble.

And is there no lesson in all this? I am not dis-

* See *Guardian* of 1851, p. 298.

posed to criticise the recent Pastoral of the Bishops severely, for I know that they occupy a most difficult position, and are exposed to influences of which I cannot measure the strength. The melancholy fact, however, is, that almost every religious movement which has contributed to the stability and welfare of the Church of England has fought its way to victory against the combined opposition of the Bishops; and it is not too much to say that if the Bishops of successive generations had had their way there would now be very little of that prosperity on which the Bishops felicitate the Church. I have no doubt that there has been and still is much that is censurable in the Ritualistic movement. But that must always be the characteristic of any movement which is energetic and enthusiastic: it is sure to make what Mr. Gladstone calls "proud flesh; a sign of ungoverned effort, and of life indeed, but of somewhat crude and disordered life."* It was so with the Tractarian movement of forty years ago: it made much "proud flesh." And the Bishops and the world could see nothing in it except the "proud flesh," and they denounced it accordingly as a mass of putrid matter, which ought to be got rid of as speedily as possible. The press, almost without exception, was dead against it, and resolutely refused to admit that a party which had for leaders men like Newman and Keble and Pusey had even any intellect to boast of. Here is a specimen from a file of the *Standard* of 1841—and the

* Essay on "Ecce Homo," p. 8.

Standard was not a whit worse than other papers, whether Tory or Liberal:—"There is not a particle of true intellectual vigour or manhood or candour in his (Newman's) whole sect." There was indeed, one notable exception—*instar omnium*—which demanded fair play for the Tractarians. The *Times*, to its honour be it said, risked its dividends for the sake of justice. It is a pleasure to reprint the following extract from an article on the Tractarians in the leading journal of March 6th, 1841:—

"No man, however widely differing from them, can open any of their publications without perceiving that they write with learning, ability, forbearance, and courtesy of language towards their adversaries. No man can know anything of their lives without being aware that they act consistently with their professions; that they are more than usually strict, circumspect, self-denying, and (as far as man can judge by outward demeanour) pious. The most respectable of their opponents in controversy have borne generous testimony to their merits in this respect. Such antagonists never, even for a moment, expressed or felt the smallest doubt that the men with whom they had to deal were sincerely attached to the Church of England, firmly persuaded that their doctrine was identical with hers, and utterly incapable of violating their oaths. No calumny, we are satisfied, was ever more unmerited than this, which casts upon men, who are peculiarly zealous for ecclesiastical authority (and who are

maligned for being so), the imputation of disregarding it in practice. They were not 'Puseyites,' who, in 1833, made the press teem with pamphlets in favour of changes in the Prayer Book. They are not 'Puseyites' who, having sworn to obey the Rubric, depart from it as often as they think proper in the celebration of Divine Service. They are not 'Puseyites' who alter or leave out such expressions as do not suit their notions in the offices of Burial and Baptism. But men who do these things, together with the organs of that political party which has abetted all the attacks of dissent upon the Church of England, accuse men, who do them not, of unfaithfulness to the Church; and politicians, whose whole life has been devoted to the advancement of Popery, cry out 'No Popery!' with the loudest, if an Oxford clergyman dares to suggest that the Church of Rome, though corrupt, may possibly not be Antichrist, or ventures to breathe a prayer for the restoration of Christian unity throughout the world."

The "proud flesh" of the Tractarian movement has dropped off, and all that was noble and good in it has been assimilated into the life and system of the Church of England: pity it should have to be added, in spite of the Bishops, and after cruel losses inflicted by their want of sympathy and statesmanship. The "proud flesh" of the Ritualistic movement will also in due time be thrown off, and the Bishops of the next generation will do it that justice which the Bishops of this have done to the much maligned

Oxford movement. The Bishops complain of the small influence which they are able to exercise. But the way to gain influence is not by offering an uncompromising opposition to religious movements while they are unpopular, and singing their praises in the hour of their triumph. Looking at the history of the period to which the recent Episcopal Pastoral has referred us, is not the moral of it this—that the prosperity of the Church has been very much in proportion to the degree in which the will of the Episcopate has been disregarded?

“The refusal to obey legitimate authority,” says the recent Pastoral, “is another evil in the Church at the present time. Not only has it frequently occurred that clergymen fail to render to Episcopal authority that submission which is involved in the idea of Episcopacy, but obedience has been avowedly refused to the judicial interpretations of the law of this Church and Realm.”

I have said so much already about that abortion of justice called the Purchas Judgment, that it is not necessary to discuss here what our Right Reverend Fathers are pleased to call “the highest judicial interpretations of the law of this Church and Realm.” But those who preach the sin of lawlessness ought surely themselves to set an example of obedience to law. How many of the signatories to the recent Pastoral have ever worn a cope on the occasions prescribed by the Purchas Judgment? A very small minority. There is much unconscious hypocrisy in

these accusations of lawlessness. It is not the violation of law which is really objected to, but the doing of something which the objectors don't like; otherwise the wearing of the stole and the not wearing of the cope would not be universally condoned. As far as the Purchas Judgment is concerned the Ritualists are not a bit more lawless than their brethren.

And as to the complaint that "clergymen fail to render to Episcopal authority that submission which is involved in the idea of Episcopacy," there is another side to the question. I beg their Lordships' pardon; but there is no such submission as they suggest "involved in the idea of Episcopacy." The fact is, "the idea of Episcopacy" which the Bishops have in their mind is utterly unknown to Catholic antiquity. It is a modern creation of Ultramontan-ism. In those primitive ages to which the Church of England refers us for her ideal of Catholic doctrine and practice the Bishop never dreamt of acting independently of his presbyters. That Bishops should concoct in secret conclave, and introduce into a secular legislature, a bill affecting the rights and privileges of their clergy, is a fact which is utterly foreign and abhorrent to the true "idea of Episcopacy." Unquestioning submission to the *sic volo, sic jubeo* of a Bishop, was certainly never a maxim in any part of the Catholic Church till Ultramontan-ism established Papal absolutism on the ruins of the ancient constitutional system. In the Arian and other troubles the second order of the clergy, and

sometimes the faithful laity, had frequently to defend the faith not only without but against their Bishops. "The Catholic people, in the length and breadth of Christendom," says Newman, "were the obstinate champions of Catholic truth, and the Bishops were not. Of course there were great and illustrious exceptions. . . . And, again, in speaking of the laity, I speak inclusively of their parish-priests (so to call them), at least in many places; but on the whole, taking a wide view of the history, we are obliged to say that the governing body came short, and the governed were pre-eminent in faith, zeal, courage, and constancy."*

Even in the middle ages the Bishops never claimed those autocratic powers which are now claimed by some of our Fathers in God. I doubt whether in any period during the middle ages the Bishops of any national Church in Christendom would have succeeded in passing a penal law against the slightest ritual transgression on the part of their clergy, and at the same time claim successfully an unlimited right of disobedience to law in their own persons. "The chapters of cathedral-churches," says Thorndike, "are by their birthright counsellors to the Bishops, and assistants in his whole office; the archdeacon, his minister and principal commissary: those, by the rule set on foot by the Apostles, and observed always by the Church, of planting cathedral-churches in cities, and making the Churches planted in cities

* *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, p. 454. Third Ed.

cathedral churches, for the government of all Christendom within the territories of those cities; thus, being by his order ministerial to them, as well as to the Bishop, where both have part in the same office.”*

It will be an evil day for the Church of England, laity as well as clergy, when her Bishops are able to say of their clergy what a French Bishop said of his not many years ago: “*Mon clergé est comme un regiment; il doit marcher, et marche.*”† I am far from suggesting that our Bishops, as a body, have any lust for lording it over their clergy; but some of them undoubtedly have, and all of them have inherited a traditional “idea of Episcopacy” which is utterly uncatholic, and which had its origin in one of the worst developments of Popery. It has been the policy of Ultramontaniam to lead to Papal absolutism by a gradually ascending scale of inferior despotisms; the laity being dependent on the priest, the priest on the bishop, and the bishop on the Pope. I am not so enamoured of the system as to view without jealousy any attempt to establish something like it among ourselves. I regard the Secret Conclave of Bishops at Lambeth before the meeting of Convocation each year as an innovation which is not only exceedingly modern, but exceedingly unconstitutional into the bargain. It is something of the same kind

* Works, pp. 456, 457; in Angl. Cath. Lib.

† Speech of Cardinal de Bonnechose in the French Senate, in the Session of 1865.

as the secret committee of Peers which the other day defeated from behind the scenes the Government Judicature Bill. The deliberations of Convocation become a farce if all the members of the Upper House meet in the Jerusalem Chamber merely to give formal and public sanction to resolutions already debated and passed in secret conclave in Lambeth Palace.

The Episcopal Manifesto lays great stress on the increasing estrangement between the clergy and laity, caused, as the Bishops suppose, by the spread of Ritualism. The extent of this estrangement is, I believe, greatly exaggerated. What has happened is this. The destructive criticism imported into this country from Germany has precipitated, to use a chemical expression, a great deal of unbelief previously held in solution. But the real source of the unbelief is Calvinism. The minds of the educated laity, and of the poor also, have been shocked and alienated by the revolting caricature of Christianity which the Calvinistic system has substituted for the old Catholic theology. I suppose the Bishops would allow that Mr. Charles Kingsley, whose premature removal from amongst us we all deplore, knew as much of the lay mind as any Bishop on the bench. One of my most pleasant reminiscences as Honorary Secretary of the Athanasian Creed Defence Committee is the fact of its having procured for me the acquaintance and the friendship of that most charming and most humble-

minded man. I had the privilege of receiving many letters from him during the Athanasian Creed controversy, and I may say that the theme of them all was the mischief Puritanism had done by its repulsive eschatology and by its rejection of the Sacramental System; and if his life had been spared, I have reason to believe that he intended to write upon the subject. Most of the unbelief of the day he attributed to what he phrased "the 'invincible ignorance' of modern Puritanism;" and in one of his letters he says, with special reference to the eschatology of Puritanism,—“I have reason to believe that the English mind (and probably the Scotch) is specially ripe just now for receiving once more this great Catholic doctrine of the Intermediate State,* and that by preaching it with all prudence, as well as with all manfulness, we should cut the ground from under our so-called 'Liberal' adversaries' feet. . . . If we keep cautiously within the limits permitted by truly Catholic antiquity, we shall set in motion a mighty engine for the Church's help in her need. I, as a student of public opinion, have no doubt whatsoever of this.”

For this and other causes of unbelief the Bishops have not one word of reproof. All the mischief of the age is caused, if we are to believe their Pastoral, by the very party whose energetic influence has produced that remarkable revival of Church life for

* He had just explained that he meant the doctrine expounded in Dr. Newman's Tract 90.

which their Lordships thank Almighty God. Do they really suppose that this exhibition of Episcopal fairness is calculated to win confidence or secure respect? For my own part, I am too much of a Celt to admire what looks so very like hunting with the hounds and running with the hare. I like courage.

I am sorry to observe that the Broad Church party, as a body, have made common cause with the Church Association in the present crusade of intolerance. For myself, I have always declined to join any one party in the Church against a third party; and for this reason I refused to put my name to the joint address of High Churchmen and Low Churchmen against the Broad; and more recently I separated myself from dear friends on the occasion of Dr. Temple's appointment to the See of Exeter. The Broad Church party make loud professions of Liberalism; but when their professions are put to the test they abandon their Liberalism and become as bigoted as the *Record*. I have no doubt they are acting conscientiously. They call the Ritualists dishonest and lawless. Be it so. But that happens to be the accusation which men who are not Ritualists make against themselves.

"The one duty," says Mr. Leslie Stephen, which at present seems to me to be of paramount importance is the duty of perfect intellectual sincerity. . . . But why complain of honourable and excellent men who are doing their best according to the lights they possess? Why, the infidel will ask, should we quarrel

with the men who are unconsciously co-operating within the walls with the attack from without? Pray leave them burrowing and undermining and sapping the old foundations. Do not interfere with their operations by cruelly unmasking their real tendency. . . . , If it were one's ultimate object to destroy the Church of England, one would not much object to the methods pursued by the Broad Church party."*

This arrow has come from the quiver of a "candid friend;" and the following has also been shot by a man who thoroughly sympathises with what he thinks is the natural tendency of Broad Church theology:—

"Those Broad Churchmen whom they all respected so much, in order to remain where they were, and to justify this panegyric (of comprehensiveness) upon the Church of England for its mild tolerance, had to strain their consciences and sophisticate their understandings by subscribing articles and formularies and administering acts in which they either did not believe at all, or which they only believed by downright evasions and non-natural interpretations which would have been a discredit to the Jesuits in their worst days."†

I trust, however, that liberality and charity will yet win the day. I am as much opposed as any one

* *Freethinking and Plain Speaking*, pp. 82, 85.

† Speech delivered by Mr. John Morley at Manchester on Nov. 4th, 1874; reported in the *Times* of Nov. 5th.

can be to inconsiderate innovations, and to the enforcement of an unwonted ritual on an unwilling congregation. But I am an advocate of the widest possible latitude when the incumbent and his people are of one mind.* And I am happy to find myself in agreement in this matter with the late Bishop Philpotts. In his Pastoral Letter of 1851 he says:—“Neither am I disposed to recommend any consideration of popular feeling beyond the particular congregation intrusted to the minister’s charge. If that congregation prefers a more ornate or elaborate service than many or all the parishes around it, I should consider it an invasion of Christian, and even of civil, liberty to control the services of any Church at the bidding of those who do not belong to it.”†

But it is objected that the congregation in most Ritualistic Churches are not parishioners. The parishioners are said to be driven out of their parish church, and their places supplied by non-parishioners. I believe that there is very little foundation for this objection. Most of the Ritualistic Churches are planted in new districts, and, with very few exceptions, the congregations consist of parishioners. This is the case, for instance, I am told, in St. Alban’s, Holborn. But let us grant the validity of the objection for the sake of argument—what then? Anyhow the Ritualistic Churches are crowded with devout worshippers. Whence do these worshippers come? Have they no local habitation? Do they drop from

* See Appendix B.

† Pastoral Letter, p. 87.

the clouds into Ritualistic Churches, and return to the clouds at the end of the service? Surely they live in *some* parish on *terra firma*. And if they go out of their proper parish into a Ritualistic Church, is it not because they are driven out of *their* church by the unedifying character of the services? Have *they* no souls to be saved? no consciences deserving of tender treatment? Are Puritanical or irreligious parishioners the only parishioners who have a claim on Episcopal sympathy?

And now my task is done. I apologise to your Lordship for abusing your kindness by writing to you at such unconscionable length. My subject has grown under my hands, and I have written in such haste that I fear I have done very scanty justice to my theme. The first hundred pages of my volume were written rapidly, while the Public Worship Regulation Bill was passing through the House of Commons. This is my apology for some expressions which it was impossible to correct afterwards, as the type had been distributed.

I trust that I have said nothing which can give legitimate offence to any one. If I have, I am very sorry for it, and I humbly beg pardon. I have written under a sense of great responsibility; and feeling strongly, I have expressed myself strongly. I love the Church of England. I believe that God has a great future in store for her, and I am anxious to enlist under her banner all who bear her true

allegiance. I believe that the Ritualists do so, and I plead for toleration in their behalf. I know that I have undertaken a thankless office, and one that does not lead to preferment; and I am by no means above the ordinary temptations of human nature. I love popularity as well as most men; but I know myself sufficiently well to be assured that it is good for me to be on the unpopular side, when I can be there conscientiously. And when I am summoned to give an account of my stewardship it will matter very little to me whether the cause I advocate is popular or the reverse; but it will matter much whether I have done my little best to advance the cause of truth and righteousness during my brief span of life on earth.

I have the honour to remain,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient and humble Servant,

MALCOLM MACCOLL.

12, CHESTER TERRACE, S.W.

March 15th, 1875.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A. (See p. 277).

“ We are by nature the sons of Adam. When God created Adam He created us ; and as many as are descended from Adam have in themselves the root out of which they spring. The sons of God we neither are all, nor any one of us, otherwise than only by grace and favour. The sons of God have God’s own natural Son as a Second Adam from heaven, whose race and progeny they are by spiritual and heavenly birth. God therefore having eternally His Son, He must needs eternally in Him have loved and preferred before all others them which are spiritually sithence descended and sprung out of Him. . . . Our being in Christ by eternal foreknowledge saveth us not without our actual and real adoption into the fellowship of His Saints in this present world. For in Him we are, by actual incorporation into that Society which hath Him for their Head, and doth make together with Him one body (He and they in that respect having one name), for which cause, by virtue of this mystical conjunction, we are of Him, and in Him, even as though our very flesh and bones should be made continueate with His. . . . The Church is in Christ as Eve was in Adam. Yea, by grace, we are every of us in Christ, and in His Church, as by nature we were in those our first parents. God made Eve of the rib of Adam ; and His Church He frameth out of the very flesh, the very wounded and bleeding side of the Son of Man. His Body crucified and His Blood

shed for the life of the world are the True Elements of that heavenly Being which maketh us such as Himself is of whom we come. For which cause the words of Adam may be fitly the words of Christ concerning His Church, 'Flesh of My flesh, and bone of My bones;' a true native extract out of My own Body. So that in Him, even according to His Manhood, we according to our heavenly being are as branches in that root out of which they grow. To all things He is life, and to men light, as the Son of God; to the Church both life and light eternal by being made the Son of Man for us, and by being in us a Saviour, whether we respect Him as God or as Man. Adam is in us as an original cause of our nature, and of that corruption of nature which causeth death; Christ as the original cause of restoration to life. The person of Adam is not us, but his nature, and the corruption of his nature derived into all men by propagation; Christ having Adam's nature as we have, but incorrupt, deriveth not nature but incorruption, and that immediately from His own Person, with all that belong unto Him. As therefore we are really partakers of the body of sin and death, received from Adam, so except we be truly partakers of Christ, and as really possessed of His Spirit, all we speak of eternal life is but a dream. That which quickeneth us is the Spirit of the Second Adam, *and His Flesh that wherewith He quickeneth.* That which in Him made our nature incorrupt was the union of His Deity with our nature. And in that respect the sentence of death and condemnation, which only taketh hold upon sinful flesh, could no way possibly extend unto Him. . . . These things S. Cyril duly considering reproveth their speeches which taught that only the Deity of Christ is the Vine whereupon we by Faith do depend as branches, and that neither His flesh nor our bodies are comprised in this resemblance. *For doth any man doubt but that even from the flesh of Christ our very bodies do receive that life which shall make them glorious*

at the latter day, and for which they are already accounted parts of His blessed Body? Our contemptible bodies could never live the life they shall live, were it not that here they are joined with His Body, which is incorruptible, and that His is in ours as a cause of immortality, a cause by removing through the death and merit of His own flesh that which hindered the life of ours. Christ is therefore, *both as God and as man*, that true Vine whereof we both spiritually and corporally are branches. . . . It greatly offendeth that some, when they labour to show the use of the Holy Sacraments, assign unto them no end but only to *teach* the mind, by other senses, that which the Word doth teach by hearing. Whereupon how easily neglect and careless regard of so heavenly mysteries may follow we see in part by some experience had of those men with whom that opinion is most strong. For where the word of God may be heard, which teacheth with much more expedition anything we have to learn, if all the benefits we reap by Sacraments be instruction, they which at all times have opportunity of using the better means to that purpose, will surely hold the worse in less estimation. And unto infants which are not capable of instruction who would not think it a mere superfluity that any Sacrament is administered, if to administer the Sacraments be but to teach receivers what God doth for them? There is of Sacraments therefore undoubtedly some other more excellent and heavenly use. . . . That saving grace which Christ originally is or hath for the general good of His whole Church, by Sacraments He severally deriveth into every member thereof. Sacraments seem as the instruments of God to that end and purpose, moral instruments, the use whereof is in our hands, the effect in His. . . . We receive Christ Jesus in Baptism once as the first beginner, in the Eucharist often as being by continued degrees the finisher of our life. By Baptism therefore we receive Christ Jesus, and from Him that saving grace which is proper unto

Baptism. By the other Sacrament we receive Him also, *imparting therein Himself*, and that grace which the Eucharist properly bestoweth. . . . The grace which we have by the Holy Eucharist doth not begin but continue life. No man therefore receiveth this Sacrament before Baptism, because no dead thing is capable of nourishment. That which groweth must of necessity first live. If our bodies did not daily waste, food to restore them were a thing superfluous. And it may be that the grace of Baptism would serve to eternal life were it not that the state of our spiritual being is daily so much hindered and impaired after Baptism. . . . Life being therefore proposed unto all men as their end, they which by Baptism have laid the foundation and attained the first beginning of a new life have here their nourishment and food presented for *continuance of life* in them. Such as will live the life of Christ must eat the Flesh and drink the Blood of the Son of Man, because this is a part of that diet which if we want we cannot live. . . . Our souls and bodies quickened to eternal life are effects the cause whereof is the Person of Christ; His Body and Blood are the true well-spring out of which this life floweth. So that His Body and Blood are in that very subject whereunto they minister life; not only by effect or operation, even as the influence of the heavens is in plants, beasts, men, and in everything which they quicken; but also by a far more Divine and mystical kind of union, which maketh us one with Him, even as He and the Father are one.”—(“Ecclesiastical Polity,” Bk. v. lvi., lvii., lxvii.)

It is true that Hooker goes on to say that “the Real Presence of Christ’s Most Blessed Body and Blood is not therefore to be sought for in the Sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the Sacrament.” But he adds that “these Holy mysteries . . . impart to us, even in true and real, though mystical, manner, *the very Person of our Lord Himself, whole, perfect, and entire.*” This surely is inconsistent with any-

thing short of an objective Presence—a Presence, that is, which is independent of man, and is imparted to Him through the external agency of the Sacrament. Evidently what Hooker was anxious to guard against was the notion that the Sacrament could benefit men as a charm, without its hidden power coming in contact with their souls through participation. The Presence is there, in the Sacrament, but only the worthy communicant can really partake of it.

APPENDIX B. (See p. 472.)

The time will come when the wisdom of the policy advocated in Mr. Gladstone's great speech on the second reading of the Public Worship Regulation Bill will be generally acknowledged, and I place on record therefore the Six Resolutions which frightened an ignorant Parliament out of its propriety.

Mr. Gladstone,—On Motion that Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair for going into Committee on Public Worship Regulation Bill, to move, by way of Amendment, the following Resolutions:—

1. That in proceeding to consider the provisions of the Bill for the Regulation of Public Worship, this House cannot do otherwise than take into view the lapse of more than two centuries since the enactment of the present Rubrics of the Common Prayer Book of the Church of England; the multitude of particulars embraced in the conduct of Divine Service under their provisions; the doubts occasionally attaching to their interpretation, and the number of points they are thought to leave undecided; the diversities of local custom which under these circumstances have long prevailed; and the unreasonableness of proscribing all varieties of opinion and usage among the many thousands of congregations of the Church distributed throughout the land.

2. That this House is therefore reluctant to place in the

hands of every single Bishop, on the motion of one or of three persons howsoever defined, greatly increased facilities towards procuring an absolute ruling of many points hitherto left open and reasonably allowing of diversity; and thereby towards the establishment of an inflexible rule of uniformity throughout the land, to the prejudice, in matters indifferent, of the liberty now practically existing.

3. That the House willingly acknowledges the great and exemplary devotion of the Clergy in general to their sacred calling, but is not on that account the less disposed to guard against the indiscretion, or thirst for power, or other fault of individuals.

4. That the House is therefore willing to lend its best assistance to any measure recommended by adequate authority, with a view to provide more effectual securities against any neglect of or departure from strict law which may give evidence of a design to alter, without the consent of the nation, the spirit or substance of the Established Religion.

5. That, in the opinion of the House, it is also to be desired that the Members of the Church, having a legitimate interest in her services, should receive ample protection against precipitate and arbitrary changes of established custom by the sole will of the clergyman and against the wishes locally prevalent among them; and that such protection does not appear to be afforded by the provisions of the Bill now before the House.

6. That the House attaches a high value to the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government with the Ecclesiastical authorities in the initiation of legislation affecting the Established Church.

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